GRENADA: A FIRST LOOK AT MECHANISMS OF CONTROL AND FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00303R000500680005-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 5, 2008
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 20, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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lqq
Director of
Central
Intelligence
Grenada: A First Look at
Mechanisms of Control
and Foreign Involvement
Interagency Intelligence Assessment
Memorandum to Holders
of NIC M 83-10021
Secret
Secret
NI IIA 84-10013
20 August 1984
Copy 358
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MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS
OF NIC M 83-10021
NI I I A 84-10013
GRENADA: A FIRST LOOK AT
MECHANISMS OF CONTROL
AND FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT
Information available as of 7 August 1984 was
used in the preparation of this Memorandum.
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CONTENTS
Page
FOREWORD ........................................................................................ 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 7
The New Jewel Movement .............................................................. 7
The Coard Coup ........................................................................... 7
Interworkings With the People's Revolutionary Government.. 7
Political Indoctrination ................................................................. 7
Relations With the Church .......................................................... 8
Relations With Labor ................................................................... 9
The Grenadian Revolutionary Armed Forces ................................ 9
Organization .................................................................................. 9
Armed Strength ............................................................................. 9
Armament ..................................................................................... 10
Factory Markings .......................................................................... 10
The Ministry of the Interior ............................................................. 11
Havana's Influence in Grenada ....................................................... 11
Cuban Military Advisers .............................................................. 11
Cuban Use of Grenada ................................................................. 12
The Point Salines Airport ............................................................. 12
Growing Soviet Influence ................................................................. 12
Soviet-Cuban Cooperation ............................................................... 13
Dealings With Other Nations .......................................................... 14
Vietnam ......................................................................................... 14
Narcotics ........................................................................................ 14
Annex A: Original Key Judgments ...................................................... 15
Annex B: Interworkings of the New Jewel Movement
and the People's Revolutionary Government ................... 17
Annex C: Assistance and Type of Aid ................................................. 19
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FOREWORD
On 19 December 1983, the Intelligence Community issued an
Interagency Intelligence Assessment, Grenada: A First Look at Mecha-
nisms of Control and Foreign Involvement, which reflected the results
of the initial exploitation of the documents recovered from Grenada
after the invasion of 25 October 1983. The judgments noted therein
were based on an all-source assessment of some 3,500 documents that
had been processed at that time. This Memorandum to Holders of the
IIA draws on the analysis of an additional 8,000 documents to provide
further insights into some of the subjects previously covered and
information on several new subjects as well.
Over 11,000 documents have been exploited to date; a few more
may be forthcoming, but we believe the vast majority already have
been reviewed. With the exception of those documents that must be
exempted by Freedom of Information Act guidelines-probably less
than 50 in all-the entire collection will be released to the public in the
near future
As we pointed out in the original Assessment, the documents reveal
Grenadian perspectives; they do not contain Soviet or Cuban objectives
with respect to Grenada. The documents do provide an appreciation of
the New Jewel Movement's (NJM) motivations, strategy, and objectives
as they applied to the consolidation of the Bishop regime's rule, and
they show how the NJM sought to make itself useful to Moscow and Ha-
vana. The documents also illustrate in considerable detail the ambitious
plans that Grenada's Marxist-Leninists had for subverting, with the
support of Cuba and the USSR, not only Grenada but the Eastern
Caribbean region as well.
Note: This Memorandum to Holders of IIA: Grenada: A First Look at Mechanisms of Control and
Foreign Involvement was requested by the President. It was prepared under the auspices of the National
Intelligence Officer for Latin America. The Memorandum was coordinated at the working level within the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence organization of the
Department of State. Also participating were the intelligence organizations of the Departments of the Army,
the Navy, and the Air Forcel
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KEY JUDGMENTS
The exploitation of over 11,000 documents captured in Grenada
has reaffirmed the basic judgments of the original Assessment:
- The New Jewel Movement (NJM) was dedicated to building a
Marxist-Leninist society in Grenada and consolidating its own
power.
- Cuba and the Soviet Union provided extensive political, eco-
nomic, and military support to the Bishop regime, and by
October 1983 had made considerable progress in turning Grena-
da into a center for further subversion in the region (see annex A
for the original Key Judgments).
The additional documents provide considerable detail on how the
NJM sought to continue its growth by indoctrinating the populace and
controlling events in Grenada through a series of mass organizations that
covered every segment of Grenadian society. The NJM was aided in the
development of these institutions by the Communist Parties of Cuba
and the Soviet Union, which provided specialized training and advice to
the NJM cadre. Nevertheless, the documents indicate that after four
years of continuous effort to build support for Marxism-Leninism in
Grenada through a variety of means, the Movement had failed in its ef-
forts and was forced to rely on the personal following of Maurice
Bishop.
The documents show that the NJM's abiding fear of counterrevolu-
tionary activity reached fever pitch after the bombing attempt on
Maurice Bishop's life in 1980. The NJM reorganized and greatly
expanded the counterintelligence section of the Ministry of Interior's
Special Branch in order to try to preempt counterrevolutionary activity.
Cuban advisers trained some agents on Grenada; others were sent to the
Soviet Union or Cuba for more detailed studies. Graduate agents were
primarily employed in gathering information on other Grenadians-the
church, labor unions, and youth-but also kept a close watch on foreign
visitors including the medical school students, and operated with Cuban
intelligence agents in support of the Bouterse regime in Suriname and
Tim Hector's leftist party in Antigua.
The leaders of the NJM were obsessed by their belief that the
United States would lead a counterrevolution against them. The Bishop
regime based its military requirements on threat analyses that anticipat-
ed US-sponsored counterrevolutionary activity ranging from domestic
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terrorism to an invasion of the island by Grenadian and Cuban exiles
based in Venezuela. The NJM planned on expanding the Grenadian
armed force, which in mid-1983 had an authorized strength of 4,400
soldiers-including reservists and militia-to as many as 20,000 Grena-
dians, about 20 percent of the population.
Grenada received nearly 11,000 weapons and various military
support equipment from Cuba and several Soviet Bloc countries in a se-
ries of deliveries between April 1979 and August 1982. Military
equipment deliveries were handled with tight security at the highest
levels of the NJM-the documents indicate that Maurice Bishop
personally coordinated offloading procedures with Colonel Tortolo, the
senior Cuban military adviser in Grenada. The Cubans carefully
monitored deliveries and brought the armored vehicles ashore them-
selves under cover of darkness.
We have received a single unconfirmed report that an unknown
quantity of arms was shipped from Grenada to St. Lucia in 1979, but
have found no trace of such a shipment in the thorough records kept by
the Grenadian custodians. However, between February 1981 and
January 1982, 900 British rifles were either combined with other
weapons on the rolls or dropped from the listings.
Our analysis of the factory markings on weapons recovered from
Grenada has revealed new information on Soviet weapons production.
The captured Soviet Bloc electronics, trucks, and armored vehicles were
manufactured after 1980. Some recovered Chinese antitank weapons
probably were delivered to Vietnam in the mid-1960s; weapons from
the same batch have turned up in El Salvador, Guatemala, Lebanon,
and Guinea-Bissau
We believe that by 1982 Havana and Moscow had accepted the
NJM as a reliable ally and had begun to exploit their relationship with
Grenada when the US-led invasion terminated their influence. The
documents show that Havana's relationship with the NJM was the more
developed: Castro used the good offices of the Bishop regime to try to
develop friendly leftist regimes in the Caribbean Basin and to help
coordinate a regional voting block of members of the Socialist Interna-
tional; Havana also encouraged a relationship between Nicaragua, the
Salvadoran insurgents, and the NJM for the mutual benefit of all
parties.
We believe that, following the establishment of a Soviet Embassy
in Grenada in 1982, the Soviet influence on Grenadian affairs began to
approach that of the Cubans. The NJM placed a high priority on further
enhancing its own stature with Moscow, but was hindered by Soviet
bureaucracy and disinterest. Nevertheless, the documents confirm that
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the NJM was determined to prove itself worthy of Soviet support, and
offered to establish Grenada as a means by which Soviet influence
might reach the Eastern Caribbean, and considered Suriname and
Belize as special targets for penetration. As reported in the original
Assessment, the Bishop regime offered both Moscow and Havana
military use of the Point Salines Airport, although neither was willing to
provide the financial support necessary to complete the project.
The documents show that the Soviets and the Cubans had worked
closely to develop and support the Bishop regime, and shared common
goals with respect to Grenada:
- Soviet projects were often preceded by Cuban feasibility
studies.
- Grenadian officials passed through Havana en route to Commu-
nist Bloc capitals.
- Soviet arms deliveries were made through Cuba, and Cuban
personnel were used to offload major shipments in Grenada.
- Nonmilitary goods shipped from the USSR and its allies fre-
quently passed through Cuban ports.
We are unable to judge from the available evidence whether
Moscow and Havana had become competitors for influence over events
in Grenada, or, in the aftermath, were simply trying to avoid blame for
the demise of the NJM. While the additional documents shed no new
light on events leading directly to the death of Maurice Bishop,
and that competition for
leadership of the NJM waste primary cause of its dissolution.
Nevertheless, blatant courting of Soviet favor by NJM officials may
have led to some reduction in Cuban influence, although the continued
pervasive presence of Cuban advisers in most People's Revolutionary
Government (PRG) offices remained a concern of some senior Grena-
dians
written by NJM officials during the Bishop-Coard dispute show that
Havana reacted with surprise, alarm, and dismay to the anti-Bishop
actions, but there is no indication of any response from Moscow. We do
not know whether this Soviet silence indicated foreknowledge of the
events, adoption of a hands-off attitude, or reliance on Havana to
control the situation. After the US-led invasion, Havana did not adopt
the Soviet line that alleged US intelligence involvement in the Bishop-
Coard dispute, and lamented that Moscow had
failed to join in Havana's attempt to me iate between the NJM factions.
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We have examined recent statements by former PRG officials who
contend that Bishop's downfall was the result of his intent to adopt
democratic institutions at the suggestion of Fidel Castro and against the
wishes of Moscow. We consider them to be self-serving attempts to
trade on Bishop's continued popularity to restructure the remnants of
the NJM into a legitimate political party.
All evidence gathered to date indicates that the leaders of the NJM
were not associated with drug dealings. They linked narcotics use and
trafficking with counterrevolutionary activity in Grenada, and ex-
pressed their opposition to any dealings in drugs by maintaining a close
surveillance over the few known users and dealers on the island.)
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DISCUSSION
The New Jewel Movement
The Coard Coup
1. We have found no documentary evidence that
sheds new light on events leading directly to the death
of Maurice Bishop. There are, however, convincing
reports that Bernard Coard had set in motion a plot to
overthrow Bishop when Coard resigned from the
Central Committee and Politburo of the New Jewel
Movement (NJM) in September 1982 to "devote him-
self to his work as Minister of Finance." Coard spent
little time in the ministry offices; instead, he gave most
of his time to the behind-the-scenes political maneu-
vering necessary to undermine Bishop's position.
Coard's scheme was disturbed by Bishop's successful
trips to the United States and Eastern Europe in the
spring and summer of 1983. A report from the
Grenadian Embassy in Moscow found among the
documents indicates that even this most pro-Soviet
sector of the NJM hailed Bishop's meeting with the US
National Security Adviser and State Department rep-
resentatives as a diplomatic triumph beyond all expec-
tations. Fearing that Bishop's popularity within the
Coard faction might spoil his plans, Coard had his
associates who controlled the Central Committee rein-
state him in the Movement and create a joint Bishop-
Coard leadership on 15 September 1983, a develop-
ment that led directly to the demise of the NJM.
2. Since the original Assessment was published, we
have received a number of reports that Bishop-on
the advice of Fidel Castro-was about to hold free
elections, encourage the development of private enter-
prise, and attempt closer relations with the United
States. We consider these reports, which cite recent
remarks made by former NJM officials now attempt-
ing to reconstruct the Movement as a legitimate
political party in Grenada, to be self-serving attempts
to trade on Bishop's continued popularity. The Grena-
dian documents show that the primary purpose for
Bishop's visit to the United States was public rela-
tions-to put the Reagan administration on the defen-
sive by appearing to be reasonable and making the
United States appear to be a bully. Other documents
indicate that the Bishop-Coard struggle focused on
Bishop's popularity with the masses, his failure to
retain control of key party positions, and his lack of
attention to day-to-day party affairs
Interworkings With the People's Revolutionary
Government
3. The NJM and the People's Revolutionary Gov-
ernment (PRG) were inseparable as evidenced by a
large number of recovered documents including the
minutes of the 3 September 1982 NJM Central Com-
mittee meeting that identified over 90 percent of the
PRG and Cabinet combined as full members of the
party. Maurice Bishop often made reference to the
"NJM/PRG" as a single entity in his handwritten
notes. Annex B further demonstrates the interactions
of the party and government by showing the overlap
of NJM and PRG positions held by the top Grenadian
officials between 1979 and 1983.
Political Indoctrination
4. The documents show that the NJM placed a high
priority on indoctrinating its members and the citizen-
ry in Marxist-Leninist thought. The Soviet and Cuban
Communist Parties provided the NJM with their
expertise in forming mass organizations, conducting
political indoctrination, and recruiting new members.
Grenadian students in Moscow and Havana studied
ideology, politics, and economics in preparation for
. . . party work among youth, women, farmers,
teachers, and workers." Maurice Bishop's special re-
quest to Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov led to a
three-month political training course in Moscow for
Grenadian Deputy Defense Minister Chris Stroude in
preparation for ". . . conducting political work in the
armed forces." A high-level NJM delegation to Ha-
vana in May 1982 sought ways to apply the Cuban
model for party work among the masses to building
internal ideological support for the party in Grenada.
5. The documents show that mass organizations
were the NJM's most frequently used form of spread-
ing influence. Grenada's leaders established Parish
Coordinating Bodies, a National Women's Organiza-
tion, and a National Youth Organization in their
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attempts to convert the masses to the state ideology. In
structure, tactics, and mission, these three organiza-
tions appear to have been closely patterned on their
counterpart mass organizations in Cuba. The Parish
Coordinating Bodies, the highest regional political
organizations, were comprised of a series of zonal
committees, each charged with monitoring the politi-
cal mood in its base area, implementing government
programs at the local level, mobilizing the masses, and
. . . carrying out the decisions of the party." The
Women's and Youth Organizations were responsible
for accomplishing similar tasks in their respective
portions of society, and with recruiting prospective
party and militia members.
6. The NJM Organizing Committee carefully moni-
tored and coordinated the use of all forms of commu-
nications to carry the party's message to the people of
Grenada; Radio Free Grenada broadcast news and
propaganda provided by Soviet and Cuban wire serv-
ices, the local newspapers were censored by the NJM,
NJM tutors taught political classes to groups of party
members and to mass organizations, and party labor
representatives conducted on-site political discussions
as a part of the normal workday. Educating the youth
received special attention in order that the future of
the revolution might be assured. Notes taken by
members of the National Youth Organization who
visited Moscow and Havana indicate that the NJM was
interested in methods to indoctrinate the very young.
7. Virtually every individual, organization, and
business that associated with the NJM were required to
submit "workplans" of the author's annual objectives
and methods for approval by higher party authorities.
Although these plans were intended to establish a
system of personal accountability, they became pro-
gressively less specific, and stated goals were rarely
met at any level of the party
8. The documents confirm that the vast majority of
the members of the NJM were themselves newcomers
to Marxist-Leninist thought and spent a great deal of
time in educating each other, as well as the general
public, in the intricacies of Communist dogma. When-
ever a party endeavor failed to reach its goal, "ideolog-
ical crash courses" were instituted in the belief that a
proper interpretation of doctrine and raising the con-
ciousness of those responsible would lead to eventual
success)
9. New Jewel indoctrination efforts culminated in a
flurry of activity from July to October 1983 as the
party attempted to reverse its declining popularity and
rectify its internal leadership schism. As recorded in
the documents, the final crisis was in part the result of
a growing awareness among party leaders that the
Movement had not capitalized on the potential of the
mass organizations it had created. Not only had the
indoctrination programs failed to popularize the
Movement and secure a broad base of support for its
programs, but the downward drift of the NJM's
fortunes was most visible in the population's increas-
ingly apathetic approach to attendance at group meet-
ings and indoctrination sessions. For example, even
though the National Youth Organization maintained
the best record of attendance among the mass organi-
zations, 21 of its 86 youth groups did not meet in
March or April 1982; a year later, only 25 percent of
its membership attended those meetings that were
held. F
10. Recovered minutes of NJM meetings indicate
that the Movement's leaders believed the church to be
its most formidable domestic foe. Over 75 percent of
the population had been educated in church-operated
private schools and remained active churchgoers. The
church competed with the NJM's organizing and
indoctrinating efforts, and preached against Marxist-
Leninist doctrine. Church leaders were considered to
be active counterrevolutionaries who used their pulpits
to complain about NJM human rights violations, cen-
sorship of church newsletters, and recruitment of
children into the militia. The NJM directed the "Spe-
cial Branch" of the Ministry of the Interior to monitor
all sermons, maintain surveillance over church leaders
and those with whom they regularly dealt, and tap the
telephones of the leading churches. Intelligence re-
ports prepared by Major Keith Roberts, head of the
Special Branch, during the March-July 1983 time
frame indicate that the four principal churches in
Grenada-the Roman Catholic Church, the Anglican
Church, the Seventh Day Adventist Church, and the
Methodist Church-were considered ". . . a threat to
the revolution" and the ". . . main churches against
whom our work is directed," but urged caution be-
cause ". . . churches thrive on persecution."
11. In October 1982, a Cuban delegation headed by
Aurelio Alonzo Tejada of the America Department of
the Cuban Communist Party visited Grenada for the
purpose of evaluating the conflict between the NJM
and the church. In a recovered document written in
Spanish, the delegation concluded that, although the
NJM perceived church bodies as adopting aggressive
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positions, the situation had not reached the critical
point of open confrontation. The delegation made
several recommendations to the NJM that included:
- Appointing a comrade to be responsible for
religious matters.
- Training the comrade in Cuba.
- Inviting Grenadian laity and clergymen to visit
Cuba.
- Promoting contacts among Grenadians, Nicara-
guans, and other Latin American laity and
clergymen.
functioning worker education classes. Tutors reported
that rarely did more than 75 percent of the workers at
each site come to class, and that participation was
uniformly low-". . . the workers still have a strong
antirevolution side to them (sic)." The anti-NJM senti-
ment in the recalcitrant unions was never effectively
controlled and seemed to grow stronger as disputes
over wages and benefits were exacerbated by a gradu-
ally increasing number of complaints against worker
education classes. Even the leaders of the unions loyal
to the Movement became dissatisfied with NJM eco-
nomic policies that failed to improve employment
opportunities for their membership.
- Passing information among the NJM, the Cuban
Communist Party, and the FSLN of Nicaragua.
We have no evidence that any of these Cuban recom-
mendations were ever presented to the NJM or imple-
mented in Grenada.
12. When the Bishop regime came to power in
1979, five of the eight trade unions in Grenada were
already under the influence of the NJM. These were:
- The Bank and General Workers Union.
- The Commercial and Industrial Workers Union.
- The Technical and Allied Workers Union.
- The Agricultural and General Workers Union.
- The Grenada Union of Teachers.
The remaining unions-the Seamens and Waterfront
Workers Union, the Public Workers Union, and the
Taxi Owners and Drivers Association-were consid-
ered to be "bourgeois oriented," and were targeted for
penetration, supervision, and control in a directive
from the NJM leadership to the Organizing Commit-
tee recovered from Grenada
13. The NJM believed that the most effective and
ideologically correct way to further the revolution was
through complete unionization of the labor force
under NJM leadership. To accomplish this, the NJM
Organizing Committee established and carefully mon-
itored a Workers Committee which was charged with
propagating Marxist-Leninist thought among the
workers, building party organizations at all work
centers, and completing the process of unionization at
the various enterprises and work centers. By June
1983, the Workers Committee had established 116
The Grenadian Revolutionary Armed Forces
Organization
14. The Grenadian armed forces were organized
into a headquarters and four geographic commands
based on electoral parishes:
- Region 1-St. George's and St. David's Parishes.
- Region 2-St. Andrew's Parish.
- Region 3-St. John's, St. Mark's, and St. Patrick's
Parishes.
- Region 4-the Islands of Carriacou and Petite
Martinique.
These organizations provided a skeleton regular army
staff that was intended to provide leadership for
reservists and militia upon national mobilization.
Armed Strength
15. The documents show that, from the beginning,
the leaders of the NJM were obsessed by the belief
that the United States would organize a counterrevolu-
tionary movement to overthrow their regime. Almost
from the day he took power, Maurice Bishop began a
series of appeals to several sources for the "means" to
defend Grenada and continued to press for greater
numbers of weapons to be delivered on steadily
advancing schedules throughout the reign of the NJM.
Early on Bishop's concerns included appropriate stor-
age space for the military equipment he had request-
ed. On 22 December 1980, he sought Bulgarian aid for
the construction of 12 warehouses ". . . to facilitate a
fully armed and prepared Grenadian army and mili-
tia." A report prepared by Deputy Prime Minister
Bernard Coard and several members of the Ministry of
Defense dated 16 April 1983 reiterated the NJM belief
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that the United States remained the primary threat to
the regime, but posited that the most likely form of US
intervention would be to facilitate domestic terrorism
or to back Cuban and Grenadian exiles who might
conduct an invasion from Venezuela. Similar threat
analyses apparently were used to justify the steadily
increasing planned strength of the Grenadian armed
services.
16. In 1980, Deputy Minister of Defense Ewart
Layne petitioned Maurice Bishop for equipment to
outfit a force of 6,000 enlisted men and 300 officers,
most of which was delivered in August 1982. The
Ministry of Defense calculated its strength in mid-
1983 at one permanent infantry battalion and five
reserve battalions plus supporting elements-with an
authorized strength of roughly 4,400-although the
Grenadian armed forces could muster only 500 to 600
effectives to meet the invasion force on 25 October.
Plans called for the formation of a far larger force by
adding two regular and four reserve battalions by the
end of 1983, one regular and two reserve battalions in
1984, and three reserve battalions in 1985, for a total
arranged the details of the transfer with Colonel
Tortolo, the senior Cuban military adviser to Grenada.
Bishop directed the harbor master at St. Georges to
close the harbor to shipping for the entire period
required for the transfer. Grenadian longshoremen
brought 42 weapons containers ashore on the 25th,
but, from midnight until 0500 on the 26th, only
Cubans were allowed into the area while the armored
vehicles and trucks were offloaded. Among the equip-
ment given to Grenada in this shipment were 3,000
Czech M-52 rifles, 1,000 Soviet assault rifles, 300
Soviet pistols, 10 armored vehicles, and 5,850 sets of
individual equipment.
of four regular and 14 reserve units.
has quoted him as planning to arm
and train 20,000 Grenadians about 20 percent of the
population. once told that any
excess weapons "... could be sent to other countries
that were having revolutions," and that some weapons
had been sent to St. Lucia in 1979. We have no
information of such a movement, nor do Grenadian
weapon logs show a decrease in holdings at that time.
17. Grenadian military records show that Grenada
received approximately 10,750 small arms from its
Communist patrons: some 3,800 rifles-apparently
including some 900 British .303 rifles and 350 US
M-16s-came from Cuba in April 1979, another 2,600
from the Soviet Union in 1981, and about 4,300 rifles
and pistols were part of a shipment received in August
1982. The Grenadians kept very thorough accounts of
the weapons in their control, but the 900 British rifles
were either combined with another category or
dropped from the rolls between February 1981 and
January 1982.
18. The best example of Soviet-Cuban delivery
tactics occurred on 25-26 August 1982. Maurice Bish-
op's handwritten notes indicate that he personally
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The Ministry of the Interior
22. This PRG organization was responsible for de-
veloping and maintaining the internal security appara-
tus. During 1980 the Ministry underwent a major
expansion that resulted in the establishment of five
branches:
The Bureau of Operations and Investigation
(Special Branch) conducted intelligence and
counterintelligence operations.
- The Personal Security Section (Guard Company)
protected Grenadian leaders and visiting
officials.
- The Police/Prisons Section provided normal po-
lice services and guarded the Richmond Hill
Prison.
- The Coast Guard patrolled beaches and coastal
waters.
The Immigration Section regulated entry and
exit from the island, and controlled foreign
residents.
All sections were assigned a Cuban adviser who was
charged with improving the general efficiency and
effectiveness of his section. This was of particular
importance in the Police/Prisons Section because the
NJM believed the police to be politically unreliable. (c)
23. the counterintel-
ligence section of the Special ranc was reorganized
under Major Keith Roberts, and further divided into
functional and geographic areas
was upgraded by sending some students to the USSR
and others to Cuba,
general, two types of training-police and nonpo-
lice"-were received at all locations. The former
concentrated on traditional criminal investgation
methods, while the latter consisted of espionage, sabo-
tage, wiretapping, assassination, and the like.
24. The majority of the graduates of these courses
were employed in searching out "counterrevolution-
ary" activity in Grenada, but there is some documen-
tary evidence of off-island intelligence operations.
Tim Hector, the leftist leader in Antigua, thanked his
personal friend Maurice Bishop for courier services
provided him by Grenadian agents through St.
Georges to Havana. The documents contain the report
of a Grenadian intelligence operative who with Bou-
terse and "the C-2 man"-believed to be a Cuban
agent-discussed training for Surinamers in Grenada
in security, intelligence, and counterintelligence oper-
ations. We have found no indications that Grenadian
agents worked for or with Soviet intelligence agencies.
Havana's Influence in Grenada
25. There is no documentary evidence that suggests
that Havana orchestrated the day-to-day activities of
the NJM and the PRG, although reports cited in the
orginal Assessment indicate that Cuban Ambassador
Torres Rizo had a particularly close relationship with
Maurice Bishop, and that Bishop counted on his advice
in many matters of state. Havana sent a number of
advisers to Grenada for about two weeks at a time on a
project-by-project basis, but only its diplomatic and
military missions maintained a continuous presence on
the island. Even so, several influential members of the
NJM had become concerned that foreigners might get
the impression that Cubans ". . . dominated the
scene." Visitors reported that their telephone calls to
PRG offices were often answered by a Cuban who was
sitting in for his indigenous counterpart. Richard
Jacobs, Grenadian Ambassador to the Soviet Union,
was especially concerned that the NJM take action to
dispel the impression that ". . . the Cubans have taken
over." There is no evidence to indicate that the NJM
took any steps to correct this situation, however
Cuban Military Advisers
26. A 1981 agreement between Cuba and Grenada
identified 40 Cuban military advisory positions in
Grenada that were established to strengthen local
defenses. Of the 40 positions, 27 were referred to as
"permanent specialists" indicating that the incum-
bents would serve until the agreement expired on 31
December 1984. The remaining 13 "Temporary Spe-
cialists" were on two- to four-month rotational duty.
Cuba paid the salaries of its advisers, and Grenada
provided for their local living expenses. The agree-
ment does not specify the positions, ranks, or Grena-
dian counterparts of the Cuban military advisers.=
27. After the remnants of his military contingent
returned to Cuba, Fidel Castro ordered a thorough
investigation of their actions during the invasion. The
results of the Board of Inquiry indicated that there
had been a broad pattern of cowardice by the Cuban
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soldiers. All those who were not wounded have been
demoted, reprimanded, or otherwise punished as an
example to future "internationalists." Colonel Pedro
Tortolo Comas, the Cuban commander in Grenada,
and many of the others reportedly have been reduced
in grade and sent to Angola as enlisted soldiers.
28. The documents indicate that Havana began to
exploit its relationship with Grenada in 1982 when it
sought to create wider support in the Socialist Interna-
tional for Soviet and Cuban viewpoints by organizing a
regional voting block within the membership. At first,
Cuba encouraged Grenada to express its support for
"progressive struggles" in southern Africa, the Middle
East, and Latin America; later, a secret regional
caucus of leftist governments was organized by Cuba
and hosted by Nicaragua to coordinate positions and
votes on issues before the body. Grenada also lobbied
within the Socialist International for the admission of
other emerging Caribbean parties in order that region-
al influence might be further expanded
29. Maurice Bishop's personal notes indicate that
Cuban officials kept the NJM informed on events in El
Salvador and Nicaragua. Other documents show that
the NJM complied with a Cuban request that Com-
rade Ramon Cordona be permitted to establish an
office in St. Georges in order to ". . . conduct work in
the Caribbean on behalf of the FMLN-FDR." A letter
from Major Keith Roberts to Leon Cornwall, Grena-
dian Ambassador to Cuba, indicates that Havana had
granted permission for three high-level NJM officials
to visit Nicaragua so that they might observe ". . . how
the war was being directed and controlled."
30. Havana was interested in securing NJM assis-
tance in gaining influence over and gathering intelli-
gence on the political parties in the Eastern Caribbe-
an-particularly in Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent,
and Trinidad and Tobago. A high-level Grenadian
delegation to Havana in 1982 agreed to provide the
Cuban Communist Party with a list of needs for
Grenada and ". . . a separate one for the Caribbean
left political parties." The NJM hosted a "Party
Building Seminar" for 15 Caribbean leftist organiza-
tions in August 1982, followed by a meeting of leftist
youth groups sponsored by the World Federation of
Democratic Youth, the Continental Organization for
Latin American Youth, and the International Union of
Students-all Communist front groups-in September.
31. The Cubans frequently sought the opinion of
Richart Hart, a Jamaican who served as the Grenadian
Attorney General and whom they considered an ex-
pert on Caribbean politics, and requested his assistance
in penetrating the Organization of Eastern Caribbean
States. Havana also cultivated the special relationship
between Maurice Bishop and Tim Hector, a leftist
leader in Antigua. Hector passed Antiguan classified
documents to Grenadian agents probably for eventual
transmittal to Cuba, arranged for security training in
Grenada for some of the members of his party, and
smuggled two of his people who were wanted by the
Antiguan authorities through Grenada en route to
asylum in Cuba.
The Point Salines Airport
32. The Grenadian documents contain many refer-
ences to the major construction project on the island,
the Point Salines Airport. This project was the corner-
stone of the Bishop regime's plans to greatly increase
the island's tourist industry, and was initially proposed
to and accepted by Havana shortly after the NJM
came to power. The runway originally was planned to
be 2,400 meters (about 7,800 feet) long-too short to
routinely handle large jet aircraft. On 29 October
1980, a Grenadian delegation to Cuba suggested that
the runway be lengthened to 2,750 meters (9,000 feet)
to accommodate the standard air carriers; the Cubans
agreed to the extension after conducting an additional
feasibility study.
33. Minutes of NJM meetings show that the airport
was the source of many of the problems faced by the
PRG. Senior Grenadian officials spent a great deal of
their time attempting to secure aid to complete the
project, but had little success. The NJM offered both
Moscow and Havana military use of the airport,
although neither was willing to provide financial aid
for the project.
As described in the Assessment, most of
whose support decreased as oil prices declined.
Growing Soviet Influence
34. Moscow also grew more interested in Grenada
following the opening of its Embassy in St. Georges in
1982. The documents show that Foreign Minister
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Unison Whiteman immediately began actively court-
ing the Soviets in order to justify continued Soviet aid
to Grenada. During the following year, members of
the diplomatic community in Grenada noticed that
the Soviets seemed to be gradually replacing the
Cubans as the primary source of advice to the PRG,
although the documents reflect a continuing closer
relationship with Havana and Ambassador Torres
Rizo. The NJM/PRG obviously believed in keeping
both patrons satisfied to the extent that was possible,
and offered political support for both in the interna-
tional arena.
35. Many recovered documents indicate that the
NJM was most interested in proving its worth to
Moscow by creating a route for Soviet influence
through Grenada to the Caribbean left, even though
the Soviets seemed content to use their Cuban proxies
for such access. During the summer of 1983, St.
Georges was developing plans to host ". . . twice-a-year
meetings with the progressive and revolutionary par-
ties in the region," after which a member of the NJM
Central Committee would report to Moscow in order
that Grenada might become the "... point of access to
the USSR for all of these groups." The NJM singled out
Suriname and Belize as special targets through which
they might enhance their importance to the Soviets.
The US-led invasion revented the NJM from pursu-
ing these plans
36. The NJM was hindered in its attempts to en-
hance its stature with Moscow by Soviet bureaucracy
and disinterest. The documents contain the report of
Bernard Bourne, Grenada's Minister-Counselor to the
Soviet Union, that the Soviet's foreign relations staff
was not organized to deal with a friendly English-
speaking government in the Western Hemisphere, so
Grenada was handled by Nicholai Mostevets, the head
of a minor section lumped in with the United States
and Canada. Bourne stated that the Soviets ". . . have
no experience in dealing with parties of socialist
orientation which are in power," and that Mostevets
repeatedly told him that ". . . the Caribbean was very
distant from the Soviet Union and not one of their
priority areas." Richard Jacobs, the Grenadian Ambas-
sador to Moscow, wrote to Maurice Bishop in July
1983 that as a result of these factors and Grenada's
small size, ". . . we would figure in a very minute way
in the USSR's global relationships.... They are there-
fore very careful, and for us sometimes maddingly
slow, in making up their minds about who to support
(sic)."
Soviet-Cuban Cooperation
37. The Grenadian documents contain a great deal
of evidence indicating that Soviet and Cuban support
for and development of the Bishop regime was closely
coordinated. They indicate that:
Soviet-sponsored economic assistance projects
were often preceded by Cuban feasibility studies.
- Grenadian official visits to Moscow or other
Communist Bloc capitals typically began and
concluded with a coordinating stopover in
Havana.
- Soviet arms deliveries came from or were trans-
shipped through Cuba, and Cuban personnel 25X1
were used to offload major shipments in
Grenada.
- Nonmilitary goods shipped from the USSR and
its allies frequently passed through Cuban ports.
38. Nevertheless, some circumstantial evidence of
rivalry between Grenada's two patrons may be in-
ferred from NJM members' notes taken during the
Bishop-Coard dispute. These notes show that Havana
reacted with surprise, alarm, and dismay to the anti-
Bishop actions, but there is no indication that Moscow
made any comment on the situation although the
USSR was officially informed of events in Grenada by
the NJM Central Committee. We do not know wheth-
er this silence indicated Soviet foreknowledge of
events, adoption of a hands-off attitude, or reliance on
Havana to control the situation.)
munity to have placed more reliance on Soviet rather
than Cuban advice after a permanent Soviet diplomat-
ic mission was established in 1982. Reports of Grena-
dian officials' courting of Soviet favor are consistent
with the accounts and recommendations recorded in
the recovered documents, but whether NJM actions
resulted in a local Soviet-Cuban rivalry, or the enmity
between the ambassadors was of a personal nature is
unknown.
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Dealings With Other Nations
41. The PRG signed aid and trade agreements with
a number of countries, most of which were in the
Soviet Bloc. Annex C shows the full scope of the NJM's
international activity as revealed in the documents.F-
42. Documents examined after the Assessment was
published have provided additional insights into rela-
tions between Grenada and the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam. Cuba facilitated meetings between the NJM
and Vietnamese officials, and all preliminary commu-
nications between the two parties were conducted
through the Grenadian Embassy in Cuba. The NJM
wanted to exploit Vietnamese experience in conduct-
ing anti-American military actions and to use Viet-
namese methods of monitoring and reeducating pris-
oners. During a visit to Hanoi in 1981, a group headed
by Hudson Austin was briefed on CIA intelligence and
counterintelligence methods, as well as antiaircraft
operations. The group then visited Ham-Na "reeduca-
tion camp," where Vietnamese reeducation techniques
of daily work regimens and routine political indoctri-
nation were demonstrated. The Austin delegation re-
ported that the Ham-Na camp was constructed in
April 1975, and at the time of their visit housed about
350 former South Vietnamese officials and priests.C
43. In April 1982, Deputy Minister of Defense and
Interior Ewart Layne led a delegation to Hanoi that
sought Vietnamese assistance in military training and
aid. Layne's meetings with his Vietnamese counter-
parts produced an agreement for training some 20
Grenadians in Vietnam, but there were insufficient
funds available to transport the students to Hanoi. The
NJM appealed to Moscow for help, but the documents
contain no evidence that they were successful. The
training never took place, nor did Vietnamese officials
ever visit Grenada.)
44. There is no documentary evidence of Grena-
dian involvement in international drug trafficking. To
the contrary, many documents indicate that the Gren-
adian leadership was strongly opposed to drug use and
trafficking for both ideological and pragmatic political
reasons. The NJM came to identify drugs and drug
usage with counterrevolutionary elements in Grenada.
Because NJM members placed great importance on an
ideologically pure model of socialism, with strong
internal organization and loyalty to the party and
government, narcotics trafficking was seen as a means
to destabilize the population, diffuse the attention of
the masses, and provide funds for anti-NJM activities.
Grenadian counterintelligence maintained a close
watch over individuals and groups associated with
narcotics in an attempt to eliminate the use of drugs
on the island
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ANNEX A
ORIGINAL KEY JUDGMENTS
Following an all-source assessment of available in-
telligence on Grenada and an analysis of that part of
the documents recovered from Grenada before 30
November 1983, we have come to the following
conclusions:
- The primary focus of almost all actors on the
Grenadian scene-both foreign and domestic-
was on consolidating the power of the New Jewel
Movement and strengthening its Marxist-Leninist
orientation. To achieve this end, a web of rela-
tions among Grenada, Cuba, and the Soviet
Union evolved, characterized by:
- Discreet associations that became more overt as
the New Jewel Movement increased its internal
control.
- Close party-to-party relations among all three
countries.
- Implementation of many Soviet-Grenadian
agreements through Cuba.
The New Jewel Movement constituted a very
small but highly influential part of the Grena-
dian populace, dedicated to building a Marxist-
Leninist society but divided by personal ambi-
tions and conflicting views on how quickly to
proceed with this task. By October 1983, Grena-
da had:
- A self-described Marxist-Leninist political par-
ty-complete with Central Committee, Politi-
cal Bureau, and Secretariat-representing the
revolutionary elite.
- An army and militia that in size and armament
far outstripped those of its neighbors or of
previous Grenadian governments; both institu-
tions helped move Grenada in the direction of
a militarized society and provided important
vehicles for indoctrinating youth.
- An internal security apparatus that dealt harsh-
ly with overt regime opponents and was suffi-
ciently pervasive to intimidate potential chal-
lenges to the New Jewel Movement.
- A highly developed propaganda machine that
relied on the government-monopolized media
and party-controlled entities throughout the
government bureaucracy to disseminate the
leadership's political message.
The captured documents underscore that the
Bishop regime viewed Cuba as its principal
foreign ally. Fidel Castro and Maurice Bishop
had developed a close personal relationship
While Castro almost certainly knew of the com-
petition between Bishop and Bernard Coard, he
probably was unaware of the degree to which
Bishop had lost support within the leadership and
of the Coard faction's growing drive for domi-
nance. The killing of Bishop was clearly unfore-
seen in Havana.
The Cuban role in defending Grenada is still
being examined. Thus far, we have not been able
to confirm that armed Cubans defended other
than their own positions or were involved in
coordinating a defense with Grenadian forces.
Most of the Cuban resistance came from the 40-
odd military advisers and an unknown number
of construction workers who were trained reserv-
ists in the Cuban military. It appears, however,
that the majority of the construction workers had
insufficient arms and ammunition and offered
little resistance.
The Soviet Union valued the New Jewel regime
in Grenada as a symbol of declining US power
and expanding Marxist influence in Latin Ameri-
ca. Moscow initially kept the Grenadians public-
ly at arm's length, effectively masking the grow-
ing military relationship. The captured
documents show that direct Soviet influence was
brought to bear on party organization, ideological
training, and management of the failing Grena-
dian economy.
Both the documents and open sources show that
Grenadian contacts with the USSR were handled
primarily by Deputy Prime Minister Coard, who
was the most ideologically committed and the
most pro-Soviet member of the leadership. There
is controversy within the Intelligence Communi-
ty regarding the extent of Soviet control over
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events in Grenada. The documents give no indi-
cation that in July 1983 Coard discussed with
Soviet officials the leadership conflicts in the
New Jewel Movement. There is general agree-
ment within the Intelligence Community that
such discussions might have taken place; the
Defense Intelligence Agency and some analysts
in CIA believe that when Coard went to Moscow
he informed the Soviets of his plans to challenge
Bishop and petitioned the Soviets for advice and
support. DIA further believes that Coard was
instructed by Moscow to take action to assume
leadership. However, no documentary evidence
of any kind of collaboration as described above
has been found as yet.
Although the documents provide no evidence of
a Soviet or Cuban request to use air and naval
facilities on Grenada, we believe that the Cuban
role in building the Point Salines Airport indicat-
ed an expectation of using it for Cuban purposes,
and the USSR probably also planned use of some
facilities. The documents indicate that Grena-
dian officials envisaged the possibility of such
use
The captured documents and other sources show
that Grenadians had been:
- Broadcasting Cuban- and Soviet-furnished pro-
paganda over Radio Free Grenada.
nalists and media workers
Although few references in the captured docu-
ments support the judgment, other evidence
indicates that both Havana and Moscow viewed
Grenada as a springboard for:
- Penetrating other countries in the area.
- Distribution of propaganda and money to left-
ists in the region.
- Military training of subversive groups.
- Captured documents reveal that Grenada had
secret military agreements with Cuba, the Soviet
Union, North Korea, East Germany, and Czecho-
slovakia. While the Grenadians may have be-
lieved these weapons were for their armed
forces, we believe that the Soviets and their
proxies probably intended to draw on the stores
of weapons on Grenada to supply friendly coun-
tries in the region as opportunities or need might
arise
- Receiving training in Cuba and the USSR for
both domestic and foreign intelligence work.
- Conducting military training and political in-
doctrination of small groups of eastern Carib-
bean leftists.
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- The overall picture presented by the evidence is
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made real progress toward turning Grenada into
a center for further subversion of the region. F
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Interworkings of the New Jewel Movement
and the People's Revolutionary Government
Name People's Revolutionary New Jewel Movement Position
Government Position
Party Central Politburo Organizing Workers Education Economic Propaganda Other
Member Committee Committee Committee Committee Bureau Committee
Austin,
Hudson
Minister of Defense, Interior, X X X
Communications, Construc-
tion; Commander of Grenada
Revolutionary Armed Forces
Bain, X X X X
Fitzroy
Bain, Minister of Housing X
Norris
Bartholomew, X X X X
Tan
Bishop, Prime Minister; Minister of X X X X X X
Maurice Defense, Interior; Command- Chairman Chairman Chairman
er in Chief of Grenada Revo-
lutionary Armed Forces
Bourne, Minister-Counselor, USSR X
Bernard
Buller, Ambassador to European X
G. R. E. Countries
Coard, Deputy Prime Minister; X X X
Bernard Minister of Finance, Plan-
ning, Trade, Industry
Coard, Deputy Secretary for X X X
Phyllis Information; Secretary for
Woman's Affairs
Cornwall, Ambassador to Cuba; Secre- X
Leon tary for Youth, Sports
Creft, Minister of Education, Youth, X X
Jacqueline Social Affairs
DeBriggs, Deputy Minister of Health X X
Chris
Gahagan, Chief of Staff of the People's X
Major Basil Revolutionary Army
Jacobs, Ambassador to USSR X X X
Richard
James, Deputy Minister of Interior, X
LTC. Liam Defense; Chief of Security
Layne, Deputy Minister of Defense X
LTC. Ewart
Louisan, Deputy Minister of Defense; X
Maj. Einstein Chief of Staff of Grenada
Revolutionary Armed Forces
Louison, Minister of Agriculture, X
George Education
McBarnette, Deputy Secretary of Infor- X X
Coleville motion
Radix, Minister of Justice, Agro- X X X
Kenrick Industries, Industrial Devel-
opment
Ramdhanny, Minister of Tourism, Deputy X X
Lyden Minister of Finance
St. Bernard, Deptuty Secretary of Interior, X X X
Ian Committee of Economic
Ministers
Strachan, Minister for National Mobili- X X
Selwyn zation, Labor, Communica-
tions
Taylor, Ambassador to the UN X X X
Caldwell _ _
Whiteman, Minister of Foreign Affairs X X X
Unison
Williams,
Dessima
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Secretary
General
X Deputy
Chairman Secretary
General
X National
Women's
Organization
International
Relations
Committee
International
Relations
Committee
National
Youth
Organization
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Country
Algeria
Agri- Communi- Construc- Diplomatic Economic Education Internal Medical Military Political Scientific Trans-
cultural cation tion Security --& Technical portation
Bulgaria X X X X X x Cuba x X X X X X X X X X
Czechoslovakia X X X
East Germany x X X X
Hungary X. X
Iraq x X X
Libya x X X X X
North Korea X X X
Poland X. X. X.
Sweden X. X.
USSR X X X X X X X
Venezuela X.
Vietnam X= X. X'
Yugoslavia X. X.
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