BACKGROUND PAPER FOR PRESENTATION INTELLIGENCE ON SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES AND OBJECTIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86R00893R000100130010-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 15, 2008
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: May 25, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

BACKGROUND PAPER FOR PRESENTATION
INTELLIGENCE ON SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES AND OBJECTIVES
I. Introduction
1. The purpose of intelligence is to assure that US leaders do not act in
ignorance of foreign developments pertinent to their decisions. The
organizations and procedures for producing intelligence, like the national
intelligence structure itself, are not of rational design. They have evolved
in response to the changing decisionmaking structure and the style of
successive Administrations. Conceptually, all levels of organization--from
the batallion to the National Security Council--responsible for independent
decisionmaking require an independent intelligence component. In Washington,
the apex of many decisionmaking organizations, supporting intelligence
components are numerous and frequently in disagreement on key issues.
2. In response to my charge for this session, I hope to contribute to
understanding of the organization and procedures for production of
intelligence at the national level, and to your understanding some of the
problems, methodologies and the track record of national intelligence on
Soviet strategic nuclear forces and objectives.
II. Intelligence Organization and Procedures
3. The present national intelligence apparat had its origins at Pearl
Harbor and has its statutory basis in the National Security Act of 1947. The
Act established the Central Intelligence Agency. The difference between
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departmental and national intelligence was acknowleged and the DCI was called
upon to produce national intelligence which gave due consideration to
departmental intelligence positions. National intelligence estimates were
envisioned as providing the top leadership with a common basis for
decisionmaking and action, thus, avoiding the intelligence and decisionmaking
failures that resulted in the 1941 disaster at Pearl Harbor.
4. The Departmental intelligence structure has undergone many changes
since World War II; the present members of the so-called Intelligence
Community are depicted here. It is like a community in that its member
agencies have some aims and expertise in common, and, like a community, its
head, the DCI, does not command all of the member elements. In this
community, the Central Intelligence Agency is unique as the only intelligence
organization not subordinate to a department of the government.
5. The intelligence structure the DCI does command in his role as
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, is depicted on this viewgraph.
(Explain) The DCI organization for producing intelligence is made up of the
offices of the Deputy Director for Intelligence and the National Intelligence
Council. The organization and procedures for producing National Intelligence
Estimates has evolved over time in an effort to improve the quality of the
product:
--Until 1973 when it was disestablished, the Office of National
Estimates produced all NIEs. It consisted of a board of
distinguished experts and later a staff to draft Estimates, using
contributions from CIA and other agencies. Draft Estimates were
approved by the Board, reviewed by representatives of Intelligence
Community agencies and issued by the DCI after review by a Board
composed of the Senior Intelligence Officers of the Intelligence
Community.
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--In the late 1960s, in part because of errors in estimates on Soviet
strategic forces, the responsibility for drafting NIEs was shifted
from the staff of the Office of National Estimates to production
offices of the CIA.
--In 1973, National Intelligence Officers or NIOs replaced the Office
of National Estimates. Each NIO was responsible directly to the
DCI for production of national intelligence covering a given
region, such as Latin America or the Far East, or in a given
functional area such as economics or strategic nuclear programs.
The NIOs were not given staffs, and were expected to rely on the
CIA, DIA and other producing agencies to provide the draft input
for NIEs. This arrangement was to make national intelligence more
an interagency product and to assure the exposure of alternative
and competing assessments in NIEs.
--The NIOs have been both military and civilian officers, drawn from
various agencies, not only CIA. It was anticipated that unlike
members of the Board of National Estimates, the NIOs would be
replaced periodically--reducing the chances of institutionalizing a
particular mind set.
--Since the inception of the NIO structure we have added groups of
expert consultants drawn from outside intelligence to review draft
NIEs, an internal Senior Review Panel, and an Analytic Group to
provide staff assistance to some of the NIOs.
These changes in organization and procedures for producing NIEs has not
altered the requirements for national intelligence, or the basic estimating
problems, including maintaining the relationship which must exist between
policymakers and defense planners on the one hand, and producers of national
intelligence on the other.
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III. Estimating Methodology
6. Intelligence estimates can be categorized by organization level of
use--national, departmental and tactical; by geographic regions; or by
topics--military, political, economic and scientific. Indications and warning
is a special category of intelligence estimates that will
discuss with you today. For discussion of methods, the track record and
problems in intelligence on Soviet strategic programs, military estimates
should be envisioned as covering--
--Policies, objectives and strategy;
--Characteristics and performance of weapons and supporting systems;
--Size, composition and deployments of forces; and
--Tactics, employment concepts and capabilities.
Lying behind the conclusions in these estimates of present and future Soviet
forces are virtually thousands of more detailed estimates, judgments and
assumptions on personnel efficiency, hardware, production, research and
development, science and technology, and in some cases, computerized
simulations of the interaction of US and Soviet weapons.
7. Intelligence estimating on these topics does not involve merely the
skillful application of academic disciplines. The specialized knowledge of
academicians in regional or functional areas is an important asset, but most
academic disciplines fail as estimative methodologies. Intelligence
estimating is a form of predictive analysis. And like any type of
forecasting, estimates are derived from analysis of the interaction of the
many factors by which weapon performance, force capabilities or future
decisions will be determined. Some intelligence estimates deal with
SECRETS. They address questions, the answers to which are already known to
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the Soviets, such as the characteristics and performance of existing weapons,
the size and composition of deployed forces, and current objectives, strategy
and operational plans. The notionalized methodology for these types of
predictions is depicted here. The key elements of an analytical model which
seeks, for example, to estimate the accuracy of a Soviet ICBM would include
all the functions of the weapon contributing to errors in its accuracy.
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8. Although, these analyses are difficult and many of them highly
complex, with uncertain outcomes, they are far easier than those which address
MYSTERIES--that is, those which seek to make predictions about capabilities
not known to the Soviets or about developments and programs on which they have
not yet decided--about Soviet intentions. Examples of mysteries are Soviet
reactions to a given US program; the characteristics and performance of future
weapons; the size and composition of future forces; and future objectives,
strategy and operational plans, say three to ten years hence.
 IV. The Track Record
10. Analytical methodologies always seem more orderly in concept than
they are in practice. Misjudgment of one factor such as overall Soviet
objectives can lead to a gross mistake in estimating overall force goals even
in the presence of good evidence on current Soviet military programs.
Uncertainty about a single technical factor,
reasons for errors in past Estimates have been various. The most important of
which, in estimates of Soviet strategic nuclear capabilities over the years,
have been--
--A lack of evidence on Soviet activities.
--Misjudgment of overall Soviet objectives, strategy and force
priorities.
25X1
25X1
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--Allied to these types of misjudgments is "mirror imaging," that is
believing that the Soviets would share some US perceived tenets
about nuclear war.
--Misjudgment about the pace of Soviet technological improvements in
weapon systems.
--You will note that I did not include the influence of policy
officials as one of the reasons for error. The charge that policy
officials have dictated the substantive judgments in NIEs, made by
some speakers at Air University schools, and in the media, is
patently false.
--Of these reasons, the most significant from the standpoint of its
impact on US security was the misjudgment about Soviet objectives
and strategy, especially in the 1960s.
The NIE track record on important Soviet developments is summarized on this
viewgraph.
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12. This summary of the track record covers the period through about the
mid- to late 1970s. Noting the good news first, Intelligence has identified
and forecast prior to deployment, virtually every new major Soviet military
weapon system, and made accurate assessments of most air defenses, and of
submarine defenses and space capabilities. The jury is still out on the
accuracy of many of the estimates made in the late 1970s and beyond. However,
as pointed out in Les Aspin's article which was in your reading material,
since 1973 the SALT I and later SALT II agreements reduced the difficulties in
making estimates on some aspects of Soviet strategic programs. Most of the
overestimates and underestimates shown, were also mentioned in Les Aspin's
article. Some of his explanations for the errors are correct; others are not.
--Les Aspin's article is better than most. But like most of those
who have written in the public media about the track record, Les
Aspin has a thesis. His concern is about the impact of not
ratifying the SALT II Treaty
--Other commentators on the track record had other theses to
convey: to show that NIEs consistently overestimated or that they
consistently underestimated, to reorganize the CIA, or the national
intelligence production element or to eliminate policy influences
on NIEs. Some, like Bill Lee and the Presidents Foreign
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characteristic which is most worrysome is the fact that the underlying
assumptions for the estimates have been drawn from a perception of the world
and its principal threats commonly shared by the national leadership and those
responsible for intelligence production. Estimates which are at odds with the
basic perceptions of an Administration cannot get fair hearing. Were it faced
with National Intelligence Estimates that consistently and substantially
undermined the basic tenets and policies of an Administration, the leadership
would either have to alter its policies or get a new DCI.
21. This tendency for intelligence officials and the leadership to have a
common view of the world has been recognized as a problem by the present and
previous DCIs. At least in part, this problem stimulated the A Team-B Team
experiment in competitive analyses. It has probably prompted Mr. Casey's
special emphasis on alternative views and encouragement of competing
estimates. Mr. Casey also insists that all NIEs contain explicit statements
of uncertainties and that all or most of them include a section specifically
addressing the implications of the findings of an Estimate on the US. He
wants the policymaking consumers not to miss the significance of estimated
foreign developments--even if the implications do challenge the propriety of
an existing policy. It is not enough to be right! The intelligence process
is not ended until the significance of an estimate is appreciated by those
responsible for US policies and defense planning decisions.
22. The functions of Air Force officers at the Washington, D.C. level are
intimately involved with intelligence of all types--from overall Soviet
strategic nuclear objectives and strategy to the signal parameters of Soviet
radars. In your new position, I recommend you determine what you need to know
from intelligence about the USSR or other foreign military forces. You have
efficient and professional Air Force intelligence staffs to assist you in
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acquiring intelligence from NIEs, from Defense Intelligence Agency issuances
and from USAF departmental intelligence estimates. Whatever intelligence you
require, as a consumer you are entitled and obligated to know more about
intelligence than just a bottom line judgment or set of numbers served up to
you. You should know whose estimate it is; its purpose and scope;
analytically how it was derived; and its uncertainties. You should not
believe that intelligence can provide firm answers for your planning problem;
intelligence can often bound a problem and help you identify US
alternatives. You must keep in mind that the defense planning and
policymaking process is always one of choosing between competing risks to the
United States' interests and security. Intelligence can help in making those
choices.