STAFF NOTES: CHINESE AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300080018-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2008
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: August 4, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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 State Dept. review
completed
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Secret
ALL IGF;
Chinese Affairs
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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the East Asia - Pacific Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence and from the Directorate of Science and Technology. Comments
and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the
individual articles.
CONTENTS
August 4, 1975
Chou' s Master Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Sino - Latin American Relations:
A Mini-Prospectus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
China: New Solutions for Old Problems. . . . . . 7
China: Oil Pipeline Construction Generates
Demand for Telecommunications Equipment . . . . 9
Testing Taiwan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Enrollment 1975: Stalemate 12
New Pipeline Links Peking
to Ta-ching Oil Fields. . 15
Playing the Angolan Sweepstakes . . . . .. . . . 16
Yao Wen-yuan:
Singing the Right Tune. 18
CHRONOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
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In contrast to the political infighting that
preoccupied China's leaders last year, they have
turned their attention this year to economic affairs.
Most of the directives issued by the party this
year deal. with problems in the economic sector
stemming from political disruptions. Peking seems
intent on resolving political problems privately,
while pushing publicly for programs that will bene-
fit the economy.
The prime mover behind this new emphasis on eco-
nomic development appeal:s to be Premier Chou En-lai.
Even if Chou may be overly optimistic about long-
range economic prospects, it is significant that the
aging Premier is actively involved in planning for
a future that he will not live to see.
China is currently on the last leg of a five-
year economic plan that will end this year and is
reportedly drawing up a plan, to begin in 1976, de-
signed to bring China into the front ranks of the
industrialized nations by the end of the century.
Chou En-lai announced this goal himself in his speech
to the Natonal People's Congress in January and in-
dicated that the State Council would be drafting
long-range plans aimed at this goal.
Hong Kong communist bankers who visited China
recently reportedly received a briefing by Chou on
the contents of what they called the "Premier's 25-
year master plan." The bankers had the definite im-
pression that Chou was in overall charge of the plan,
indicating the extent to which the hospitalized Pre-
mier remains involved in major policy questions. The
day-to-day work undoubtedly is being directed by Vice
Premier Li Hsien-nien, China's leading economic spe-
cialist and a close associate of Chou's, and by chief
economic planner Yu Chiu-li, also a Chou protege.
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Chou reportedly said that the initial ten-year
phase of the plan will emphasize the development of
transportation facilities and heavy industry, espe-
cially the petroleum industry. In addition, the
Premier claimed that China had drawn up a new plan
for education. The latter point is consistent with
Chou's comment in January that the current educa-
tional system is not adequate to meet China's future
economic needs and is a tacit admission that Mao's
radical reform of education, initiated during the
Cultural Revolution, has been a failure and needs to
be drastically revamped.
The Premier admitted that the f4.rst phase of
the plan will not result in a significant improvement
in living standards but reportedly claimed that the
second phase, beginning in 1986, will bring living
standards up to these of modern industrialized na-
tions by the year 2000. The second phase is to
focus on technical and scientific developm nt that
will leave China "second to none" in these fields.
Ironically, the plan, if successful, would make
China a superpower, a goal the Chinese have con-
sistently eschewed-,-at least in public. In any
event, China could no longer ..lake a credible claim
that it belongs to the Third World.
The success of the plan, of course, depends on
several factors. China will have to achieve and
maintain over a quarter of a century a greater degree
of political stability, from Peking down to the grass
roots, than it has had in the past decade. Economic
factors, many of which are beyond China's control,
can also intervene. The weather, as usual, will af-
fect agriculture, which remains the basis of the
economy. Changes in the world economic situation are
likely to have a greater impact on the economy, now
that China is more deeply involved in international
trade. Moreover, the contentious and still unresolved
issues of wages and incentive programs could have a
critical affect on worker morale ana nrnc1nri-ivity.
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Sino - Latin Amerd,can Relations:
A Mini-Prospectus 25X1
The Panamanian National Assembly's call last
week for closer relations with the communist bloc
and the signing of a Sino-Ecuadorean trade agree-
ment in early July strengthen the possibility that
Peking will establish full diplomatic relations
with these two countries in the near future. When
it occurs, the exchange of ambassadors will be an-
other milestone in Peking's drive for respectability
in Latin America that began when the Chinese emerged
from the Cultural Revolution and returned to fields
of diplomacy in 1969. At that time, only Cuba had
formal ties with Peking; the rest of the hemisphere
was a Nationalist Chinese stronghold. China now has
relations with ten Latin American countries--includ-
ing all of the regional heavyweights--and when Panama
and Ecuador enter the fold, Peking will have achieved
numerical parity with Taiwan.
The diplomatic ledger is only a small part of the
story. On the economic front, Sino - Latin American
trade was negligible before 1969; preliminary esti-
mates indicate that it passed the $500 million mark
last year. Chile has become an important source of
natural fertilizers and copper, and the Chinese have
imported substantial amounts of alumina and bauxite
from Jamaica and Guyana. Brazil has sold iron ore
and a wide variety of agricultural products to the
Chinese, and Argentina has secured sizable grain con-
tracts during years when China's own harvest was
poor. As this suggests, the balance of trade has
been heavily in Latin America's favor, but Peking
has made some progress recently in expanding sales
of Chinese machinery and textiles in the Latin market.
On the political front, China's emphasis on
good nation-to-nation relations has in large part
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succeeded in overcoming distrust and suspicion
created by Peking's earlier ideological and material
support for Latin American revolutionary groups. Now
the Chinese enjoy a measure of influence commensurate
with their limited interests in the area. On a
broader plane, the movement of Latin American coun-
tries into the mainstream of the Third World has
served the interests of China--the Third World's
self-proclaimed spokesman--in expanding its prestige
and influence as a world power. Peking has done its
part to facilitate the process by stressing the com-
munity of interests between Latin America and the
rest of the Third World--particularly the need for
Latin countri s to unite with Asia and Africa to re-
sist dominatioi by the US and USSR. As Latin Amer-
ica's special ties with the US have loosened, Chi-
nese warnings of the dangers posed by the Soviets
have become accordingly more strident.
More Relaxed Diplomacy
With the modest objectives of its Latin American
policy largely achieved, China's future efforts to
woo hold-out Latin American countries will probably
be conducted at a much more relaxed pace. Peking is
not likely to expend much effort in Central America---
still a Nationalist Chinese stronghold--after rela-
tions with Panama are established. Peking appears to
view the area as a US preserve and may believe that
the republics will, of their own accord, seek ties
as Sino-US relations develop further. In the meantime,
the Chinese probably feel that the investment that
woulc; be necessary to win over the conservative Cen-
tral American regimes quickly would not be worth the
return either politically or economically. Similar
factors; should weigh against any significant Chinese
diplomatic initiatives toward Caribbean nations such
as the Dominican Republic and Haiti. Peking will,
however, continue to include these countries in its
Third World rhetoric--especially in regard to re-
gional economic cooperation--and can be expected to
continue dabbling in trade with them through indirect
channels.
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After relations with Ecuador and Panama are
consummated, Colombia and Bolivia are the next most
likely candidates for Chinese diplomatic attention.
The Chinese have, in fact, already been preparing
the ground in Bogota and La Paz with unofficial
delegations. The Colombians, for their part, are
caught between their long-standing ties with Taiwan
and a desire to pay more than lip service to their
concept of "ideological pluralism" in foreign affairs
with the result that Bogota has blown hot and cold
on the question of an opening toward Peking. The es-
tablishment of formal links between Peking and Panama
--which has close ties with and considerable influ-
ence in Bogota--could decide the matter. La Paz
also appears to value its relations with Taiwan. Com-
petition with Peking in world metal markets--China
and Bolivia are major producers of tin, tungsten, and
antimony--has, however, provided some impetus in Bo-
livia for the creation of a formal channel with China
to coordinate metal strategy. Given the relatively
small political and economic returns for China, Pe-
king's courtship of both countries will probably re-
main low key.
Pragmatism at Work
With the Latin American diplomatic horizon rela-
tively bare, Peking can be expected to place emphasis
on improving those existing relations it considers
most important. Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, and
Mexico will figure high because of their status as
oil producers. During a tour of the three countries
this spring, the Chinese vice minister of fuel and
chemical industries made no secret of China's need
for technical assistance in exploiting her own oil po-
tential. The high ranking visit itself was testimony
of Peking's recognition of the three countries' grow-
ing political clout in the region. The Chinese will
also probably try to build goodwill in Brazil because
of its importance as a trading partner and because the
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powerful Brazilian military establishment is still
not completely sold on the new Sino-Brazilian ties.
Peking's extension of an $11 million loan to Guyana
this spring helped soothe irritations caused by
misunderstandings over existing Chinese aid and
trade agreements. The additional investment is likely
to make Peking work harder to keep relations on an
even keel in Georgetown.
Tn contrast, the Chinese will clearly maintain
a low profile in their dealings with Argentina,
Chile, and Peru. Peking has not contracted for any
sizable grain shipments from Buenos Aires this year,
but access to Argentine grain markets is still im-
portant as a hedge against future domestic shortfalls.
At the same time, however, Peking's Latin American
watchers probably concluded long ago that the Peron
government's days were numbered. As a result Chi-
nese diplomats in Argentina will probably be or-
dered to keep their heads down so as not to jeop-
ardize their standing with--and future grain purchases
from--a successor government.
The situation is even more delicate in regard
to the mutually antagonistic military regimes in
Chile and Peru. Peking has few economic stakes in
Lima but a strong interest in monitoring the Soviet
military assistance program and the progress of the
military-directed "social revolution." China's
ties with the junta in Santiago, on the other hand,
az:e a political liability, and the junta's continuing
u.,Lofficial contacts with Taiwan are undoubtedly a
source of heartburn in Peking. Chilean natural fer-
tilizers and copper, however; remain important to the
Chinese economy. With these conflicting interests,
Peking has carefully avoided being drawn into the dis-
pute between the two countries, a fact evidenced by
Chinese failure to respond to requests for military 25X1
assistance from both Santiago and Lima. This balanc-
ing act will almost certainly continue.
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China: Now Solutions for Old Problems
Peking recently changed tactics in its attempt
to solve the persistent factional problems in Che-
kiang. Recent events indicate that the new strategy
includes a leadership reshuffle and the use of troops
to restore order in a number of I-Iangchou factories.
Although Tan Chi-lung, who assumed he post of
first party secretary in 1974, remains in power,
many new faces have appeared in both the military
structure and the lower and middle echelons of the
party and revolutionary committees. Of the fourteen
officials identified at the recent provincial meet-
ing, seven are newcomers to the Chekiang scene. Sev-
eral leaders including Chang Wen-pi, a new party sec-
retary and the military district commander, and the
new first and second secretaries of the Hangchou mu-
nicipal party come from other provinces.
The need to bring in outsiders to ensure order
and the implementation of central instructions stems
from the continuation of Cultural Revolutionary ri-
valries within the leadership at all levels. The
purge of Nan Ping, the first secretary from 1968 to
1972, for suspected involvement in the Lin Piao plot
only increased the problems for his successor Tan
Chi-lung--Nan was the first political commissar of
the Chekiang-based Twentieth Army, segments of which
remained loyal to him after his purge. It appears
that earlier this year the troublemaking Twentieth
Army was removed from Chekiang and replaced by ele-
ments of the Twelfth Army from Anhwei. The new
military district commander, Chang Wen-pi, has had
a long association with the Twelfth Army.
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In the past, the central leadership has called
Tan to Peking for consultations, issued directives
concerning problems in Chekiang, ordered the disband-
meizi: of militia units and sent Wang Hung-wen to Che-
kiang. Now, however, Peking seems prepared to go a
step further and use force in order to back up Tan's
recent demands for an end to factionalism and im-
plementation of central instructions.
In a move reminiscent of the Cultural Revolu-
tion, PLA troops have been dispatched to various
factories in Hangchou to restore order. While the
troops are ostensibly going to the factories to en-
gage in production, the factional disputes and the
resultant disruptions in production are apparently
so serious that Peking is willing to use troops de-
spite its attempts to remove the army from positions
of power gained in the aftermath of the Cultural Rev-
olution. An earlier broadcast ascribed past lapses
in production at one Hangchou factory to bourgeois
factionalism and sabotage by class enemies.
The dates of dispatch of the troops, July 19
and July 22, coupled with the announcement that
those PLA figures involved in the decision to use
troops were received by Chairman Mao, suggest that
the Chekiang problem may have been a topic of dis-
cussion at the recent high-level meeting in Peking.
Whether this new plan can solve the long-stand-
ing factional disputes in Chekiang remains to be
seen. The formula chosen by Peking, the use of out-
siders and troops, is one which has been avoided in
the past several years. Outsiders have tradition-
ally had a more difficult time dealing with provin-
cial problems; Tan Chi-lung, who was originally from
Shantung, has not had much success in Chekiang. Per-
haps now with th
b
e
acking of the Twelfth Army, Tan
and his new associates will be able to bring faction-
alism i
g under control.
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China: Oil Pipeline Construction Generates
Demand for Telecommunications Equipment 25X1
China's surge in oil pipeline construction has
generated a sizable demand for associated telecommu-
nications equipment. The Chinese are in the market
for modern data transmission equipment to monitor
and control oil flow along their newly constructed
pipeline networks. The cost of this equipment
could total several million dollars.
Potential suppliers include a US-affiliated
manufacturer as well as British, Japanese, Italian,
and Hungarian firms. Peking has asked Bell Tele-
phone of Antwerp, an ITT affiliate, to submit bids
on data transmission systems next year. When asked
about distances envisaged for the system, a Chinese
trade official indicated that it would be from 50
to 2,000 kilometers. Since the current total re-
quirements are nearly 6,000 kilometers, China's in-
terest in the Bell equipment may signal the opening
of a new and continuing market for American technology.
The Chinese reportedly are also negotiating with
Budavox, a hungarian producer of data transmission
equipment. Budavox representatives are anxious to get
a foothold in the Chinese oil pipeline communications
market, and there is tenuous evidence that a contract
for some 13 microwave radio relay stations may have
been signed. Thirteen stations would span roughly
650 kilometers of pipeline.
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Testing Taiwan
:.?n-a Chinese have reacted swiftly to widespread
but unsubstantiated rumors that Chinese Nationalist
Premier Chiang Ching-kuo recently toyed with the
idea of making a deal with Moscow.
The rumors, circulated primarily in Hong Kong
and Japan, suggested that Soviet front man Victor
Louis was in Taipei recently for talks with Chiang
and other Nationalist leaders. In fact, there is
no firm evidence that Louis--or any other Soviet
representative--ha; had contact recently with the
Nationalists. Moreover, it is difficult to see how
a flirtation with Taipei would work to Moscow's ad-
vantage at this time. The Soviets recognize that
a deal with Taipei would greatly complicate efforts
to restore normal relations with Peking in the post-
Mao period.
A second rumor suggested that high-level offi-
cials on Taiwan were meeting in late July to con-
sider establishing trade relations with the USSR.
The story is far-fetched. On several occasions
since the death of former President Chiang Kai-shek
last April, Premier Chiang has stressed that there
will be no negotiations or relations of any kind
with the Soviets, and has argued that "self-reliance"
is the key to the Nationalists' survival.
Although Taipei s not seriously interested
in a mov' toward Moscow now--a step that would only
damage the more importaiit interest of maintaining
friendly ties with the US--Nationalist officials
certainly recognize Peking's extreme sensitivities
on this matter and are probably persuaded that occa-
sional "leaks" of alleged contacts are useful as ir-
ritants in Peking.
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The PRC-owned press in Hong Kong, undoubtedly
reflecting Peking's views, seized on these rumors
to attack Nationalist officials who consider "enter-
ing hell and embracing the devil." The press was
especially critical of Premier Chiang and former For-
eign Minister Chou Shu-kai, whom it described as the
"architect" of Taipei's pro-Soviet policy.
There have been other recent indications of Pe-
king's concern over Premier Chiang's long-term inten-
tions toward the USSR. In a conversation late last
month with a US official, Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao edi-
tor Fei I-min insisted that Premier Chiang was capa-
ble of coming to terms with Moscow, although he specu-
lated that it would not occur until after the US and
China exchanged embar;ies.
Chinese unhappiness over the failure of their
efforts over the past six months to develop a dia-
logue with the Nationalists contributes to Peking's
sensitivities on the possibility of a Moscow-Taipei
deal. China's reaction to Taipei's failure to accept
any of the "war criminals" whom Peking released in
April is a case in point. Peking clearly hoped that
Taipei would accept the releasees and that there
would be resulting pressures for some form of main-
land-Taiwan contacts. The Nationalists' adamant re-
fusal to accept the "war criminals" is a clear signal
that they are not prepared for contact with Peking.
In his conversation with the US official, Fei
I-min was so emphatic about the need for contacts
to begin soon that he appeared to be asking the US
to encourage Taipei in this direction. Fei also di-
rectly connected thi iesire with concern over the
Soviets by arguing that, so long as Taipei does not
try the Soviet option, there would be no problem
working out the details of mainland-Taiwan talks.
Fei implied that Peking had exhausted its initiative
on this subject and that the next step was un to *hA
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n.irollment 1975o Stal mate
The recruitment of university students for the
academic year that begins this fall has been under
way since mid-July. Admissions standards generally
do not appear to differ significantly from those
that have been in effect for the last few years.
A few provinces apparently require that uni-
versity candidates have a senior high school educa-
tion, rather than the junior high school level that
has been acceptable since 1972, but it is not cer-
tain that this is a nationwide phenomenon.
e uca Iona level for enter-
ing students is senior high school, and a broadcast
from Anhwei said students must have a background
above that of junior high school. Universities in
Kweichow reportedly will accept junior high school
graduates only if they have continued their education
on their own, presumably through the correspondence
courses now offered by a growing number of universi-
ties for educated young people working in factories
or on farms.
Most other provinces publicly refer to the need
to ensure that candidates meet the required academic
standards, but they do not specify what the standards
are c what steps will be taken to verify the appli-
cants' scholastic background. The broadcasts say
only that the educational level of candidates must
be evaluated or investigated, but only Kweichow has
publicly admitted to using entrance examinations.
Both oral and written examinations reportedly are be-
ing given in Kwangtung as well.
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The examination issue, which became a major
political controversy in 1973, apparently remains
sensitive. Ilupei Province, in a recent broadcast,
attacked what it called an overemphasis on academic
qualifications during the 1973 enrollment,.
The newest wrinkle in this year's enrollment
process is the open admission that the "Chaoyang
model," an agricultural college that relocated to
the countryside, does not apply to all universities.
The rationale for the model is that agricultural
students must return to the countryside after gradu-
ation, a process called "from the commune to the
Commune."
The provincial media make it clear that this
program applies to all graduates of agricultural
colleges, to some graduates of medical, forestry.
and teachers colleges, but not to universities that
emphasize science and technology. The latter will
implement this program only on a limited, experi-
mental basis, suggesting that graduates of such uni-
versities can be expected to work in scientific areas
after graduation and will not be required to return
to the farms.
Nevertheless, all universities will have to
accept some "from the commune to the commune" stu-
dents. These students will receive vocational train-
ing, however, while the other students will pursue
"regular" academic courses. Consecquently, the "track
system," whereby even the best universities must ac-
cept some clearly unqualified students, remains in
effect.
This system imposes a burden on the universi-
ties, which must devote some of their resources to
training semi-literate workers and peasants, and has
hampered the efforts of the universities to raise
their academic standards. Moreover, the "from the
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commune to the commune" students take up places in
the bettor universities that could be awarded to
well-qualified young people more likely to play an
important role in China's future.
On a more hopeful note, there are signs that
a few provinces have returned to the recruitment
system used in 1972, whereby the universities or
provincial officials responsible for education sent
recruitment teams to the rural areas on a talent
hunt for qualified students. The system was dropped
after 1972, and the universities, which make the
final selection of students, had to choose from a
list of candidates who had applied themselves, Gaon
the approval of their work units, and had the bless-
ing of the local and provincial party organizations.
With some provinces sending out enrollment teams,
which presumably will encourage better qualified
students to apply, the universities may have a
better list of students to choose from.
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New Pipeline Links Peking
to Ta-china Oil Fields
export and to domestic refineries.
shouldered the burden of moving crude to ports for
worked railway system, which until recently had
of crude. It will also take pressure off the over-
NCNA reports that Peking has been linked by
pipeline with the large Ta-ching oil field, 1,000
miles to the northeast. The pipeline will assure
the Peking area of a reliable, high-volume supply
A Wall Street Journal article of July 7 re-
ported the Chinese claim that they can ship out
210,000 barrels (30,000 tons) of crude per day from
the Ta-ching fields. If true, such a movement would
take nearly 10 percent of China's total tank car
fleet and would monopolize the rail system in the
northeast. The new pipeline will relieve the taut
transport situation in this area.
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Playing the Angolan Sweepstakes
For some time the Chinese have had the uneasy
feeling that they were betting on the wrong horse
in Angola, and the recent fighting there has done
little to assuage these fears. The Soviet-backed
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola has
acquitted itself well on the battlefield at the
expense of the National Front, which has received
the bulk of Chinese material aid over the past
year and a half.
The fast-changing situation in Angola led Pe-
king to toy briefly with a vitalization of its con-
tacts with the Popular Movement. In June, for the
first time in almost two years, a Popular Movement
delegation visited Peking. The Chinese told the
group that it planned to reduce its aid to the Na-
tional Front and pursue a more balanced policy to-
ward the two contending organizations. Peking may
have hoped to wean the Popular Movement from depen-
dence on the Soviets, but this hope almost certainly
has been dashed by developments during the past month.
In any event, reception of the Popular Movement
delegation has brought the Chinese very little politi-
cal mileage, especially since the Soviet Union con-
tinues to furnish generous amounts of armaments cru-
cial to the current fighting. The Popular Movement's
sympathies for Moscow were evident during the talkc
unces of opinion regarding the "international situa-
tion" (read, Soviet Union).,
Moreover, Peking has clearly not decided to
abandon the National Front. This group still repre-
sents China's best chance for a voice in Angolan af-
fairs after independence in November. Last month--
after being pushed out of Luanda--a delegation from
the discussions were "very hard" because of differ-
in Peking in June.
August 4, 1975
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the National Front visited Peking and was promised
an unknown quantity of arms. Zaire subsequently
turned over to the National Front a quantity of
weapons, after receiving r,;isurances that Peking
would replace the equipment. It may well have been
these arms that enabled the National Front to launch
its recent counteroffensive. Peking probably hopes
that such aid, if it will. not bring victory, may en-
sure the National Front a role in the post-indepen-
dence government.
Peking's approach to the Popular Movement may
have stemmed in part from a shared view with Zairian
President Mobutu that continued military support for
Angola's liberation groups escalated the risk of
civil war. With the new outbreak of fighting, Mo-
butu's position appears to be changing. Given this
fact, and continued Soviet support for the Popular
Movement, Peking may now feel that it has no alter-
native but to continue support to the National, Front.
In any event, one of the main reasons Peking switched
its support from the Popular Movement to the National
Front in late 1973 was to curry favor with Mobutu.
Ideally, at this point the Chinese would like
to see an effective cease-fire in Angola. Peking
pushed for an end to the fighting in the talks with
Popular Movement representatives, and the short-lived
cease-fire arranged at the end of June was accorded
favorable treatment by NCNA. Clearly, the Chinese
see brighter prospects for the National Front at the
bargaining table than on the battlefield. Like most
other observers, however, Peking is not optimistic
about chances for a cease-fire and therefore is more
inclined to protect its interests by continuing to
supply arms.
August 4, 1975
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Yao Won-Yuan: Singing the Riiht Tune
In his meeting in May with leftist journalists
from Hong Kong, Politburo member Yao Wen-yuan shed
some light on his own role in the leadership and
seemed to reveal a genuine concern in Peking over
how the rest of the world sees events in China.
Yao's remarks were not unusual in themselves--they
were generally moderate in tone and have been made
by others in the leadership--but coming from the
once firebrand leftist, his comments seem to suggest
that Yao is toeing the line set forth by the pre-
dominantly pragmatic coalition in Peking.
Yao urged the journalists to emphasize the
unity and stability theme that has been a staple
of domestic propaganda in order to create a good
impression among readers in Hong Kong. lie said
the journalists must publicize the party's policies
in the "correct" manner, and their articles should
reflect China's progress and prosperity. These com-
ments imply that it is important in Peking's eyes
for the Hong Kong communist press to present a fa-
vorable picture of China to the outside world.
In foreign policy, Yao also urged a "correct"
assessment of the international situation. As for
China's attitude toward Bong Kong and Macao, Yao
reportedly said that it wo!ild be necessary to wait
for a rather long time before solving these problems
by "peaceful negotiations." In the meantime, he re-
portedly told the journalists to try to "win over"
anti-communist residents of Hong Kong, claiming that
they can be re-educated, as were the former Kuomintang
prisoners of war.
Predictably, Yao told the journalists to write
articles, based on guidance from Peking, on the cur-
rent "proletarian dictatorship" campaign. Less pre-
dictably, he put relatively little emphasis on the
August 4, 1975
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25X1
revolutionary model cultural works that are the
product of his mentor, Chiang Ching. Yao reportedly
noted only that the meaning of the model works
"should not be neglected" and urged the journalists
to carry on China's cultural heritage.
Yao has long been thought to have domestic
propaganda duties, particularly in regard to the
official party journal Red Flag, but there are in-
dications that he may share the propaganda account
with fellow Politburo member. Chang Chun-chiao.
C,iven his briefing of the Hong Kong journalists,
it appears that Yao also has some responsibility
fog: the overseas Chinese press as well.
If Yao does in fact direct overseas Chinese
propaganda, it will be interesting to watch the per-
formance of the Hong Kong leftist press. Two news-
papers in Hong Kong, Ta Kung Pao and Wen Hui Pao,
have often seemed to take opposing lines on domestic
events in China. In view of Yao's order to emphasize
unity and stability, presumably there should be less
difference in the editorial lines taken by the two
Hong Kong journals in the future.
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July 11 Papua New Guinea Chief Minister Maori
Kiki meets in Port Moresby with China's
charge d'affaires in Australia, Chu
July 11-29 Japanese Liberal Democratic Party elder
Tokuma Utsunomiya visits China at invi-
tation of China-Japan Friendship Associa-
tion; also makes side-trip to North Ko-
rea where he meets with President Kim
Il-song.
July 14
July 15-19
July 17
July 19
July 22
Peking.
Tanzanian trade delegation arrives in
Zambian trade delegation feted.
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Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien meets and
has "cordial and friendly" talk with
visiting North Vietnamese insurance
delegation led by Vice Finance Minister
Trinh Van Binh; delegation returns to 25X1
Hanoi on July 19.
Palestine Al Fatah delegation arrives
in China.
PLA troops in Chekiang enter factories
to restore order.
Chang Wen-pi, former subordinate of
Li Te-sheng in Anhwei's 12th Army,
identified as new commander of Chekiang 25X1
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July 23 Chinese bank delegation departs Pekin
for Somalia, Tanzania, and ZambiaJ
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L
Malagasy Republic economic delegation
July 24 Mauritanian public health de eanti-n
starts visit to China.
Vice Premier I-Iua Kuo-feng meets with
visiting Albanian friendship delega-
tion led by alternate central committee-
man Bajram Thermia.
Sino-Soviet trade agreement for 1975
signed in Moscow by Deputy Foreign Trade
July 26 China launches 3rd successful satellite.
July 27 Vice Premier Hua Kuo-feng meets with
visiting North Korean Vice President
Kang Tung-uk.
July 31 Army Day celebrations marked by re-
1.abilitation of Lo Jui-ching and ap-
pearance of most reaional military
Augi;3 t 4, 1975
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