DIRECTOR S STATE OF THE AGENCY MESSAGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00780R003400060049-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 2003
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: July 7, 1970
• Content Type: MF

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STATINTL
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F I L E
DI)/.S 70-2760
? JUL 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy :Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT : Director's State of the Agency Message
Jack:
You will recall that I advised the DCI at
the Executive Committee Meeting the other day that the transcript
of his State of the Agency Message was available for his review. He
asked that your Staff edit his speech. After you have done so please
return to me and I will place it In the Agency archives.
R. L. Bannerman
Deputy Director
for Support
Att
DD/S B:llc (6 July 1970)
Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - DD/S Chrono
"L - DD/S Subject
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Attached is a transcript of your State-of-the -
ff
Agency Messag\on 19 June 1970. Other than record copy no other
`Y
copies nave beenprep pending your decision A
this speech for Agency ' tributbn-.
The fil of your speech h just been delivered and
::::: your convenience. I thi the m conveys your message
much better than the printed text and wo ld recommend your approval
to show it to Agency employees.
For control purposes I r-
"Confidential" to ensure its co4ol within Agency remises.
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19_ tune L970
The suggestion for the meeting this morning came a few weeks ago from
something that is known as the Management Advisory Group which is not an
organization but a grouping of a dozen individuals from the Agency who come
from various offices and Directorates and who sit together with the thought in
mind that they could come up with some suggestions and recommendations
which would help us in the management of the Agency. One of their suggestions
was that I make sort of a state of the Agency presentation; the thought being that
a lot of people on the outside knew more about what was going on in the life of
the Agency than people inside. I find this hard to believe but knowing what the
grapevine around the organization is; but nevertheless it did seem to me like a
good idea to do this from time to time and this is what I intend to carry out. I
want this to be quite informal. I had rather planned that I would speak for a
while and then I would take questions from the floor. But in the last ten minutes
that's been changed because I've been asked to come down to the White House
and I'm going to have to leave at 11 o'clock, I can keep the President waiting
20 minutes but not indefinitely.
What I did in trying to get the topics that I thought you would be interested
in hearing about this morning was to ask that the Deputies and various others
submit their lists. These have been consolidated and the items that appeared
most frequently are the ones on my list today. Now I submitted evidence that
on such subjects as policy and budgetary squeeze and the future and all the rest
of it that I'm bound to oversimplify and I'm bound to leave unanswered a lot of
questions that you may have and about that I'm sorry. But I do intend to come
back and have these meetings on other occasions. And under those circumstances
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If
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maybe over a period of time we can handle a lot of these things which are on
your mind and which would not possibly have occurred to me
First off, there is obviously a lot of interest in budgetary constraints.
It is clear to everyone that the U. S. budget has gotten enormous; that some-
thing is going to have to be done about it; that there's a vast preoccupation in
this country with our domestic problems and the possible solutions thereto; and
that there's a tendency for the American people to look inward rather than out-
ward; and what is the effect of this on the Central Intelligence Agency,
Well, obviously with the money shorter and harder to come by we're going
to come in for cuts in our requirements. I don't think there's any doubt about
orl~
that. But I don't think that this, is any reason for us to feel that the tv read- is
coming to an end and that we can't survive. I have always felt, and I know many
disagree with me so that this has to be a personal view, that this Agency can do
its work and handle its affairs with an organization that is even smaller than the
one we have now, that the answer to the intelligence business is its people, their
high quality, not their numbers, and that the direction of this Agency should con-
sistently be to try and keep itself manageable and at the same time with very
high competence o
Now you know it's perfectly natural that in any large bureaucracy people
pay attention to the ones who are working for them. A Cabinet Minister,
obviously, he makes out the fitness reports and pays certain people in his
organization and as a result of this he wants to accept their work and use their
work and push them along. This is the most natural thing in human life.
How does that apply to the Central Intelligence Agency? It simply applies
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to us in this fashion. That the papers that we produce: have got to be better
than are produced by any other organization in town or we're going to be out
of business. Nobody looks to a third agency to get a piece of information or
to get an analysis or an assessment or an estimate unless they have reason
to believe that that is going to be better than they can get from their own or-
ganization. This alone makes it absolutely fundamental that we keep a high
level of performance and that our work as it circulates around town shows this
high level of performance.
In addition, we have got to maintain the objectivity and the integrity of our
product--a reputation we've established but one which we must maintain. About
this there is absolutely no question. This Agency depends and the only constituency
it has is on bipartisan support in the Congress and the Presidency, those: two
power sources. We can't go to the country and we can't write letters to the editor
and we can't get a groundswell of human emotion behind the Central Intelligence
Agency. You all know that very well. But as long as we are doing our job and
doing it professionally and doing it objectively, I think you have no reason to be
concerned about the central intelligence concept. It will survive.
In the Senate these days, for example, in the whole spectrum from those
that you might describe'as very liberal to those you might describe as very
conservative we do have a reputation for objectivity. They've had a taste for
this now; they know they can get it when they call us down. This is important
to them. And therefore if we can maintain this, as I believe we can, then we'll
have the support that we need to continue our work.
No1a(pX*@rj&f%Xqkb#
0@'MGRQWfW06W4R a years
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it's going to be heavy going. It wouldn't be truthful of me to stand up here and
sort of wave my hands and say that all's perfect in the ideal world or anything
of that kind. Of course we're going to get cuts and we may have a rough time
of it. But I don't think that's something that we need to get unduly concerned
about. And above all, I assure you there's powerless little we can do about it.
And one of the things in this life, it seems to me, that's rather pointless is to
get ulcers over something you can't effect. We can effect it up to a point but
not very much. But I would predict that we will get our share.
I'd now like to turn to this question which comes up so frequently about the
policy making in the Government and the Agency's role in policy making. I sup-
pose this has been most recently on people's minds in connection with the President's
decision to go into Cambodia or into the Cambodian sanctuaries, Before I talk
about the Agency's role in these decisions, I would like to get back to first prin-
ciples if I may and if you think in saying what I'm about to say that I am talking
down to you, I am certainly not doing any such thing. I simply have found that
the most sophisticated and educated people in this country simply don't understand
the United States Government's policy making process. Therefore I would like
to describe it to you very briefly but based on my personal observations under
three Presidents.
Under our Constitution, the President is the Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces and he also makes foreign policy. PERIOD. Now this is his
right as an individual and as a human being. It is not the right of the Secretary
of State or the Secretary of Defense or the Director of Central Intelligence or
of anybody in this room. So wi ere_that.m1 seeks his advice and how he puts
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that advice together into a given decision is almost never known except to him.
Presidents almost never make decisions in National Security Council meetings
or in open meetings of any kind, even as restricted as that. They usually say
that they've heard all the arguments and thank you very much they'll think it
over. And then at some point in time the decision emerges. It may be the de-.
cision you thought it was going to be; it may be something quite different. But
in the process of this, no one knows exactly how many other people have talked
to the President on this matter. He may have called several Senators on the
telephone; he may have talked to some Congressmen; he may have talked to reli-
gious leaders in the Middle West; he may have gotten a group of black leaders
in from the South; he may have talked to his wife; he might have talked to his
daughter; he may have gone to some old friend of his that he went to college
with and said what's your view of this. I doiit mean this to sound silly; I simply
mean it to indicate that what the Presidential decision usually ends up by being
is some strange calculus or chemistry in his mind which emerges in this form
based on all the things that he has put into his mental computer.
I find that most of the newspapermen in this town are constantly striving
to find out who influenced the President most on decision A and they go to vast
pains to try and find this out. As though there was some particular relevance.
Because if Mr. A had the influence in decision A, it may well be Mr. B who
has the influence in.decision B, and therefore the standing of Mr. A in the case
of B decision may be zero whereas it was 90% in the case of decision A.
11
Now this I wish you woulc ?take as fact. This is indeed the way it happens.
And power in our Cabinet, in, contradistinction to the British Parliamentary system,
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derives from the President. Any Cabinet officer has strength or weakness on
any given day depending upon how he relates to the President and how the flow
of Presidential power goes through him into the apparatus over which he pre-
sides. Dean Rusk described this very well in a very short couple of squibbs
he had in Life magazine a couple of years ago. I think the article was totally
overlooked because it was written in a kind of shorthand and it was in the back
of the magazine and I don't think people paid much attention to it and if they did
I don't think they knew what they were reading. But he does describe this process
very accurately and this is indeed the way it works.
Now we come back to any decision like the Cambodian decision, obviously
the President seeks advice from those people whom he thinks can make a contri-
bution. Sometimes he talks to them privately; sometimes he talks to them in
groups. Sometimes he talks to them on the telephone; sometimes he talks to
them face to face. There've been questions in connection with Cambodia having to
do with the extent to which the problem was thought through, were the domestic
implications carefully considered, was this done that done or the other done.
As nearly as I can establish, I think they were. Certainly as far as the domestic
side of this is concerned, this Agency or its Director has no role in that. And
if you sometime would like to have an interesting experience, you might just try
to advise the President about domestic opinion. I mean the advice lasts about
five seconds and then you've gotten the first three or four words out, and then
there's either a stoney look or a pretty quick reply, just like that, that you can
just mind your own business. Once the President has been elected, he figures
he knows about domestic /political opinion. Maybe he doesn't anticipate a Kent
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State or something of this kind; maybe that didn't get into his computer - -I
don't know. But I would just say that there's a limitation to the role that each
individual among his advisors can and should play.
As far as the intelligence inputs were concerned, I have no policy making
role. I don't attempt a policy making role. I attempt to answer the questions
I'm asked based on the information I'm given by the analysts in the Agency. I
know that recently I've been criticized by some of them because on one occasion
when I was going down for a briefing in one of the Congressional committees I
had two or three pages of text on Cambodia that I didn't think I could read or convey
to this group and I asked to have it rewritten and it was done in a very short time-
frame and some of the people involved in the substance of this disagreed about
what I should have said. And since then I know in some quarters I've been accused
of only supporting the Administration's positions. Well, this is certainly not true.
I have not done any such thing. And if it would give any solace to those who are
concerned about it, I never used either text. The subject never came up.
Another matter which I know bothers many people, particularly in the Clan-
destine Service, has to do with the priority which seems to be given these days
to technical collection. This Agency pioneered in overhead reconnaissance. In-
dividuals who have worked for or still do work for the Agency deserve more
credit in this field than individuals in any other part of this Government in any
previous Administration. We have been in the vanguard of this, considerable
imagination has been used and shown. Just today another type of satellite has
gone into the far out reaches of space. If it works, it'll be the most modern,
sophisticated bird that has ever flown. We hope it will; so far, so good. Let
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me just say that when one looks at this gadget, and I can only call it that, Rube
Goldberg in his palmiest days never could have contrived anything like this.
And like some of Rube Goldberg's arrangements, it may just work and the coffee
bean that you put in this end may come out coffee on that end.
In any event, technical collection in the last ten years has come on enormously.
It has given us vast amounts of information about the Soviet Union and Communist
China and it's a very important part of intelligence collection these days. About
this there is no doubt. Equally, there is no doubt that human intelligence collection
is not going out of style, is not going out of fashion, and becomes even more impor-
tant with each passing day. We can't get any information about the intentions of the
other fellow through satellites or cameras or sensors or listening devices, or very
little. We have a very hard time finding out about his research and development
programs through these devices- -perhaps the development programs but not the re-
search programs. And we're still lacking some very important information about
the Soviet Union and particularly Communist China which lies in these fields of what
goes on in the human mind and what human beings intend to do. So I can assure those
in the Clandestine Service who are concerned about this that (a) they're not going to
be out of business, (b) the important thing is that they get on with the job better.
I think that I'd like to skip over another point I was going to make which is the.
discussion of the Agency's relationships with the Administration, the Congress,
and so forth. I'll be glad to discuss that at another time. I've touched on the one
relevant point a few minutes ago when I discussed the importance of Congressional
support and what I believe to be our standing in Congress now. And I don't think
that this is something on which I ought to use up any more time. I'd like to get over
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onto another type of consideration which has to do with some of the allegations
which get thrown around about the Agency which I wouldn't have thought would be
of much concern to at least the people that worked in it, possibly their families.
But let me set the record straight on a few points here so this will be done once
and for all
First, the CIA had nothing but nothing whatever to do with Sihanouk's down-
fall in Cambodia. We didn't even have a CIA staff member in Cambodia, Senator
Mansfield who was a friend of President Sihanouk made an arrangement with Sihanouk
at the time that we resumed diplomatic relations that we would accede to his wish
that there be no CIA people in Cambodia since he distrusted them. Like a lot of
other things in this life, he obviously made a mistake. If there'd been somebody
there, we might have counseled a different kind of action or moderation. I know
not. But I simply say in this life that you can be awfully smart and awfully wrong
at the same time.
Second point. I know in the country there's a lot of feeling about the ABM
system and whether the United States should have one, commonly known as Safeguard.
I know there's been a lot of material in the press back and forth about the Agency's
position versus Secretary Laird's position, and so on. Let me just say this.
Secretary Laird and I work from the same basic material, the same raw material,
the same statistics, facts, whatever you want to call them--intelligence informa-
tion. But he is Secretary of Defense and I am Director of Central Intelligence and
these are two very different jobs. Now as Secretary of Defense he has the respon-
sibility for defending the United States of America. I do not. I have a responsibility
for conveying certain information, assessing it, passing it on to those people who
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advise the President on what should be done, and their interpretations of it
they're entitled to have. They have always had them; I'm sure they will continue
to have them. I don't think therefore that anybody in this room or anybody in the
Agency needs to be distressed about these newspaper stories. They simply derive
out of the desire of most journalists to have a story to write and if you can have
a fight between two people then it makes a better story. This is a simple aspect
of journalism that everybody recognizes, including the journalists themselves.
To say that Laird and Helms agree is hardly a story. To say that Laird and Helms
hardly are speaking these days because of their violent disagreement can get on
the front page of the New York Times.
The third is SALT. There has been a lot of backing and forthing about the
Agency's position on SALT. I don't know exactly whence this derived. I do know
that we have contributed to all the deliberations leading up to the SALT negotiations,
that we have worked on the various working groups and panels, that we have con-
tributed everything we know how to contribute particularly the subject of what is
known as verification. If a SALT agreement is reached, it's going to be up to us
to verify that agreement as best we can through the various intelligence collection
devices which we have at our disposal. And in this way we are going to have a
particularly critical intelligence function. In short, a SALT agreement is going
to make more work for the Agency and more important work, not less.
The disagreements that fly around town on the subject of verification derive
in large measure out of different assessments of what can specifically be verified
and what cannot. And there's a lot of emotion and passion in this as there is in
a lot of things these days. Voices get-verv shrill. Hearts pound. Adrenalin runs.
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Tables are hammered. Not that this necessarily gets the cause forward but be-
cause there are people around who feel that they are--came down on a beam of light
from heaven to advise the rest of the world as to which direction mankind should go,
But I see nothing wrong with the position that we've had in these matters, par-
ticularly on this SALT thing, I think we've made a substantial contribution to it.
I think we've made a very realistic contribution. I think the American positions
are in good shape these days and rational and sensible ones, And I think as of
this point we have no cause to be concerned particularly.
The last two things have to do with the My Lai massacre and the Garrison
allegations.
The Agency had nothing to do with the My Lai massacre--either in an intelli-
gence way, an informational way, an operational way, a military way, a political
way, or a psychological way. We didn't even know and none of our people knew
that it had even happened or occurred. This was not our bag. We had nothing
whatever to do with it and I just would like to leave it there. And this includes
General Cushman who was in command at the time in Da Nang and to whom this
whole episode was never reported.
As far as the Garrison allegations are concerned, these reiterated charges
that the Agency was responsible for killing President Kennedy or a conspiracy
to kill him or connived with the FBI to hide information, and so forth, is absolute
rubbish. This Agency did everything possible it could to cooperate with the
Warren Commission when it made its report. We wrote endless papers, con-
ducted endless investigations, had our hands thoroughly on the table; and there
isn't one word of truth in these at%ons=. di if you, like a lot of people from
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Louisiana, suddenly look up at me and say but then how could the man possibly
say these things, I would answer you and say, I don't know.
Another thing that seems to have come up in recent times, and I don't know
how these groundswells get started, is that with the retirement program--early
retirement program--there seems to be a feeling that one day the present man-
agement of the Agency is going to leave the field and others are going to take over
and that this is going to cause a, quote, leadership crisis, unquote. God, I would
think you'd be glad to get rid of us. I have absolutely no feeling about leadership
crisis whatever. I would hope that the Agency was going to be better led in the
future than it has been in the past. I would hope that as a result of the experience
that many of you have had growing up in this Agency, growing up in this work,
getting the scars on your back for jobs done not jobs avoided, that?the future we
would have maybe a cooler, more sophisticated, and tougher leadership than we've
had in the past. I certainly hope so. But I can assure you I'm not spending one
minute of my time worrying about the leadership crisis. Somebody will come along.
In this general connection, I did want to speak a little bit in just a moment
here about some of the benefits and services available to the Agency employees
and their families. I assume you know about these. But nevertheless I think it
would be worth taking a moment to run over some of them so that we're all square
about it.
The Agency has developed over the years what I honestly believe is as good
a program of its kind as exists in the Federal Government. There are those
who say it's the finest. I happen to believe these days that the elocution of this
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country has become so shrill and so full of hyperbole that I would like to bring
mine down to something that I can stand by. I believe it to be a good program.
Let's take our insurance program, for example. Our own hospitalization
plan is unique in that it is tailored to our experience and needs. It offers
comparable benefits at a cost lower than our major competitor's and most
importantly claims are processed by Agency personnel who provide a quicker
and more judicious settlement than is frequently the case when dealing directly
with the compani In IMay of this year the Agency's term life insurance benefit
increased 80% at no additional cost, so that $15 per month now purchases
$36, 000 of insurance, The $3, 000 insurance for each eligible dependent is
an improvement of 300970 over the previous limit, again at no extra cost,
The Educational Aid Fund was created to respond, at least in part, to
another employee need- -to assist deserving children of Agency employees
in meeting some of the costs of a college education. In 1969 the Fund received
86 requests for financial aid and was able to award 34 grants of $500 each, This
helped, of course, but we need to do more and we are now in the initial stages
of deciding how to go about seeking to raise at least $500, 000 from private dona-
tions. Such a financial base would enable the Fund to increase the number of
grants as well as the value of each grant,
The Employee Activity Association exists to provide employees with the
opportunity to participate in a variety of clubs and associations. Approximately
5,600 employees now participate in 45 recreational clubs, have access to EAA's
ticket service which accounted for $64, 000 in ticket sales in 1969 alone, and may
purchase in the EAA store various kinds of merchandise at discounts ranging up
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to 40570.
The Agency's Public Service Aid Society is an institution to which employees
gravely in need of financial help can turn for both counseling and assistance. At
the present time over $100, 000 is on loan without interest to 112 employees who
had exhausted all other means of assistance and who confronted acute personal
problems such as sudden death in the family or extraordinary medical bills.
Many of you are familiar with the scope and nature of assistance rendered
in our retirement activity. The Agency's pre-retirement counseling program was
a pioneering effort in this field and preceded by several years the Civil Service
Commission's program, We make every effort to support and counsel the
prospective retiree, not only in preparing him for the inevitability of retirement
but also to permit him to retire with security and with confidence in his future.
I doubt that many of you realize the amount of time the Agency spends daily
in providing compassionate assistance to employees and their dependents. Repre-
sentatives of the Office of Security, Medical Services, and Personnel are on call
around the clock to respond to Agency employees and their dependents who have
problems o 400 calls per month are received on the Agency's emergency security
telephone extension, 6161, and they include such difficulties as urgent medical
problems, missing persons, encounters with the police, critical need for funds,
use of dangerous drugs, and overseas employee emergencies, Since July of last
year the Office of Medical Services has offered to Agency employees an expanded
program of consultative services. These include such specialties as internal
medicine, psychiatry, and clinical. and vocational psychology. Any employee
may, by virtue of a simple telephone call, arrange for the use of these services,
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The need for such consultation may arrive from the employee's health - -
arise from the employee's health, a family medical or emotional problem,
difficulties in job adjustment, or any matter in which the professional compe-
tence available in the Office of Medical Services may be of assistance.
There are, of course, other such programs which time does not permit
me to enumerate. And in any case, no simple listing adequately communicates
what I believe to be the central message intrinsic to all of these services; that
is, they are a consequence of the collegial spirit which abides in our organization
and the deep professional and personal concern which our employees have for one
another.
I realize that I've rambled a bit this morning. As I said at the outset, I'm
sorry we don't have, or I don't have the time for the questions that I wanted to
have from the floor. But in light of that, we'll try and set up another meeting
like this, or something like it, early on and in the course of this maybe I'll just
answer questions rather than giving any remarks at all.
I hope I've covered some of the subjects this morning in which you're in-
terested. I know that this country is keenly aware of the problems that it faces
and the unease that many of our citizens have about it. I must say that when I
read editorials saying the great problems which are tearing our nation apart,
I worry about the English. I don't imagine the problems are tearing the country
apart, I imagine it's disagreement about the solutions to the problems or some-
thing of this kind that's tearing the country apart.
But we have a very glib way, I'm afraid, these days of trying to deal with
things and I find this as distressing as anything.
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But in the world of intelligence and in this organization we don't have to be
subject to all of the illnesses, if you want to put it that way, of our society.
There's no doubt that the world of the 1970's is going to put us all to the test.
I'm sure it's not going to be a test of survival; we'll survive. Mankind is going
to survive. But he's not going to do it without working and without working hard
at it. Problems of his environment are far more troublesome as the years go by
than the worries about the atomic bomb and whether we're going to be blown up
and whether the ICBM has really stalemated existence as we know it. I don't put
any credence in that at all. I think man can hack it. What disturbs me is how
hard is he prepared to work at it.
Our problem is to face the life that we've got in front of us and stop groaning
about what it might be or what it ought to be. Changes have got to be made. It
seems to me that's abundantly clear. But they're certainly not going to be made
in an atmosphere of emotion and passion and people running around the streets
blowing things up and activities of this kind. I'm saying this to you because I
believe that the CIA by and large presents a cool, objective, and reasoned voice
in Washington. And I would like it to stay that way. Certainly escapism and
hand-wringing and apocalyptic language are going to get us nowhere. They avail
no one of anything.
Please ponder that.
Please let's stay on our course.
Please let's not get over-excited and over-swayed by the cross-currents
of life in the world today. There is a reasonable course, a reasoned course.
And let's us set a good example by staying on it.
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F I L E
18 June 1970
NOTES ON "STATE OF THE AGENCY" ARRANGEMENTS
1. The cameras will be located behind the last row of seats in order
to reduce the "top of the head" angle. They operate so silently that noise
will not be apparent even to people in the rear of the auditorium. Two
cameras are necessary since each film pack will cover only thirty minutes.
The right-hand camera as you face it will cover the initial period and the
left-hand camera the final portion..
2. Except for Colonel White, the Deputies and other most senior
officials will be seated in the rear center of the auditorium.
3. The throat microphone is necessary to get a proper recording
for film and tape purposes. The two microphones permanently mounted
on the lectern will be amplified for the audience and for your hearing of
your own voice.
4. In order to get, the questiomon the sound track and tape and to
ensure that all in the auditorium hear them, please repeat each question
before answering it..
5. In case you need to clear your throat, there will be a carafe
of water and a glass on a small table behind the lectern. It is out of sight
of the camera and close enough to avoid your having to go any distance with
the throat microphone on.
6. It is necessary to cut the air blowers completely in order to have
a good recording. To compensate, but to avoid overheating prior to 1130 hours,
the temperature as people come into the auditorium will be at or a bit below
65 degrees. It is estimated that the temperature will rise at least ten degrees
during the hour.
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~RL L
DD/S 70-2232
8 JUN 197
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director -Comptroller
SUBJECT : The Director's State of the Agency Message
There appears to be some genuine worry among
Agency personnel about the role of the Agency and the U. S. Government
in Southeast Asia in the face of reaction and broadening of difficulties
on the U. S. domestic scene. As I understand it, the worry is reflected
more in the younger personnel and the move into Cambodia has
sharpened this worry, presumably in the same manner it has worried
a number of U. S. citizens in the public scene. In a non-challenging
and in a sincerely loyal way, some questions are being raised orally
on this matter and there are some employees who may be considering
putting their concerns on paper with a view to seeking clarification from
senior Agency management. I would assume that most of these employees
are not privy to the highly controlled information on the current action
in Southeast Asia and the absence of knowledge, except as they see in
the newspapers, is probably stimulating and heightening their concern.
As a further description of this matter and stated somewhat differently,
some of these officers worry a bit about their relationship as intelligence
officers interested in foreign affairs with their concerns as citizens
interested in the domestic scene. I do not think they are challenging the
issue but they are merely seeking some reassurance on a subject that is
troubling many people in the American scene.
While it is recognized that information concerning
it might be helpful and reassuring if the Director could speak in some
degree to this subject in his State of the Agency Message. A voluntary
statement to break the "silence" would be a welcome example to the
employees of the desire of senior management to acquaint them with our
part in matters of intense national concern.
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