COVERT ACTION IN CENTRAL AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01070R000200740002-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 26, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 7, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2008/06/26: CIA-RDP88-01070R000200740002-5
RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
DATE June 7, 1983 7:30 P.M. CITY Atlanta, Ga.
ANNOUNCER: From Washington, Crossfire. Tonight, covert
action in Central America. The hosts for Crossfire, on the left,
Tom Braden; on the right, Pat Buchanan. In the crossfire,
Stansfield Turner, former Director of the CIA.
PAT BUCHANAN: Yesterday Nicaragua, the government of
Nicaragua expelled three Americans, accusing them of being CIA
agents who attempted to murder the Foreign Minister of Nicaragua
by planting a poisoned bottle of brandy in his cabinet. Today
the United States called that a cock-and-bull story, retaliated
by expelling 21 Nicaraguan diplomats and closing down all six
consulates in the United States.
To talk about that with us tonight, Admiral Stansfield
Turner, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency under
President Carter.
TOM BRADEN: Admiral Turner, in the light of the
poisoned cigars of the past, the dirty tricks that were perpe-
trated during the time before you took over the agency, is it
conceivable, conceivable, that the poisoned-brandy story is true
and that some of the people have reverted -- some of the people
up there in Langley have reverted to their old habits?
ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER: I don't think it's at all
conceivable, Tom, because President Ford, with George Bush as his
CIA Director, issues a direct presidential order in February of
1976 prohibiting anyone in the CIA from even planning assas-
sination, let alone carrying one out. President Carter reaffirm-
ed that order. President Reagan has reaffirmed that order. It's
just against our rules.
Material supplied by Radio N Reports, Inc. may be used for file and reference purposes only. It may not be reproduced, sold or publicly demonstrated or exhibited
Approved For Release 2008/06/26: CIA-RDP88-01070R000200740002-5
 Approved For Release 2008/06/26: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200740002-5
BUCHANAN: You don't believe Bill Casey, who's now
Director of the CIA, or any other CIA person that you knew over
there would authorize or carry any such thing out, do you?
ADMIRAL TURNER: We've got a written presidential rule
against it. And therefore I don't think he would break that at
all. No.
BUCHANAN: All right. So the Nicaraguans, obviously,
they've gotten someone who has been involved with the CIA and
they've hoked up this story about poisoned brandy for poor Father
D'Escoto.
Why would they do such a thing unless they wanted to
provoke some kind of break in relations with the United States?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Oh, I think they're just doing some-
thing to try to make us look bad because we've taken a very
strong stand against them. They're desperate to find ways to
make the United States look like an evil aggressor against them.
BRADEN: But yet, Admiral Turner, you recently said that
you disapproved of the covert operation which Casey and company
at the CIA are now running. A covert operation, I say. Actual-
ly, it's very overt. Maybe that's what's wrong with it.
BRADEN: Tell me, do you think it's possible -- this is
a question we used to worry about when we came out of the OSS
after World War II. Do you think it's possible for a democratic
nation to run large-scale covert operations?
ADMIRAL TURNER: It's not possible since we've esta-
blished congressional and White House oversight of intelligence
if the covert action is highly divisive. If the responsible
members of Congress and the State Department and the White House
who now have to know about covert actions are very, very divided,
particularly Democrat-Republican, politically divided, then
you're not going to keep it a secret.
BRADEN: Because they will leak it. Is that it?
ADMIRAL TURNER: They will leak it. It will leak. Yes.
BUCHANAN: Well, you're talking about the irresponsibi-
lity of certain members of Congress who are going to violate
--what kind of oath do they take when they get secret informa-
tion?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, the word I used was "respon-
sible." What I'm saying is I think these people are very
Approved For Release 2008/06/26: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200740002-5
 Approved For Release 2008/06/26: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200740002-5
responsible.
BUCHANAN: Irresponsible, right?
ADMIRAL TURNER: No, they are very responsible. They
are very good citizens, and they keep secrets normally. But when
it gets highly divisive -- and it was in this case because,
first, we started using Argentinians to carry out the covert
action. Then we, reportedly, started using supporters of
dictator Somoza.
BUCHANAN: According to your logic, Admiral, we get down
to a point -- look, the American people are divided over foreign
policy. The Congress is divided over foreign policy toward
Central America, toward the Middle East, toward the Soviet Union,
toward arms control. Are you suggesting that the President of
the United States really can't use the CIA to advance the policy
he's pursuing because the divisions on the Hill mean that people
will run out and leak things they don't agree with?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I say to you yes. Either on the Hill
or in the White House or in the State Department. Somewhere in
this government, this kind of thing will leak if it is very
divisive.
BRADEN: ...It seems to me there's another factor here,
Admiral. This is a big covert operation, a big one. Even if it
weren't leaked, even if everybody in the Senate Intelligence
Committee and the House Intelligence Committee kept absolutely
mum about something they thought was a very bad idea, wouldn't it
have come out, with -- you've got 7000 soldiers going into --from
Tegucigalpa over the border into Nicaragua. Isn't obvious that
everybody's going to say, "Well, that's got to be CIA. It can be
nothing else"?
ADMIRAL TURNER: There's a real risk. But I have seen
covert actions take place which did not leak. They weren't quite
as extensive as this, perhaps, but fairly sizable. And I think
because the people are responsible on the Hill, if there's
general agreement up there -- it doesn't mean the whole country's
a hundred percent behind it, but it means that these responsible
members of Congress recognize that it's for the national good
--you can keep it a secret.
BUCHANAN: Well, you're saying, Admiral, that the
liberal Democrats who oppose what the President is doing in
Central America are leaking it. And therefore, because they're
going to leak it, we should give them veto power over how the
President uses the CIA.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Now you're putting the words in my
mouth.
Approved For Release 2008/06/26: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200740002-5
 Approved For Release 2008/06/26: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200740002-5
BUCHANAN: No, no. I'm asking you.
ADMIRAL TURNER: ...the liberal Democrats. I'm not
saying who leaked it. I don't know who leaked it. All I'm
saying is it is bound to leak somewhere in this system if there
is such high divisiveness associated with a covert action.
BUCHANAN: So what? Why should we let a bunch of
irresponsibles who can't keep their promise or their commitment
to keep these things secret, why should we let them have veto
power by saying, "Well, they're going to leak it. And if they
leak it, we can't do it"?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, how can you do a covert action
that isn't covert?
ADMIRAL TURNER: That's right. And the Administration
should never have started it because there was never a chance
that it would stay covert.
BUCHANAN: All right. It's not covert. So what?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, then let's go ahead with it.
I'm not opposed to trying to topple the government of
Nicaragua. I'm not opposed...
BRADEN: What you're saying is that you can't do it by
covert operations.
ADMIRAL TURNER: That's right.
BRADEN: All right. Well, then what we should do, if
you follow your line, if we're going to take an action in Central
America against the Sandinista government, we have to go to the
country and say, "We're going to take an action against the
Sandinista government. And it's not going to be run by the CIA.
We're just going to do it."
ADMIRAL TURNER: That's right.
BRADEN: That, in my view, would be the way to do it.
ADMIRAL TURNER: The only chance you've got.
BUCHANAN: I don't see what the problem is, what the
problem is.
BRADEN: The problem is, Pat,...
Approved For Release 2008/06/26: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200740002-5
 Approved For Release 2008/06/26: CIA-RDP88-01070R000200740002-5
BUCHANAN: Hold it. Hold it. Let me ask a question
here, in this sense: that, look, yes, everybody is fairly well
agreed that the CIA is -- the United States Government, through
the CIA, is funding both groups in Nicaragua, or all three
groups, however many there are. This is well-known. There's
objections to it on the Hill. As long as the President is not
prohibited from doing that, what's wrong with just continuing it?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Because the Congress did prohibit him from
overthrowing the government of Nicaragua. The covert action is
limited to stopping the flow of arms.
Now, what's happened is that the dividing line there is
very thin. And already, responsible members of Congress have
accused the CIA of breaking that law. That's hurting the CIA in
its long-term ability to serve this country. And that's an
important institution we shouldn't undermine in this way.
BUCHANAN: Wait a minute, Admiral. Excuse me. That's
not really -- is it really hurting the CIA? The CIA says, "Look,
the President of the United States has authorized us, he's made
the decision, he's told us to put the money in there. And that's
what it's for. That's his objective. That's the purpose. As to
what they're doing down there in Nicaragua, that's their busi-
ness. This is our purpose."
ADMIRAL TURNER: But the CIA was found to have committed
errors in the past, during the 1975 investigations. And now
you've got people standing up and saying, "There they are again
breaking the law." That is hurting. That is hurting the
reputation of the CIA.
Secondly, the Congress is now talking, and the Admini-
stration is about to agree, we understand, to a new rule that
will give the Congress the right to veto in advance any future
covert actions. That's a real setback for the CIA. It's all
come about because of this fiasco over Nicaragua.
BUCHANAN: But it's not going to happen, is it? No
President will agree to that.
ADMIRAL TURNER: I am told that the President and the
White House are about to agree to that in this one instance. And
it's going to set a precedent that...
BUCHANAN: Oh, you mean they will not -- it's not a law,
then. They're not going to allow an operation to be conducted in
Nicaragua unless they get the approval of Congress.
ADMIRAL TURNER: That's correct. And that will be
something the Congress will follow through and pass a law saying,
Approved For Release 2008/06/26: CIA-RDP88-01070R000200740002-5
 Approved For Release 2008/06/26: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200740002-5
"You must tell us in advance of all covert actions."
BRADEN: Isn't it true, Admiral, that if -- I'm trying
to follow your point. But I think what you're telling us is that
if that goes through as a precedent, then it will be very
difficult for a future Director of the CIA to run any covert
operations.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Not any, but certain ones where you
just can't afford to tell 30 or 40 more people, not only in the
Congress, but even in the CIA, what you're doing.
BUCHANAN: Well, what you're saying, Admiral, look...
ADMIRAL TURNER: When people's lives are at risk, for
instance, Tom, you won't go out and say, "Stick your life on the
line. I'm going up and tell 30 or 40 people about this."
BUCHANAN: Admiral, what you seem to be saying is, look,
the CIA can't conduct covert operations that are large.
ADMIRAL TURNER: I'm not sure that's entirely true. I
BUCHANAN: Well, if it's large in Central America, it's
going to be known that it's CIA. As Tom says, 7000 guys go
plowing across the border. They just haven't got together on the
weekend. Somebody's organized them, trained them, given them
weapons.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, I think there have been other
operations take place that were just as large and have been kept
secret.
BUCHANAN: You say the problem, then, is the political
division. Okay?
ADMIRAL TURNER: That's one of the problems. Yes.
BUCHANAN: All right. Well then, does the President not
need -- if the CIA should not do it, it should keep its new
image, doesn't the President need some sort of instrument to
handle situations like Nicaragua that's not somewhere between
letting them do what they want to do down there to us and sending
in the Marines?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, the other point here is that
Nicaragua isn't that important to us, Pat. We have used a tool
here that should be reserved, for instance, as a much greater
significance.
Approved For Release 2008/06/26: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200740002-5
 Approved For Release 2008/06/26: CIA-RDP88-01070R000200740002-5
BUCHANAN: Hold it, Admiral. Ronald Reagan says
Nicaragua is important to us; that if Central America goes, the
whole position of the Western Hemisphere goes.
ADMIRAL TURNER: That doesn't make it true, you know.
BUCHANAN: I know. But he's the President. He was
elected, and he's the one to set policy. And the CIA is an
instrument for carrying out that policy.
Now, do you dis -- your problem, is it not, is with Mr.
Reagan's policy?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Oh, I think his policy is very wrong
with regard to making Nicaragua an El Salvador this much of a
cause celebre. It's wrong, in part, because I think he's going
to lose. I think the odds of being able to keep El Salvador from
going Marxist are not good. And he's now committed the national
reputation...
BRADEN: Okay. When we get back -- when we get back, I
want to hear from Admiral Turner as to why he thinks Reagan is
wrong and what we should do instead.
BUCHANAN: Welcome back to Crossfire, where our guest is
Stansfield Turner, Admiral Turner, former Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency [technical difficulties] covert operations.
Admiral, before the break you were talking about the
importance of Central America. Now, here's what Ronald Reagan
says, and I gather believes: Nicaragua is a Soviet, Castroite
base camp in Central America. It's being used as [technical
difficulties] Central America, in all probability, is going with
it. And it's going to be a great strategic defeat of the United
States, affecing our policy around the world.
Now, you don't think that's right?
ADMIRAL TURNER: No, I don't think that's accurate. The
parts of Central America that are really important to us are
Mexico and Panama. The other countries in between are of rather
secondary importance.
What you need to do, then, is buttress those countries,
strengthen economically, socially. And you can't do that by
appearing to be on the side of the supporters of former dictator
Somoza in the Nicaraguan...
BRADEN: Well then, let me follow up on that, Admiral.
Approved For Release 2008/06/26: CIA-RDP88-01070R000200740002-5
 Approved For Release 2008/06/26: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200740002-5
What would you do, given the situation in Nicaragua, where,
obviously, they are getting large arms supplies from the Soviet
Union and are building a vast army for a small state? What would
you do?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I would, again, concentrate first on
getting Panama and Mexico into a sound an ecnomic and social
situation as I could, so they can resist any overthrow from these
other countries.
Secondly, I think we should continue what we're doing in
places like El Salvador, strengthening their government, helping
them economically in particular, but putting a lot of pressure on
El Salvador to clean up their own government situation.
ADMIRAL TURNER: And then I'd try to contain Nicaragua
all you can.
BUCHANAN: Admiral, how is -- everybody would like to
see El Salvador, the human rights situation cleaned up. But how
can you go about building a sound economy in a place like El
Salvador when the guerrillas have destroyed something like $100
million worth of property in an impoverished country like that?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, how did you get the guerrillas in
the first place? Because the country was so inequitable,
socially and economically. You've got to attack both of them at
once.
But the basic point I'm making to you is it's a very
difficult proposition, and the President isn't likely to win this
one. And he's committed himself to winning.
BUCHANAN: You mean, Admiral, that those guerrillas up
there in the hills, armed by Castro and indirectly by the Soviet
Union, are fighting against social injustice?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes. There is social injustice,
economic injustice, human rights injustice in El Salvador. It's
not unusual in that part of the world.
BUCHANAN: And hwat has a Castroite guerrilla movement
ever done, communist guerrilla movement, when it's succeeded, to
eliminate social injustice and poverty?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Not a thing. And that's one of our
salvations down here. The Sandinistas are Marxists. They're
supported by the Cubans in Nicaragua. And look, they've only
been there three-four years, and what have they got? They've got
Approved For Release 2008/06/26: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200740002-5
 Approved For Release 2008/06/26: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200740002-5
dissatisfaction within their own government. They've got
defectors from the Sandinista government who are fighting against
them. Nicaragua...
BUCHANAN: With our help.
ADMIRAL TURNER: No. Even without that. The people in
the south, Eden Pastore has not had any help from us, maybe until
recently. But they were genuine defectors from the Sandinistas
because Marxism, Cuba, the Soviet Union cannot satisfy the
economic, social aspirations of the Central American countries.
BUCHANAN: Admiral, it can't satisfy the social or
economic aspirations of Chinese or Russians or Poles or Cubans or
Hungarians or Afghans or anybody else.
ADMIRAL TURNER: That's probably true.
BUCHANAN: How has that ever helped one of these people
to throw off a communist yoke once it's been imposed?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, the Sandinistas are in trouble.
BUCHANAN: They're in trouble because we're aiding the
rebels to overthrow them.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Oh, no. They were in trouble before
BUCHANAN: All right. You tell me this: How do you
think impoverished people in Nicaragua, without weapons, can
overthrow a government supported by the Soviets and Cubans, which
has 25,000 soldiers and 50,000 militia?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I'm not all that interested in over-
throwing that government. It's destabilizing itself. They're
going to have a lot of problems. And we can contain that problem
and not get ourselves enmeshed in this this way.
BRADEN: You said recently that -- just now, as a matter
of fact -- that a covert, a big covert operation, or I guess any
covert operation, has to have strong backing from the public,
from the general public.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, it has to...
BUCHANAN: A covert operation, strong backing from the
public?
BRADEN: Otherwise it might leak.
Approved For Release 2008/06/26: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200740002-5
 Approved For Release 2008/06/26: CIA-RDP88-01070R000200740002-5
BUCHANAN: [Laughter] Otherwise it might leak?
BRADEN: Wait a minute. What I'm saying is if you did
tell the public what it was, they would support you.
ADMIRAL TURNER: That's right. That's right. There'd
be general support. Not a hundred percent support. You'll never
get that.
BRADEN: Which leads me to this question: What covert
operations do you conceive of that the public of the United
States, if they were told about it, would save, "Three cheers for
you"?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, let's say we could use covert
action to overthrow Khomeini, particularly when he was being even
more obnoxious to the United States, holding our hostages. Don't
you think the country would have united behind that?
ADMIRAL TURNER: We just didn't have the capability to
do it covertly, with a covert action. But it certainly, I think,
would have had almost unanimous support in this country.
BRADEN: But you had a heck of an operation going on
over there. I understand that the CIA people were ready to get
those prisoners out and take them on to a good secret place.
ADMIRAL TURNER: As an ex-CIA man, you know we don't
talk about what we talk about or planned.
BRADEN: But I want to congratulate you. I hear it was
a great operation.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Thank you.
BUCHANAN: Let me -- when the congratulations are going
around on the Iranian thing -- Dr. Brzezinski and there are
others who seem to indicate that the CIA was caught -- when you
were in charge of it, was caught flat-footed by what happened in
Iran, when the Ayatollah came to power, and that it really
misread the situation; and that President Carter, at the time
--correct me if I'm wrong...
ADMIRAL TURNER: We're the only ones who supplied
Brzezinski with information, were we?
BUCHANAN: No. Brzezinski's was the President's
National Security Adviser. And I believe he said in his book
that the President of the United States was deeply dissatisfied
Approved For Release 2008/06/26: CIA-RDP88-01070R000200740002-5
 Approved For Release 2008/06/26: CIA-RDP88-01070R000200740002-5
with the intelligence he was getting on Iran when you were
Director. Is that true?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I don't think that's quite true.
ADMIRAL TURNER: That's not what Brzezinski says, even.
He says that he wrote that note that said the President was
dissatisfied.
BUCHANAN: Was the President curt or short with you
BUCHANAN: He was not. Okay. 'Cause I'm doing this
from memory. There was criticism of -- all right, let me ask you
the question about...
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well now, I don't want to say that I'm
proud of what we did in Iran, Pat. We didn't do as well as we
should have.
BRADEN: Intelligence-wise.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Intelligence-wise.
BUCHANAN: That's the biggest debacle in recent memory
in the United States.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Oh, no. That's not nearly the biggest
debacle, from an intelligence point of view. I'm not talking
about the whole country.
You know, predicting coups and revolutions is not the
primary function of intelligence. We'd like to be able to do
that. But telling the decision-makers where the long-term trends
are leading. If we had told them in the last minute that the
Shah was going to fall, there's nothing they could have done. The
mistake we made was two and three years ahead of time --partly on
my watch. I'm not trying to absolve myself -- where we didn't
warn them that the undercurrents were as deep and as strong as
they were.
BUCHANAN: Let's exonerate individuals and tell us, why
did the CIA, generally, fail there?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Because we made a bad assumption. The
Shah had tremendous military power and police power. We knew
there was a lot of opposition stirring to him. But we assumed
Approved For Release 2008/06/26: CIA-RDP88-01070R000200740002-5
 Approved For Release 2008/06/26: CIA-RDP88-01070R000200740002-5
that when the time came, he would step in with that police power,
that military power, and he would crush the budding revolution.
The Shah did not do that.
BUCHANAN: All right. As a former intelligence individ-
ual who knows -- who can see trends, which way is Central America
going? Communist?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I think that it will go more Marxist,
yes. Not all the way into the communist camp. They know they
can't afford that. That's why the Sandinistas have not gone all
the way to Marxism, to communism in their country. They know
they've got to be under the economic support of the United
States. The Soviets are not going to support them.
BRADEN: Why is the CIA -- what's in your book that the
CIA wants to censor?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, that's been most exaggerated. And
a week ago today, the CIA and I agreed that the seven chapters I
have written are cleared, are ready to go. I've turned them over
to public people now. I had to take a few things out to get that
agreement which I still don't think are classified. There's some
disagreement on that. I'm appealing that to Director Casey, and
we'll see whether I can put some of those back in. But we have
basic agreement that the text is unclassified.
BUCHANAN: Okay.
BRADEN: All right. I hope Director Casey won't take a
dim view of what you said tonight and withhold anything from you.
We want to thank you, Pat and I, Admiral Turner, for
being our guest on Crossfire tonight.
BUCHANAN: Tom, one thing I was glad Admiral Turner did,
because there's probably some lingering suspicion out there in
this country from the '70s, is knock down the idea as preposter-
ous that the Central Intelligence Agency would try to poison with
a brandy drink the distinguished Foreign Minister of Nicaragua,
my old classmate, Father D'Escoto. What's the point?
BRADEN: It would be a very stupid operation. And I'm
sure he's right that it wasn't undertaken.
But I thought that Turner was very interesting, Pat, on
the fiasco that's going on down there across the border with
Honduras. I just can't conceive how after the Bay of Pigs and
Approved For Release 2008/06/26: CIA-RDP88-01070R000200740002-5
 Approved For Release 2008/06/26: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200740002-5
after so many other things we would try to put seven or eight
thousand, I guess maybe up to ten thousand, men across the border
and then say we didn't do it.
BUCHANAN: Tom, simply because Jack Kennedy failed, for
a lack of nerve, at the Bay of Pigs does not necessarily mean
Ronald Reagan lacks nerve or that he's going to fail. This is...
BRADEN: The operation is already blown, Pat. It's
already a failure. It is not a covert operation.
BUCHANAN: Tom, simply because the operation is no
longer covert, is blown does not mean it's a failure. We'll find
that out in the future. Have high hopes.
BRADEN: Except that the Constitution of the United
States says if we're going to have a war, we have to declare it.
Approved For Release 2008/06/26: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200740002-5