TRYING HARDER TO BLOCK THE BOMB

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87R00111R000200140025-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 14, 2008
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: September 12, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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( 1
MEW YORK TIPS MAGAZINE
12 September 1982
An international agency that monitors nuclear-power plants
around the world faces crucial tests of its ability to spot
any diversion of fuel for making atomic weapons. A change of
policy in Washington may help the effort - or hurt it.
TRYING HARDER TO
BLOCK SHE BOMB
By Judith Muller
Valindaba, Angra, Osirak, Dimonah,
Embalse, Kahuta, Tarapur ... the
names are known to few, but they hold
the potential for making the world
more perilous for everyone. With a
macabre poetry, nations have often
turned to myth or the gods in choosing
names and sites for their nuclear-
energy facilities. Iraq's Osirak is de-
rived from Osiris, god of the under-
world in Egyptian mythology. Dimo-
nah was a biblical town given unto to
the tribe of the children of Judah. South
Africa's choice was particularly evoca-
tive: Derived from the African lan-
guage Sotho, Valindaba means the
place where "we don't do much talk-
By contrast, there is little poetry at
U.N. City, the antiseptic modern com-
plex on the outskirts of Vienna that
houses the International Atomic
Energy Agency (I.A.EA.) and several
other United Nations bodies. The devel-
opment's steel-gray, towers and color
coded corridors are filled with engi-
neers, scientists, lawyers and interna-
tional civil servants who talk, in the
mind-numbing parlance of arms con-
trol, of such things as "nuclear nanpro-
liferation" and the "international safe-
guards regime."
In plain Fngiish, the I.A.E.A.'s ntis-
sisn is to promote the wort of those
places named for myths and gods and to monitor
the sites at the same time, so that the agency can
assure the world that some 840 nuclear facilities os-
tensibly dedicated to the production of nuclear
power and reef---` --- --- -
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U
in many respects, the agency can claim a laud-
able record. After the dawn of the atomic age over
Hiroshima in 1945, there were dire predictions that
the world would soon be populated with dozens of
nuclear-weapons states. But the nuclear club has
remained fairly exclusive, boasting only five mem-
bers: the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain,
France and. China. Eight years have passed since
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi received the mes-
sage "The Buddha is smiling. which told her of the
success of India's nuclear test ; yet India has held
back from producing nuclear weapons.
Now, however, nuclear-policy analysts are warn-
ing with renewed fervor that the world is on the
verge of a dangerous increase in the number of nu-
clear-weapons states. Soon, they say, several less-
In their rounds of the world's nuclear-power
plants, the agency's inspectors, recruited from
many of its 111 member countries, may inspect
naffs on sensitive material that can potentially be
used in weapons. They look at millions
of slides from cameras monitoring
huge indoor cooling ponds, where
developed nations - even some headed by irre- `
sponsible and irrational leaders - will possess the
instruments of Armageddon. At the same time, the
United States and the Soviet Union are intensifying
their nuclear-weapons programs, and the Reagan
Administration has adopted anew nuclear-export
policy that, in the view of many critics, reduces
safeguards against the diversion of nuclear fuel for
military purposes. The response has been a rise of
antinuclear movements in Western Europe and the
United States demanding not only a freeze and re-
duction in weaponry but an end to the spread of
atomic power.
These developments have focused attention on
the International Atomic Energy Agency. As the
agency prepares to celebrate its 25th anniversary
at a general conference starting on Sept. 20, doubts
about its ability to carry out its mandate are
mounting. Within the past year, two former
I.A.E.A. inspectors have charged that the agency
is incapable of quickly catching a country that is se-
cretly using its nuclear facilities to make bombs.
Last November, the United States Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission informed Congress that the agen-
cy , s safeguards system was inadequate for some
kinds of facilities. Senator Alan Cranston, minority
whip, charges that the United States and other gov-
ernments have been covering up the agency's fail-
ings so that they can pursue their nuclear com-
merce. Representative Edward J. Markey, Demo-
crat of Massachusetts, says, "The I.A.E.A. has be-
come little more than an international nuclear
boosters club."
At U.N. City - or the Vienna International Cen-
ter, as it is officially called - Hans Blix, the
IA.E.A.'s new director general, contests the jus-
tice of these accusations. "Our role is not under-
stood by many in your country," said Mr. Blix, who
is a Swede, in a recent interview. "We Fire not inter-
national nuclear policemen. We can't roam about
searching for clandestine facilities, miffing out
hidden plutonium and uranium."
that a tarpaulin had been placed over
the pond while the pond was being painted. Moni-
tors installed near the reactor's exits were register-
ing the passage of radioactive substances. Inspec-
tors, according to intelligence reports, found a
large, unexplained hole in a wall.
Matters came to a head a year ago. "It looked
like a diversion," recounted a Congressional ex-
pert. "It smelled like a diversion. But, as usual,
there was no actual proof that a diversion had oc-
curred."
Pakistan had been a problem all along. It had de-
clined to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
of 1968, under which nations without nuclear weap-
ons agreed to forswear their development. So only
some of its facilities were open to inspection - only
-those where safeguards had been made a condition
of a foreign sale. Pakistan's former President, Zul-
fikar All Bhutto, had vowed that his country would
"eat grass," if necessary, to match the detonation
of India's so-called "peaceful nuclear explosive" in
spent, or used, nuclear fuel is stored.
They pore over records of fuel invento-
ries to insure that all -the material that
went into the reactor came out and was ~
accounted for. Yet, in the light of all the
complexities, the inspectors' role is
very circumscribed, and they may visit
only those facilities that are designated
by the government involved.
"I'll tell you what we are," Mr. Blix
said. "We are somewhat like an airport
security system. Of course there are
deficiencies in the X-ray system that
inspects your luggage. Sure, the system
could use more security guards. But
why concentrate on this when there are
passengers on your plane who refuse to
submit any luggage at all to inspec-
tion? Or why not worry about the pas-
senger who says, 'I'll submit this bag
but not these other three'?"
His analogy goes to the nub of one of
the clearest challenges to the agency's
effectiveness the Pakistani nuclear
reactor near Karachi.
0
For months, I.A.E.A. inspectors had
been reporting disturbing incidents at
the Canadian-supplied nuclear facility.
Cameras monitoring the cooling pond
began failing at an astonishingly high
rate; their pictures showed a blur.
The Pakistanis' odd explanation was
1974. In addition, Pakistan had established a world-
wide network of purchasing agents, including
phony companies and spies, to obtain components
for a uraniumrichment plant, which can be used
to fabricate fuel for weapons.
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cmp cious events at Pakistan's nuclear reactor have raised
Now came these "anoma-
lies" and "irregularities," as
the agency preferred to call
them, at Pakistan's deu-
terium uranium reactor. In
this type of facility, which the
United States does not sell,
fuel rods are loaded into the
reactor and extracted from it
without any shutdown of the
plant and mostly without the
presence of inspectors. Since
the fuel for -the Pakistani
reactor is produced domesti-
cally, the agency had no right
to oversee production and
count the number of rods
made. Theoretically, there-
fore, it was possible for the
Pakistanis to load and ex-
tract more fuel rods than the
inspectors were aware of.
And, theoretically, any rods
that slipped by could be used
to make bombs.
had been
.ayon toying the installation of
the fuel rods, but as Pale-
-stan's fuel-production cape-
: ty increased, the inspec-
tors tat they needed more
cameras and other surveil-
lance equipment. The agency
asked Pakistan for permis-
sion to install more monitors;
the Pakistanis balked. This
dispute, combined with the
suspicious activities reported
by the agency's inspectors,
led to a dramatic warning. In
September 1961, Sigvar'd Ek- I
hind of Sweden. the agency's
director general at the time,
informed his board that the
agency could no longer pro-
vide assurances that Paki-
stan was not diverting nu-
clear fuel for military pur-
poses.
His statement - the agen-
cy's first acknowledgment of
this kind - shook the interna-
tional safeguards system to
its foundation. In the face of
the uproar in various capi-
tals, including Washington,
Pakistan agreed to some of
the I.A.E.A.'s requests. But,
I as Mr. Blix, the new director,
1 emphasized in his best bu-
reaucratese in a statement
last February, "full imple-
mentation of safeguards is
needed before requisite as-
surance of verification can be
made by the agency-? The
.deadlock continues to this
nay.
Moreover, disquieting re-
ports have continued to reach
Washington. Pakistan, ac-
cording to American offi-
cials, has been trying to make
Sept purchases of highly
sensitive diagnostic coaxial
cable from European and
American suppliers; the
:cable can be used to monitor
^uodergrotmd tests. The
the same officials
art, have dug a huge tun-
nel in the Baluchistan Moun-
tains near the Afghan border,
where such a test could be
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ITS of secret fleet diversion.
conducted. And, these
sources say, Pakistan re-
cently approached the
French and other suppliers
for 184nch metal globes for
shaping uranium, fnsuu-
ments primarily used in nu-
clear explosions.
Despite these develop-
ments, the lesson as Mr. Blix
sees it is that "toe system
works" - at least as tar as
his agency is concerned. -
V the I.A.E:A.'s salegoards
are alarm bells whose useful-
-am depends an how tie
member tovernmeats re-
spond to the warning, then
the agency's eveness de-
pends first and foremost an
the United States. the leading
shtporter of nuclear technolo-
My. Consequently, the most
significant factor in the whole
situation may be the change
of policy instituted by Presi-
dent Reagan.
Every mhclear reactor is a
potential bomb factory.
Highly enriched uranium,
.which is burned in reactions to
prodshce power. can also be
President Reagan's policy breeder reactors, type of or p a differs from Mr. Carter's in
tone and substance. Despite
statements to the contrary,
stopping the spread of nu-
clear weapons plays a less
prominent role in the spec-
trum of foreign-policy objec-
tives. Administration offi-
cials have adopted a security-
oriented approach to the
"We have rung the alarm,"
he said during the interview
in his Vienna office. "That is
the and of our role. The gov-
?ssnments must now decide
what to do about Pakistan.
Safeguards, after all, are not
an end in themselves."
fl
weap ns
used directly In
Uranium rods that are
".cooked" in a reactor to
produce power also produce
plutonium, another weapons
substance. If a country wants
to make plutonium bombs, it
separates the plutonium from
the spent, or used, fuel rods
through what is known as re-
processing-
What arms-control experts
fear most in the whole pro-
em is the development of
trade in plutonium. Such
commerce, they say, would
Eby complicate ef-
forts to curb the spread of
atomic weapons, while sub-
stially increasing the
threat of nuclear terrorism.
Man-made and highly toxic,
plutonium. is an extremelY
dangerous bomb-making ma-
terial. Only 10 to 20 pounds
are required to make an
atomic device. A far smaller
amount placed in a building's
ventilation system could kill
hundreds of People, some ex-
perts say, by poisoning the
air.
presidents Ford and Carter
sought to raise international
consciousness about sensitive
nuclear exports - equipment
that is very difficult, if not
impossible, to safeguard. Mr.
Carter in particular tried to
persuade European suppliers
not to export enrichment
plants or reprocessing tacili-
snores. Mr. Carter banned
commercial reprocessing and
breeders in the United States.
He also vowed to deny nu-
clear fuel and technology toI
any nation that did not:
submit to international con-I
trots.
Toward the and of his Ad-
ministration, however, Mr.
Carter began backing away
from his strategy. Even
though his message on the
perils of proliferation was
making an impact on the
Europeans and the Japanese,
the friction produced by their
unwillingness to give up re-
processing was interfering
with broader foreign-policy
objectives, particularly after
the Soviet invasion of Af-
ghanistan. This exposed him
to attacks on two fronts - by
those who ridiculed his policy
as overly ideological and by
those who charged him with
inconsistency.
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problem : They argue that third-world
nations can best be dissuaded from
acquiring atomic weapons if their se-
curity concerns are allayed. This ap.
proach has resulted in greater em-
hasis on military aid and security
arrangements and less emphasis on
public efforts to tighten international
nuclear controls. Mr. Reagan has
canceled the ban on domestic breeder
and reprocessing technology, and has
vowed to stimulate both efforts.
Reagan Officials argue that it is
best to recognize "reality." The
Europeans and the Japanese, they
Say, have been adamant about re.
Processing because they are deter-
mined to reduce their dependence on
imported oil and imported uranium,
and to establish an independent nu-
clear-power capability. With that as a
national goal, it is reasoned, these na-
tions will eventually turn to plu-
tonium no matter what Washington
says or does. Thus, officials explain,
the Reagan Policy is aimed at limit-
ing the use of plutonium to Japan and
the Western European allies, which
(with the exception of Britain and
France) are not likely to build nu-
clear weapons.
At the same time, they add, the Ad-
ministration is committed to tight in-
ternational controls on the sale of all
sensitive technology to suspect coun-
.tries, and they claim that private dip-
lomatic efforts are sudceeding in
reducing this flow. Finally, th y,
the Administration is seeking tone-es-
tablish the United States as a "reli-
able supplier" of nuclear fuel and
nonsensitive technology in order to
reduce the temptation for third-world
countries to go their own way and de-
velop facilities that are not under
I.A.E.A. controls.
"There's not all that much differ.
ence between Carter's and Reagan's
export policies in practice," asserted
one long-time arms-control official.
"The Reagan Administration is just
more discriminating in its ap-
proach."
But critics, who include some mod-
erate Democrats and Republicans in
Congress, vehemently disagree.
Senator Charles H. Percy, Republi-
can of Illinois and chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee, and
Democratic Senators Cranston of
California, John H. Glenn of Ohio and
Gary W. Hart of Colorado, have ac-
cused the Administration, in Mr.
Glenn's words, of "turning the clock
back to the.days of laissez-faire nu-
clear commerce of the early 1970's."
They are particularly critical of the
decision on reprocessing. This ap-
proach, they warn, will result in the
spread of reprocessing facilities not
only in Western Europe and Japan
but eventually in less reliable coun-
tries. These facilities, they say, will
generate thousands of pounds of plu-
tonium - enough material for hun-
dreds of bombs. This fuel, they cau-
tion, can be diverted and converted
very quickly for use in atomic weap-
ons. Moreover, they argue, the Ad-
ministration will not be able to dis-
criminate so neatly between reliable
and unreliable nations.
The critics also assail recent Wash-
ington decisions they regard as capit-
ulation to Japan's wish to use plu-
tonium rather than uranium in its ex-
isting reactors and as encouragement
to American companies to vie for re-
processing construction contracts. In
the critics' view, the Administration
has gone beyond acquiescing to "nu-
clear reality" and has been creating
new realities with fateful implica-
tions for the world.
"Our Government has long ac-
knowledged that the I.A.E.A. cannot
adequately inspect reprocessing
plants," said Paul Leventhal, presi-
dent of the Nuclear Control Institute,
a private watchdog group. "Yet the
White House is promoting the very
technology that the agency cannot
safeguard. This is really the begin-
ning of the end. "
At the I.A.E.A. in Vienna, the reac-
tion to the Reagan approach is mixed.
Officials fear that if reprocessing
spreads widely, they will not
be able to provide --timely
warning" that a --algnificant
amount" of plutonium
enough to build a bomb - is
being diverted. --We are '
stretched to our limits al-
ready," said a senior agency
official. "There is no way that
we will be able to provide as-
surances that thousands of
tons of plutonium are being
devoted to peaceful purposes.
And that seems to be where
the world is heading."
On the other hand, the Rea-
gan philosophy of seeking to
allay the security fears that
make countries hanker for
nuclear weapons was
strongly endorsed by Mr. Blix
and other officials. "Security
considerations are decisive,"
Mr. Blix said. "If a country
feels secure, it is more likely
to invite us in. Insecure coun-
tries are more likely to seek
atomic bombs."
0
From the vantage point of
U.N.City, the tests of the
Reagan Administration's ap-
pa+oach are multiplying.
Not all of the I.A.E.A.'s
niember governments have
signed the IM nonprolifers-
tian treaty. Under the Ford-
Carter , policy, Washington
put pressure on the holdouts
iD sign; agency Officials
sense that under the Reagan
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Atomic envy head Hans Blix: "The alarm bells are ringing."
Adtninistratim this pressure
has let up. The nations that
did not sign the treaty submit
some but not all of their
atomic facilities to -
Lion. Pakistan, India, Israel
and South Africa were among
the member nations that re-
fused to sign, and all four
have either developed or are
close to developing a nuclear-
weapons capability.
In its 1981 annual report,
the agency admitted that it
could no longer guarantee
that two unnamed countries
- known to be Pakistan and
India - were not diverting
nuclear fuel for use in a weap.
ons program. many intelli-
gence analysts believe South
Africa secretly assembled
and tested an atomic device
In September 1979. Israel is
believed to have a number of
unassembled, untested nu-
clear bombs - to be a screw-
driver-turn away from full
nuclear capability. "The
alarm bells are ringing loud
and clear with respect to
these four,.' Mr. Blix de-
clared.
There is growing anxiety.
-too, about nations suspected
of engaging in what is known
as ..phantom proliferation- pledging commitment to
"nonmilitary use of the atom
but secretly putting together
the pieces for a potential
bomb. Libya, . for mample.
has ratified the nonproliferation
treaty, and so far has purchased only
one small, Soviet-supplied research
reactor. Yet Western intelligence
agencies report that the Libyan lead-
er, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, has
tried secretly to buy bomb eompo-
rents and fissionable material, from
several countries, including China.
Industry sources report that Colo-
eel Qaddafi has bought more than
1,000 tons of uranium concentrate, or
.'yellow cake," from Niger, a ma-
terial that can be converted into a
substance suitable for weapons mak-
ing. The Reagan Administration has
quietly asked other nuclear suppliers
not to cooperate with Libya. It has
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r-,
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pressed Belgium - with little success
- not to proceed with plans to sell
Libya a UF4 plant, which would en-
able Colonel Qaddafi to proceed with
conversion of his massive yellow-
cake stockpile.
Then, there is the can of Argentina,
one of the I.A.E.A. members that did
not sign the 1968 nonproliferation
treaty. Argentina, whose nuclear pro-
gram is in its 31st year, has been
working openly to acquire the ability
to produce on its own all it would need
.'to build nuclear-power plants. When
and if Argentina succeeds in complet-.
ing its own independent nuclear-fuel
cycle, it will be able to make nuclear
fuel - and, theoretically, nuclear
weapons - without violating any of
the 11 safeguard agreements it has
signed with five supplier countries
under the auspices of the I.A.E.A.
Moreover, Rear Adm. Carlos Cas-
tro Madero, head of Argentina's Com-
mission on Atomic Energy, has stated
that Argentina might export plu-
tonium soon to be produced in a re-
processing plant. "in addition to
building a bomb themselves, the Ar-
gentines now seem intent on helping
others do it, said an exasperated
I.A.E.A. official. Whatever Argenti-
na's determination to acquire nu-
clear-arms capability, it can only
have been heightened by its defeat in
the Falkland Islands war.
American and international experts
list Iraq, Taiwan, South Korea and
Brazil as other aspirants to nuclear-
power status, though all four are
I.A.E.A. members and all except
Brazil signed the 1968 treaty. The
Iraqi program became a major crisis
for the I.A.E.A. when Israel carried
out an air strike against the Iraqi nu-
clear reactor in June 1981, claiming it
had detected advanced preparations
for the manufacture of atomic weap-
ons.
While admitting that there were
suspicious aspects to the Iraqi pro-
gram, the I.A.E.A. maintained that
there was no evidence that Iraq was
not living up to its pledge to use its
French-supplied Osirak reactor near
Baghdad only for peaceful purposes.
Hence, the intense resentment
aroused among I.A.E.A. officials by
the Israeli action, a stunning demon-
stration of no confidence in the agen-
cy.
Mr. Blix agrees with Israel's
charge that the safeguards system
contains an inherent weakness: It
cannot detect a country's future in-
tentions. Theoretically, Iraq could
use the I.A.E.A. to acquire all the
technology it needs for attaining an
independent nuclear system, and then
renounce membership in the agency.
The nonproliferation treaty contains
a clause that permits withdrawal on
three months' notice.
"yes, any nation could do this,"
Mr. Blix conceded. "But in the agen-
cy's 25 years, no nation has done so.
We have found that nations honor
their sworn commitments. Those that
want to develop nuclear weapons
refuse to sign the treaty."
13
In one sense, the I.A.E.A.'s difficul-
ties are rooted in its dual mandate -
to promote the use of nuclear power
and to monitor it. The agency grew
out of President Eisenhower's 1953
"Atoms for Peace" speech at the
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 U. N. City in Vienna: The developing nations are demanding more atomic?energv assistance.
United Nations, in which the
United States offered to share
its atomic technology with
any country that promised to
use it for peaceful purposes.
Established in 1957, the
I.A.E.A. was enjoined ,to ac-
celerate and enlarge the con-
tribution of atomic energy to
peace, health and prosperity
throughout the world," opti-
mism that seems naive in ret-
rospect. The program was en-
thusiastically supported by
the American nuclear indus-
try, which had long urged a
shift in nuclear orientation
from secrecy to salesman-
ship.
The industry lost little time
in feeding the world's appe-
tite for nuclear power. The al-
hue of this new form of
energy remains undimin-
ished in the third world, what-
ever the second thoughts in
some of the industrialized
countries. Developing nations
look to the I.A.E.A. for nu-
'clear assistance. Particu-
larly since 1977, the have4 is
have complained that the
agency has been spending too
much of its budget on inspec-
daps and safeguards and not
? duoug- an teebnicel aid.
Their demands for a policy
reversal have been opposed
by the United States and the
Western European countries,
which supply about half of the
:agency's $86 million annual
budget. The agency is becom-
ing polarized between devel-
oping and developed nations;
there are fears that the disa-
.greement may jeopardize the
LA.E.A.'s future viability.
we're in danger," said one
official, 'b[ getting a vary
bad case of United Nations
disease."
The Group of 77, as the
developing nations within the
I.A.E.A. are known, has put
forward proposals designed
to increase its voting strength
and political muscle. On
third-world initiative, South
Africa was expelled from the
I.A.E.A. board of governors
participation," said one
American arms-oantrol ex-
pert. "And that means you
can say goodbye to the agen-
cy.,,
in 1977, though retaining
membership in the agency. A
move to expel Israel, in pun-
ishment for Its raid an the
Iraqi nuclear reactor, was
narrowly averted at the last
general conference. Another
attempt will be made at the
general conference next
week. "If Israel goes, you can
say goodbye to United States
tween Washington and Mos-
COW.
Yet the most immediate
remains the amblgu-
cus status of Pakistan's tan's nu-
ar program. ~} ? ie agency,
4ike the united States Con-
gress, has been relying an the
}Reagan Administration's as-
sertion that while Pakistan
may soon be able to detonate
a nuclear device, it is not
likely to do so, since that
would jeopardize a $3.2-bil-
lion, five-year American miL-
taryaid package and the sale
of 40 F-16 fighter jets. Ameri-
can aid to Pakistan, termi-
nated by congress in 1979 be-
cause of concern about its nu-
clear ambitions, was restored
last year, but Washington has
warned that a nuclear deto-
nation would jeopardize the
new security relationship-
if the $3.2 billion carrot
does not dissuade Pakistan
from crossing the nuclear
threshold, a much more un-
certain future awaits South-
west Asia. What India would
do if its bitter rival Pakistan
exploded a nuclear device is
an ominous question. Several
American analysts have
argued that neither India nor
Israel is likely to stand by and
permit Pakistan to develop a
nuclear-weapons arsenal.
"If the I.A.E.A. fails and
the Reagan Administration
fails, a much less secure
world is in store for all of us,"
warned a senior agency of I-
dal. "A world of pre-emptive
strikes and nuclear black-
mail. It won't be a pretty
world." ^
Another concern within the
-
agency stems from the Rea
gan Administration's more
confrontational attitude to-
ward the Soviet Union. The
Russians, who became
I.A.E.A. enthusiasts after
China detonated its nuclear
device in 1964, have had a
tough nuclear-exports policy.
"This is one of the few places
where the Soviet Union and
the United States have
worked together for many
years in a quiet, orderly and
quite effective way," said
David Fischer, a former top
agency official. He and others
are concerned that this long-
standing cooperation may
fall victim to the new chill be-
Approved For Release 2008/04/14: CIA-RDP87R00111 R000200140025-4