BRIEFING ON NUCLEAR TERRORISM FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (HFAC) 8 NOVEMBER 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87R00029R000300590025-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 23, 2008
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: November 8, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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DATE
TRANSMITTAL SLIP I oY 83
To:
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC 8073-83
8 November 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Briefing on Nuclear Terrorism for the Subcommittee on
International Security and Scientific Aff airs,
House Foreign Aff airs Committee.(HFAC), 8 November 1983
1. Participants. The two and one half-hour briefing was conducted in
the HFAC hearing room, Chairman Clement Zablocki presiding.
were General Hoover of DNA, Assistant Secretary of Defense fo
The principals
Energy, Dr. Richard Wagner, and myself. I was accom anied b
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OALA, who provided the details of the threat, and b
, w o 25X1
answered questions about terrorist behavior
.
2. Briefing Substance, My presentation covered the following paints:
The possibility that nuclear terrorism dill occur is a subject
of growing concern given the spread of nuclear facilities and
materials throughout the world. Nevertheless, our overall
perspective is that would-be nuclear terrorists will face immense
technological problems in trying to build nuclear weapons with or
without patron country support. The most likely form of terrorist
incident involving nuclear materials will not involve the
f abrication of a bomb by asub-national group. R ather, if nuclear
materials are involved, we will be dealing with either the risk of
radiation explosure or a hoax supported by the presence of nuclear
materials. I emphasized that we had no clear-cut examples of the
acquisition by asub-national group o~significant nuclear material
or technology. But because so many variables were involved, the
threat that some foreign terrorist group might attempt a
potentially serious nuclear operation could not be entirely
discounted.
SECRET
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3. Transcri t and Follow-Up. A transcript of the proceedings was
prepared and will be availa6 a ar review. As the briefing broke up, I was
ask ed by NFAC Staffer Arch Roberts if we could provide him and his chief,
Bill Barnds, with an update on Indian nuclear test preparations. I said
ld be happy to do so and that he should make arrangements with
for this purpose.
Assistant National Intelligence Officer at Large
cc: C/NIC
VC/NIC (C. Waterman)
DDI/CSS/OLL
SECRET
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 Approved For Release 2008/04/29 :CIA-RDP87R00029R000300590025-6
Approved For Release 2008/04/29 :CIA-RDP87R00029R000300590025-6