STANDING GROUP AGENDA 14 MAY MTG

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050013-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 76
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 2005
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: May 14, 1963
• Content Type: AG

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STANDING GROUP AGENDA
May Mtg.: Memo re "Cuban Attacks on Recon Flights -- a Contingency Plan"
discussed and to be revised for a future meeting.
vienio "Certain Cuban Contingencies" noted.
Memo on "Developments in Cuba... Castro's Death" postponed.
Cubant.gar & world market, Agriculture to develop paper with
State/CIA consulting.
State and Defence prepare plans to meet contingency of USSR e=-
forts to stop U-s's over Cuba by means other than force.
tither Related Papers:
cog:/OCI memo re Reactions to low-levels over Cuba.
NRO summary of sources of info on U-Z shoot-down.
RR memo re Cuban sugar, etc.
DDP additional actions against Cuba.
Cuban supply/demand POL.
NSA, NRO, JCS, OSD reviews completed
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: DOD-State Paper: U-2 Flights nha Con-
tingency Plans
I. In addition to the attached ccmments of ONE. Desmond [itzGerald
has the following observations in that he questions the validity of the
paragraphs below:
a. Page 2, paragraph 3a: "Moreover, in any new con'ronta-
tion over_duba _the United States will be facing, a Khrush,thev who
has reflected on the lessons of the missile crisis and who will
be less likely to retreat before U.S. power."
b. Page 3, paragraph d to end. of page: "It is also
oossible that the shock effect of such vigorous response could
lead to a decision by the USSR to cut her losses and gradually
withdraw from Cuba."
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following an incident." I a
untington D Sh@ldon
Acting Deputy Director (Intelligence)
?-2. The DD /R c ent which is set, forth below, raises t:ue issue of
the use of the I I which heretofore the Joint ='hiefs have
been unwilling to authorize for use over Cuba.
"In the event of the loss of a. U-2 over Oiba and the intention
of the U.S. Government to react innediately it is highly problem-
atical that detailed knowledge of the exact cause of the incident
or the political reasoning behind the incident will be k,own.
1."herefore, the initial problem is to continue to obtain intelli-
gence information through reconnaissance flights. To fulfill
this requirement authority must be obtained to operate U-2
aircraft equipped with
Aircraft; so equipped are on standby for this mission at .ll.
times and could be moved. into place to allow a mission the day
r n
Attachments
1. DOD-State Paper
2 . ONE Comments
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IvUMORANDUPvI FOR: Denuty Director/Intelligence
SURTECT . OT`?E Comments on DOD-State Paper, "IT-2 Fl ig"ts, Cuba --
n Corti. gen^y Plans"
The Paper's Assumption
1. The paper should explicitly acknowledge that it is addressed
to the present situation, in which control of the SARv syste~-: rusts
with the USSR, and is not applicable to a possible future s_'_tuation
in which the system has been turned over to the Cubans.
US Objectives
2. The paper ought to be clearer about U o,,jectl.ves ; n the
stated contingency. The only objective mentioned is to use the crisis
as an opportunity to bring down the Castro regimc_. Tn fact, however,
the US also has the more limited objective of restoring; unt1?ammeled
reconnaissance. Moreover, in proposing to suspend U-2 flights, after
the first reprisal, until further Soviet intentions can be Cetern-fined,
the contingency plan seems designed to avoid escalation, or at least
to leave the next crucial step to Soviet choice. Without trying to
pre judge the US choice, we believe that the paper ought to recognize
that, if the US objective is to use the crisis as a means of overthrowing
Castro, this purpose would probably be better served by an immediate
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heightening of tensions such as would result from a second T:h-2
3. The same point is relevant to the proposals for low-level
overflights discussed in paragraph 6. As presented in the raper,
these appear to be conceived as temporary su::)stitutes which would
help to keep the crisis at a more manageable level than high-altitude
reconnaissance. In fact, we believe that lo,,,!-level overflights, because
they are such an ostentatious violation of sovereignty and i;ecause they
would generate alarm and fear in large secti!>ns of the Cuban population,
would be more difficult for the Cuban and soviet regimes to tolerate
than high-altitude reconnaissance. These regires would not recognize
low-level flights as temporary substitutes, and would. be unlikely to
believe US assurances to that effect. Law-l flights thus seem
to us to be better suited to a heightened crisis which minht lead to
Castro's overthrow than to a regulated crisis.; aimed at rest,)-ing un-
opposed reconnaissance.
4. In sum, we believe that, after the first LS renrisa1., the
objective of avoiding escalation and aiming only at a rr?esto:.-ation of
"immunity" for U-2s would best be served by the temporary substitution
of high-altitude drones, both target and photographic. The objective
of exploiting the crisis and aiming at Castro's cMnfall wo-_;1d best
be served by continued U-2 overflights, low-level overflifh!.ss, or both.
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Soviet Pre-Attack Propaganda
5. The paper should give some attention to Soviet contingency
plans for attacking a U-2. In our view, the USSR would enter upon
this venture expecting a prompt and vigorous US response, and would
be intending to provoke a severe but controlled crisis designed to
force an end to overflights by political means, probably at the UN.
6, If this is so, then the US ought to be nrepared for a major
preparatory campaign against the U-2. There is a good chance that
the USSR, in setting the stage for an attack, would try to agitate
the general issue of overflights as an impermissible transgression of
sovereignty. In the course of this campaign, they might re,real a
great deal of information about U-2 overflights
In this way, they would try to capture the support of countries which
had been overflown in the past and the votes of the generality of
nonaligned nations.
7. As a second stage in this campaign, the PPSSF could -legin to
hint that it was preparing to take military action against over-
flights of Cuba. This would be intended to bring the issue of peace
into play as a supplement to the issue of sovereignty . In I':-le Course
of these hints, the Soviets Might add. an ominous note by reminders
that, in any US attack upon SAM sites, Soviet lives would be lost,
making a Soviet counter-action all but inevitable. This would have
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the incidental effect of confounding any US contingency planning to
represent an attack on a IT-2 as an act of Cif_-an policy.
8. This course of action has the advantf;a,,e, from the soviet view-
point, of offering some chance of forcing; an end to overflights by
political means,, without shooting. If it failed to accomplish this
result, it would then serve as political preparation for manipulating
the crisis initiated by an attack upon a U-2.
9. We cannot predict that the contingency under study would in
fact occur in this context. It seems likely enou.h, however, to
require advance consideration. In particular, the US ought to concern
itself with the problem of meeting a prior political can aign against
the U-2 which included revelations of overfl i_g'_.tc, of non-l.1-,,c countr:' es .
Other Comments
10. The next-to-last sentence of paragraph 'Da is very confusing.
There are many lessons in,!.thr_ Cuban crisis for ruhrusl::.chev. One of them,
of course, is not to make attacks rich as arc -.or.. idered he-c. Another
is that, once the US has proven itself ready to i se ar-ea fn- ce against
Soviet units, it would be prudent for the USSR to close ant the crisis
rather than expand it.
11. The discussion of US options (final paragraph of 3d, page L;-)
cites several ways to make US reactions "more palatable to The USSR."
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One of these -- placing public rcsponsibilit,r on Castro rate e:r than
the USSR -- might give the appearance of fea=ring a cc Cr. onta.tion with
the Soviets and thereby perhaps encourage greater boldness in Moscow's
next response. The second -- renewal of the US "offer" to cork out
ground inspection -- might assist otm efforts to ._;air allies and neutral
support, but would certainly not be palatable to bhe USSR; this is the
very issue on which the Soviets badly burned themselves with Castro
before and which formed the basis for Communist China's most, telling
charges against Soviet policy.
LEI"EI
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In reply refer to 1-35505/63
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON
-A15ril 1963
MEMORAND FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
SUBJECT: DOD-State Paper, "U-2 Flights, Cuba -- Contingency Plans"
Attached is a revision of the DOD-State paper incorporating
all those changes recommended by JCSM 325-63 which were acceptable
to me and the Secretary of State. You will note that subparagraph
3?d. has been reworded in such away as to meet the conce of the
JCS that there be no precommitment against an invasion of Cuba.
It is anticipated that the paper, in its present form, will
be used for discussions with the President at an early date.
/s/ ROBERT S. MCNAMARA
Attachment
As stated above
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DOD-STATE PAPER
U-2 FLIGHTS, CUBA - CONTINGENCY PLANS (C)
1. Problem. The possibility exists that Soviet/Cuban forces may shoot
down, or attempt to shoot down, a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft over Cuba.
The purpose of this report is to develop a series of actions to be considered
by the United States in advance of and after the event.
2. Facts Bearing on the Problem
a. U-2 flights are currently conducted over Cuba at the rate of
approximately two sorties per day.
b. Alternative methods of carrying on surveillance are available
but the quantity of data that could be obtained by these alternative
methods is. smaller than that obtainable with the U-2; thus, the avail-
able alternatives would not meet presently stated requirements. A
prolonged hiatus in high altitude surveillance would be intolerable in
view of the continuing Soviet option of reintroduction of IREMs and MREMs.
c. While not a certainty, present intelligence resources give a
considerable degree of confidence that Washington should have reliable
information on the destruction of a U-2 by a SAM shortly after the
attack. There is also a probability that, correspondingly reliable
information would be available with respect to an unsuccessful firing
of a SAM on a U-2. A possibility exists that a U-2 could be attacked
by MIG aircraft using air-to-air rockets and special attack techniques.
In this case also, information would probably be available promptly.
However, there remains a possibility that a U-2 could disappear under
circumstances in which we had no positive information on the cause of
its loss.
3. Political Considerations
a. Balancing Objectives - The optimum objective with regard to
this contingency is to deter the attack on the U-2 by giving private
i
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and public assurances that the US reaction to such an attack would be
prompt, firm, and effective. The fundamental political judgment to be
made in connection with the attack itself involves balancing the
opportunity to make progress toward our long-term objective vis-a-vis
Cuba (the overthrow of Castro's regime and elimination of Communism
from Cuba) with our objectives vis-a-vis the US-USSR confrontation.
The political and power realities, including the USSR's capability to
react in Berlin or..elsewhere, argue against arbitrary and unilateral
action, without provocation, to eliminate Castro. The exploitation of
contingencies is the only politically feasible means for taking steps,
in the immediate future, to apply US military power directly to reduce
Castro's power and influence. Yet obviously, no single contingency
can be said to offer the last chance to move against Castro. Moreover,
in any new major confrontation over Cuba the United States will be
facing a Khrushchev who has reflected on the lessons of the missile
crisis and who will be less likely to retreat before US power. Thus,
the United States must consider the USSR's capability to react to a
second Cuban crisis by actions in Berlin or elsewhere.
b. The context of the attack - It is judged that the USSR would be
likely to deliver an official warning prior to an attack on a U-2. In
the event that an attack is conducted, therefore, without advance warning,
allowance should be made for the possibility that there was a failure of
USSR command and control procedures by providing for a minimum response,
initially, while attempting to ascertain Soviet intent by all means
available. For the same reason, in a case where USSR responsibility is
in doubt, the US might desire to take an initial public position that
holds Castro rather than Khrushchev responsible.
c. Advance notification and consultation - Secretary Rusk has
recently informed the North Atlantic Council of US concern that there
may be an attack on a U-2 over Cuba. Consultation with our Allies after
a Soviet warning or a Soviet attack probably would become known to the
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A)l TS
CIA CONTROL NO.
188307
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2 May 63
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REMARKS:
TS# 188307
Memo for the Chairman, JCS, frm
Robert S. McNamara, Sec/Defense.
Subj: DOD-State Paper. "U-2 Flights, Cu
Contingency Plans"
Attachment is a revision of the DOD-Sta
paper incorporating all those changes
recommended by JCSM 325-63 which were'd
ceptable to me and the Sec/State
cy #2 Series "A" DDCI frm Ex Dir
1o may 1963
FROM:
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27 April 1963
ONE-O/CI MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Reactions to Low-Level. Overflights of Cuba
1. In this memorandum we consider Soviet and Cuban
reactions to a program of three low-level overflights of Cuba,
undertaken within a single day some time in the near future.
We do not consider reactions to a more extensive program.
Direct Reactions
2. Soviet forces on the island probably have standing
orders not to fire on any US planes. Cuban forces, which
control the light AAA, may not have such orders, and in any
event there is always a chance that some Cuban military unit,
surprised by a low-level flight, would fire on it and perhaps
be lucky enough to hit it. We note that the cause of the loss
of an aircraft over Cuba might not be ascertainable.
We have not discerned any particular Soviet or Cuban
reactions to the low-level overflights of 9 February. Since
the Soviets are chary of drawing attention to their unwillingness
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to fire on US reconnaissance aircraft, we doubt that they would
make a major propaganda response to the overflights considered
here. They might, however, lodge a private complaint to the US
arguing the dangers of this course, warning of consequences if
the action is repeated. It is not excluded, however, that they
would undertake a major political. and propaganda exploitation,
arguing that the provocative action by the US threatened to
revive a dangerous crisis over Cuba whereas they themselves
had been pursuing a policy of restraint.
Effects on Soviet/Cuban Polite
4. The chief effects of the overflights on the Soviets
and Cubans would be to pose again the question of US intentions.
In our view, both parties are presently agreed on tactics of
easing tensions in the Caribbean in order to stabilize Cuba's
position and prepare for a period of new advances in the future.
They are trying in various ways to reduce US pressures, and they
will probably continue on this tactical line for some time unless
they come to believe that the US is determined to brin?; about a
showdown through a more militant policy. If they should reach
this judgment, they might switch tactics in order to stage a
showdown, probably by moving for political action against the
US in the UN.
5. The Soviets and Cubans would see these overflights as
a form of US pressure. The limited action considered here,
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however, would probably not lead them to conclude that they must
reappraise their current tactics. They would probably continue
to believe that US policy is pulled in two directions, wishing
to liquidate the Castro regime but unwilling to take the risks
of military intervention achieve this objective. Thus, considering
this action alone, the Soviets and Cubans would probably continue
to believe that their best course was to offer a minimum of provoca-
tion, unless they considered that the flights presaged a more
extensive, continuing program.
6. It is possible, however, that the overflights would
occur at a time when they seemed to the USSR and Cuba to reinforce
other indications of a US shift to strong pressures and greater
risks. This might be the case, for example, if the overflights
occurred contemporaneously with a large-scale renewal of exile
raids. If Khrushchev interpreted any of Governor Harriman's
remarks to him as presaging more active US moves against Cuba,
the overflights would contribute some confirmation to this
C
impression. It is also possible, that if the action
during Castro's presence in Moscow the Soviets would tend to
attach exaggerated significance to it. Barring some such special
combination of circumstances, however, the Soviets would probably
not conclude that there had been a decisive change in US policy.
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Effects on General Soviet Policy
7. All US measures against Cuba make it difficult, to a
greater or lesser degree, for the USSR to pursue a line of seeking
agreements with the US on other problems. At the present time,
however, Soviet interest in negotiated agreements with the US
appears to be very low. We conclude from Khrushchev's recent
statements that no change in the USSR's position on nuclear
testing can be expected during the current period. In southeast
Asia, the USSR may wish to avoid a sharpening of the Laos crisis,
but whether or not this is so, we believe that the Soviets, with
North Vietnam already tending toward China in the Sino-Soviet
dispute, do not feel free to advise or press Hanoi to moderate
its tactics. In our judgment, therefore, the proposed action
would not materially affect the prospects for other US-USSR
agreements.
8. To the Cubans themselves, any low-level flights con-
stitute an humiliating affront, and the strong impulse to try
and bring them dorm is tempered only at the higher levels of the
regime by fear of drastic US retaliation and, probably, some
uncertainty about Soviet willingness to protect the Cuban
therefrom. On the whole, even aside from Soviet influence,
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such rational counsels as exist in Castro's regime, vould probably
work to avoid the risks of shooting down US aircraft, but pressures
on the regime to counter these actions will mount and in turn will
lead to pressures on the Soviets from the regime.
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14 May 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Deputy Director (Intelligence)
SUBJECT : Comments on Cuban Sugar Sales in the
World Market and Possible U. S. Actions
REFERENCE : Memorandum to the Acting Secretary of State
from Mr. Edward Martin (ARA), Subject; Sugar,
Dated 3 May 1963
1. This memorandum.is in response to your request of today for
comments on the referenced memorandum., and your additional auestions
on Cuban sugar sales.
2. Mr. Martin concluded, in response to the Standing Group's
suggestion that, we figure out some way to diminish the Cuban income
from the sale of sugar, t' that there is no feasible way to do so. Unless
the U.S. is willing to curtail its consumption of sugar by cutting back
on imports Mr. Martin may be right. However, we do not concur fully
with the statement that the Soviets are not holding sugar off the market.
We estimate that Soviet sugar stocks are now 1 to 2 million tons above
normal, due to past deliveries from Cuba. The Soviets, if they wished,
could sell this sugar on world markets. We also believe that, if the
U. S. were to make Public the infox-Eq1tio that the Soviets hol ar e
sugar sur uses thi u ht ha__`ve a epressing effect on prices
on t e world s sugar exchanges.
3. With reference to your specific questions on Cuban sugar
sales, we have prepared the following notes:
a. A large portion of Cuban sugar that will be exported
to the Free World was contracted for in late 1962 at prices sub-
stantially below current levels. If Cuba honors these contracts, and
does not attempt to resell at present prices, she will receive between
$120 and $150 million. Sales to the Bloc should range between $200
to $230 million. Bloc sales are at 4 cents per pound, which price the
Cubans are still required by the Communist Bloc to maintain. Thus, in
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permit greater Cuban sales to the Free World, the Cuban position could
be substantially improved. If the Soviets were to permit Cba to sell
on the Free World market a million tons of its commitments to the USSR,
then at present prices, a total value of $220 million would be realized.
This amount of convertible exchange would be of great benefit to the
Cubans. However, we have no evidence that the Communist Bloc would be
willing to accept less than the 2.5 million tons which Cuba apparently
will have available to sell to the Bloc from the 1962/63 crop. If the
Soviets were to sell a million tons of their surplus sugar on the Free
World market at present prices, the $220 million realized would be about
equal to the amount of convertible currency which they have been receiv-
ing annually by sales of gold.
an estimated $430 million during 1962. However, if the USSR should
1.1r( Inp
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spite of the present high world price, Cuba's total exports of sugar
in 1963 will probably net between $320 and $380 million in contrast to
b. The current "world"sugar price* of about 10 cents per
pound is more than 3 times the level of a year ago and the highest
in 40 years. Most of this increase has taken place within the last
6 months.
of Agriculture are in general agreement that the current rise in the
world price of sugar is attributable primarily to a tight supply
situation rather than to Soviet manipulation of the market.
c. World sugar consumption is expected to exceed total
production by about 3 million tons in 1962/63, the first year in which
consumption has exceeded production since 1956/57. World sugar consump-
tion has been increasing about 4 percent per year -- two to three million
tons annually. On the other hand world sugar production of about 51 million
metric tons in both 1961/62 and 1962/63 was about 4 million tons below
the peak level achieved in 1960/61. Carry-over stocks of sugar in 47
countries at the beginning of the 1962/63 season were about 19 percent --
almost 2 million tons -- below those of a year earlier.
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Assistant Dfrector
Research and Reports
All sugar prices in this memorandum refer to raw canes-agar. The
`world" price is for bagge s_FOB Greater Caribbean ports.
i2iw" c siFS ,fc1
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TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE May 11, 1963
Members of the Standing Group
Attached are two papers for discussion at the Standing
Group meeting, Tuesday, May 14, 1963, at 5:00 P.M. in
the Situation Room.
Bromley Smith
A third paper is being sent direct to you from Sherman Kent
of CIA.
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TS# 188312
O
D
C. NO.
DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED
DOC. DATE 11 May 63
13Ma 63
COPY NO. r''n 1
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TS 188312/1 and 188312/2
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE STANDING GROUP
Subject: Cuban Attacks on Reconnaissance Plights--A Contingency Plan
1. The Problem.
To capitalize on an attack on a US aircraft engaged in
reconnaissance of Cuba by taking reprisals designed to place pressure
on, or to effect the removal. of, the Castro regime.
2. Facts Bearing on the Problem.
a. U-2 flights are currently conducted over Cuba at the
rate of approximately two sorties per day. These flights have come
to be accepted as a US right emanating from Cuban refusal to fulfill
the Soviet commitment of October 28, 1962, for on-the-ground safeguards
against the presence and reintroduction of offensive weapons.
b. Alternative methods of carrying on surveillance are
available, but the quantity of data that could be obtained by these
alternative methods is smaller than that obtainable with the U-2 and
would not meet the stated requirements. A prolonged hiatus in high
altitude surveillance would be intolerable in view of the continuing
Soviet option of reintroduction of ]vMBMs. This need has also become
public knowledge as a result of the widespread news coverage and the
Secretary of Defense's briefing of the public; hence, there would be
substantial political support for the US insistence on maintaining an
acknowledged vital right.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading
and declassification.
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c. Present intelligence resources give a considerable
degree of confidence that Washington would have reliable information
on the destruction of a U-2 by a SAM shortly after the attack. There
is also a probability that correspondingly reliable information would
be available with respect to an unsuccessful firing of a SAM on a
U-2. A possibility exists that a U-2 could be attacked by MIG
aircraft using air-to-air rockets and special attack techniques.
In this case also, information would probably be available promptly.
However, there remains a possibility that a U-2 could disappear
under circumstances in which we had no positive information on the
cause of its loss.
d. If the US did institute increasing surveillance by low
and medium altitude aircraft, ostensibly and partly in order to acquire
more detailed information, the chances of an incident triggered by the
firing on a US reconnaissance overflight would be increased.
Political Considerations.
a. Balanc-in Obiectives -- The fundamental political judgment
in this problem involves balancing the opportunity to achieve our long
term objective in Cuba, the overthrow of Castro's regime and elimination
of Communism from Cuba, with the risks of the US-USSR confrontation and
the political acceptability of our means of attaining that objective.
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Since the political and power realities argue against arbitrary and
unilateral action without provocation, the exploitation of Cuban
provocations is the most feasible means for taking the action
necessary.
The political costs of using an incident to press courses
of action and reaction leading to the achievement of US objectives
in Cuba, possibly including the removal of the Castro regime, have
been considered. We conclude that such costs will be least, and will
be acceptable, if (a) initial Cuban provocation is internationally
recognized, and (b) a measured pattern of increasing US military
reprisal, in reaction to escalating Cuban actions, is established.
4. S nario--Phase I.
a. The most appropriate reprisal to destruction of a
US reconnaissance aircraft engaged in overflying' Cuba would, if the
~,-e
attack were made by a SAM, be either (1) a limited number of SAM
sites in the vicinity of the action (depending on the geographical
location, three or four nearby sites), or (2) to eliminate all SAMs
in the initial attack. In the case of an interceptor attack, either
(1) the facilities of the nearest (or, if known, the offending) fighter
airfield, or (2) facilities of the few active fighter airfields, should
be completely taken out. At the same time, the US would initiate a high
volume of harrassing medium and low level reconnaissance overflights, in
addition to maintaining the U-2 coverage.
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b. The US would promptly initiate (without publicity)
generation of the necessary invasion force, so that it would be
ready as soon as possible, in the event Cuban escalation were to
lead to a decision to invade.
c. US forces would be placed on appropriate readiness
d. The US would inform selected heads of government,
NAC, and the OAS governments immediately prior to the reprisal
action, of the reprisal and of the UN proposals we planned to
make, and would initiate promptly consultations with the NAC and
OAS groups on possible future measures which might be required--especially
a new quarantine.
e. The US would call for prompt consideration of the crisis
in the Security Council, and would vigorously attack Cuba and defend
the necessary but limited US reprisal. We would concentrate our charges
against Castro's regime, rather than the Soviet Union, and we would take
the initiative in hauling him before the UN. We would, in addition to
defending the requirement for reconnaissance, offer to end all aerial
reconnaissance over Cuba if the Cubans would accept UN (including US)
ground inspection adequate to insure against the presence or introduction
of offensive weapons or offensive training, and when all Russian military
personnel were returned promptly to the USSR.
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5. Phase II.
a. It is unlikely that the USSR would react to the US
Phase I actions by instituting serious counterpressures at Berlin
or elsewhere, unless of course they had shot down the first reconnaissance
aircraft intending to use our reaction as a pretext to create a crisis
in Berlin or elsewhere. If that were the case, we would in any event
be faced by a Soviet created crisis. If this were not a deliberate
Soviet action to touch off a crisis, the Soviets would probably be
cautious at least while assessing our intentions in Cuba. During this
period, they would probably give strict orders to Soviet personnel
manning the SAMs and in other positions on Cuba to avoid any reprisal
or provocative action.
b. The Cubans would almost certainly initially reject
the US offer. The Soviets and Cubans would exert maximum political
and propaganda pressure on the US in the UN and in general.
c. It is possible that the Cubans might shoot down another
US aircraft, either through lack of discipline or miscalculation of
the consequences. As a general principle, the most appropriate level
of reprisal would seem to be graduated suppression of Cuban air
defenses. Thus, if the first plane had been destroyed by a SAM and
only a few SANS had been knocked out in the initial reprisal, and
if a second aircraft were attacked by a SAM, all SAA1s would be
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_F,_
destroyed. If the initial attack had been by a righter, and the
second by a fighter or a SAM, any remaining SAMs and fighter airfields
would be taken out on the second offense. If the second attack were
by AAA, the problem would be more complicated but all AAA in the area
of the attack could be promptly suppressed, as well as any remaining
SAMs.
6. Phase III.
a. In the second round of US initiative (-Phase III), there
are two broad alternative courses of action, depending upon whether
the enemy reaction (Phase II) had involved military engagement.
b. Alterna~tiv~ 1. If the Cubans have made a second military
attack in Phase II, the US, in addition to the immediate further military
reprisal sketched above (in 5.c.), would note that since the Cubans did
not accept our offer of an equitable arrangement to dispense with US
overflights, and were continuing to interfere with them, a Quarantine
(on everything but food and medicine) was being established. The US
would either seek OAS authorization, for which a majority but not
unanimity could probably be gotten, or would undertake it unilaterally
on the basis of its earlier consultations with the OAS and NAC, and the
OAS resolution of October 1962.
(1) US justification for a quarantine would include
stress on the vital Hemispheric need for information on military
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activities in Cuba, the fact that the Cuban action demonstrated a
determined effort to overthrow the status quo established in
October-November 1962, and the fact that such action further raised
suspicions of Cuban military intentions. We were compelled by these
facts to interdict all direct and indirect military support to the
Island until complete assurance of the security of the Hemisphere
could be obtained. We could further note that the US had chosen to
exercise a restrained course of action which would involve minimum
sacrifice by the innocent Cuban people. We might publicize our
earlier offer, and the reasons why the quarantine was necessary,
in leaflets to be dropped over Cuba.
(2) Quarantine might be initiated even in the
absence of a second Cuban attack, for example if our reconnaissance
detected suspicious signs of new threatening military activity, or
perhaps if the Cubans or Soviets instituted reprisals elsewhere.
(3) Once the quarantine was established, in due
course something would have to give.. Assuming the Soviets would
comply with the blockade, Castro or some other element of Cuban
leaders might decide that there was nothing that the Soviets could
or would do to help them, and that agreeing to the removal of Russian
military men and inspection, in exchange for withdrawal of the quarantine
and harrassing reconnaissance, would be their best deal. The US would,
in that case, settle for that agreement.
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(4.) The Soviets would, in the case oi' a quarantine,
be under conflicting pressures to do something but not to overcommit
themselves. They might risk an incident in challenging the quarantine,
which would have to be strictly enforced. If they did undertake counter-
pressure on access to Berlin, the existing contingency plans would be
put into effect as necessary. The US would have to persevere in main-
taining the quarantine until Castro cracked or capitulated, or the
deterrent effect of our will to stand up to Soviet pressures and
counterpressures in other cases would be badly undermined.
(5) It is possible that an affective quarantine would
provoke an uprising. In that case, the US would support the uprising
by whatever means are necessary, up to and including invasion, to
insure its success. (This represents a new situation for which a
different scenario applies.)
c. Alternative 2. If there is no military counteraction to
the harrassing reconnaissance, and no other persuasive trigger for a
quarantine, the US could undertake various measures designed to stimulate
the Cubans to provoke a new incident.
(1) The US might initially intensify its reconnaissance
with night flights, "show-off" low-:Level flights flaunting our freedom
of action, hoping to stir the Cuban military to action.
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_.9.-
(2) The US might extend its actions to large scale
leaflet drops, drops of agents, "CARE"-type packages delivered to
known or possible guerrilla areas, and the like. This course might
stir the Cubans to military action or induce therm. to agree to the
US terms. It also might stimulate an uprising. In any of these
cases the subsequent course of action would be clear, and would be
to our advantage: either invasion if an uprising occurred or the
Cubans undertook military action, or removal of the Russians and
ground inspection if the Cubans agreed. If, however, the Cubans
did not react, this kind of activity on our part would give them
propaganda ammunition. Such measures must therefore be gradual,
geared to world political reactions.
(3) Perhaps the US could use some drone aircraft as
"bait," flown at low speeds and favorable altitudes for tempting
Cuban AAA or aircraft attacks.
(4) Soviet politico-military counterpressures else-
where, beyond a vigorous political offensive and propaganda, would
not be likely. Soviet commitments to Cuba might rise at whatever
time the Soviets decided we did not intend to escalate the crisis--perhaps
a few weeks after the invasion force had been readied but not committed.
It is possible that the Soviets might approach us privately with an
offer of quiet withdrawal of their military men from Cuba in exchange
for our dropping the harrassing reconnaissance (by imniicitly accepting
the U-2's only) and our demand for inspection.
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d. Thus, depending above all on whether the Cubans were
or could be made to be trigger-happy, the development of the initial
downing of a reconnaissance plane could lead at hest to the elimination
of Castro, perhaps to the removal of Soviet troops and installation
of ground inspection in Cuba, or at the least to our demonstration of
firmness on reconnaissance and, if our initial reprisal had eliminated
all the SAMs, we would have greatly increased our future military
freedom of action and political options.
7.
If this course of action were to be pursued,
(1)
Medium and low :Level reconnaissance overflights
of Cuba, on a scale paralleling present, U-2
high altitude flights and as a supplement to
them, should be instituted.
(2) Authorization should be given for programs to
reduce the present eighteen day period required
for the generation of invasion forces, by pre-
positioning some equipment, buildup of sealift,
etc., so that the US would be able to support
more quickly an uprising on the Island, if that
were necessary.
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Addendum
We have considered the question of a fabricated incident and
conclude that it would not be feasible or desirable to contrive a
mock Cuban attack on a US reconnaissance aircraft. This plan
applies to a genuine attack on a US aircraft over or near Cuba.
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ME'11,4ORANDUM FOR THE STANDING GROUP
Subject: Certain Cuban Contingencies
TThe Proble.
To capitalize on various Cuban provocations by taking
reprisals to place pressures on, or to effect the removal of, the
Castro regime.
A. Internal Revolt
1. An internal revolt could take one of two general
forms: (i) a revolt within the structure of the existing regime or
(ii) a revolt essentially outside the governmental structure against
which the full power of the Government might be arrayed. In addition
(i) might trigger (ii) or vice versa. Either might also involve
Soviet troops in countering the insurgency. Any of these cases could
provide the basis for increasing US military pressures to eliminate
the Castro regime.
2. Case (i) is the most likely, and also the case most
likely to succeed without outside intervention. It would draw its
inspiration and support from nationalistic elements who had become
disenchanted by the abject dependence of the regime on the Communist
Bloc, isolation within the Hemisphere, deepening of the economic crisis,
a threatened or actual Communist accession to complete control of the
regime at the expense of the remaining members of the 26th of July Move -
ment, or the death of Castro.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading
and declassification.
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3. Case (ii) might take the form of widespread
disruptive behavior supported in who:Le or in part by elements of
the militia, or an uprising in one of the mountainous areas which
might attract local militia elements.
4. There are several variants to case (i), in particular:
(1) A "palace coup" either by hard-line Communists,
or by members of the 26th of July Movement.
(2) A revolt by the Cuban armed forces or militia.
a. Palace Coup.
1) A palace coup by hard-line Co~st
might be the trigger for a counter-coup by elements of the armed forces
or militia. Each of these cases has a great danger of involvement by
Soviet forces, but presumably the Communist coup is most dangerous
from this standpoint. Since the world is on notice that the US
would tolerate no interference by local Soviet forces in an attempt
by the Cuban people to throw off the Castro yoke, it would provide
a platform for US intervention on behalf of the Cuban people.
2) A palace coup by members of the
26th of July Movement would probably arise from a broad conspiracy
involving support from elements of the armed forces
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and militia. Such a coup might start with the assassination of Castro
and a plea to the US to fend off intervention by Soviet forces. Clearly,
if both Army and militia arrayed themselves against the putchists, the
opportunity for US intervention would be fleeting. The attitude and
actions of Soviet forces would vitally affect the outcome. The most
favorable case for persistence of the coup would ensue if both elements
of the Cuban armed forces supported them and the Soviets remained aloof.
On the other hand, were the latter to intervene, the basis for forceful
US action would be more solid.
b. Military Revolts.
Local or general revolts by the Army or
militia coupled with attempts to seize the seat of Government or proclaim
an alternate regime are possible quite apart from any links to a conspiracy
within the regime. It is possible that an action within one of these
elements might be the catalyst for similar action within the other. A
militia revolt opposed by the Cuban Army and the Soviet troops would
provide the least time for the US to react while the revolt was still
alive. It is conceivable, however, that the revolutionists could take
to the hills, prolonging resistance and giving us more time to react.
5. Popular Uprising. Case (ii), a revolt outside the
governmental framework, could manifest general discontent through the
appearance of a number of guerrilla bands operating at widely separated
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points and supported with food by the peasants. Alternatively, a
single guerrilla leader, operating in a particularly disaffected
province,might expand his operations to the point where the Government
was compelled to react massively. Suffice it to say, in the atmosphere
of present-day Cuba neither of these possibilities is very likely. The
Government has an excellent surveillance network, both internally and
with respect to the air and sea approaches to the Island, and the peasants
as yet are unwilling to risk their necks until the Government's chances
appear poorer than they now are.
B. Cuban Interve,t "ion inLatin America
1. A flagrant case of Cuban interference and violence
in the internal life of another country (such as Venezuela or the
Dominican Republic) could provide the basis for OAS sanctions,
including a quarantine or perhaps a demand for inspection at Cuban
ports and airfields. It would be difficult to use such an incident
directly as justification for an invasion. However, in addition
to the institution of a quarantine, the US could use the resulting
tension as justification for a quiet buildup of the invasion force,
and then use a new incident in quarantine enforcement, Cuban
incursions on Guantanamo, or an uprising as justification for
invasion.
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2. It might be desirable in preparation to highlight
Cuban training and dispatch of subversives, instruction for sabotage,
etc., as background for "the incident." The incident itself should be
domestic, violent and quickly identified as part of a pattern of Castroist
export of revolution which would threaten other Latin American governments.
(A "one-two" series of incidents would excellently serve to underline
this point.) In this manner, the need for a drastic quarantine would
be established.
3. A quarantine should cover POL as well, as all arms
entering, and arms and "agents" leaving, Cuba; it should probably not
cover food and medicine. In the long run, a POL blockade should be
effective in disrupting Cuba internally. If Castro sought to negotiate
an end of it, we should set an unacceptably high price such as unlimited
inspection to verify no subversive training being undertaken, no arms
shipments in or out (except returns to the USSR), etc.
4. An "uprising" in this situation would be similar
to any other, except that the US would have been able to generate US
invasion forces for its support during the blockade.
C. Incidents at Guantanamo
1. An incident at Guantanamo, such as a Cuban incursion,
or cutting off of the water supply (the source of which is off the US
reservation), could provide an opportunity for protective action
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beyond the perimeter of the base. In particular, restoring the
source of water and protecting it from further interference would
provide a reasonably good justification for the US to react with
whatever degree of force was deemed necessary for this task. Assuming
the Cubans resisted, the security of the element would justify broadened
actions. This could come to involve pitched battles, and require US
invasion.
2. Expansion and escalation from an incident at
Guantanamo would be fully supported in the US and by some Allies,
but it would have the political disadvantage of stemming from a US
base held against the desires of the incumbent government. In
general, justification based on protecting US rights would be less
suitable than support to a Cuban uprising or strong action after
Cuban export of revolution.
3. While the scenario of events following from an
incident might escalate to full-scale US-Cuban combat, it might not.
The Cubans might, at once or after some initial skirmishes, break
contact and withdraw to permit the US to restore the water supply
and even to keep guards outside the US military reservation. In
that case, especially if the Cubans had offered to restore the water
supply, it would be very disadvantageous for the US to appear to be
"'picking a fight" over a broad definition of our base rights.
TOF SECRET
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4. An uprising fortuitously located within range of
US assistance from the Guantanamo Bay base would be militarily favorable,
but it might appear to be contrived by the US.
D. Incidents at Sea.
1. There are two categories of possible incidents at
sea which might justify reprisal against Cuba:
a. Castroite hi-jacking of a Latin American
vessel; or
b. Cuban naval attacks on or harrassment of a
US or Latin American ship.
The former would not, in itself, seem to provide c2-ear opportunity for
reprisals of a direct effective na-;.ure. The Tatter could be met by
attacking the offending Cuban vessels and perhaps counter-harrassment
of Cuban ships with the possibility of an incident arising.
2. Escalation at sea might lead to US reprisal against
Cuban gunboats in port as well as at sea, but unless such action led
to shooting down a US pl-.ne it is difficult to see how it would
justify US quarantine or invasion. If a US attacking aircraft (at
sea or over a Cuban port) were attacked, we might start the scenario of
reprisals against Cubais air defense. Thus, an incident at sea could
trigger the air defense scenario; otherwise, incidents at sea do not
seem promising.
TOP SECRET
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 UVCLASS.I 'IED when blank - TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document - Automatically downgraded
to SE"C ,ET when $f++ , jars K@jW 1 _JM/Mjjp}.j0A0RDfMB0j 676R002400050013-9
CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
,4mIr&000MENT DESCRIPTION
REGISTRY
SOURCE
White House
CIA CONTROL NO.
TS 188312/2
DOC
NO
.
.
DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED
DOC. DATE #13 Max 3
6
COPY NO.
13_ May
3
LOGGED BY
NUMBER OF PAGES 7
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS
None
ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency
or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or
transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official
duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form
and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and
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DATE
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fir
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below
and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.
DOWNGRADED
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FORM
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lease 2005/06/14.: CI
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9- 60 26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
TOP SECRET
 SECRET
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6 May 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR The Director, NRO
UBJECT: Flight Following Arrangements for High Altitude
Reconnaissance of Cuba
1. The following information on this subject has been obtained
from the Joint Reconnaissance Center in response to your previous
request.
2. Currently the BRASS KNOB U-2 photographic flights over
Cuba are supported as follows:
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In the event of a hostile attack by interceptor aircraft the
information could be available.
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-=._...C p Les
B0,;16 "10- "MUU/-14UUM7
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5. SUMMARY. The support presently being provided during
BRASS KNOB operation is capable of supplying timely and comprehen-
sive information concerning hostile actions taken against U-Zs over
Cuba. It may be ezpected that Washington authorities will be advised
of the circumstances surrounding a hostile act within 5-10 minutes after
the occurrence.
Therefore post v'e assuraSnce that such a timely er a on
possible cannot be given.
John L. Martin, Jr.
Colonel, USA F
Director, NRO Staff
cc: DDNRO
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 D ILL C ~ IF TI
(O 1 IAL SECRET
TO
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
AM AD ESS
D CI
L;~ ~?
2
DCI
3
4
5
6
DD/R (for file)
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
xx
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks :
This is an NRO summary of sources
which might provide information on U-2
shootdown over Cuba as per request
in connection with Cuban Contingency
Plan.
H. Scoville, Jr.
Att: Control No. NRC 0129-63, dated 6 May
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
pro
DD/R
edt~I, d
5 8 63
A
p
A 0013-9
FORM 10. 237 Use previous editions (40)
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961 0-587282
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[' V J
C THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
0 WASHINGTON
P
Y
In reply refer to 1-35505/63 24 April 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
SUBJECT: DOD-State Paper, "U-2 Flights, Cuba -- Contingency Plans"
Attached is a revision of the DOD-State paper incorporating
all those changes recommended by JCSM 325-63 which were acceptable
to me and the Secretary of State. You will note that subparagraph
3.d. has been reworded in such a way as to meet the concern of the
JCS that there be no precommitment against an invasion of Cuba.
It is anticipated that the paper, in its present form, will
be used for discussions with the President at an early date.
/s/ ROBERT S. McNAMARA
Attachment
As stated above
C
0
P
Y
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DOD-STATE PAPER
U-2 FLIGHTS, CUBA - CONTINGENCY PLANS (C)
1. Problem. The possibility exists that Soviet/Cuban forces may shoot
down, or attempt to shoot down, a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft over Cuba.
The purpose of this report is to develop a series of actions to be considered
by the United States in advance of and after the event.
2. Facts Bearing on the Problem
a. U-2 flights are currently conducted over Cuba at the rate of
approximately two sorties per day.
b. Alternative methods of carrying on surveillance are available
but the quantity of data that could be obtained by these alternative
methods is smaller than that obtainable with the U-2; thus, the avail-
able alternatives would not meet presently stated requirements. A
prolonged hiatus in high altitude surveillance would be intolerable in
view of the continuing Soviet option of reintroduction of IRBMs and MREMs.
c. While not a certainty, present intelligence resources give a
considerable degree of confidence that Washington should have reliable
information on the destruction of a U-2 by a SAM shortly after the
attack. There is also a probability that correspondingly reliable
information would be available with respect to an unsuccessful firing
of a SAM on a U-2. A possibility exists that a U-2 could be attacked
by MIG aircraft using air-to-air rockets and special attack techniques.
In this case also, information would probably be available promptly.
However, there remains a possibility that a U-2 could disappear under
circumstances in which we had no positive information on the cause of
its loss.
3. Political Considerations
a. Balancing Objectives - The optimum objective with regard to
this contingency is to deter the attack on the U-2 by giving private
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and public assurances that the US reaction to such an attack would be
prompt, firm, and effective. The fundamental political judgment to be
made in connection with the attack itself involves balancing the
oppoi,tunity to make progress toward our long-term objective vis-a-vis
Cuba (the overthrow of Castro's regime and elimination of Communism
from Cuba) with our objectives vis-a-vis the US-USSR confrontation.
The political and power realities, including the USSR's capability to
react in Berlin or elsewhere, argue against arbitrary and unilateral
action, without provocation, to eliminate Castro. The exploitation of
contingencies is the only politically feasible means for taking steps,
in the immediate future, to apply US military power directly to reduce
Castro's power and influence. Yet obviously, no single contingency
can be said to offer the last chance to move against Castro. Moreover,
in any new major confrontation over Cuba the United States will be
facing a Khrushchev who has reflected on the lessons of the missile
crisis and who will be less likely to retreat before US power. Thus,
the United States must consider the USSR's capability to react to a
second Cuban crisis by actions in Berlin or elsewhere.
b. The context of the attack - It is judged that the USSR would be
likely to deliver an official warning prior to an attack on a U-2. In
the event that an attack is conducted, therefore, without advance warning,
allowance should be made for the possibility that there was a failure of
USSR command and control procedures by providing for a minimum response,
initially, while attempting to ascertain Soviet intent by all means
available. For the same reason, in a case where USSR responsibility is
in doubt, the US might desire to take an initial. public position that
holds Castro rather than Khrushchev responsible.
c. Advance notification and consultation - Secretary Rusk has
recently informed the North Atlantic Council of US concern that there
may be an attack on a U-2 over Cuba. Consultation with our Allies after
a Soviet warning or a Soviet attack probably would become known to the
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USSR. The longer the period of direct or indirect warning thus given
to xhrushchev, the more opportunity he is given to make threats of
retaliation from which he would find it difficult to withdraw, thus
increasing the dangers of escalation, causing confusion among our Allies,
and inhibiting their decision to support the United States. On the
other hand prior knowledge acquired by the USSR could provide the
deterrent effect suggested above. Moreover, once a specific indication
of intent to attack is received, or an attack occurs, the retention of
political support of our allies argues for as much notice as possible
of our intentions.
d. tions - The plans which follow provide for a spectrum of
response against the presupposed contingencies. The decision as to the
specific degree of force to be applied within this spectrum is a matter
for determination at the time of the attack on the U-2 and is dependent
on evaluation of latest intelligence and the existing political dynamics.
The removal of a facility of the same type (SAM, MIG airfield, AA battery)
as the weapon which attacks the U-2 has the virtue of a limited, eye-for-
an-eye retribution before the world. Retaliation against a single SAM
site regardless of the type of the offending weapon retains the political
advantage of a limited response and has the additional feature of
orienting action against the weapons system we are most interested in
removing.
Both of the foregoing options can be made relatively surgical in
nature in order to provide minimum offense to the USSR. The elimination
of all facilities of any one weapons system (SAM, MIGs, AA batteries) or
all air defense systems would provide progressively larger steps toward
the elimination of the Castro regime but might be considered of such
proportion by Khrushchev as to make counter Soviet retaliation mandatory.
It is also possible that the shock effect of such vigorous response could
lead to a decision by the USSR to cut her losses and gradually withdraw
from Cuba. US retaliation by elimination of one facility and subsequent
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large-scale surveillance at low levels deprives the US of required high
altitude coverage and cannot safely be continued indefinitely.
Any of the foregoing options could be combined with a decision to
reinstitute a partial or total quarantine. Total quarantine, if maintained,
could serve to bring Castro down. At the very least, it would provide
a negotiable application of force from which to bargain in the Security
Council in exchange for Soviet concessions.
The foregoing options might be made more palatable to the USSR by (a)
taking the public position that Castro had been the perpetrator of the
attack; (b) renewing the US offer to work out on the ground inspection
of Cuba and the Caribbean (coupled with a general settlement such as
withdrawal of Soviet troops) to eliminate the need for future aerial
surveillance; (c) making it clear that the foregoing reprisals were not
intended as a prelude to an invasion. '.Phis would leave open the decision
to invade if required in the event of escalation by Cuba or by the USSR
in Cuba or elsewhere.
4. Military Considerations
a. Prompt, but deliberate, retaliatory measures should be taken fol-
lowing the shooting down of a U-2 and, in certain circumstances, in event
of an unsuccessful attack against a U-2. After certain precautionary
measures are taken, including the evacuation of noncombatants from
Guantanamo and the initiation of reinforcement of that base, it is
feasible to make a retaliatory attack on a Cuban military facility or
facilities at first light on the morning of the day following the shooting
down of a U-2, weather permitting.
b. US response to an attack by SAM site, MIG, or AA battery should be
against one or more Cuban military facilities. Where retaliation is to
be taken against a single facility, it should normally be a SAM site
selected to meet the following criteria., It should be as close as
feasible to the location of the incident but should be selected for
accessibility of attack and for isolation from populated areas to minimize
noncombatant casualties.
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5. Range of Circumstances. In the event of the shooting down, or the
attempted shooting down of a U-2 over Cuba, a wide variety of circumstances
may attend the incident:
a. With public advance warning by the USSR either through press
media or through official governmental communications and/or other
indicators of imminent Soviet/Cuban action:
(1)
Pre-attack
(a)
(b)
Public threat only
Covert indicators or official governmental communications.
(2)
Unsuccessful attack
(a)
(b)
Demonstrable and persuasive evidence
Doubtful evidence
(3)
Successful attack
b. Without public advance warning and other indicators of imminent
Soviet/Cuban action:
(1) Unsuccessful attack
(2) Successful attack
6. Courses of Action to be Considered
a. With public advance warning by the USSR and or other indicators
of imminent Soviet/Cuban action:
(1) Pre-attack
(a) Public threat only - If the warning is limited to
public threat, unaccompanied by confirming intelligence indica-
tors of imminent Soviet/Cuban action., the United States should
inform Khrushchev that the flights will continue.
(b) Covert indicators and/or official governmental communi-
cations - If advance warning is obtained through covert means
and/or official governmental communications, with or without
public warning:
U-2 flights should be suspended while military preparations
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 Approved Fc OVe
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CRET
are initiated. by establishment of appropriate
conditions of readiness in all US commands and
readiness is improved for evacuation of noncombatants
from and reinforcement of Guantanamo. The fact of
increased readiness would almost immediately become
public. U-2 flights should be suspended. Enemy
intentions may be verified by flying target drones,
for a limited time. If these drones are not fired
upon, U-2 flights will be resumed. If the target
drones are fired upon, consideration will be given to
taking out all or selected SAM sites, or substituting
photographic drones and low-level reconnaissance for
U-2 flights. U-2 flights will be resumed where there
is reasonable prospect that they will not be fired
upon. Adequate surveillance of Cuba requires teat
any hiatus in U-2 flights be limited in time.
(2) Unsuccessful attack
(a) Demonstrable and persuasive evidence - In the event
that public advance warning or other data provides demonstrable
and persuasive evidence that an attack has been made, the
United States should-,
1. At the time of the decision to take reprisal action,
declare appropriate conditions of readiness in all US
commands (if not already in effect), and initiate evacuation
of dependents from and reinforcement of Guantanamo.
2. Initiate military preparations for an attack early
the next day.
3. Alternatives. Conduct the attack on one, several
or all SAM sites. Before resuming U-2 flights, check enemy
intentions by flying target drones. If these drones are
not fired upon, U-2 flights will be resumed. If the target
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TA! Q rA t``vvJ'
drones are fired upon, consideration will be given to
taking out all or selected SAM sites, or substituting
photographic drones and low-level reconnaissance for U-2
flights. U-2 flights will be resumed when there is
reasonable prospect that they will not be fired upon.
Adequate surveillance of Cuba requires that any hiatus
in U-2 flights be limited in time.
(b) Doubtful evidence - In spite of public advance
warning, an unsuccessful attack may occur in circumstances
which make it impossible to provide demonstrable and
persuasive evidence that an attack has in fact been made.
In such a case, the United States should assess the situation
in the light of circumstances existing at the time and apply
flexible, selective measures ranging from no response to
those measures specified in subparagraphs (2) (a), 1, 2, and
3, above.
(3) Successful attack
(a) At the time of the decision to execute reprisal
attacks, the United States should declare an appropriate
condition of readiness in all US commands (if not already in
effect), and initiate evacuation of dependents from and
reinforcement of Guantanamo.
(b) Initiate military preparations for reprisal action
early the next day.
(c) Alternatives:
1. Alternative I - Conduct an attack on all SAM sites.
2. Alternative II - Destroy one SAM site; thereafter,
until safety of U-2s can be assured, or for a limited
time, fly only low-level reconnaissance and photo drones.
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
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b. Without public advance warning and other indicators of imminent
Soviet action.
(l) Unsuccessful Attack
(a) In light of assessment made at the time, make military
preparations by establishment of appropriate conditions of
readiness in all US commands and by evacuation of dependents from
and preparations for reinforcement of Guantanamo.
(b) U-2 flights should be suspended while these preparations
are being made.
(c) Pfter preparations are made, publicly announce that an
unsuccessful attack was made.
(d) Execute reprisal attack against one SAM site; then either
resume U-2 flights, or test enemy intentions with target drones.
If these drones are not fired upon, U-2 flights will be resumed.
If the target drones are fired upon, consideration will be given
to taking out all or selected SAM sites, or substituting photographic
drones and low-level reconnaissance for U-2 flights for a limited
time. U-2 flights will be resumed when there is reasonable pros-
pect that they will not be fired upon. Adequate surveillance of
Cuba requires that any hiatus in U-2 flights be limited in time.
(2) Successful Attack
(a) At the time of the decision to attack a site, declare an
appropriate condition of readiness in all US commands, initiate
evacuation of dependents from and reinforcement of Guantanamo.
(b) Initiate military preparations for and conduct reprisal
attack early the next morning on one or more of the SAM sites,
depending on the circumstances.
(c) Execute reprisal attack against one, several, or all
SAM sites. Before resuming U-2 flights, check enemy intentions
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UP K('OICT
by flying target drones. If these drones are not fired upon, U-2
flights will be resumed. If the target drones are fired upon,
consideration will be given to taking out all or selected SAM
sites, or substituting photographic drones and low-level recon-
naissance for U-2 flights for a limited time. U-2 flights will
be resumed when there is reasonable prospect that they will not
be fired upon. Adequate surveillance of Cuba requires that any
hiatus in U-2 flights will be limited in time.
e. Concomitant Political Initiatives. In each of the foregoing cases,
the United States should consider concomitant political initiatives as
follows (parenthetical portions that follow are applicable only to those
cases in which a retaliatory attack on a site is to be made):
(1) Inform North Atlantic Council (immediately prior to attack).
(2) Transmit Presidential messages to Macmillan, Adenauer, de Gaulle,
Fanfani.
(3) Inform Organ of Consultation of Organization of the American
States of the situation and US intentions.
(ti) Transmit instructions to USUN to inform Secretary General,
United Nations at time of attack or clear warning and call for immed-
iate Security Council meeting.
(5) Transmit message from President to Khrushchev - giving it
simultaneously to Soviet Ambassador in Washington (deliver at time
of attack).
(6) Issue public statement by the President, including message to
the Cuban people (at the time of the atack).
(7) If the Soviets wholly or partially blockade Berlin in response
to US retaliation, immediately convene Quadripartite Group to consider
implementation of "Preferred Sequence" courses of action with respect
to Berlin.
d. Subsequent Military Action. If strike aricraft used in the
9
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 Appro3 # FoSK 2005/06/14: CIA-RDPSMW 0050013-9
retaliatory strike against a single site are shot down, additional
retaliation action would be taken against appropriate Cuban targets.
e. U-2 is missing with confirmation lacking as to cause. No action
should be initiated until there is confirmation that the disappearance
is the result of a Soviet/Cuban attack; then the United States should pro-
ceed in accordance with subparagraph 6 a (3) or 6 a (2), as appropriate.
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TOP StCP!T SENSITIVE
 25X1
, TOP SECRET
~^~r r
ubtbi~a11y downgraded
UNC
I
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CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION - ~_ REGISTRY
SOURCE CIA CONTROL NO.
DEMSE TS #188307
DOC. NO. DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED
DOC. DATE !P4 AprJ1I 1963 - 27 April 1963
COPY NO. LOGGED BY
NUMBER OF PAGES 3 (lot)
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS
Ono
ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency
or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or
transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official
duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and./or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form
and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and
indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.
REFERRED TO RECEIVED RELEASED SEEN BY
OFFICE. DATE TIME DATE TIME SIGNATURE OFFICE/DIV. DATE
ER /I
Acti
s ~//p 1__~ I_ - - ~~
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below
and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.
DOWNGRADED
DESTROYED
DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)
TO
BY (Signature)
TO
BY (Signature)
WITNESSED BY (Signature)
BY (Signature)
OFFICE
DATE
OFFICE
DATE
OFFICE
DATE
Ap
roved For Re
ease 2005/06/14: CIA
RDP80B0167
R002400050013-9
FORM 2V 6 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
,O
60
 ...............
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 Approved For Release 2005/06/14: CIA-RDP80BO167
U.S. CC J'i G`~:, ?.i) "1 '-_AL PHOTO
7th Coal u G-u District
APR 26 1963
?, File Noa --------------
~..a e ct
-------------------
--------------------------------------
Location ------_
- I` ---------------------
-----
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For
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 'U041 a r &T ..
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 Approved For Release 2005/06/14: CIA-RDP80BO1676R002400050013-9
 Approved For Release
CREDIT U.S. Coe-v1 CU: kiD O FICI.AL PHOTO
7th Coay~ Guard
APR 261
Subject
7-") ----------- l'--------
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 Approved For Release 2005/06/14: CIA-RDP80BO1676R002400050013-9
 PLEASE CREDIT
Un$, COAST GUARD OFFICIAL PHOTO
7th Coast Guard Distriot
Miami, F7.a.
7~0--042663-O AP
B
File No. Date
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