INTERVIEW WITH VLAHOS AND SUVOROV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01070R000200850003-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2008
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 2, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200850003-2
RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
Good Morning America STATION WJLA-TV
ABC Network
DATE September 2, 1983 7:00 A.M. GTY Washington, D.C.
DAVID HARTMAN: Yesterday George Shultz, our Secretary
of State announced that -- and I'm quoting -- at 18:26 Greenwich
Mean Time, a Soviet pilot told ground control his target was
destroyed.
Now, that is just one of the details that illustrates
the precision with which, apparently, the United States can
monitor secret Soviet military conversations. The jet was shot
down in a region where the Soviets have strategic military
installations not far from major commercial airline routes.
HARTMAN: Michael Vlahos, former CIA employee, is now
Director of Security Studies at Johns Hopkins University. He
joins us from Washington. And Viktor Suvorov is a pseudonym, as
a matter of fact. You won't see his face. His voice will be
somewhat electronically disguised. He is a Russian defector,
former Soviet military officer. He's written a book called
"Inside the Soviet Army," and he joins us by satellite, live,
from London.
Mr. Vlahos, first of all, why did it take so long for us
to know that this plane was shot down?
MICHAEL VLAHOS: Well, there's a procedure whereby
intelligence that's collected, whether by satellite imagery or
signals itelligence, or what we call comment, interception of
communication transmissions, message traffic, has to be sorted
out. And there's so much, there's such a huge volume of this
kind of intercepted messages coming in to the United States that
the process of filtration and running it through a computer that
Material supplied by Radio N Reports, Inc. may be used for file and reference purposes only. It may not be reproduced, sold or publicly demonstrated or exhibited.
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200850003-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200850003-2
might be able to make some rough determination of what's
important takes some time. And then it has to be analyzed.
Furthermore, the problem can be abetted if the messages
are encrypted and have to be decoded.
So that there is going to be an elapsed period of time,
especially in routine intercepts that we have no prior awareness
of their importance in some specific operational fashion.
HARTMAN: Right.
Is there any reason -- we hear talk today and late last
night about could this have been prevented. I mean, realisti-
cally, the way our intelligence operation works, whether it's
Japan, Korea, United States, any of it, realistically, might this
have been prevented? Could it have been stopped?
VLAHOS: Sure, if you want our military to be on full
alert around the periphery of the Soviet Union, anticipating a
hostile action, a warlike action on their part at all times. In
other words, every time that something like this happens, the
United States is blamed for some kind of intelligence failure or
intelligence lapse. Whereas, in reality, our military can't be
in a position of guaranteeing our security unless we're in a
position close to combat status, where our units are on full
alert.
So, unless you want to start escorting these passenger
liners and having the kind of internal preparations of our
intelligence apparatus to respond immediately to Soviet provoca-
tion, a la the good old days of the Cold War, then you can't
expect that this kind of thing can be prevented in normal
peacetime situations.
HARTMAN: Mr. Vlahos, thank you.
And now let's turn to London, Mr. Suvorov, a Soviet
defector to the West.
Mr. Suvorov, why would the Soviet Union risk an incident
of this nature? What's so important that they would take this
chance, internationally?
VIKTOR SUVOROV: First of all, that area, Okhotsk Sea,
it's extremely important area for Soviet Union. I repeat,
extremely. In that area there is lots of -- it's a place of
deployment of Soviet strategic submarine. There is Komsomolskiy,
city Komsomolskiy, in which way built strategic nuclear sub-
marine.
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200850003-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200850003-2
Also, in that area there is quite a lots of missiles,
like Soviet missiles type 8K84, which have a double capability.
See, it's illegal missile. It's a missile can be ballistic
missile and it can be anti-missile missile. You see, very
concentrated. There is such a missile in that area.
It's also been suggested there may be camps of some
kind, concentration camps, worker camps? Is that true?
SUVOROV: Of course. Oh, yes. In that area, there is,
I know, three very terrible camps. You see, it's at Taria (?),
Akushka (?), Olga (?), Chamor (?), Kalavaria (?). It is a very
important camps in which the prisoners directly involved in a
nuclear production. And aircraft been exactly nearly their
concentration Taria. You see, it is a base of nuclear submarine
and prisoners in that very big nuclear submarine base. They're
involved in a very dangerous job. Yes. They change active zone
of [unintelligible], you see.
So, it is a military secret and it is a political
secret. So Soviet Union cannot have such a risk somebody will
know that, you seek, somebody will make such a photograph, you
see.
So, it's astonishing why they don't shot down that
aircraft two hours, you see. If aircraft appear in that area of
Taria, so it must be immediate action, you see.
Mr. Suvorov, thank you very much for joining us from
London this morning. It's good to have you with us.
SUVOROV: Thank you very much.
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200850003-2