ABC NIGHTLINE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01070R000200720003-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2008
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 1, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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ABC NIGHTLINE'
1 June 1983
KOPPEL. The'White House had no comment. The CIA had no
comment, and the State Department went only a hair further. 'We
don't comment on intelligence activities,' said state, 'but as a
matter of policy, it is not the policy of the government of the
United States to overthrow the government of Suriname.' That
was all in response to a report by Carl Bernstein on this
broadcast last night. In that report Bernstein quoted
congressional sources as claiming that CIA Director William
Casey told the House and Senate Intelligence Committees last
December of a covert. CIA plan to overthrow the government of
Suriname. In the face of heated congressional opposition, the
plan was reportedly. dropped. Today the New York Times reported
that its independent sources had confirmed that story and
Bernstein reports that other congressional sources have now also
confirmed it. A little later in this broadcast we will talk
with Henry Kissinger, Richard Allen and Stansfield Turner about
the pros and cons of covert activity. But first, Fred ?ia rte, a
leader of the Council for the Liberation of Suriname. hr.
?carte, the conditions in your country-you claim they are even
worse than we have heard. How bad are they? ?iARTE: Well, Ted,
they are very bad because to look at the Suriname situation, one
should view them on two levels. The first is the level of the
national unit in which we have to do, we are confronted with
armed bands in a fragmented state which are terrorizing the
majority of the people of Suriname. Now, 99% of the Suriname
people are against these armed bands, and it is a matter of fact
that conditions are far worsen, worse than we've, you've heard
here.
KOPPEL: Had you heard,,let me just ask you first of all whether
you had heard, and I mean has the CIA for example, been in touch
with you or any of your collegues,'about providing assistance?
hARTE: No, we don't, we know nothing whatsoever about CIA and
CIA contacts. We are trying to liberate Suriname from
(inaudible) in fact criminals, and we are determined to do that,
and we have embarked on this course.
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KOPPEL: Realistically speaking, is that the kind of thing you
can do on your own? MARTE: Well-certainly not. That, I think
that, as I said to you already. 99. of the Suriname people are
against this regime in Suriname, and I'm sure that the Suriname
people will react on a certain moment against it. But if you
permit me, because I was not here last night when }ieidweiller
and Bishop were on in the studio.
KOP?EL: You're speaking of the Ambassador of Suriname to the
United States and the Prime Minister of Grenada. ?RTE: Yes.
sir. Well first of all. the ambassador said that Suriname was
at the brink of racial violence and trouble in that country and
that s why the military moved in, but that's not true. not at
all, and the Suriname ambassador was the one L.,hc said this
because one of the most vrecious export products is the fact
that we Surinamers can cope peacefully with each other.
KOPPEL: Forgive we for interrupting because I'm going to try
and focus on the subject that we're going to be discussing
tonight and you can be helpful to me if you would. The question
we're talking about is covert action and the CIA's role in that.
From your point of view, and you are someone who, would like to
see the current government in your own country overthrown, is it
the kind of thing that you would like to see, would you want to
see covert help from the CIA? MARTE: Well as a matter of fact,
we've talked to a lot of people, a lot of governments. The
point is that because the situation in Suriname is that serious
that whatever it comes from, ,it doesn't mean that I am allowing
that I am saying that the CIA has been in touch with the
council. I know nothing whatsoever about that kind of a-
contact, but you can say yes, that if we can get help to
liberate the Suriname people we can get, we will get from every
source we can. But that dosn't necessarily mean that the CIA
has been in touch with us.
KOPPEL: I understand. Mr. Marte, thank you for joining us this
evening. In a moment the history of covert CIA intervention in
other countries since the end of World War II. Our guests will
include former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, as we discuss
whether such activities are an appropriate part of U.S. foreign
policy; and later, the West reaps the disastrous spring floods
and mudslides sown by last winter's record snow.
KOPPEL: Nearly everybody does it. Throughout modern history
major world powers have engaged in secret activities to further
their own national interest--covert actions that fall into a
gray area somewhere between diplomacy and warfare. For the
United States, covert actions are not new, but they have always
been the object of debate. The issues: are such activities
effective, and even if they are, should a democracy use such
methods? Nightline correspondent Betsy Aaron looks at the
record.
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AARON: The year was 1953. Iran's Prime Minister Mohammed
Mossadegh was jailed, the government overthrown, the Shah
reinstated. The CIA was involved. The year was 1954. Jacobo
Arbeaz. president of Guatemala, resigned. His government
collapsed. The CIA was involved. There was CIA activity in
Indonesia in the '50s, in Laos and Vietnam in the '60s. Angola
in the '70s, assassinations in which the CIA was involved,
Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, *Lumumba of the Congo.
Chile in 1972: failing to prevent President Salvador Allenda's
election, the CIA launched a year-long operation to unseat him.
On September 11. 1973. he was out and dead. Cuba rates a whole
book on CIA activity--five know; plots to assassinate Fidel
Castro and in .pri 1. 1961. the Bay of Pigs . an army of Cuban
refugees, trained, armed and guided by the CIA. (Network
difficulties)...but not tc an end to covert operations in Cuba,
in the Caribbean or in Central and South America. After all. we
in the United States had and still have a large stake in what
happens in, part of the voric. So said Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles in June, 1954, speaking on radio and
television following Arbenz's overthrow in Guatemala. JOHN
FOSTER DULLES: (June, 1954 Film Clip): The United States
pledges itself to support not merely political opposition to
communism but to help to alleviate conditions in Guatemala and
elsewhere which might afford communism an opportunity to spread
its tentacles throughout the hemisphere.
AARONS: Dulles in 1954; Reagan in 1983, speaking to a joint
session of Congress. PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN: The national
security of all the Americas is at stake in Central America. If
we cannot defend ourselves there, we cannot expect to prevail
elsewhere.
AARON: Given that premise, reports of covert activities against
the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua are not surprising.
UNIDENTIFIED REPORTER (Film Clip, February 18, 1982): Have you
approved of covert activity to destabilize the present
government of Nicaragua? REAGAN: Here again this is something
upon which in national security interest I just, I will not
comment.
AARON: In December, 1982, the House Intelligence Committee
under Chairman Edward Boland passed the Boland Amendment
prohibiting U.S. aid used for the purpose of overthrowing the
government of Nicaragua. Ever since then the Congress and the
administration have been battling that one out, what monies are
being used for what activities to overthrow or destabilize what
government to protect whom from whom in Nicaragua. REAGAN:
(April 14 Film Clip): We are not doing anything to try and
overthrow the Nicaraguan government. We are complying with the
law, the Boland Amendment, which is the law, with anything that
we are doing that is aimed at interdicting supply lines and
stopping this effort to overthrow the El Salvador government.
REP. GERRY STUDDS (Foreign Affairs Committee): The covert
activities being engaged in uncovertly by this administration
cannot be justified. .
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AARON: Back in 1974 the CIA was rocked by revelations of
domestic and foreign spying. The next year three committees
were formed to investigate those activities. As a result, the
CIA must now notify Congress of all covert actions, and during
the four years of the Carter administration covert actions were
kept to a bare minimum. With the arrival of the Reagan
administration times have changed. In addition to Nicaragua
there are allegedly actions underway in at least four countries,
actions never officially admitted. Take Afghanistan; there is
word. all unofficial, that we are arming the rebels. Here the
president meets with Afghan fighters in the White House. And
then there is Libya and our not so secret desire to see Khadafy
disappear somehow, and Cambodia and?Iran and Ayatollah Khomeini.
Back in February. 1982, on this program Sen. Joseph Biden. a
member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said: SEN. JOSEPH
BIDEN: There is not any great covert action going on that I an
aware of unless we are not being told the truth in the
committee.
AARON: Today Sen. Biden says his statement was correct at the
time, and he has no commment beyond that. Betsy Aaron for
Nightline in New York.
KOPPEL: 'Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Libya, Iran. Is undercover
subversion the way the United States government should be trying
to get what it wants in such countries? We'll discuss that
question in a moment as we,talk with, among others, Former
Secretary of State Henry.Kissinger and Former National Security
Adviser Richard Allen. Later we'll focus on the disastrous
floods and mudslides in the West. We'll talk about the factors
this spring that caused them.
KOPPEL: The question whether the CIA's covert activities are
effective, and even if they are, are they the sort of thing a
democracy should be engaged in? With us now live to discuss
that question from our New York studios, former secretary of
state and Former National Security Adviser Dr.\Henry\Kissin.lter?
from our Washington bureau Former National Security Adviser
Richard\Allen; and from our affiliate WJB in Baltimore,
Republican\Congressman\William\Goodling of Pennsylvania, a
member of the house Intelligence Committee. Congressman, let me
begin with you and have you tell us just what power it is that
your committee has over the CIA, if any. Are they required to
do anything beyond inform you? GOODLING: Well, they not only
have to inform us, but they have to get their money from us to
do whatever it is they want to do, and so I would think that
we're rather powerful and influential as far as the CIA is
concerned.
KOPPEL: That you must be, but the money is a wholesale
operation, not retail. They don't come to you operation by
operation, do they? GOODLING: No. they don't, but they can
soon have their supply cut off as a matter of fact. Nothing is
secret. I don't think there can be a covert activity in the
United, carried on by the United States.
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KOPPEL: Isn't there a rather large discretionary fund that is
available to the director of the CIA over which you have no
control? GOODLING: but it isn't very long until we would find
that out, and a;., the mood of the Congress is such that that
fund, too, would be taken care of.
KOPPEL: All right, let me have, if you can give it to me. your
general attitude toward covert actions. What do you think
justifies them? What do you think should cause then to be
called off? GOODLING: Well, first of all, if the purpose of
the covert activity is to destabilize an existing government.
then I think it's morally wrong.?and I think it's stupid foreign
policy. There ar.e many other opportunities for covert activity,
for instance if i country _s -anvaoec or is a country
feels that they will be invaded and they wish to go the covert
route, or if we think it's in our best interest to go that way,
then I think it would be justified.
KOPPEL: Well, now short of destabilizing a government, what
kinds of operations then are you saying Congress might approve,
or you personally would approve? GOODLING: Well, I would
approve, ah.... For instance, you talk about Afghanistan.
Afghanistan is a country that has been invaded. I consider that
totally different than an existing government that we might be
trying to destabilize.
KOPPEL: Then I suppose the, question would have to be, and let
me ask it of you first, and then I'll go to our other guests.
Why, if it is that clear-cut a manner, don't we just simply do
it openly? Why don't we just say, 'Fine, were going to support
the rebels?' GOODLING: Simply because some countries find it
very difficult to openly do things of that nature. Poltically
it is not the way they want to go. Sometimes politically it
isn't in our best interest to overtly do those kind of things,
and therefore you go the covert route.
KOPPEL: Do you have, or did you have when you were secretary of
state, when you were national security adviser, any guidelines
in your own head as to what it is that warrants covert action
and what does not? KISSINGER: Before I answer that question I
think I would like to point out some inaccuracies in the film
that preceded these questions. It is my impression that the
Senate investigating committees found out that the united States
was not involved in assassination attempt, assassination
attempts, and, ah, the film left the impression that the united
States was. The cases that were mentioned were in an
administration which I didn't serve, but I think it is important
to find thi' out.
KOPPEL: Well, ah. the two cases that I think were, were
mentioned were,.was it Trujillo and Lumumba. KISSINGER: That's
correct.
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KOPPEL: And there's an excellent book, as you know. by the wife
of a friend-of both of ours, by "hadelaine Kalb on the Lumumba
subject which seems to indicate quite clearly that the CiA was
involved. KISSINGER: Well, ah, my recollection is that the
Church committee which looked into this found to the contrary,
but I haven't read the Kalb book, and I, ah. I can't comment on
that.
KOPPEL: All right. As to the, as to the.... KISSINGER: Nor
did I have guideline! in my mind as to what could or could not
be done. There was a committee in my-day, and I'm sure there's
a committee today of an interdepartmentcl nature, which acted on
recorimendations for covert action. 'These were generally in an
area in which, that fell between formal diplomacy and, ah,
where, or '?herc military action was appropriate. FOr example:
in many parts of the world there are communist-supported
newspapers. There are all kinds of front organizations, and we
thought it, appropriate that those forces that could support a
democracy-had an opportunity to receive funds and where, if they
received official governmental funds they would not be able to
be effective. This was one sort of guideline. When you get to
the destabilization of existing governments, you get to the
borderline, and I agree with the congressman. There is
nevertheless an area where if some country is of vital
importance to the United States and where if it becomes, if it
falls under communist control or Soviet control or Cuban control
it would threaten the national security of the United States,
then we have to look to the most effective means in which we can
protect the national security of the United States, and it's
very difficult to make abstract rules about this in advance.
KOPPEL: Well, let me ask you a specific question then, and I
think I can ask it of you freely because you, you clearly are
not involved in what this administration is doing. Would the
case of Suriname fall under such a guideline? Would that.....
Would that seem to be the sort of government that requires
covert action to destabilize? KISSINGER: Well, I don't know
too much about Suriname..as such, but if the administration came
to the conclusion that Suriname was on the verge of falling
under Cuban control, and in light of the fact that the rule of
Suriname had murdered all possible opposition, I would not be
offended by the fact that the United States would prevent, seek
to prevent another Cuban beachhead in Latin America.
KOPPEL: That raises then a question that perhaps has no part,
or perhaps it should in foreign policy, and that is the question
cf morality. Let me ask it first of you Dr. Kissinger and then
of Richard-Allen. Where does, where does morality come in in
all of this? KISSINGER: Well, ah, we have to believe that the
defense of democratic values-and of free institutions in the
world is a mo=al objective, and therefore, if our government in
its, on the pages of its firmest convications comes to the view
that freedom is threatened or the American national security is
threatened, then it has to look for the most appropriate means
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to defend it. Nov. obviously you can make fun of this, and
obviously one can, ah, one, there are borderline cases, and it
should be done with great care, but the issue of morality I
would define in these terms.
KOPPEL: When you speak of defending the free institutions and
you speak. of it in the context of using methods that, that must
seem repugnant to some Americans, isn't there an internal
conflict there? KISSINGER: Of course. In World War II
Churchill supported Stalin against Hitler. He consider Stalin
the lesser of two evils. Sometimes political leaders find
themselves in the position whereOtheir only choice is among
evils. Nor do I say that every time something happens that we
do not like we should resort to covert action, nor should all
core.-t actions be lumped in one categcr~?. but if after the most
prayerful consideration we conclude that there is an actual
serious threat to the survival.of free institutions in the
world, then I would consider covert actions one of the
instruments.'that, ah, that, that we should, that we should have
at our disposal.
KOPPEL: hr. Allen, when you were national security adviser, how
did you resolve in your own mind this conflict between what is
moral and what is perhaps practical or necessary from a foreign
policy point of view? ALLEN: I think people in positions of
power must always have the circumstances of morality clearly in
mind when they make decisions of this type. I'd like to point
out that this administration, at least at its outset, and I.
believe it still exists as a functional pattern, had an
appropriate committee, an inter-agency committee that carefully
considered all of the details attended to any covert action.
This group, a very small group, met with the president, the vice
president and the other relevant members of the Cabinet and
other advisers as required, carefully went over the details in
each and every instance, whereupon the president would, if he so
chose, sign a finding, and that finding would be communicated to
the approriate committees of Congress by the director of Central
Intelligence. This is not something that's done willy-nilly,
Ted. It's not something that, ah, that necessarily involves the
use of undemocratic or violent means, and I, I think perhaps the
implication and the constant question of somehow everything that
is done in the name of covert action is immoral or borders on
immoral leaves the, the casual listener with the wrong
impression.
KOPPEL: Well, let me, let me be a little more specific, then,
and forgive me if I come back to Suriname once again because as
you suggest, that is precisely what happened according to
reports that we have. not oniy ours but also The New York Times
reports the president did sign off, and Director Casey did go to
the respective committees before the house and the Senate, and
they were aghast and almost unanimously in both cases rejected
the proposal. Now that clearly raises in my*mind something more
than just this rather naive public reaction to something that
perhaps people don't understand. ALLEN: I'm not suggesting
it's naive, but there may indeed have been a, a program which
the administration thought feasible which might have involved,
MV77WT)7Q
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under the guise of covert action, under the rubric of covert
action support for forces that would oppose the government in
Suriname. That may have been justified in the circumstances,
and I believe the situation in Suriname ever since the present
group took over in 1980 has been one of steady deterioration. I
don't say that Suriname is absolutely vital to our national
security or that a continued leftist movement or lurch in
Suriname is going to threaten Brazil or Venezuela. but 1 think
there is a legit:=ate interest in preventing, as henry Kissinger
has accurately pointed out. a new beachhead in this herisphere.
KOPPEL: All right. Gentlemen, let's take a break. We'll
continue our discussion in a moment when we'll be joined by a
man who used to be in charge of the CIA's covert activities as
well as its other operations, former CIA Director Stansfield
Turner.
KOPPEL: Joining us live now from our Washington bureau,
Admiral\Stansfield\Turner, former director of the CIA under
President Jimay Carter. Under your administration, Admiral
Turner, there was less of a reliance, unless I'm mistaken, on
covert action. Why? TURNER: Because in 1975 there were all
these investigations of the intelligence-activities of our
country, and as a result of those there was an aversion to
covert action. When we took over, the larder was bare. It was
built up with the appropriate kinds of covert action over the
years.
KOPPEL: Well, when you say an aversion to it, an aversion
because you didn't have any money for it, an aversion because
you were scared you would be caught, or an aversion because you
didn't think it would work? TURNER: No, I think it was a
public reaction to the Church committee report that led to a
diminishing of covert action.
KOPPEL: There's an internal conflict here, and once again, it
relates to the fact that you're operating within the strictures
of a democracy, and that is ideally, covert action ought to be
undertaken without anybody but the CIA knowing about it, but in
a democracy you can't work it that way, so since that makes it a
little bit impractical, might it not be a good idea just to dump
them all together? TURNER: No. In our democracy we want to
have some oversight, some control over the secret intelligence
activities. We have to find a level of compromise in which
there is enough disclosure to people like the intelligence
committees of the Congress to give oversight and yet enough
secrecy so that these covert actions and other clandestine
activities of intelligence aren't spread all over the
newspapers.
KOPPEL: And how do you feel that that balance is best achieved?
TURNER: I think rt's worked out very well over the seven years
since President Ford opened that up with an executive order in
February of 1976.
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KOPPEL: If it is needed--and obviously national interest
becomes the criterion by which all these things are measured-if
it is needed, does the CIA or should the CIA stop at anything?
TURNER: Yes. There are lots of things the CIA would and should
stop at. All three presidents since 1976 have ruled out any
darning of or participation in assassination. for instance.
ROPDEL: Why? TURNER: It's a firm verboten. I think that i_
just beyond our moral reach.
KOPPEL: Oh, come on, now. I mean, if we're gonna go to war and
we're gonna kill millions of people, why do we shrink from
killing just one person? TURNER: Because your question that
you've been dealing with tonight about morality and covert
action to we comes down to the following. Any nation's going to
do what it needs to preserve its security, but any nation that
is smart is.going to make sure that in preserving its security
it doesn't undermine its basic principles, its democratic
freedoms that we have in our country, and if you start on a
track of assassination, I think you're going to undermine the
foundations of the country that we cherish so much.
KOPPEL: Dr. Kissinger, you have not only been a statesman; you
have not only had to work at this from a practical point of
view; you're a scholar; you're a philosopher on this subject
also--is it something that is indeed appropriate to a democracy
or a democracy is somewhat naive? KISSINGER: No. I think it
is appropriate, but I agree with Admiral Turner that I also
would rule assassination out of bounds, and it was never planned
or considered in any of the administrations in which I served.
KOPPEL: Well, then, tell me why, I mean, let, let me ask you to
address that question. Since we don't draw the line at killing
innocent civilians--I mean, perhaps we try not to, but when
bombs fall, bombs fall. Why this curious sensitivity about the
assassination of one man when it might prevent a war?
KISSINGER: Because for the United States to hire murderers on a
clandestine basis is so contrary to our values that even though
your question may be theoretically correct, it is something that
we cannot in good conscience. carry out as part of a covert
operation. If we want to kill somebody, they. it has to be as an
overt action taken in full public view.
KOPPEL: Well, you've got to explain to me how that's possible.
When do we do that short of war? KISSINGER: We can't do that
short of war.
KOPPEL: All right. So then I suppose, Admiral Turner. I have
to come back to you and say take us down the ladder, de-escalate
for us a little bit. Where is the line drawn? TURNER: You
have to draw the line based on a combination of how serious the
problem is for the United States. The problem with Suriname is
not very serious at all. Covert action is not an appropriate
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tool there. The country does not have that much interest in
doing something in the dirty tricks department. You then.
balance how dirty is the dirty trick you've got to pull against
how critical is the interest of the United States in that
situation. It's a tough judgment. moral, ethical call in each
instance.
i;OPPEL: but I mean, if you're going to do it on the basis of
now large or how critical a country is. you'd have to also rule
out war. wouldn't you? mean. the United States is not going
to oe.lare war on Surir,zriE. so esr:'t have any Cipiomfitlc
wedges or levers to use, why not covert activity? TURNER:
Because it just is not of that great significance to us, because
with the oversight procedures in our country, you should not
undertake a covert action that you can't keep covert, one that
people wouldn't agree on generally. It's going to leak through
the administration or through the Congress.
KOPPEL: All right. TURNER: It's not going to be covert.
KOPPEL: You've raised a very practical consideration, and we'll
pick up on that in a moment when we continue our discussion.
KOPPEL: Continuing our discussion now with Dr. Henry Kissinger,
Richard Allen, Stansfield Turner and Congressman William
Goodling. Congressman, your colleagues must have been a little
bit upset when this story broke on Suriname. I mean, normally
the question that Admiral Turner raised a moment ago, namely
that these kinds of things have a tendency to leak, that's
exactly what makes congressmen bristle, isn't it? GOODLING:
Well, as I said at the beginning, I don't think this country can
carry on a covert activity. We have a certain number of
secretary of states that are colleagues of mine, but they like
to play the game in front of television cameras. We have staff
members who haven't been elected, but they like to be the power
behind the throne, and yes, it makes me bristle because we
shouldn't be on the committee as a matter of fact if we can't
take the confidence that are placed in us and maintain them.
(sic)
KOPPEL: All right. Just to set the record straight, when
Director Casey came before your committee, you weren't on it,
back last December. You only joined in January, didn't you?
GOODLING: I joined in January.
KOPPEL: All right. Let me see if I understand what you just
said, though. You seem to be suggesting we shouldn't be in
covert activities at all because what? GOODLING: No, I never
said that. I said that covert activities to-destabilize
existing governments are wrong morally and bad foreign policy.
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KOPPEL: No, I was asking about the leaks, and you were talking
about some of your colleagues who think the secretary of state,
in other words people who talk too much, right? GOODLING:
That's right. We are placed there because they had the
confidence thet we would keep those things we learned to
ourselves and do the oversight that we're supposed to do and do
it for the other 1435 members, and that's the way it should be.
KOPPEL: Dr. Kissinger, can we deal, with Congress? Can our
administrations deal with Congress and expect that
confidentiality will be maintained? KISSINGER: The record
seems to indicate that we cannot.' On the other hand, if we
cannot, we are going to deprive ourselves of s toci that our
opponents are using in any event much more that. we dc, and which
I consider in many respects essential, so I think the solution
is to tighten up our procedures.
KOPPEL: Richard Allen, how is that done? How does one tighten
up the procedures so that both masters can be served, so that
the government still has that flexibility but the Congress is
kept informed? ALLEN: In my personal view, I think the most
important thing we can do is to begin to build the basis of
genuinely bipartisan foreign policy and take foreign policy and
national security actions, under which covert actions would
necessarily fall, out of the realm of partisan politics. We
have a situation now in which it is extremely difficult to do
business with the Congress simply because there are too many
cooks, so to speak, in the broth, yet there is the
responsibility of oversight. I think that this administration
has taken some wise steps and has created some of the basis for
developing into ultimately a bipartisan foreign policy. I'd
like to see this process continue. Otherwise, I don't know 'how
we can continue, because one party, for whatever reason, may
want to hold the other party up to ridicule and scorn and to
political embarrassment. This is bad business, very bad foreign
policy as well.
KOPPEL: Is it, I don't even know if it's constitutionally
possible, but does it make any sense--you spoke before of the
committee that meets with the president and the vice president.
Would it make any sense to turn that into a bipartisan committee
and have a member of Congress or a couple of members of Congress
sitting on that committee with the president, with the vice
president, with all the members of the intelligence community?
ALLEN: I would think that would be constitutionally very
difficult, and both the administration and the member,
respective members of Congress would resist that, but perhaps
there could be developed certain better mechanisms of
communication that go beyond the, one might say the mere
informing of the members of Congress by the director of Central
Intelligence. ?I-say perhaps because this is a very, very
difficult area. I would say that once the general atmosphere
for creating bipartisan foreign policy in the genuinely national
interest would develop,-then indeed we may have the chance of
greater cooperation in such instances as the one you suggest.
GIJ
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12.
KOPPEL: All right. Admiral Turner, give us a final view, then,
frog, the vantage point of a former director of the Central
Intelligence Agency. Can you or can you not work with Congress?
TURNER: Yes. During my four years, we had almost leaks on the
subject of covert action, but administrations must recognize
that when we established oversight, we in effect forsook the
possibility of doing controversial covert actions, 'cause
controversial covert actions will leak as they have in Nicaragua
and Suriname. There is a limit that we can go to nowadays
because of the oversight process. That's a sacrifice we have
made in order to have oversight.
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