US AND SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00303R000500770002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 16, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 14, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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 Intelligence
US and Soviet
Strategic Forces
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Secretary of ' - ,,?f Director of Top Secret
MASTER COPY
U0 NOT GIVE OUT
oil MARK ON
Top Secret
NI 83-10002X
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14 November 1983
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JOINT NET ASSESSMENT
US AND SOVIET
STRATEGIC FORCES
EXECUTIVE VERSION
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PREFACE
This first joint net assessment by the Secretary of Defense and the
Director of Central Intelligence analyzes factors central to understand-
ing the significance of the Soviet and US strategic postures. Emphasis is
on displaying trends and key asymmetries in US and Soviet forces,
perspectives, operational concepts, and capabilities. This assessment,
although incomplete, is intended to serve as a prototype for future
efforts and to identify areas for additional study and intelligence
collection.
To a large extent, any net assessment is the result of review and
synthesis of many diverse analyses of a broad subject area. In this
assessment we discuss the serious deficiencies in our traditional analyses
of the strategic balance. These analyses limit our perspective and cause
distortions in our views of the strategic balance. If current work on
improved methods is successful, future assessments will include more
informed judgments. However, that research is not likely to bear fruit
for at least several more years, and no amount of modeling and gaming
can ever fully substitute for what we hope will continue to be a lack of
operational experience in nuclear warfare.
A more detailed assessment is given in a separate supporting
volume.
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CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE ................................................................................................................... iii
KEY JUDGMENTS ....................................................................................................
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KEY JUDGMENTS
The strategic nuclear balance is probably adequate to deter a direct
nuclear attack on the United States or a major attack on Europe. The
Soviets, in our view, have some clear advantages today, and these
advantages are projected to continue, although differences may narrow
somewhat in the next 10 years. It is likely, however, that the Soviets do
not see their advantage as being as great as we would assess. Moreover,
even in our assessments the Soviet advantages, while significant, do not
appear to be great enough for us to be concerned that we no longer have
the capability to deter large-scale nuclear war. Clearly we still do. The
uncertainties in all this still would make it unattractive for the Soviets to
escalate to such a level of warfare; they could not expect with high con-
fidence to prevail. We are greatly concerned, however, about the
effects of strategic nuclear imbalances on the behavior of the two sides
in crises and lesser conflict situations.
The United States structured its major alliances during the period
of US superiority in strategic nuclear forces. When our decisions were
made in the early and mid-1960s to settle for parity, the concept of par-
ity was seen by some as a good thing of itself. The full consequences of
strategic parity for the overall military balance with the Soviets, for our
position throughout the world, and for the cohesion of US alliances over
the longer run have not yet been fully realized.
One consequence is that the range of Soviet actions we can deter
has undoubtedly narrowed. The shift in the strategic balance over the
last 15 to 20 years has made the Soviets more willing to try to coerce the
Europeans and to try to split them from the United States. This policy is
paying off; there has been an edging of many Europeans toward a
position of neutrality, coincident with the buildup of Soviet strategic
forces and of other Soviet forces focused directly against Europe. The
Soviets have also been willing to exploit soft spots in the Third World
more aggressively.
There is a heightened possibility that the Soviets might challenge
some US interventions in crises, particularly those involving actions
against a friendly or client state in the Third World. A major crisis,
analogous to the Cuban missile crisis, in which we are forced to back
down much as the Soviets did in 1962, would produce a massive shift in
the perceptions of US strength relative to that of the Soviet Union in the
eyes of the US public and of other nations.
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If deterrence fails to one degree or another, the adequacy of the
strategic balance would vary during the possible phases that might
precede, constitute, and follow initial large-scale nuclear strikes:
- During a crisis, and in conflict prior to large-scale nuclear
strikes, the US relative strategic position would probably im-
prove over the peacetime situation with the generation of the
full US bomber and ballistic missile submarine forces, and the
deployment of our attack submarines, which are capable of
attriting a large part of the Soviet SSBN force.
Although we believe the Soviets are closer to achieving their goals
than we are to achieving ours, the Soviets would evaluate their own
prospects more pessimistically, and would lack confidence in being able
to succeed. They are highly concerned about:
- The capabilities of US antisubmarine warfare (ASW) against
their submarines.
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- The effects of new US programs on overall US capabilities.
- Their ability to degrade US command, control, and communica-
tions sufficiently to prevent a large-scale, well-coordinated
retaliation.
- Their own ability to maintain continuity of command and
control throughout key phases of a conflict.
How Much Do US Programs Help?
Renewed US efforts over the past several years will slow the
erosion in the relative US position. However, it will take a long time,
and a persistent effort, to redress our deficiencies. Although US
investment will be substantial over the next decade, Soviet investment
will also be considerable, will be more comprehensive, and will build on
20 years of previous investment. Our changes in policy and planning are
as important as the increased investments.
The Soviets already show signs of being worried about our
turnaround, which signals greater American seriousness about compet-
ing in the strategic force arena than has been evident for many years.
The Soviets must fear that we will follow with the introduction of new
technologies that would render the entire Soviet strategic posture much
less effective. The President's speech of 23 March 1983 proposing US
defenses against ballistic missiles has probably increased Soviet con-
cerns.
From the Soviet perspective, the best way to avert these dangers is
to try to prevent the United States from carrying through with our
programs, using domestic opposition in the United States and Western
Europe, diplomacy, and the arms control process. Eroding the credibil-
ity of US nuclear strength by any and all means, including arms control
agreements and the negotiating process, is a central Soviet strategic aim;
they made great progress in the 1970s. The Soviets have pursued a dual-
track approach to arms control: seeking agreements which halt or slow
US strategic force deployments, while continuing an across-the-board
buildup and modernization of forces not limited by agreements. F_~
Strategies for Competing More Effectively With the Soviets
The military programs the United States is now pursuing have a
more competitive character than any since the mid-1960s. A more
effective competitive strategy might include the following elements:
Complicating Soviet Military Problems: Evolving strategic of-
fensive and defensive postures, which are so diversified as to pose
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difficult problems of attack to the Soviets-postures strengthened by
more emphasis on survival, wartime endurance, and robust C3I.
Leveraging Our Lead in Technology: Selectively exploiting our
lead in technology to introduce qualitatively superior new US weapons
systems, which could render obsolete large portions of the capital stock
of weapons in the Soviet arsenal and cause them to react in ways costly
to them but not to us (for example, air defense). We could also
strengthen deterrence by playing on Soviet fears about our technical
prowess. It may be better to allow the technological competition in
defensive systems to proceed, rather than try to stop it, in the dubious
belief (not shared by the Soviets and rejected by the President in his
strategic defense initiative) that active defenses are bad per se.
Altering the Thrust of US Arms Control Initiatives: Much more
limited agreements, more readily verified, may be more feasible than
the comprehensive kind that we have been seeking (for example, more
like the atmospheric nuclear test ban rather than SALT or START). In
this case, arms control could partially constrain the Soviet Union, but
there would be no illusion that an agreement is a panacea for the
strategic competition-the illusion that attended SALT I and SALT II.
To be successful we would have to change the public perception of arms
control as the solution to our strategic force problems, to one of arms
control as an adjunct to our strategy for competing with the Soviets. C
Reasssessing the Role of Allies: The largest unsolved problem
created by the growth of Soviet nuclear power is a new strategy for the
defense of Europe. We have sought a cheap defense based on the threat
of nuclear escalation, but the growth in Soviet strength has eroded the
basis for such a strategy. There are several alternatives for improving
the defense of Europe, including a change in the willingness of the
Europeans to invest in their own security, a greater role for the British
and French nuclear forces in the defense of Europe, and a conscious ex-
ploitation of instabilities in Eastern Europe.
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