GRENADA: THE CUBAN FACTOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00303R000500640007-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 5, 2008
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: October 26, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/05/05: CIA-RDP86T00303R000500640007-2
26 October 1983
NOTE FOR: Howard Davis/INR
IDIA
A/NIO/LA
Attached is the final version of the IIA as signed off by Bob Gates.
Please note the additional information incorporated into the last two
paragraphs, and the attachment which was prepared later this morning and
coordinated telephonically with the Intelligence Community representatives.
Attachment:
as stated
25X1
/NSA 25X1
DIA
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/05/05: CIA-RDP86T00303R000500640007-2
 Approved For Release 2008/05/05: CIA-RDP86T00303R000500640007-2
The Director of Central Intelligence
%DCZOSOS
INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
26 October 1983
GRENADA: THE CUBAN FACTOR
Prior to yesterday's invasion, the Cuban contingent in Grenada was
believed to comprise at least 400 personnel consisting of the following
elements:
-- a construction brigade housed at the Point Salines Airfield
(350 personnel)
-- a military advisory mission headquartered about a mile north of Point
Salines (10 to 12 advisors)
-- the Cuban Embassy staff and guard force located in southeastern
St. Georges (at least 15)
-- civilian technicians and advisors (including 25 medical personnel and
15 technicians at Radio Free Grenada)
This does not include any forces that may have been aboard a Cuban Naval
Academy training ship, the Vietnam Heroico, which has been used to tram
cargo and as a troop carrier that was anchored at Port St. Georges.
a ua
the airfield were safe and in their barracks. These men include many military
reservist of whom may have had combat experience in Angola or
Ethiopia. indicated they were armed
and may have been formed into squads or companies. Cuban Colonel Pedro
Tortola Comes, who arrived on the island only Monday, was said by Radio Havana
yesterday to be in charge of the workers holding out at the airport.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
LOA I
This Interagency Intelligence Assessment was requested by the National
Security Council Staff. It was prepared under the =ices of the
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America by the 25X1
Office of African and Latin American Analysis, CIA. The Assessment
was coordinated at the working level with the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency,
and the Department of State. Information available as of 0900 hours
on 26 October 1983 was used in the preparation of this Assessment.
ccr0 rTl
Approved For Release 2008/05/05: CIA-RDP86T00303R000500640007-2
25X1
LOA I
 Approved For Release 2008/05/05: CIA-RDP86T00303R000500640007-2
The Cuban military advisory contingent is evidently larger than we had
reviousl estimated and could number as many as 100. Reporting from the _,.
indicated personnel from the mission were active in
fighting at the o n a ines Airfield, firing on US helicopters with small
arms and a machine-gun, and making a stand against a ground assault near the
fuel tanks north of the airfield. The Cubans who reportedly were encountered
at Pearls Airfield and at the Radio Free Grenada site north of St. Georges may
have included advisors from the military mission as well.
The Cubans could have landed some additional forces from the Vietnam
Heroico without our knowledge, but we know that it loaded sugar, 500 tons of
cement and other cargo in Mariel harbor before departing Cuba for Grenada on
1 October. There are accommodations on the ship for 240 personnel when
carrying cargo. The cargo manifest and destination were declared on 29 August
and it took one month to complete the loading. We believe that the cargo was
delivered, suggesting that no more than 240 additional Cuban personnel could
have been transferred to Grenada. The ship has been in port or just outside
St. Georges' harbor since the week before the coup.
We have received at least two reports of landings, but none have been
confirmed_
rena a were facing the equivalent of two well-armed and well-trained Cuban
light infantry battalions, which could indicate that some additional forces
were inserted. A report yesterday that tanks and armored personnel carriers
were located near Pearls Airfield was not corroborated
and CINCLANT Intelligence has disavowed the
report.-
The stiffness of the resistance thus far can be attributed to the
The
following factors:
-- Colonel Tortola's effective command of Cuban personnel on the island.
-- The Cubans had warning of the likelihood of landings and had time to
arm and disperse themselves for defensive action. They probably had
a plan for deployment in case of attack and had the advantage of
knowing the terrain.
Heavy, accurate anti-aircraft fire from known Grenadian Army
positions downed or disabled the majority of the Black Hawk transport
helicopters early in the action, severely reducing the mobility of US
forces in the St. Georges-Point Salines area.
-- The only road leading from the airfield north toward St. Georges goes
right past both the Cuban workers housing area and their military
mission headquarters, where 300-400 armed Cubans were concentrated.
2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/05/05: CIA-RDP86T00303R000500640007-2
 Approved For Release 2008/05/05: CIA-RDP86T00303R000500640007-2
SECRET
-- The strongest units of the Grenadian Army -- at Fort Frederick and in,
the Frequente-Grand Anse area north of the airfield -- have probably
been stiffened by Cuban advisors.
We believe that the arrival-last night of additional helicopters and
troops of the 82nd Airborne at Point Salines, the reported Marine armored
force landing north of St. Georges, and continued heavy supression of anti-
aircraft and artillery positions in the Fort k area will lead to a
collapse of organized resistance today.
POSSIBLE CUBAN DIVERSIONS
As President Fidel Castro has publicly admitted, the Cubans are incapable
of reinforcing their forces in Grenada. Nor are they likely to risk a direct
attack on US Naval forces off Grenada. Cuba's two FOXTROT submarines were
observed in port on Monday. Castro, however, may be angry enough to order
sabotage against US forces, bases, or embassies elsewhere in the Caribbean
Basin or in the continental United States, using surrogate forces or Cuban
operatives employed in such a manner to provide plausible denial. While some
isolated Cuban retaliatory acts may occur, we do not belie Havana can create
any diversion sufficient to alter the outcome in Grenada.
Approved For Release 2008/05/05: CIA-RDP86T00303R000500640007-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2008/05/05: CIA-RDP86T00303R000500640007-2
ANNEX
PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (PRA)
Commander: General Hudson Austin
Size Equipment
1,000 - 1,200 AK-47s, RPGs,
heavy machine guns,
mortars, recoilless
rifles, BTR-60 and
BRDM armored personnel
carriers, ZU-23,
ZPU 4 AA batteries,
and field artillery.
Comment
Headquarters at Ft. Rupert
with camps near St: Georges and at
Calivigny. Groups of junior
officers NCOs trained in Cuba.
Some Cuban advisors on island
provide basic training. Officer
Corps probably loyal to Austin.
People's Revolutionary Militia (PRM)
Commander: Winston Bullen (deceased)
2,000-4,000 AK-47s, small arms, Created by Bishop as his personal
possible heavy machine security force. Several hundred
guns and light members reportedly trained in
artillery Cuba. The Militia reportedly was
disarmed last week by PRA with
Bullen subsequently executed.
Loyalties unknown.
Grenada Police Service (GPS)
Commander: Major Ian St. Bernard
300-500
Small arms. Consists of Prison Service,
Coast Guard Immigration Service, and.
has four small Coast Guard. Some police
British patrol boats received training, including
provided by Libya. political indoctrination, in
Cuba.
SECRET L
Approved For Release 2008/05/05: CIA-RDP86T00303R000500640007-2
 Approved For Release 2008/05/05: CIA-RDP86T00303R000500640007-2
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STATEMENT
26 October 1983
ATTACHMENT TO GRENADA: THE CUBAN FACTOR
At approximately 0130 hours on 26 October, Cuban President Castro made a
public statement and answered questions from the press in Havana. When asked
how many Cubans are in Grenada, Castro responded that there were more than
700, including some 550 construction workers. At 0945 on 26 October, we
received a report
25X1
25X1
25X1
stating that the Cuban Foreign Ministry was informing is 25X1
Missions overseas that there are approx1mte1v 1.000 Cubanc in Grenada. 25X1
2bX1
have brought in some 200 - 300 more personnel, accounting for the remainder of
the discrepancy.
25X1
In view of the conflicting reports and the lack of good independent
information, we estimate that as many as 1,000 Cuban personnel could be in
Grenada, although an estimate of 400 to 700 still appears to be a more
credible range.*
25X1
Previous reporting has indicated a basic complement of 350 to 400
construction workers, although approximately 200 additional workers were
introduced late last year -- presumably to replace construction workers
already there -- but we were never able to confirm their return to Cuba. If
they did not return to Cuba, this would account for much of the discrepancy
with our previous estimate of 350 construction workers. Vietnam Heroico could
*INR believes that the range is more l1kely to be 600 - 1,000 Cuban personnel.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/05/05: CIA-RDP86T00303R000500640007-2