DEAR(SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B01034R000500260045-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 6, 2008
• Sequence Number: 45
• Content Type: LETTER

Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP87B0l034R000500260045-4
Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20545
Chairman, lou security Uommi tee
Via Ames/ISC
Room 1225, Ames Building
Washington, D.C. 20505
By virtue of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Energy Reorganization
Act of 1976, the Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for operating
special nuclear materials (SNM) research and production facilities, Naval
Reactors' facilities and the Nation's nuclear weapons research and develop-
ment, testing, and production facilities in support of the national defense.
These major national security programs are carried out at government-owned,
contractor-operated (GOCO) facilities located throughout the United States.
From the original establishment of the atom bomb development effort under
the Manhattan Engineering District, the Government's operating philosophy
has been to depend upon the expertise in the private sector rather than
attempt to maintain such capabilities in the Government ranks. This
philosophy led to the existing system wherein major educational institu-
tions and industrial organizations are responsible for the operation of
DOE's facilities, which are closely administered by field offices consisting
of Government personnel.
In the chaotic world in which we exist today, with the widespread antinuclear,
antimilitary and anti-U.S. sentiments, and proclivity for terrorists to strike
symbolic targets, the DOE believes that its facilities require a high degree of
protection.
It is recognized that most terrorist acts have occurred outside of the United
States. However, in these days of rapid transportation and high technology
any location is within striking distance of would be terrorists. In addition,
essentially all forecasts are for increasing terrorist activity within the
continental limits of the United States.
DOE review completed.
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 Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP87BOl034R000500260045-4
While there is no current indication of an imminent terrorist threat to
facilities, there are numerous indications that cause heightened concern.
The DOE has been the subject of considerable congressional interest in
and criticism of the state of its physical security capabilities. The
DOE has spent more than $1.5 billion for security upgrades over the past
3 years and has increased its ar+ned security forces by about 25 percent
to ap_7roximately 4,500 personnel. The planned security upgrades costs
(including operating costs) in FY 1986 will amount to $729 million. The
DOE has taken the position that it cannot afford a failure at a nuclear
weapons or SNM facility; that the consequences of the loss of a weapon,
or a significant quantity of SNM, are so serious as to be unacceptable.
One of the major problems facing DOE at the present time is the maintaining
of a heightened consciousness of world and domestic conditions among
personnel operating its facilities. As part of the effort to deal with
this issue, DOE has received permission from the Defense Intelligence
Agency and the U.S. Navy to disseminate their daily terrorism bulletins
to the DOE field offices. These bulletins are classified at the collat-
eral level (normally SECRET/NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION (NSI)). Because
some of these bulletins occasionally have "NOCONTRACT" markings, and due
to the fact that essentially all DOE field office communication centers
(COMCENTERS) are contractor-operated, the Office of Safeguards and Security
in Headquarters, DOE, is required to send hard copies of the bulletins to
its field personnel. This effort on the part of DOE to abide by the
"letter of the law" regarding "NOCONTRACT" provisions of DCID causes
problems: (a) it causes a great deal of excessive clerical effort (DOE
maintains document accountability for all SECRET material); and (b) it
results in the bulletin information being delivered through mail channels
several days late at a minimum. The Department therefore requests that
it be granted a waiver of the "NOCONTRACT" caveat of DCID 1/7 for the
purposes of rapid transmission of such intelligence bulletins as described
above, directly through the DOE's COMCENTERS to its field operating
(Federal employees) officials.
The following are pertinent factors with regard to DOE field and
Headquarters COMCENTER operations: (1) the COMCENTERS are GOCO; (2) all
processing of COMCENTER materials is conducted onsite~in a cleared environ-
ment; (3) there is a high degree of employment stability among contractor
staff in the DOE COMCENTERS; (4) COMCENTERS routinely handle material
classified SECRET/NSI or SECRET/RESTRICTED DATA (RD); (5) all COMCENTER
personnel are DOE "Q" cleared. These clearances are appropriate for up
to TOP SECRET/NSI or RD, and are based on a full background investigation
Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP87BOl034R000500260045-4
 Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP87BOl034R000500260045-4
which, at a minimum, covers the most recent 5-year period. Moreover,
DOE's reinvestigation`policy provides for additional background inves-
tigations at the 5 and 20-year intervals and a National Agency records
check and credit check at the 10 and 15-year intervals; (6) COMCENTER
personnel are not supervised by government personnel; however, COMCENTER
operations are routinely and closely monitored by both DOE Federal
communications and security personnel.
Enclosed is a listing of the DOE COMCENTERS. There is an average of
five personnel working in each COMCENTER who might potentially see one of 10'
the referenced messages. However, our direct procedure will be that when
ll
MCENTER
a
u
a "NOCONTRACT" message is received in a contractor-operated CO
copies will be immediately put in a sealed envelope and delivered to DOE. t' k`~~c
The DOE will appreciate the OCI Security Committees' consideration of this
matter as early as practicable.
Deptment of Energy
Representative to SECOM
Enclosure
Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP87BOl034R000500260045-4