THE AEGEAN DISPUTE: A NEW LOOK AT AN OLD PROBLEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00217R000700070005-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 20, 2009
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: November 5, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
NI IIM 84-10005
5 November 1984
Copy 4 9 0
Director of Secret
Central
Intelligence
The Aegean Disput
A New Look
at an Old Problem
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NI I I M 84-10005
THE AEGEAN DISPUTE:
A NEW LOOK
AT AN OLD PROBLEM
Information available as of 15 October 1984 was
used in the preparation of this Memorandum.
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 9
Overview ........................................................................................... 9
The Problem ................................................................................. 9
The Context: Greeks and Turks ................................................... 9
Issues in Dispute ............................................................................... 10
Overview ....................................................................................... 10
Territorial Seas .............................................................................. 11
Airspace Issues ............................................................................... 13
The Continental Shelf .................................................................. 15
Militarization of Greek Islands .................................................... 17
NATO Issues ................................................................................. 18
Other Bilateral Issues ........................................................................ 20
The Minorities Issue ..................................................................... 20
Cyprus ........................................................................................... 20
Other Players in the Aegean ............................................................ 21
The Soviet Union .......................................................................... 21
Western Europe ............................................................................ 22
The Arab States ............................................................................. 23
Conflict Resolution in the Aegean ................................................... 23
A Comprehensive Approach ........................................................ 23
An Issue-by-Issue Approach ......................................................... 24
Alternative Negotiating Structures .............................................. 24
Optimum Political Conditions for Productive Negotiations ..... 25
Implications for the United States ............................................... 26
ANNEX: Excerpts From Treaties and Agreements Relevant to
Greek-Turkish Aegean Disputes ..................................... 27
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SCOPE NOTE
US policymakers have requested that the Intelligence Community
review the principal issues involved in Aegean disputes between Greece
and Turkey. This Interagency Intelligence Memorandum examines the
evolution of Aegean issues and their legal dimensions, including the
interests and positions of each side, and the way that related issues and
other players complicate efforts to deal with Aegean problems.' It also
evaluates the prospects for resolution and the implications for US
interests. An annex provides citations from additional international legal
documents relevant to the Aegean disputes. Maps depicting the respec-
tive Greek and Turkish claims and showing key US facilities in Greece
and Turkey are included with the main text.
This Memorandum was produced under the auspices of the
National Intelligence Officer for Europe. It was coordinated at the
working level with the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence
organizations of the Department of State and of the Army, Navy, and
Air Force.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Disputes between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean frustrate
NATO's arrangements and exercises on the southeastern flank, compli-
cate US relations with both countries, and constitute a potential casus
belli between these two putative allies. Tensions over Cyprus and
domestic political imperatives in Greece currently dim the prospects for
settlement of Aegean disputes and could increase the chances of
conflict. In case of hostilities, both sides would expect the United States
(and probably NATO) to quickly mediate a cease-fire and disengage-
ment. If Washington's response were considered unsatisfactory, US
access to facilities in either or both countries could be endangered,
hampering important strategic military and intelligence functions. In a
worst case scenario, either ally or both might withdraw from NATO.
Greece's sovereignty over its 2,000 to 3,000 Aegean islands-some
lying as close as 3 miles to the Turkish coast-is not in question.
However, there is a tangle of jurisdictional disputes between Greece and
Turkey over the definition of air and sea rights, the delimitation of the
continental shelf, and the militarization of certain Greek Aegean
islands.2 At stake are the potential exploitation of continental shelf
resources, access to and control over air and sea transit through the
Aegean, and the allocation of NATO command and control responsibil-
ities in the area.
Domestic forces-including public opinion, political interest
groups, and the press-have the potential to support a high level of
tension between Greece and Turkey; whether that tension prevents
progress on Aegean disputes or manifests itself in actual conflict
depends on choices made by the respective leaders.
The near cessation of bilateral talks under Greek Prime Minister
Andreas Papandreou has reduced the chances of compromise, and there
is little prospect for productive talks to begin any time soon. With some
short-lived exceptions, the thrust of Papandreou's policy has been to
curtail bilateral discussions and internationalize the disputes. The
Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence, with the ensuing events
on Cyprus, is perhaps the most serious factor currently sustaining
Papandreou's hardline posture. Papandreou will continue to use the
"Turkish threat," a common concern for Greeks across the political
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spectrum, to deflect attention from deepening domestic economic and
political troubles, to unite the people behind him, and to force the
opposition to mute its criticism or appear weak on the Turkish issue.
In spite of Ankara's frustration with Greek tactics and its isolation
from Western allies on the Cyprus issue, the Ozal government has
followed a low-key policy with Greece on the Aegean, periodically
attempting to draw Papandreou into direct talks. So far this policy has
met with little success. Prime Minister Ozal is likely to continue efforts
to play down Aegean problems, recognizing that conflict with Greece
could endanger his efforts to restructure the Turkish economy, to
improve relations with the European Community, and to obtain
sufficient and continuing US aid for modernizing the Turkish military.
If Greece should make some dramatic gesture having serious implica-
tions for Turkish security interests, Ozal could be expected to respond
decisively, with the full backing of virtually all domestic players,
including the powerful military. For example, Greece's implementation
of its right to extend territorial seas in the Aegean from 6 miles to 12
miles would almost certainly provoke a Turkish naval incursion into the
disputed waters-which would be likely to cause a clash with Greek
forces. Although Greece's recent buildup of its island military forces has
so far provoked only diplomatic protests from Turkey, Ankara could
respond more forcefully to additional buildups.
While we cannot exclude inadvertent clashes that could lead to
wider hostilities, premeditated aggression by either Greece or Turkey
over Aegean disputes is unlikely, in our view. Both countries have
shown a desire to avoid hostilities. Athens is convinced that Ankara's ul-
timate objective is to partition the Aegean and ultimately to challenge
Greece's sovereignty over some of its islands, but at the same time the
Greeks do not want to risk a debilitating conflict. Similarly, Ankara,
although unprepared to legitimize the existing regime in the Aegean,
considers its complex elements to be in a state of fragile equilibrium.
Thus, while conflict between Greece and Turkey is more likely to
stem from a military clash on Cyprus, it could spread to the Aegean and
possibly Thrace-if only because the Greeks recognize Turkey's clear
military advantage in a conflict confined to the island. The Greeks
would have a slight edge in aerial combat in the Aegean, and at a mini-
mum they would hold their own in naval engagements. In the border
area of Thrace, the difficult terrain would be likely to offset the Turks'
manpower advantage, and fighting there would probably end in
stalemate.
Even short of military hostilities, Greek-Turkish differences over
Aegean issues will complicate US relations with Athens and Ankara.
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Both place a high premium on US security assistance. Greece values the
assistance as a means of obtaining military parity with Ankara and for
its potential as a lever on Turkish policy on Cyprus. Turkey, in addition
to its force modernization needs, views aid as proof of the West's
commitment to Turkey as an equal partner in the Alliance. Both view
US aid as a measure of US partiality or pressure. As experience in the
area has demonstrated repeatedly, each country at times questions
Washington's good faith and the value of close relations with the United
States.
The Soviet Union, up to now a marginal player, has important
interests on both sides of the Aegean question, and thus is likely to
continue its efforts to appear above the debate. At the same time,
Moscow will try to exploit the situation by playing on both sides'
disenchantment with the West. On the one hand, it will encourage
Papandreou's disruptive behavior in NATO and European councils and
will try to foster closer relations between Greece and various Soviet
allies. On the other hand, it will court the Turks where possible and en-
courage any signs of Turkish disaffection with the West.
We believe that any efforts by the two parties to reach accommo-
dation on Aegean questions would be aided by initial confidence-
building measures. Ultimately, bilateral comprehensive negotiations
that exploit opportunities for effective trade-offs among diverse issues
offer the best prospect for a general Aegean settlement, given the range
of issues under dispute, their varying impact on Greek and Turkish
interests, and their implicit interconnectivity. Disputes over airspace
and NATO command and control may be more amenable to resolution
than the others. Continental-shelf issues also have some history of
serious negotiations and, now that shelf resources are no longer thought
to represent great riches, could again be the focus of productive talks in
a more hospitable negotiating climate. At the same time, both sides will
be wary of making any precedent-setting compromises on these issues
that might negatively affect their position on others. Finally, disputes
over territorial waters and island militarization appear to be the most
intractable because they affect control of economic lifelines and coastal
defense.
While a good-offices role by the United States, the United Nations,
or other NATO states could facilitate the process, the beginning of a
productive dialogue, let alone hope of a successful outcome, will have to
await an easing of tensions over Cyprus, as well as an improvement in
the political climate in the area. Some sort of confidence-building
measures, such as progress on Cyprus or a renewal of trade and tourism
talks, might ameliorate the mutual distrust.
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In the interim, tensions in the Aegean will remain at best a chronic
irritant in US and NATO relations with Greece and Turkey that will
have to be carefully managed and, at worst, an ember that could ignite
into conflict between these two NATO allies. Should the situation
remain as it is, the United States should be prepared for continuing
instability and persistent demands for intervention: the Turks will want
to expand military assistance and decouple the military aid process
from Aegean/Cyprus questions, and the Greeks will pressure Washing-
ton to hold to traditional aid ratios and terms and to use the military aid
process to force Turkish concessions on Cyprus. Such a climate will
demand skillful crisis management to limit the damage to US and
Alliance interests.
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Greek-Turkish Disputes in the Aegean
Does Greece have the right to claim a 12- Yes. International law recognizes this right. No. A 12-mile zone would close off Aegean
nautical-mile territorial sea in the Aegean? Extension of territorial waters would not international waters and would not be equitable.
interfere with normal navigation.
Must military aircraft flying in Aegean Yes. Military aircraft must file flight plans.
FIR a file flight plans with Greek civilian Athens cites 1944 ICAO treaty clause on
air traffic controllers? safety, other ICAO resolutions.
Is Greece's claim of a 10-mile airspace Yes. Athens declared a 10-mile zone by
around its islands valid? presidential decree in 1931, and Turkey
did not challenge it until 1974.
How should a continental shelf shared by Greek islands are entitled to a continental
two states be delimited? Should islands be shelf according to international law. Pref-
used as basepoints if the equidistance erably, islands should be used as base
method is applied? points.
Militarization of Greek Islands
No. The 1944 ICAO treaty expressly exempts
military aircraft from this requirement.
No. This is a unique claim; it has no basis in
international law or practice.
Many Greek islands sit on the natural prolonga-
tion of the Anatolian shelf. This and other
special circumstances in the Aegean make an
equidistance line based on islands inequitable.
May Greece place regular military forces Yes. If Greek security from "Turkish No. Greece is violating several treaties in so
on islands despite specific treaty prohibi- threat" requires it. doing.
tions?
Can the Greeks militarize the island of Yes. The Montreux Convention supersedes No. Treaty provisions restricting militarization
Limnos? previous convention restricting militariza- were not specifically replaced by Montreux.
tion.
Should the Greek island of Limnos be Yes. Exercises defending the Turkish
included in NATO exercises? Straits should include Limnos.
What arrangements should be made for Turkey should not have security responsi-
Aegean command and control? bilities over Greek territory. Athens wants
return to pre-1974 arrangements (Greek
control of Aegean). Establishment of
NATO's Larisa headquarters must follow
agreement on command and control re-
sponsibilities.
a Flight information regions (FIRs) are air traffic control zones
allotted by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
FIRs are intended to protect the safety of air passengers and do not
represent geographic or legal boundaries.
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No. NATO should continue to leave out areas in
dispute such as Limnos.
Turkey needs a security zone west of FIR line.
SACEUR agreement provides for modification
in pre-1974 command and control arrange-
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DISCUSSION
Overview
1. Disputes between Greece and Turkey in the
Aegean frustrate NATO's arrangements and training
exercises on its southern flank, complicate US bilateral
relations with both countries, and constitute a poten-
tial casus belli between these two putative allies. The
lateral effects of these disputes are pervasive, extend-
ing into NATO's planning and review processes and
generally undermining readiness along the southern
flank. In the event of serious conflict between the two
countries, US access to facilities there could be denied,
hampering important strategic military and intelli-
gence functions as well as undercutting potential US
policy initiatives in the Middle East and Southwest
Asia.
2. Greece's sovereignty over its 2,000 to 3,000 Aege-
an islands-some lying as close as 3 miles to the
Turkish coast-is not in question. However, there is a
tangle of jurisdictional disputes between Greece and
Turkey over the definition of air and sea rights, the
delimitation of the continental shelf, and the militari-
zation of certain Greek Aegean islands. At stake are
the potential exploitation of the resources of the shelf,
access to and control over air and sea transit through
the Aegean, and the allocation of NATO command
and control responsibilities in the area.
3. Each capital believes that the other's current
claims threaten vital national economic and security
interests:
status quo that had been validated by both
precedent and international agreement. They are
convinced that the Turks have designs on this
Greek territory and might at some point use
force to take it.
- The Turks, on the other hand, believe that
Greece wants to make the Aegean into a "Greek
lake," an arrangement that they believe could
give Athens control of commercial transit to
Turkey's western ports, limit Turkey's capacity
to conduct military exercises off its coast, deny
Ankara the right to explore what the Turks
consider their own continental shelf upon which
many of the Greek islands sit, and allow Athens
to use the nearby militarized islands to threaten
Turkey. Ankara argues on the basis of equity in
international law-that is, that the Aegean is a
special case, and that historical and geographical
circumstances require that arrangements be
worked out between the parties with conflicting
claims.
4. Other disagreements-particularly that over Cy-
prus, but also disagreements over the status of respec-
tive minorities-compound the problem. In addition,
the provocative rhetoric of Greek Prime Minister
Andreas Papandreou and, more recently, the Turkish
Cypriot declaration of independence in November
1983 have soured already deteriorating relations be-
tween Athens and Ankara and all but eliminated near-
term prospects for progress on Aegean issues.
- The Greeks want to protect their islands in the
Aegean as part of their historical homeland and
an integral-and economically important-part
of their country; they believe these islands form a
political continuum with the mainland, and that
Greek sovereignty provides the basis for Greek
control of most of the seabed economic resources
and transit rights in the Aegean Sea. Most Greeks
across the political spectrum view Ankara as
seeking to capitalize on the results of the 1974
Cyprus conflict and Greece's withdrawal from
the military wing of NATO by trying to alter a
5. A purely historical and legal treatment of Aegean
disputes would fail to convey the depth of feeling that
the two sides bring to their disagreements. Greek-
Turkish antipathy colors the entire range of relations
between the two, and intrudes into nearly every
activity in which both participate. Over recent years,
it has developed into a sort of rivalry for the support of
international audiences, primarily the United States
and Western Europe, which are the main sources of
economic and military assistance for both Greece and
Turkey. Their common economic interests in areas
such as trade and tourism do not compensate for the
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conflicting claims over the Aegean and a growing
disparity in Greek and Turkish threat perceptions vis-
a-vis the Warsaw Pact.
6. Differences in mutual perceptions strongly affect
the prospects for resolving the outstanding conflicts.
For Greece, Turkey represents a clear and present
danger to Greek territory and Greek interests and is
the center of Athens's foreign policy and security
concerns. These perceptions filter Greek judgments of
US as well as Turkish behavior, and are widely shared
within the elite and the population, making each issue
in contention with the Turks a matter of keen national
interest and high domestic stakes. While the volatility
and unpredictability of the current Greek socialist
leadership exacerbates these attitudes, they did not
create them.
7. For the Turks, disputes with Greece represent
one group within a broader range of foreign policy
problems, many of which are considered more crucial
to Turkey's national interests: military modernization
to meet the potential military threat from the Warsaw
Pact; instability and unrest on Turkey's Middle East-
ern borders; and the prospects for terrorist attacks on
Turkish targets. However, the Turks are wary of
Greek intentions, and Prime Minister Ozal may find
himself subjected to domestic pressures to toughen his
moderate stance toward Athens. Ankara views Papan-
dreou's determination to internationalize the Cyprus
question as an effort to isolate the Turks from Europe
at a time when there is already strong West European
criticism of Ankara's human rights record.
8. A determination not to be perceived as submit-
ting to external influence is a fundamental principle of
both Turkish and Greek foreign policy. Whenever
Ankara or Athens perceives such pressure (especially if
it becomes public) it has demonstrated that it will
sacrifice other objectives in order to resist. Turkey's
perception in recent years of its isolation and alien-
ation from the Western community has only increased
its determination not to yield on issues regarded as
matters of national interest and principle. Greece's
perception of a US and NATO tilt toward Turkey
makes it especially skeptical of Western calls for
compromise.
9. The play of domestic politics makes dispassionate
handling of these Aegean issues all the more difficult.
Regimes disposed to make concessions have rarely
governed in both countries at the same time, a situa-
tion likely to persist. The domestic political costs of
compromise appear great to political leaders. Papan-
dreou has used disputes with Turkey to rally support
when challenged on other issues; he may use them
even more frequently if economic problems intensify
and his popularity wanes, particularly during the
campaign preceding parliamentary elections now
scheduled for October 1985. Similarly, although Prime
Minister Ozal's approach thus far has been to play
down these issues, the fuller return to democratic
politics in Turkey could increase the public debate and
raise the level of nationalist rhetoric.
10. Both governments appear poised to confront
any challenge to perceived legal or moral rights in the
Aegean and aggressively solicit international support
for their positions. Over the past year the downturn in
bilateral relations over Cyprus has led to a near-
complete cessation of a dialogue even on issues of
common interest, and a heightening of mutual suspi-
cions. In such a charged climate, the prospects are
poor for progress in resolving Aegean disputes. More-
over, unexpected events could touch off an escalating
sequence of conflict that neither side really wants and
that could only benefit the Soviets and the Warsaw
Pact.
Issues in Dispute
Overview
11. The Aegean is an island-studded, semienclosed
sea extending 400 miles south from Greek/Turkish
Thrace to the island of Crete. It is dotted with more
than 2,000 islands, practically all belonging to Greece,
and some lying within 3 miles of the Turkish main-
land. Today, as a result of several international treaty
settlements, Greece owns all the significant Aegean
islands except for Turkish-owned Gokceada (Imroz),
Bozca Ada (Tenedos), and the small Tavsan Adalari, or
Rabbit Islands, all near the entrance to the Dardanelles
Strait. The 100 or so inhabited islands are almost
entirely Greek populated, with a little less than 1
million people.
12. Islands in the areas most affected by Aegean
disputes lie in the northern and eastern Aegean groups,
plus the Dodecanese. These islands have a current
population of less than 400,000, which has been
declining in recent years as mainland urban centers
attract the youth.
13. Issues in dispute-how to divide the continental
shelf in the Aegean, how to organize air and sea transit
through the sea, and how to share NATO defense
responsibilities in the area-reflect deeper concerns
about territorial integrity, sovereignty rights, and na-
tional security. The Greeks and Turks want to benefit
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from whatever wealth there may be in the Aegean
seabed, pursue freely trade and commercial activities
in the sea, and ensure their security against external
threats. Although these interests are not inherently
mutually exclusive, Athens and Ankara have staked
out positions that are for the most part incompatible.
14. The definition of the territorial sea for the
islands in the Aegean has implications for all countries
whose ships transit the area between the Black Sea or
Sea of Marmara and the Mediterranean, including the
United States and the Soviet Union. Both Greece and
Turkey currently claim a 6-mile limit 9 in the Aegean.
In the cases where the separation between the eastern-
most Greek islands and the Turkish mainland is less
than 12 miles, both Athens and Ankara consider the
dividing line to be midway between them. The pres-
ent 6-mile territorial sea limit allows some high-seas
corridors in the Aegean. Should Greece choose to
implement the 12-mile limit now allowed under the
recent Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS),' no
high-seas passageways through the Aegean would re-
main. (See figure 1.) Rights of navigation and over-
flight would be governed by applicable rules respect-
ing such activities in and over territorial seas and
international straits:
- Specifically, in and over those territorial waters
constituting straits used for international naviga-
tion and linking high seas on each end, vessels
and aircraft of all states have the right of transit
passage-that is, the nonsuspendable right of
continuous and expeditious transit through and
over such straits.
- In other territorial sea areas, vessels, but not
aircraft, have the right of innocent passage,
which is a more limited right in that, for exam-
ple, submarines have to surface and fly their
flags, and aircraft may not be launched or
recovered. No aircraft may overfly a coastal
state's territorial sea (other than in exercise of the
right of transit passage) except with the permis-
sion of the coastal state. In the absence of the
' Territorial sea and other maritime and airspace distance meas-
urements are in nautical miles; 1 nautical mile equals 1,852 meters
or 6,076 feet.
'The LOS Convention was adopted in 1982, but has not yet
received the 60 ratifications required to put it in force. Greece has
signed the Convention; the United States and Turkey have not.
Nevertheless, the United States recognizes many of its provisions,
including those on continental shelf jurisdiction and international
navigation, as valid statements of customary international law.
coastal state's consent, ships sailing through its
territorial seas may not conduct military maneu-
vers or exercises there.
15. The possible declaration of a 12-mile territorial
sea in the Aegean also raises the question of interna-
tional straits designation. Because all of the straits
between the Mediterranean and the Dardanelles
would be overlapped by a Greek 12-mile territorial
sea, the issue of straits designation is of considerable
concern to the United States and the Soviet Union as
well as Turkey. (See annex, beginning on page 27, for
text of relevant treaty provisions.)
16. Greek interests include protecting the island
populations and their access to fisheries, protecting the
country's extensive commercial trading activities, and
preserving the recognition of Greek sovereignty over
the islands. The Turks want to protect their own
commercial and naval traffic through the sea and
preserve Aegean access for busy western ports such as
Izmir.
17. The Greek Position. Greece currently claims a
6-mile territorial sea. Its spokesmen have stated pri-
vately on several occasions that it has no current plans
to extend its waters to 12 miles, but Athens reserves
the right to do so based on common world practice and
the provisions of the 1982 LOS Convention. These
spokesmen declare that innocent passage regulations
would pose no threat to Turkish ships, pointing out
that Greece, with a large commercial fleet of its own,
has no interest in restricting freedom of the sea.
18. In the past, Greece has also sought the same
rights as those generally accorded archipelagic states in
international law-rights that would have allowed
Greece to designate international straits under the
terms of the current LOS Convention. During the LOS
talks, Greece was unable to achieve such recognition.
Upon signing the LOS Convention, however, Greece
made a reservation claiming the right to determine
which passageways through the islands would be
deemed straits governed by transit passage rules and
which would not. (Straits not subject to the right of
transit passage are still subject to the right of innocent
passage, except that passage rights for vessels through
such straits may be nonsuspendable.) The United
States has not accepted Greece's assertion of the right
to designate straits. (See annex for relevant treaty
provisions.)
19. The Turkish Position. Turkey claims only a 6-
mile territorial sea in the Aegean, while claiming a 12-
mile territorial sea in the Black Sea and the Mediterra-
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Figure 1
Territorial Waters and Continental Shelf Dispute in the Aegean
Sri ri!
~larrnnr,i
NORTHERN
SPORA DES
Greece Evvoia
,ATHENS
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Turkey
KhBlki
Present Greek-claimed territorial water (6 nm)
Limit of potential Greek territorial water
(12 nm)
Line reflecting Greek position on continental
shelf (median line measured from low-water
coastline)
Line reflecting possible Turkish position
on continental shelf (limit of Turkish
petroleum concession)
0 25 50Kilometers
0 25 50 Nautical Miles
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nean. Ankara argues against a 12-mile sea in the
Aegean because it believes that the Aegean is a special
case and should be delimited on the basis of equity
that takes into consideration historical usage and spe-
cial geographical circumstances. Ankara has made it
clear that a potential Greek action regarding extension
of territorial seas in the Aegean that might disadvan-
tage Turkish shipping, military exercises, or rights to
the continental shelf would be unacceptable. Though
muted in recent years, Ankara has occasionally
warned that it would regard a Greek declaration of 12-
mile territorial seas in the Aegean as a casus belli.
20. Legal Bases.s Common state practice has
evolved in the direction of recognizing a 12-mile
territorial sea. The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention,
although not yet in force, is the first international
agreement to specifically recognize a territorial sea of
up to 12 miles. The LOS Convention provides that, in
the absence of coastal state agreement, the maximum
territorial sea claim between coasts opposite or adja-
cent to each other is the median line equidistant from
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
seas of each state is measured, although other methods
may be applied by reason of historical title or other
special circumstances. The LOS Convention does not
provide for coastal-state designation of alternative
shipping channels between islands, except for archipe-
lagic states-that is, states composed solely of islands
or groups of islands, but not composed of islands and
continental areas.
Airspace Issues
21. Disputes over control of Aegean airspace have
interfered with both civilian and military air traffic in
the area, created serious difficulties for the NATO
Allies, and raised the potential for conflict between the
two Aegean states. The governments in 1980 and 1981
resolved differences on civilian air traffic, but Aegean
military air traffic remains a chronic problem. Two
airspace issues lie at the heart of the dispute: differ-
ences over the extent to which Greece's civilian air
traffic control responsibilities allow it to control mili-
tary traffic in its flight information region (FIR)'-
which covers nearly the entire Aegean-and over the
Greek claim of 10-mile airspace. (See figure 2.)
' Legal bases for these positions derive from a variety of sources.
Rulings of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), traditional state
practice, arbitration decisions, and conventions that have codified
customary international law all provide reference points.
6 Flight information regions are air traffic control zones allotted
by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). FIRs are
intended to protect the safety of air passengers and do not represent
geographic or legal boundaries.
22.' Greece wants to ensure the security of the
islands and protect transportation links between them,
as well as to gain recognition for its jurisdiction.
Turkey is concerned about its air defenses and recon-
naissance activities along its west coast and the mainte-
nance of civilian air access to European destinations.
23. The FIR Issue. The Athens Flight Information
Region was established in 1952 and 1958 by Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) regional
conferences in which both Greece and Turkey partici-
pated. At that time, Greece was given air traffic
control responsibilities for virtually all of the Aegean
area. The Athens FIR shares a common boundary with
the Istanbul FIR, a boundary passing between the
Greek islands and the Turkish mainland. In that
respect, Athens has also sought to designate military
air corridors over the Aegean. US and NATO refusal
to file flight plans for state aircraft creates a few
problems, but Turkish refusal generally results in an
"incident," with Greek claims of airspace violations.
24. Ankara had tacitly accepted the Greek FIR
administration until 1974, when it declared that secu-
rity concerns, deriving from the Cyprus conflict and
Greece's withdrawal from NATO's integrated military
structure required a new administration of air traffic
control in the Aegean. Ankara argued that Turkish
authorities could no longer identify friend or foe
approaching the mainland from the west. Turkey took
some unilateral measures in this direction, and Greece
countered by declaring the Aegean unsafe and closing
it to civilian air traffic. Progress toward resolving the
issue was made in February 1980, following a renewed
sense of Warsaw Pact threat in the wake of Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan. The Turkish Government
withdrew its objections to the Athens Flight Informa-
tion Region and Greece's control over civilian aircraft.
Greece subsequently reduced the restricted military
zone it had declared over the Aegean.
25. Greece has always insisted that for "safety
reasons" state aircraft-aircraft operated by a govern-
ment-should file a flight plan with the Greek air
traffic controller even if flying only over international
waters. Although ICAO regulations specifically ex-
empt state aircraft from filing such flight plans,
Greece claims its ICAO responsibilities include admin-
istering the FIR in accordance with its own national as
well as international rules, and its national regulations
require such notification. Turkey maintains that state
aircraft are required only to fly "with due regard to
safety." Although Ankara does not file flight plans for
its military aircraft, it does routinely issue a
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s
Andros,
Figure 2
Airspace Dispute Between Greece and Turkey
(' Samos''~S
Ikari.
Scn of
iv,armara
Turkey
Palmos~??
Tinos
9`o Thira
~ J ?
KAlimnos
0 \2 Kos
Astip9laia
2 Nisi os
n Fs Til s
Crete
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Rhodes
Greek airspace recognized by Turkey
(6 nm)
Limit of airspace claimed by Greece
(10 nm)
Boundary of flight information region
(median line measured from low-water
coastline)
0 25 50Kilometers
0 25 50 Nautical Miles
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26. Airspace. On the basis of a 1931 executive
proclamation, Athens has claimed a 10-mile airspace
around its territory. The decree also extended the
width of territorial seas for purposes of air navigation
only-a claim unique in international law. This is still
an official Greek Government position. Athens has
argued that the 10-mile zone is necessary for air
policing purposes and because of aircraft speeds. In
1960, however, the Greek Government agreed to a 6-
mile airspace for NATO purposes. Nonetheless, since
1974, Athens has made a point of protesting whenever
NATO exercises or Turkish patrols bring foreign air-
craft closer than 10 miles.
27. The Turks wish to avoid any tacit recognition of
the 10-mile claim, and periodically demonstrate their
position by flying patrols in the disputed 4-mile zone.
During periods of tension Athens has dispatched inter-
ceptors against Turkish aircraft, a move that has
sometimes prompted the Turks to threaten to send
fighter escorts along with the unarmed patrol aircraft.
Ankara will probably continue this policy of patrolling
within the disputed area unless some mutual arrange-
ment with Greece, such as held for a time in 1982,
offers incentives for restraint.
28. Legal Bases. With regard to the FIR issue, the
1944 ICAO convention signed in Chicago, to which
both Turkey and Greece are parties, does not require
state aircraft to file flight plans, although they are
required to fly "with due regard for safety" (Article 3).
The United States and Turkey refuse to file military
flight plans with civilian controllers as a matter of
principle and to avoid creation of an undesirable
precedent. In daily practice, computerized flight plans
automatically reach the civilian controller; only the
flight plans of military pilots relying on "visual flight
rules" do not customarily reach civilian controllers.
29. On the question of airspace, international con-
ventions, including the ICAO treaty, as well as other
sources of international law, do not recognize coastal
state claims to airspace extending beyond the limit of
the territorial seas. Athens formally signed a 1936
convention acknowledging a 6-mile territorial sea, but
in its view this act did not invalidate the executive
proclamation of 1931 that set forth a 10-mile territori-
al sea limit for air navigation purposes.
30. Greek-Turkish differences on the continental
shelf center on how it is to be delimited around the
islands in the Aegean, where the two states appear to
have a common shelf. In the early 1970s, Greece
granted exploration licenses to parts of the continental
shelf it claimed in the Aegean. The issue, however, did
not become highly contentious until the discovery of
exploitable oil deposits in 1972 off the Greek island of
Thasos. Greece proceeded to claim mineral rights over
what it viewed as its continental shelf-which includ-
ed most of the Aegean. Turkey then decided to
exercise petroleum exploration rights granted by the
state for the area between the Turkish island of
Gokceada (Imroz) and the Greek island of Limnos and
in 1973 issued a map in its governmental gazette
showing about 40 percent of the Aegean as its petro-
leum concession claim, including areas where there
were Greek islands. (See figure 1.) When Greece
protested, Turkey responded by proposing negotia-
tions, but the two sides could not agree on the bases for
beginning the talks. In May 1974, Turkey sent out an
exploratory vessel into the disputed area and simulta-
neously conducted naval exercises in the Aegean. The
issue heated up again in 1976 when Turkey sent out a
research vessel into contested waters, accompanied by
a naval escort in response to Greek threats.
31. The impact of the first mission was lost in the
1974 Cyprus crisis and the fall of the Greek junta; the
second mission, in 1976, brought the two countries to
the brink of war. In response, the Greeks appealed to
both the UN Security Council and the International
Court of Justice (ICJ). Neither body ruled decisively,
but both called for calm and restraint and urged
bilateral negotiations be undertaken to resolve the
dispute. These events led to the 10-point Berne Decla-
ration (see annex for text), in which both parties agreed
to refrain from provocative steps in the Aegean that
would prejudice further negotiations. Over the next
two years, each side advanced proposals for ways of
handling the dispute. Ankara initially suggested joint
exploration of the contested areas, leaving aside the
question of specifically delimiting jurisdictions. Greece
called for what amounted to a series of alternating
corridors extending from the two mainlands, with the
Greek corridors encompassing the easternmost Greek
islands and the Turkish corridors extending between
the islands midway into the Aegean. Later, the Turks
suggested that each country retain a coastal shelf
encompassing 15 percent of the seabed, with the
remainder to be exploited jointly. The Greeks respond-
ed with a variant of their corridor suggestion that
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envisaged smaller Turkish salients and did not rule out
the principle of joint exploration once a method for
delimitation had been accepted.
32. Ultimately, the two sides could not agree, and
neither has offered further proposals. The issue reced-
ed in importance after 1977 as oil exploration efforts
proved less fruitful than anticipated. Thasos oil is not
considered of good quality and is expensive to exploit.
Moreover, Greece considers it less important than
other, closer fields, and the Turks have turned to the
southern and south-central parts of their country for
better oil prospects. In 1981, Papandreou terminated
the talks begun in 1976. When in early 1982 he
authorized renewed exploration in the Aegean, Ankara
reacted strongly, and an incident was averted when
both sides pulled back. Should additional natural
resources be discovered on the shelf, this conflict could
easily resurface.
33. The Greek Position. The Greeks argue on the
basis of the 1958 Geneva Convention and the 1982
LOS Convention that, because inhabited islands are
entitled to a continental shelf, they should be given
full consideration in discussions on delimitation of the
shelf in the Aegean. Athens prefers delimitation based
on the equidistance method (that is, a line generated
by plotting points equidistant from the nearest base-
line by which the territorial sea is measured) using the
islands in the Aegean as the baseline. (Greece made a
reservation to the 1958 Geneva Convention to this
effect-see annex for text.) This method would give
virtually all the continental shelf in the Aegean to
Greece. Athens believes that, failing bilateral negotia-
tions, the disputing states should submit their case for
international adjudication. The 1982 LOS Convention
provides for continental shelf delimitation between
states with opposing or adjacent coasts through agree-
ments made on the basis of international law, without
specifying the equidistance method. Greece has made
no declaration respecting this provision.
34. In arguing its legal case, Athens asserts that the
islands form a political continuum with the mainland.
The Greeks fear that any demarcation of the shelf to
the west of Greek islands or any formula for joint
control of the seabed would lead to the enclavement of
about 500 Greek islands. Such a situation in Athens's
view ultimately could result in a Turkish challenge to
the sovereignty over the islands themselves.
35. The Turkish Position. Turkey did not sign and
does not recognize the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf or the recent LOS Convention as
having any legal effect. It maintains that many of the
Greek islands are small and insignificant and to give
them full weight in a boundary delimitation would
deprive Turkey of access to the natural prolongation of
its continental landmass; therefore they should be
considered geological protrusions on the Turkish conti-
nental shelf and, by inference, should not be used as
basepoints for delimiting the shelf if the equidistance
method were to be employed. Although the Turks
have not argued for a specific shelf boundary, we can
infer that their preferred line would incorporate more
of the Aegean under Turkish jurisdiction than would
be available under the strict application of the equidis-
tance method using all islands as basepoints. The
boundaries drawn for Turkish oil exploration conces-
sions in 1973-which included about 40 percent of the
Aegean-might be illustrative of Turkish preferences.
(See figure 1.)
36. To support their position, the Turks have
quoted, inter alia, from a 1982 ICJ judgment concern-
ing a Tunisian-Libyan dispute: ". . . equidistance may
be applied if it leads to an equitable solution; if not,
other methods should be employed ... since equidis-
tance is not, in the view of the Court, either a
mandatory legal principle or a method having some
privileged status in relation to other methods." They
further insist that their situation with Greece is a
special case that should be negotiated bilaterally in
good faith, and that some sort of joint approach to the
exploitation of resources in contested areas should be
adopted.
37. Legal Bases. There is a large body of interna-
tional law, including conventions, court rulings, and
arbitral decisions, that addresses continental shelf is-
sues. Both Greece and Turkey can find ample bases to
defend their positions credibly. The 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Continental Shelf notes that, when-
ever one continental shelf is adjacent to the territories
of two states, the boundary is to be determined by
agreement between them. Without agreement, the
boundary is to be the median line equidistant from the
nearest baseline from which the territorial sea of each
country is measured. The 1982 LOS Convention
obliges such states to reach an agreement, based on
international law, in order to achieve an equitable
solution. The LOS Convention also provides for a
complex dispute settlement process to which nonpar-
ties may be able to resort (see annex for relevant
provisions).
38. The ICJ exercised a great deal of caution in
handling the 1976 Greek submission, due in part to the
large number of pending cases involving rival claims
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to continental shelf delimitation. In its response to the
1976 Greek submission, the ICJ did not enjoin the
Turkish vessel from further exploration in disputed
waters, but declared it could not assume jurisdiction in
the matter so long as the two parties had not given
their full efforts to resolving their differences bilateral-
ly. The Court, however, reserved the right to issue a
decision on the matter in the future, and, as did the
UN Security Council, it recommended that both par-
ties pursue direct negotiations, and refrain from prov-
ocations during the negotiating period.
39. An issue related to the exploitation of the
continental shelf is the trend toward state claims for
exclusive economic zones (EEZs) that may in the
future complicate the disputes in the Aegean. An EEZ
is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea-
limited to a maximum of 200 miles from the baselines
from which the territorial sea is measured-in which
the coastal state is considered to have special interests
and rights; this applies particularly to exploration and
exploitation of the natural resources of the waters and
the seabed, as well as to the jurisdiction to establish
structures having economic purposes, to conduct and
regulate marine scientific research, and to protect and
preserve the marine environment. It is a relatively
recent concept in international law, with its first
multilateral articulation in the 1982 LOS Convention.
It is, however, already well established in international
practice, with over 60 states claiming EEZs. Such
zones obviously increase the areas in which coastal
states may properly interact with persons and vessels
of other states, in, for example, fisheries enforcement
or environmental protection. Neither Greece nor Tur-
key has claimed an EEZ; doing so could, in the
Aegean, create disputes similar to the continental-shelf
disagreements.
Militarization of Greek Islands
40. Turkey has protested that Greece has been
illegally remilitarizing some of its islands close to the
Turkish mainland. Current figures indicate that
Greece has stationed the equivalent of two divisions,
about 25,000 troops, on Limnos, Lesvos, Khios, Samos,
Kos, and Rhodes. Greece claims these troops are
needed to defend its territory against threatening
Turkish forces, citing Turkey's IV Army (the so-called
Army of the Aegean) created in 1975 and stationed
near the Aegean coast. Turkey denies it has any
intention of attacking Greek islands but, in light of
military forces stationed there, asserts a need to pro-
tect its own security as well as important commercial
and naval access routes through the Dardanelles Strait
and the Aegean. As it is now constituted, the IV Army
is a skeleton force composed mainly of training
components.
41. This issue is complicated by the historical fact
that different groups of Aegean islands fall under
different international legal provisions (see annex for
relevant texts):
- The islands of Limnos and Samothraki, near the
mouth of the Dardanelles Strait, were demilita-
rized under the Straits of the Dardanelles Con-
vention of 1923, which also provided for the
demilitarization of the Turkish islands. In 1936
the Western Powers agreed to alter the 1923
Straits document in light of the changing political
and military situation in Europe. The ensuing
agreement, the Montreux Convention, replaced
the Dardanelles Straits Convention without ex-
plicitly continuing its provisions for demilitariza-
tion. These islands have been remilitarized by
Greece, slowly after 1960, then rapidly after the
Cyprus crisis of 1974.
- The Greek islands of Lesvos, Khios, Samos, and
Ikaria were demilitarized under the 1923 Treaty
of Lausanne, which provided that "no naval base
and no fortification" may be established there.
However, forces equal to "the normal contingent
called up for military service" are allowed, and a
force of gendarmerie equal to the total strength
of Greek security forces may also be maintained.
These provisions remain in force today.
- The Dodecanese Islands, which lie close to Tur-
key's southwest coast, were ceded to Greece
under the Italian peace settlement in 1947. This
treaty calls for demilitarization of the islands
except for internal security forces. Since 1974 the
internal security forces have become essentially
an extension of the regular Greek military. Turk-
ish protests over Dodecanese remilitarization
have been rejected by Greece on the grounds
that Turkey is not a signatory to the treaty, and
that Greece has a right to defend its own territo-
ry in light of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and
the formation of a Turkish Army of the Aegean.
42. Concerning the demilitarization of Limnos and
Samothraki, the Greeks claim that, because Montreux
replaced the Straits of the Dardanelles Convention,
they were no longer bound by the demilitarization
provisions of the earlier document. And the Greeks
point out that the Turkish Foreign Minister admitted
in 1936, in remarks before the Turkish Assembly, that
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the treaty provisions prohibiting militarization of Lim-
nos and Samothraki had been superseded by the
Montreux Agreement.
43. For their part, the Turks argue that the replace-
ment of the 1923 Straits of the Dardanelles Conven-
tion by Montreux did not terminate the Greek obliga-
tion to demilitarize the islands of Limnos and
Samothraki. They point out that the purpose of the
Montreux agreement was to reinforce Turkish securi-
ty, and it expressly gave Turkey the right to militarize
the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits, while making no
explicit mention of any Greek right to remilitarize
Limnos or Samothraki.
44. Greece has sought in several ways to have the
remilitarization of Limnos and Samothraki confirmed
in the international community. Athens insisted that
Limnos be included in the NATO evaluation of
potential Colocated Operating Bases (COBs), asked for
a NATO infrastructure project to be established there,
and regularly attempts to have the island included as a
target in NATO exercises. More recently, Papandreou
has made inclusion of Limnos a sine qua non of Greek
participation in the Aegean portion of NATO
exercises.
45. The rationalization of NATO's command and
control arrangements in the Aegean, including its
intention to establish a headquarters at Larisa on the
Greek mainland, have been frustrated by unresolved
problems connected with Greece's reintegration into
the military wing of NATO. These problems have also
disrupted NATO joint exercises in the region, and
more recently a bilateral US-Greek exercise, and
portend serious difficulties in an actual NATO-War-
saw Pact crisis. Moreover, Greek-Turkish wrangling
repeatedly stalls progress in important NATO plan-
ning meetings.
46. Exercise Problems. Greek governments under
three successive Prime Ministers have used their par-
ticipation in NATO exercises scheduled for the eastern
Mediterranean to register displeasure over NATO
handling of what the other Alliance members consider
bilateral Aegean questions. Papandreou, however, has
considerably increased the frequency of Greek with-
drawal from planned exercises-in several cases at the
last minute after preparations were completed. Since
1981, Greece has withdrawn from at least seven major
NATO exercises scheduled for the Aegean/eastern
Mediterranean; its withdrawal in November 1982
from Apex Express cost NATO more than a million
dollars, not including costs to the individual countries
participating.
47. Greece currently follows a policy of "selective
participation" in NATO exercises: Athens is willing to
join in where activities are confined to the western or
central Mediterranean, but will opt out of eastern
Mediterranean or Aegean exercises. This posture
means that NATO cannot use Greek territory for
practice and that NATO's southern forces cannot
practice with Greek forces for quick-reaction rein-
forcement, sea control operations, or land-based air
operations training.
48. Papandreou's across-the-board rejection of fur-
ther participation arises primarily from the Greek
argument that the island of Limnos should be included
in any such NATO operation. Because of the dispute
between Athens and Ankara over the Greek right to
militarize the island, NATO's practice has been to
avoid including it in exercise plans, much the same as
is done with respect to disputed areas of the Barents
Sea. Greek military officers argue that exercises to
strengthen defense capabilities for the Turkish Straits
that do not include Limnos make no military sense.
Papandreou claims that NATO is impugning Greek
sovereignty over the island by refusing to include it
and that NATO is covering for Turkish aggressiveness.
49. Recently, Papandreou canceled Greek partici-
pation in exercise "Display Determination," scheduled
for September-October 1984, as well as a bilateral US-
Greek exercise scheduled earlier in September de-
signed to improve special-forces operations in northern
Greece. As justification for withdrawing from the
NATO exercise, a Greek spokesman cited the exclu-
sion of Limnos and unwillingness of NATO to recog-
nize the 10-mile island airspace and Athens FIR
control of military aircraft. With regard to the bilater-
al exercise, the spokesman stated that such activities
were unnecessary, because they are meaningless in
light of the nonexistent threat to Greece from the
Warsaw Pact and the primacy of the threat from
Turkey. Papandreou's decision to withdraw from this
exercise marks the first instance of Greek withdrawal
from bilateral exercises with the United States.
50. Athens's nonparticipation serves several pur-
poses: it makes domestic political points, serves to
protest command and control arrangements, and em-
phasizes the contention that NATO is not responding
to Greek security needs. Meanwhile, the pressure is
building within NATO planning councils for some sort
of resolution of this impasse before NATO loses credi-
bility as a deterrent force along the southern flank
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because of failing readiness and the absence of coordi-
nation between the key players in regional defense.
51. Command and Control Arrangements. Be-
fore 1974, American generals acted through Greek and
Turkish deputies to exercise NATO air and ground
command and control responsibilities in the Aegean.
Air defense areas for NATO air command purposes
corresponded roughly to the Athens and Istanbul FIRs.
NATO's Aegean naval command fell to a Greek
admiral because Turkey had not dedicated any naval
forces in the Aegean for NATO purposes. Following
Greek withdrawal from NATO's military wing, the
naval command reverted to NATO headquarters in
Naples and the air and land commands in the Aegean
fell to Turkish officers because only Turkish forces
remained under these commands.
52. Under the SACEUR agreement-the NATO
plan that provided for Greece's reintegration into the
military wing in 1980-new air and land headquarters
were to be set up at Larisa, giving both Greece and
Turkey their own air and land-commands. Overall
Aegean command and control responsibilities were
assigned to an American admiral, CINCSOUTH, in
Naples, pending the resolution of the disputes between
Greece and Turkey. An Allied regional commander,
COMAIRSOUTH, was to coordinate in time of war.
53. Since 1980, disagreements over how to interpret
the SACEUR agreement have prevented full imple-
mentation of the SACEUR plan. The main sticking
points concern air command issues, although naval
command responsibilities are also in contention, since
Turkey now would like a share of the NATO naval
responsibilities in the Aegean. The following questions
remain to be resolved:
- Can air command headquarters at Larisa be
established before the extent of its responsibilities
is explicitly delineated?
- To what extent can those responsibilities be
allowed to deviate from the arrangements that
prevailed before the Greek withdrawal in 1974?
- To what extent should NATO naval command
and control arrangements be modified?
54. The SACEUR agreement provided for interim
Aegean air command and control arrangements to
apply until Turkish and Greek commanders could
work out new ones in consultation with COMAIR-
SOUTH. Both Greece and Turkey consider these
arrangements valid in the interim, but cannot agree on
their precise nature or on the shape of permanent
arrangements to follow.
55. After his election to office, Papandreou argued
that the new Larisa headquarters could not be estab-
lished before the extent of its responsibilities were
clearly delineated, and that the extent of its air
defense responsibilities should be exactly the same as
before 1974-that is, coincidental with the Athens
FIR, a position taken by previous Greek governments.
He also denied that the interim naval arrangements
worked out by SACEUR differ from those that pre-
vailed before 1974. To bolster their arguments on
these points, the Greeks cite NATO Military Commit-
tee documents MC 36/2 (which states that countries
are "ultimately responsible for the defense and securi-
ty of their territories and peoples") and MC 38/4
(which deals with naval command arrangements).
56. The Turks argued that the status quo ante 1974
was unacceptable to them, that military committee
documents are not endorsed by the NATO Defense
Planning Committee (DPC), and that the SACEUR
agreement and its attendant understanding implied
that there would be some adjustments in the interim as
well as the permanent Aegean air and naval command
responsibilities.
57. In NATO's December 1983 DPC meeting,
SACEUR stated that the Greek reintegration agree-
ment did provide for some modifications in the air
and naval command boundaries. He further stressed
that NATO command and control arrangements apply
only in time of war involving the Alliance; each
member protects its own territory and peoples in
peacetime. Thus, the NATO arrangement does not
establish or confirm precedents for international legal
claims to airspace or seaspace jurisdiction. As with
other Aegean issues, both sides tend to view it in this
way despite all remonstrations to the contrary. Mean-
while, disagreements over Aegean air and naval com-
mand responsibilities, the establishment of a new
Larisa air command headquarters, and the inclusion of
Limnos in NATO exercises have stymied, and will
continue to stymie progress toward full Greek reinte-
gration into NATO's military structure.
58. Underlying these positions are familiar Greek
and Turkish concerns: Athens wants to protect its
islands by controlling all the airspace above them, and
Ankara wishes to protect the security of its western
coast through effective early warning and IFF (identi-
fication friend or foe) systems and the conduct of
appropriate military exercises.
59. NATO Planning Problems. To some extent,
NATO serves as the primary stage upon which Greek-
Turkish disputes are played. Greece particularly has
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used it as an international soundingboard to gain
recognition for claims extending from its sovereignty
over the Aegean islands. Recent meetings of the
Defense Planning Committee and the High-Level
Exercise Planning Group have witnessed Greek un-
willingness to approve technical solutions to procedur-
al issues that would have allowed planning for coming
exercises and permitted Southwest Asia contingency
planning measures to go forward. Most recently at
NATO meetings in the spring of 1984 to discuss future
force goals, the Greeks refused to approve a Turkish
force goal related to Straits defense-the first time a
NATO member has ever opposed another's force
goals.
Other Bilateral Issues
60. Other bilateral issues, although not directly
related to the Aegean disputes, complicate the pros-
pects for settlement: these include the treatment of
respective Greek and Turkish minorities and, most
important, the Cyprus problem.
63. The Greeks deny that the Muslim minority is
subject to any systematic discrimination. They claim
that land for civil projects has been taken from both
Greeks and Turks living in Thrace, point out that two
members of the Turkish minority currently serve in
Parliament, and note that special provisions have been
made for the education of the Turkish minority,
including the establishment of an academy for the
training of Muslim teachers.
64. Greeks countercharge that the decline of the
Greek population in Turkey stems from various forms
of discrimination over the years-most recently, con-
trols on the Orthodox Church's right to export artistic
or historical relics, but also limitations on professions
and trades open to non-Turks which prevailed for a
time in the 1930s, and an arbitrary capital tax imposed
during World War II. They also accuse the Turkish
Government of tolerating outbursts of violence against
minorities, and holding the Istanbul Patriarchate of
the Greek Orthodox Church hostage to Athens's
policies.
The Minorities Issue
61. Alleged mistreatment of their respective minor-
ities is an emotional issue that attracts extensive press
play and has the potential to spark serious trouble
between Greece and Turkey on short notice. The 1923
Treaty of Lausanne, which provided for the repatria-
tion of the bulk of Turks to Turkey and Greeks to
Greece, guaranteed certain rights for the approximate-
ly 100,000 Greeks who desired to continue living
primarily in and around Istanbul, and an approxi-
mately equal number of Turks who wanted to contin-
ue living in western Thrace. Since that time the
Turkish minority in Greece has grown to its present
level of about 120,000, while the Greek population in
Turkey has declined to between 6,000 and 8,000.
62. The Turks charge that their compatriots in
Thrace suffer discrimination of several kinds, in viola-
tion of Section III of the Treaty of Lausanne. They
claim that they may be deprived of their citizenship if
they leave Greece; that their lands are expropriated by
the Greek Government for public purposes, and they
are not allowed to buy real estate to replace it or to
expand the buildings on the land they do own; that the
Greeks attempt to suppress or otherwise interfere with
minority education in Greece; that the Greek Govern-
ment is resettling Greeks in Thrace to dilute the
Turkish population and dispossess the Turks of their
land; and that the Greek Government discriminates
against them by requiring a knowledge of Greek to
pass tests for various licenses and occupations.
Cyprus'
65. The Cyprus stalemate profoundly affects over-
all Greek-Turkish relations. Moreover, conflict over
Cyprus often reverberates in the Aegean. The declara-
tion of independence by the Turkish Cypriots in
November 1983 has exacerbated mutual suspicions
and forestalled hopes that discussions of Aegean issues
halted in 1981 might be resumed any time soon.
Cyprus remains, as it has been for years, an issue of
great importance to Greeks and Turks. Progress on the
Cyprus problem would considerably improve the cli-
mate for resolution of larger Aegean issues. Continued
stalemate complicates efforts to resolve Aegean
disputes.
Domestic Forces
66. Domestic forces in both Greece and Turkey
work against major compromises on Aegean questions.
Political interest groups and the press tend to fan the
flames of nationalism extant in both populations. This
latent popular hostility is available for political leaders
on both sides to exploit, depending on their own goals
and intentions.
67. These domestic forces clearly play a lesser role
in Ankara's position on Aegean issues than in Athens's.
The Turkish Government and Prime Minister Ozal
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have proceeded in a somewhat more low-key fashion
in handling Aegean questions, a style that has helped
to defuse potentially dangerous situations. This persist-
ently moderate approach to Aegean issues has given
rise to some domestic criticism, but Ozal has continued
to call for new discussions in areas of common concern
such as trade and tourism. If this criticism should
become serious, however, and especially if it is echoed
by key military leaders, Ozal would then be forced to
stiffen Turkish policy toward Athens.
68. For the Greek Government, the political risk of
compromise is great. Policy toward Turkey constitutes
an important focus of domestic opinion as well as
foreign policy interest. The Greek public and virtually
all political elites support a tough stance on Greek-
Turkish issues. And, at a time when domestic dissatis-
faction with his economic policies is deepening, Pa-
pandreou can use the "Turkish threat" to deflect
attention and unite the people and his supporters
behind him. In such situations, the conservative New
Democracy party-which differs from Papandreou's
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) party pri-
marily in its willingness to negotiate directly with the
Turks-cannot afford to appear weak on Turkish
issues.
69. While no one in the Greek Government wants
conflict with Turkey, the volatile personalities of
Papandreou and some of his advisers have led to a
tendency to overreact in tense situations. President
Constantine Karamanlis and Greek military officers
have counseled restraint at such times, and conflict has
been avoided in the Aegean. But Papandreou some-
times makes important decisions without consulting
them. While both the President and senior military
leaders share many of Papandreou's concerns about a
possible Turkish threat, they tend to assign greater
importance than he does to a Warsaw Pact threat and
to military cooperation with the United States and
NATO.
70. The press in both nations tends to sensationalize
bilateral relations, often suggesting conspiratorial sce-
narios and US collusion. Any negotiations between the
two governments are subject to frequent leaks, wheth-
er intentional or unintentional, which endanger pre-
liminary agreements or even trial balloons.
71. On balance, short of an immediate Warsaw
Pact threat, domestic forces do not work toward
encouraging compromise on Aegean issues. In Greece,
the "Turkish threat" is a central theme of Papan-
dreou's political posture, and one that appeals to
Greeks across the political spectrum. In Turkey, irrita-
tion with perceived Greek misrepresentation of Anka-
ra's intentions is growing. Short-lived rapprochement
can occur, and both sides have proved themselves
capable of refraining from provocative actions on
occasion, and even maintaining a framework for dis-
cussion; but any kind of flareup in collateral issues
such as Cyprus easily and quickly sours the climate for
cooperation.
Other Players in the Aegean
The Soviet Union
72. With important interests on both sides of the
conflict, the Soviets have not sought a major role in the
dispute. But, at the same time, they have tried to
exploit the situation, playing on heated nationalist
sentiment in both countries in order to weaken Greek
and Turkish cooperation with the United States and
NATO and to moderate Aegean perceptions of the
threat from Moscow.
73. In addition to its ultimate goal of establishing
pro-Soviet regimes in the area, the USSR has several
more immediate goals:
- To maintain naval access to the Mediterra-
nean Sea through the Turkish Straits and the
Aegean Sea. Moscow has let it be known that it
expects to enjoy full rights of free passage
through the Aegean, reflecting concern over a
possible Greek declaration of 12-mile territorial
seas for the islands and restriction of sea lanes.
Moscow also desires to preserve access to offshore
anchorages and maintenance facilities in the
Aegean, most of which would fall within 12-mile
Greek territorial seas. Moreover, the Soviets
would like to retain access to repair facilities at a
Greek-owned shipyard on Siros Island, granted in
a 1979 agreement and renewed in 1982.
- To restrict US military and intelligence-gath-
ering assets in the region. The Turkish-US
rapprochement after 1980 and the 1983 Defense
and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA)
with Greece have probably heightened Soviet
- To break or at least weaken ties to NATO.
Greek-Turkish disputes over the Aegean and
Cyprus provide Moscow with convenient oppor-
tunities to encourage the alienation of those
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NATO Allies from NATO itself and from the
United States.
- To prevent incorporation of Cyprus into
NATO. Immediately after the Turkish Cypriot
declaration of independence, Soviet spokesmen
reiterated to the Turks Moscow's longstanding
opposition to the incorporation of any part of
Cyprus into NATO.
- To eliminate British bases on Cyprus and
prevent their use by US CENTCOM. The use
of British bases in support of the Multinational
Force in Lebanon heightened Soviet anxieties
that Cyprus would become an advanced basing
area for the forces of US CENTCOM, earlier
known as the Rapid Deployment Force.
- To limit or inhibit modernization of Turkey's
nuclear-capable aircraft and missile delivery
systems. The Soviets have repeatedly voiced
their concern to Turkish officials that the United
States may seek to deploy Pershing II and cruise
missiles in Turkey.
74. Greek-Turkish Aegean problems and disputes
connected with Cyprus enable the Soviets to court
whichever side is currently the more disaffected with
US policies, while at the same time retaining a gener-
ally correct posture toward the other. After 1974,
when US-Greek ties deteriorated because of Greek
disenchantment with perceived US support for the
military junta and dissatisfaction with the US response
to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, Soviet relations
with Greece significantly improved. In the aftermath
of the Cyprus crisis, the US arms embargo against
Turkey from 1975 to 1978 gave Moscow an opportuni-
ty to court Ankara with generous offers of economic
assistance (over $1 billion worth of credits were of-
fered, although much of this aid has not been utilized
by Turkey). Since the signing of the US-Turkish
DECA in 1980, Moscow's relations with Ankara have
been cool but correct, while Soviet-Greek relations
took a decided upward swing with the election of
victory Papandreou and the PASOK party in 1981.
75. Within the confines of its need to maintain
positive relations with Ankara, Moscow has been hap-
py to exploit the opportunities presented by Papan-
dreou. Many facets of his foreign policy have pleased
the Soviets: he has opposed INF deployment, champi-
oned a Balkan nuclear-weapons-free zone, played a
disruptive role in NATO and European Community
forums, and has generally espoused a pro-Third
World policy. The Communist parties of Cyprus and
Greece (not instrumental to Papandreou's survival)
have both been instructed by Moscow to refrain from
criticizing Papandreou, so as not to endanger his
regime and perhaps open the door for a rightist return
to power. An unusually prominent Soviet party (CPSU)
representative attended PASOK's May 1984 party
congress, another sign of Moscow's favor, and the
Soviets recently expanded trade contacts with Greece.
76. At the same time, the Soviets also recognize the
self-interest behind Greek ties to Moscow. Greece
seeks to indicate specific instances of displeasure with
US actions, in order to demonstrate independence
from US influence, to placate leftist elements of
Papandreou's party whose support he needs to stay in
power, as well as to alleviate pressure from the Greek
Communist Party; and to secure Soviet diplomatic
support against Turkey in Aegean and Cyprus matters.
77. The Soviet Union's long border with Turkey,
large Muslim-Turkic population, and dependence on
favorable Turkish interpretation of the Straits agree-
ments make the cultivation of good relations with
Ankara a continuing Soviet policy objective. Soviet-
Turkish relations have remained cool but correct since
Stalin left the scene, and since 1965 intergovernmental
contacts have remained at a high level. Soviet-Turkish
economic cooperation has continued and expanded; a
new trade agreement also was recently signed.
78. On Cyprus, the Soviets have become somewhat
more open in asserting their support for the Greek
position-perhaps because the dispute technically in-
volves Greece and Turkey only indirectly. Although
Moscow's immediate public response to the Turkish
Cypriot declaration of independence was slow, reticent,
and unsatisfying to Athens, once international opinion
began taking shape in favor of the Greek Cypriots, the
USSR followed suit. Recently, Papandreou demanded
even more strongly worded Soviet condemnation of
Turkish support for northern Cyprus. Moscow respond-
ed by issuing a communique after a recent visit to
Moscow by Greek Communist Party leader Florakis
and by sending Deputy Foreign Minister Aristov to
Cyprus for talks with President Kyprianou, where he
condemned the Turkish Cypriot declaration of inde-
pendence. Simultaneously, a pro-Greek tilt appeared in
the Soviet press, probably in response to Turkey's
closeness to the United States and a deterioration in US-
Soviet relations rather than as a signal of any meaning-
ful shift in Soviet regional posture.
Western Europe
79. Western Europe is unlikely to be a major factor
in the resolution of Aegean disputes. By and large, the
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West European countries appear unwilling to play an
independent mediating role between the two southern
allies, and their organizations have no formal mecha-
nisms for handling bilateral disputes such as the
Aegean ones. Strong anti-Turkish sentiment in the
Council of Europe and the presence of Greece and
absence of Turkey from the European Community
make unlikely the use of such forums in any West
European mediation effort in the Aegean.
80. At the same time, the countries of Western
Europe have important commercial ties and NATO
responsibilities in the region. European relations with
Turkey are shaped by Turkey's critical role in NATO's
southern flank, the huge numbers of Turkish workers
residing in Europe, European access to NATO facili-
ties in Turkey during joint exercises, potential Turkish
cooperation to defend European oil lifelines in the
Persian Gulf, Europe's interest in Ankara's return to
democracy, and future efforts to reunify Cyprus.
European relations with Greece are also influenced by
Athens's participation in both NATO and the Europe-
an Community.
81. European condemnation of the former military
government and the slow pace of democratization has
been costly for the Turks; it eliminated any possibility
for European-Turkish cooperation on F-16 produc-
tion, and halted OECD economic assistance. European
remonstrations, however, have had little effect on the
Turkish Government, and Ankara's position on Cyprus
seems not to have been affected by European opinion.
Greece, on the other hand, has better ties to Europe
and views its access to European organizations as an
opportunity to bring pressure on Turkey to compro-
mise on Aegean and Cyprus issues. This advantage is
somewhat mitigated by Papandreou's behavior in EC
and NATO forums, which has upset many West
European officials.
Aegean questions. Papandreou shelved intermittent
talks between Athens and Ankara on airspace and
continental shelf issues when he came to power in
1981. During 1982 the two sides were able to agree to
a (short-lived) "moratorium" on provocative words
and actions. In spring 1984 the Turkish Government
attempted to initiate new high-level contacts with
Athens and offered some proposals that were rebuffed
by Papandreou, who cited discord over Cyprus.
84. The Turkish objective has been to reengage the
Greek leadership in direct bilateral negotiations, while
the Greeks, although agreeing occasionally to low-level
talks, have consistently sought to draw the United
States and other allies more directly into the disputes.
This section examines the feasibility and prospects of
several alternative negotiating approaches and struc-
tures for resolving Aegean disputes.
A Comprehensive Approach
85. Combining all outstanding Aegean issues be-
tween Greece and Turkey would widen the range of
possible trade-offs for negotiating purposes. The inter-
connectivity of Aegean issues also offers some prospect
for effective trade-offs and bargaining in bilateral
negotiations. Aegean air, sea, and continental shelf
issues are at the same time complex and intertwined,
and changes in one element affect the others. The two
sides rank the issues differently in terms of impor-
tance. Turkey probably takes most seriously Athens's
threat to claim a 12-mile territorial sea, with the
potential to restrict Turkish trade and military activi-
ty, and the stationing of Greek military forces on the
islands so close to the Turkish mainland. Greece, on
the other hand, is more worried about the vulnerabili-
ty of its islands, and places highest priority on prevent-
ing changes in NATO regulations that would allow
Turkish command of airspace above them, and on
gaining recognition for the right to militarize Limnos
and Samothraki.
82. Greece and Turkey will continue to vie for the
political and diplomatic support of Middle Eastern
countries. The Arab states, however, have no direct
interest in the Aegean dispute, and Ankara has been
unable to translate its Islamic heritage into support on
Cyprus in international forums. We do not foresee any
active Arab intervention in Aegean disputes.
Conflict Resolution in the Aegean
83. Periodic tensions in the Aegean, exacerbated by
a deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations over Cy-
prus, make more urgent the search for solutions to
86. While including Cyprus among the range of
issues to be negotiated might potentially extend the
opportunities for trade-off, the chances of settling the
Aegean disputes would, in our view, be complicated
by linking them with Cyprus. The nature of the
Cyprus problem is different from Aegean questions
with respect to the number of participants directly
involved and the way the issue relates to national
interests. The Cyprus problem cannot be decided
solely by Greece and Turkey-both Cypriot commu-
nities will be central to any solution, Great Britain is
an important player as guarantor of the founding
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treaty, and the United Nations has been actively
involved since 1964. At the same time, progress on
Cyprus would serve as a significant confidence-build-
ing measure in Aegean negotiations, facilitating agree-
ment by helping to alleviate the distrust that poisons
the atmosphere between Greece and Turkey.
An Issue-by-Issue Approach
87. An issue-by-issue approach would offer varying
incentives and opportunities for compromise. Disputes
over airspace and NATO command and control ar-
rangements may be more amenable to resolution,
because they entail a larger area of common interest.
Neither side wants a misunderstanding to lead to
military conflict, and both are subject to pressures
from concerned NATO Allies whose interests are also
affected. They are also concerned that mutual security
arrangements aimed at Warsaw Pact threats should
not expose their nations to undue threats from each
other. To date, whatever progress has been achieved
through negotiation on Aegean questions has come
mainly on these issues.
88. Continental shelf issues constitute a second cate-
gory of disputes, less urgent than airspace and NATO
command and control, but with some history of serious
negotiations. Both sides presented serious proposals
during discussions in 1976-78. Doubts about the pros-
pects for discovering valuable natural resources on the
shelf have reduced the immediacy of this issue, per-
haps allowing each side more room for maneuver
should a more hospitable negotiating climate permit
renewed talks. Of course, both sides remain wary of
making any precedent-setting compromises on the
shelf that might affect air and sea issues.
89. Over time, disputes over territorial waters and
island militarization have proved to be the most intrac-
table because they appear to have more serious conse-
quences for economic lifelines and coastal defense. The
two parties have made no attempts to negotiate these
issues. Few incentives can be found for the parties to
compromise, and both have threatened to fight if the
other side takes steps to change the status quo.
Alternative Negotiating Structures
90. Given the intensity of mutual distrust, any
Greek-Turkish negotiations will probably require some
involvement by outside participants to facilitate the
proceedings. But the two parties to the dispute are not
likely to agree on a common agent, and the potential
outside actors-with the possible exception of the
ICJ-appear unprepared for such a role.
91. The European Community. Greece has sought
to use the process of European political cooperation to
win EC support for its positions on the Aegean and
Cyprus, and is pleased with the Community's condem-
nation of the Turkish Cypriot declaration of indepen-
dence and its willingness to adjust trade relations with
Cyprus. Accordingly, Ankara views the EC as less than
neutral, a sentiment reinforced by EC rebuff of
Turkey's aspiration for membership. As an organiza-
tion, the EC has neither the formal mechanism nor the
inclination to settle extra-Community disputes of its
members, although individual members could work
with Greece and Turkey to encourage moves toward
bilateral negotiations. In this case, Athens would look
most favorably on France, and Turkey on West
Germany.
92. The United Nations Secretary General's Of-
fice. The UNSYG has provided a major framework for
Cyprus intercommunal talks deriving from the UN's
historical involvement on Cyprus-it has dealt with
various aspects of the problem for years, and UN
forces (UNFICYP) have occupied the neutral zone
between Greek and Turkish sectors since 1964. This
UN framework has provided a "cooling off" period by
substituting negotiations for open conflict. However,
unlike the case of Cyprus, the United Nations has no
logical connection to Aegean issues, and. neither party
has shown any interest in UN involvement on Aegean
questions.
93. The International Court of Justice. The ICJ's
1976 ruling that it did not have jurisdiction in the
various cases in question because the two parties had
not exhausted the possibilities for bilateral negotiation
continues to apply. In general, Athens is more eager to
secure an ICJ role because it believes it has the
stronger position in international law on many of the
Aegean issues while Turkey believes that the 1976 ICJ
ruling that the parties should give full effort to
resolving the dispute bilaterally has not met with a
good-faith Greek effort. (The LOS Convention pro-
vides for an additional arbitration process to which
Athens and Ankara might conceivably accede in the
future. See the annex for relevant provisions.) Because
the ICJ will not consider cases unless both parties
agree, and has no power of enforcement, there is little
prospect for a juridical solution to Aegean disputes.
94. NATO. NATO members regard the Aegean
disputes as bilateral questions with which they should
not have to deal, and have in the past carefully
avoided becoming involved. However, they have be-
gun to express growing disgruntlement when Greece
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or Turkey disrupts NATO meetings or upsets NATO
activities because of Aegean matters. The many prob-
lems created for NATO by the Aegean disputes may
be generating new incentives for NATO members to
play a more active role.
95. In view of this growing concern about the way
in which such disputes affect the organization's south-
eastern flank, the new Secretary General, Lord Car-
rington, could conceivably play a more active role
than his predecessor in seeking to mediate security-
related Aegean issues. In our view, however, both
Greece and Turkey will be leery of any highly visible
NATO approach. Athens does not consider the Alli-
ance an impartial forum in which to settle Greek-
Turkish disputes, believing that NATO overvalues the
Turkish strategic-military contribution to NATO and
does not share the Greek view that Turkey, not the
Warsaw Pact, is the more imminent threat to Greek
territorial integrity and security. Ankara, on the other
hand, will almost certainly continue to press its prefer-
ence for bilateral discussions with Greece. More im-
portant, both will be concerned about the precedent-
setting effects of accommodations on military
questions for other disputes.
96. A US Role. Washington to date has contended
that the complexity of Aegean issues and the ambigu-
ity of international legal principles necessitate a settle-
ment through substantive bilateral political negotia-
tions or agreed third-party procedures. The United
States has encouraged both sides to negotiate on the
whole range of issues in contention, and it has been
prepared to play a procedural or "good offices" role
when asked, but not a substantive one. In 1976 the
United States responded to Greek requests for a US
security guarantee against possible Turkish aggression
by pledging in a letter from Secretary of State Kissin-
ger to Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios that "the United
States would actively and unequivocally oppose either
side's seeking a military solution and will make a
major effort to prevent such a course of action."
Although the letter remains "on file" as a statement of
US policy in the Aegean, the United States has rejected
Greek entreaties to reaffirm or renew it, most recently
during the 1982-83 DECA negotiations.
97. While each side urges US pressure on the other
for accommodation and compromise, each has reser-
vations about US impartiality. Athens believes that
Washington places greater strategic value on Turkey-
particularly in view of the Soviet activities in Afghani-
stan and the threat to the West's oil supply in the
Gulf-and thus favors Ankara. Ankara perceives
Greek influence in Congress as a major constraint on
the US administration's room for maneuver, and fears
that Athens's US supporters will succeed in pressuring
Washington to hold to traditional aid ratios and terms
and to use the military aid process to force Turkish
concessions on Cyprus.
Optimum Political Conditions for Productive
Negotiations
98. Whether Athens and Ankara will engage in
serious negotiations over Aegean issues will be largely
determined by the timing of such efforts and the
prevailing political climate. Prospects for productive
talks will improve during periods when stable domes-
tic conditions and relatively low levels of tension on
Cyprus allow both governments to deal quietly with
one another. Bilateral discussions are likely to be
nonproductive when either government is on the
political defensive at home. On balance, Greece's and
Turkey's endemic distrust of one another and differing
perceptions of the level of threat posed by the Warsaw
Pact will probably prove to be highly resistant to
change.
99. Given the level of mutual distrust, the situation
probably requires an initial series of confidence-build-
ing measures that would mute the rhetoric, emphasize
areas of common interest, and bring the two sides
together to deal face to face with the issues. Progress
on Cyprus has already been noted as a potential
builder of confidence. The exploitation of common
economic interests might also be a fertile area to
develop: joint development of the Evros River basin
separating Greek and Turkish Thrace was once sug-
gested as a possibility, and cooperation on trade and
tourism might be another. In the past, however, only
two circumstances have compelled Greeks and Turks
to set aside old grievances and cooperate for mutual
benefit: a period of domestic reconstruction when
pragmatic statesmen led both countries at the same
time, and a heightened sense of vulnerability to
external threat.
100. In spite of the obvious tensions in the Aegean,
we believe that the prospects of premeditated aggres-
sion remain limited. Both Greece and Turkey have
stakes in avoiding a military conflict. Athens, con-
vinced that Ankara's objective is to partition the
Aegean, and ultimately to challenge Greek sovereignty
over some of the islands, has shown some willingness to
negotiate on Aegean issues in the past, but not in
recent years. Although Turkey is unprepared to legiti-
mize the existing regime in the area, Ankara considers
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the Aegean situation to be in a state of fragile equilib-
rium. Hence, despite the militant rhetoric, we believe
that forceful change in the Aegean would be viewed
by both Athens and Ankara as destabilizing; and each
has the incentive to avoid overt hostilities and to
carefully manage conflicts that do occur.
101. At the same time, inadvertent clashes, either
on Cyprus or in the Aegean, have considerable poten-
tial to lead to wider hostilities. Mutual suspicions have
been exacerbated by recent events on Cyprus, and
domestic imperatives in Greece may make the risk of
compromise too high at this time. Ankara's frustration
with Greek tactics and its sense of isolation from its
Western allies on the Cyprus issue could move the
locus of attention from constructive dialogue on Aege-
an problems to resisting outside pressures-an issue on
which the Turks are firmly united. While Ankara has
been forthcoming on the issue of resuming direct talks,
Papandreou's refusals have allowed the Turks to avoid
being tested as to where they might give on substance.
102. Prospects for significant progress toward re-
solving Aegean disputes have never been great. We
believe that the atmosphere for productive negotia-
tions has deteriorated over the last few years largely
because of Papandreou's hardline stance against Tur-
key and events arising from the Turkish Cypriot
declaration of independence.
103. Although Cyprus remains the most likely scene
of a Greek-Turkish military clash, hostilities could
spread to the Aegean or Thrace-if only because the
Greeks recognize Turkey's military advantage on the
island. The Greeks would have a slight edge in aerial
combat in the Aegean, and at a minimum they would
hold their own in naval engagements. In the border
area of Thrace, the difficult terrain would be likely to
offset the Turkish manpower edge, and fighting there
probably would end in stalemate. Whatever form the
fighting outside Cyprus took, a war involving more
than small-scale skirmishes would almost certainly be
short-because of limited ammunition stocks-and
very costly for both Ankara and Athens.
Implications for the United States
104. The troubled Aegean will continue to pose
major concern for the United States and NATO.
Disputes in the area have contributed to weakening
the southeastern flank of the Alliance and have led
both Greece and Turkey to question the value of close
relations with the United States. Should the situation
deteriorate sharply, larger US interests could be en-
dangered: access to military
facilities in Greece and Turkey, efforts to modernize
the rapidly deteriorating Turkish weapons inventory,
hopes to enlist Greek and Turkish support for US
activities in the Middle East, and attempts to gain
Turkish cooperation in support of NATO out-of-area
efforts, such as protection of oil lifelines in the Persian
Gulf.
105. The quality of Turkish-Greek cooperation in
the Aegean will also affect the stability of the eastern
Mediterranean, where Soviet and US forces constantly
maneuver. In the worst case, if Greek-Turkish tensions
should escalate to open conflict and Athens perceived
a decided NATO tilt toward Turkey, Greece could
conceivably withdraw from NATO completely, leav-
ing a gap in the southern flank. At that point, land
defense against a Warsaw Pact thrust through Bulgaria
and naval transit through the Aegean could become
critical NATO problems. On the other hand, if Ankara
perceives that NATO, especially the United States, is
taking the Greek side, the possibility of Turkish with-
drawal from the Alliance should not be ruled out.
However, the Turkish border with the Soviet Union
and Turkish perceptions of a greater Soviet threat
make Turkey's withdrawal much less likely than some
form of noncooperation in areas not directly related to
homeland defense. In an extreme case, each side
might view NATO as supporting its adversary, and
both might withdraw from NATO.
106. Should the situation remain as it is, with
periods of tension followed by a backing away from
confrontation, the United States should be prepared
for continuing instability and for persistent demands
for intervention. Both Greece and Turkey place a high
premium on US security assistance; the United States
faces strong pressure from Turkey to expand military
assistance and decouple the military aid process from
Cyprus questions, and counterpressures from Greece
to hold to a 7-to-10 aid ratio and use the military aid
process to force Turkish concessions on Cyprus. Such a
climate will demand skillful crisis management to
limit the damage to US and Alliance interests.
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ANNEX
Excerpts From Treaties and Agreements
Relevant to Greek-Turkish Aegean Disputes
Law of the Sea Convention, 1982
Part II. Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.
Section 1. General Provisions.
Article 2. Legal status.
1. The sovereignty of a coastal State extends
beyond its land territory and internal waters ... to an
adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over
the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil.
Section 2. Limits of the Territorial Sea.
Article 3. Breadth of the territorial sea.
Every State has the right to establish the breadth
of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12
nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in
accordance with this Convention.
Article 15. Delimitation of the territorial sea
between States with opposite or adjacent coasts.
Where the coasts of two States are opposite or
adjacent to each other, neither of the two States is
entitled, failing agreement between them to the con-
trary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median
line every point of which is equidistant from the
nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth
of the territorial seas of each of the two States is
measured. The above provision does not apply, howev-
er, where it is necessary by reason of historic title or
other special circumstances to delimit the territorial
seas of the two States in a way which is at variance
therewith.
Section 3. Innocent Passage in the Territorial Sea.
Article 17. Right of innocent passage.
Note: Spelling in this Annex reflects treaty language and, particular-
ly in the case of place names, may differ from that used elsewhere
in this Memorandum-which generally follows spelling guidance
provided by the US Board on Geographic Names.
Subject to this Convention, ships of all States,
whether coastal or landlocked, enjoy the right of
innocent passage through the territorial sea.
Article 19. Meaning of innocent passage.
1. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudi-
cial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal
State....
2. Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to
be prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of
the coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in
any of the following activities:
(a) any threat or use of force against the sover-
eignty, territorial integrity, or political independence
of the coastal State, or in any other manner in violation
of the principles of international law embodied in the
Charter of the United Nations;
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any
kind;
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the
prejudice of the defence or security of the coastal
State;
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the
defence or security of the coastal State;
(e) the launching, landing, or taking on board of
any aircraft;
(f) the launching, landing, or taking on board of
any military device;
(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity,
currency or person contrary to the customs, fiscal,
immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the
coastal State;
(h) any act of wilful and serious pollution con-
trary to this Convention;
(i) any fishing activities;
(j) the carrying out of research or survey
activities;
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(k) any act aimed at interfering with any system
of communication or any other facilities or installa-
tions of the coastal State;
(1) any other activity not having a direct bearing
on passage.
Convention on International' Civil Aviation,
Chicago, 7 December 1944
Article 1. Sovereignty.
The contracting states recognize that every state has
complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace
above its territory.
Article 2. Territory.
For the purposes of this Convention the territory of
a state shall be deemed to be the land areas and
territorial waters adjacent thereto under the sovereign-
ty, suzerainty, protection, or mandate of such state.
Article 3. Civil and State Aircraft.
(a) This Convention shall be applicable only to civil
aircraft, and shall not be applicable to state aircraft.
(b) Aircraft used in military, customs and police
services shall be deemed to be state aircraft.
(c) No state aircraft of a contracting state shall fly
over the territory of another state or land thereon
without authorization by special agreement or other-
wise and in accordance with the terms thereof.
(d) The contracting states undertake, when issuing
regulations for their state aircraft, that they will have
due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft.
Convention on the Continental Shelf,
Geneva, 1958
1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to
the territories of two or more states whose coasts are
opposite each other, the boundary of the continental
shelf appertaining to such states shall be determined
by agreement between them. In the absence of agree-
ment, and unless another boundary line is justified by
special circumstances, the boundary is the median
line, every point of which is equidistant from the
nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth
of the territorial sea of each state is measured.
2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to
the territories of two adjacent states, the boundary of
the continental shelf shall be determined by agree-
ment between them. In the absence of agreement, and
unless another boundary line is justified by special
circumstances, the boundary shall be determined by
application of the principle of equidistance from the
nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth
of the territorial sea of each state is measured.
Greek Reservation on Acceding to This
Convention
... the Kingdom of Greece makes a reservation with
respect to the system of delimiting the boundaries of
the continental shelf appertaining to states whose
coasts are adjacent or opposite each other, provided
for in article 6, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Convention.
In such cases, the Kingdom of Greece will apply, in
the absence of international agreement, the normal
baseline system for the purpose of measuring the
breadth of the territorial sea.
The Berne Declaration, 1976
On the procedure to be followed for the delimita-
tion of the continental shelf by Greece and Turkey.
(1) Both parties agree that negotiations be sincere,
detailed, and conducted in good faith with mutual
consent regarding the delimitation of the continental
shelf.
(2) Both parties agree that these negotiations should,
due to their nature, be strictly confidential.
(3) Both parties reserve their respective positions
regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf.
(4) Both parties undertake the obligation not to use
the details of this agreement and the proposals that
each will make during the negotiations in any circum-
stances outside the context of the negotiations.
(5) Both parties agree that no statements or leaks to
the press should be made referring to the content of
the negotiations unless they commonly agree to do so.
(6) Both parties undertake to abstain from any
initiative or act relating to the continental shelf of the
Aegean Sea which might prejudice the negotiations.
(7) Both parties undertake, as far as their bilateral
relations are concerned, to abstain from any initiative
or act which would tend to discredit the other party.
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(8) Both parties have agreed to study state practice
and international rules on this subject with a view to
educing certain principles and practical criteria which
could be of use in the delimitation of the continental
shelf between the two countries.
(9) A mixed commission will be set up to this end
and will be composed of national representatives.
(10) Both parties agree to adopt a gradual approach
in the course of the negotiations ahead after consulting
each other.
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982
Part VI. Continental Shelf.
Article 83. Delimitation of the continental shelf
between states with opposite or adjacent coasts.
1. The delimitation of the continental shelf between
states with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected
by agreement on the basis of international law, as
referred to in article 38 of the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable
solution.
2. If no agreement can be reached within a reason-
able period of time, the states shall resort to the
procedures provided for in Part XV (settlement of
disputes).
3. Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1,
the states concerned, in a spirit of understanding and
cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into provi-
sional arrangements of a practical nature, and during this
transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the
reaching of the final agreement. Such arrangements shall
be without prejudice to the final delimitation.
Part VIII. Regime of Islands.
Article 121. Regime of Islands.
2. (Except for rocks which cannot sustain human
habitation or economic life) the territorial sea, the
contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the
continental shelf of an island are determined in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this Convention appli-
cation to other land territory.
Straits of the Dardanelles Convention,
Lausanne, 1923
Article 4. The zones and islands indicated below
shall be demilitarised:
(3) In the Aegean Sea, the islands of Samothrace,
Lemnos, Imbros, Tenedos and Rabbit Islands.
Article 6. . . . there shall exist, in the demilitarised
zones and islands, no fortifications, no permanent
artillery organisation, no submarine engines of war
other than submarine vessels, no military aerial organi-
sation, and no naval base.
No armed forces shall be stationed in the demilitar-
ised zones and islands except the police and gendar-
merie forces necessary for the maintenance of order;
the armament of such forces will be composed only of
revolvers, swords, rifles, and four Lewis guns per
hundred men, and will exclude any artillery.
... Greece shall be entitled to send her fleet into the
territorial waters of the demilitarised Greek islands,
but may not use these waters as a base of operations
against Turkey nor for any military or naval concen-
tration for this purpose.
Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits,
Signed at Montreux, 1936
(The parties to the Convention) Have resolved to
replace by the present Convention the Convention
signed at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923 ....
(No provision is included dealing with demilitarisation
of the Aegean islands named in the Lausanne Conven-
tion cited above.)
Treaty of Lausanne, 1923
Section I. Territorial Clauses
Article 12. The decision taken on the 13th Febru-
ary, 1914, by the Conference of London, in virtue of
Articles 5 of the Treaty of London ... and 15 of the
Treaty of Athens ... regarding the sovereignty of
Greece over the islands of the eastern Mediterranean,
other than the islands of Imbros, Tenedos, and Rabbit
Islands, particularly the islands of Lemnos, Samo-
thrace, Mytilene, Chios, Samos, and Nikaria, is con-
firmed, subject to the provisions of the present Treaty
respecting the islands placed under the sovereignty of
Italy which form the subject of Article 15 (Dodecanese
Islands transferred from Turkish to Italian sovereign-
ty.) Except where a provision to the contrary is
contained in the present Treaty, the islands situated at
less than three miles from the Asiatic coast remain
under Turkish sovereignty.
Article 13. With a view to ensuring the mainte-
nance of peace, the Greek Government undertakes to
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observe the following restrictions in the islands of
Mytilene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria:
(1) No naval base and no fortification will be
established in the said islands.
(3) The Greek military forces in the said islands will
be limited to the normal contingent called up for
military service, which can be trained on the spot, as
well as to a force of gendarmerie and police in
proportion to the force of gendarmerie and police
existing in the whole of the Greek territory.
Italian Peace Treaty, Paris, 1947
Section V. Greece (Special Clause)
(1) Italy hereby cedes to Greece in full sovereignty
the Dodecanese Islands indicated hereafter, namely
Stampalia (Astropalia), Rhodes (Rhodos), Calki
(Kharki), Scarpanto, Casos (Casso), Piscopis (Tilos),
Misiros (Nisyros), Calimnos (Kalymnos), Leros, Patmos,
Lipsos (Lipso), Simi (Symi), Cos (Kos), and Castellorizo,
as well as the adjacent islets.
(2) These islands shall be and shall remain
demilitarised.
D. Definition of the terms "Demilitarisation" and
"Demilitarised."
For the purpose of the present Treaty the terms
"demilitarisation" and "demilitarised" shall be
deemed to prohibit, in the territory and territorial
waters concerned, all naval, military and military air
installations, fortifications and their armaments; artifi-
cial military, naval and air obstacles; the basing or the
permanent or temporary stationing of military, naval
and military air units; military training in any form;
and the production of war materiel. This does not
prohibit internal security personnel restricted in num-
ber to meeting tasks of an internal character and
equipped with weapons which can be carried and by
one person, and the necessary military training of such
personnel.
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES-LAW OF THE
SEA ARBITRATION PROVISIONS
Part XV. Settlement of Disputes.
Section 2. Compulsory Procedures Entailing Bind-
ing Decisions.
Article 287. Choice of procedure.
1. When signing, ratifying, or acceding to this
Convention or at any time thereafter, a state shall be
free to choose, by means of a written declaration, one
or more of the following means for the settlement of
disputes concerning the interpretation or application
of this Convention:
(a) the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea established in accordance with Annex VI;
(b) the International Court of justice;
(c) an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance
with Annex VII;
(d) a special arbitral tribunal constituted in ac-
cordance with Annex VIII for one or more of the
categories of disputes specified therein.
Section 3. Limitations and Exceptions to Applica-
bility of Section 2.
1. Disputes concerning the interpretation or appli-
cation of this Convention with regard to the exercise
by a coastal state of its sovereign rights or jurisdiction
provided for in this Convention shall be subject to the
procedures provided for in section 2 in the following
cases:
(a) when it is alleged that a coastal state has acted
in contravention of the provisions of this Convention
in regard to the freedoms and rights of navigation,
overflight or the laying of submarine cables and
pipelines, or in regard to other internationally lawful
uses of the sea specified in article 58 (exclusive
economic zone);
(b) when it is alleged that a state in exercising the
aforementioned freedoms, rights or uses has acted in
contravention of this Convention or of laws or regula-
tions adopted by the coastal state in conformity with
this Convention and other rules of international law
not incompatible with this Convention; or
(c) when it is alleged that a coastal state has acted
in contravention of specified international rules and
standards for the protection and preservation of the
marine environment which are applicable to the coast-
al state and which have been established by this
convention or through a competent international orga-
nization or diplomatic conference in accordance with
this Convention.
Article 298. Optional exception to applicability of
section 2.
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1. When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Con-
vention or at any time thereafter, a state may, without
prejudice to the obligations arising under section 1,
declare in writing that it does not accept any one or
more of the procedures provided for in section 2 with
respect to one or more of the following categories of
disputes:
(a) (i) disputes concerning the interpretation or
applications of articles 15, 74 and 83 relating to sea
boundary delimitations ... provided that a state hav-
ing made such declaration shall, when such a dispute
arises subsequent to the entry into force of this
Convention and where no agreement within a reason-
able period of time is reached in negotiations between
the parties, at the request of any party to the dispute,
accept submission of the matter to conciliation under
Annex V, section 2 (compulsory conciliation); and
provided further that any dispute that necessarily
involves the concurrent consideration of any unsettled
dispute concerning territory shall be excluded from
such submission;
(ii) after the conciliation commission has pre-
sented its report, which shall state the reasons on
which it is based, the parties shall negotiate an agree-
ment on the basis of that report; if these negotiations
do not result in an agreement, the parties shall, by
mutual consent, submit the question to one of the
procedures provided for in section 2, unless the parties
otherwise agree;
(iii) this subparagraph does not apply to any
sea boundary dispute finally settled by an arrange-
ment between the parties, or to any such dispute
which is to be settled in accordance with a bilateral or
multilateral agreement binding upon those parties.
(b) disputes concerning military activities, includ-
ing military activities by government vessels and
aircraft engaged in noncommercial service, and dis-
putes concerning law enforcement activities ...
(c) disputes in respect of which the Security
Council of the United Nations is exercising the func-
tions assigned to it by the Charter of the United
Nations, unless the Security Council decides to remove
the matter from its agenda or calls upon the parties to
settle it by the means provided for in this Convention.
Article 299. Right of the parties to agree upon a
procedure.
1. A dispute excluded under article 297 or excepted
by a declaration made under article 298 from the
dispute settlement procedures provided for in section
2 may be submitted to such procedures only by
agreement of the parties to the dispute.
2. Nothing in this section impairs the right of the
parties to the dispute to agree to some other procedure
for the settlement of such dispute or to reach an
amicable settlement.
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