LETTER TO (SANITIZED) FROM ROBERT W. KLINE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86R00893R000100130008-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 15, 2008
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: May 13, 1982
• Content Type: LETTER

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AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE (Al V)
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA 36112
Assistant National Intelligence Officer
for Strategic Programs
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
I am most pleased to invite you to address selected memher.s.of the..
Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) Class of-1982 in the "Intelli-
gence and National Security" Tailored Instructional Program (TIP)
on 1 June 1982 at 0830. A two-hour period has been reserved for
you to discuss Strategic Intelligence Estimates... Please use this
time as you deem appropriate--formal lecture, informal remarks,
question and answer, or any combination thereof.
The TIP is an elective course designed for ACSC course officers
with follow-on assignments to national or Department of Defense
intelligence organizations or to operations,. plans, programs, or
R&D staff positions which involve the use of national intelligence
products. It is intended to provide an introduction to the history,
structure, and operation of the US Intelligence Community and the
production and use of intelligence products. Your wealth of
knowledge and experience will provide the course officers a
valuable insight into the intelligence activities of this country.
Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Setlow, telephone [phone] will
coordinate the details of your visit.
I greatly appreciate your support of our educational program and
look forward to having you as our guest next month.
ROBERT W. KLI
Colonel, USAF
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OBJECTIVES:
1. Comprehend the major issues involved in the production of intelligence
estimates on Soviet strategic forces and objectives.
1.1 Summarize the historical record of U.S. Intelligence
estimates. on Soviet strategic forces.
1.2 Explain the analytical methodologies employed in
estimating the present and future capabilities of
Soviet strategic forces.
1.3 Give examples of the major problems encountered in
producing estimates on Soviet forces and objectives.
OVERVIEW:
Estimative intelligence on Soviet strategic forces and objectives
constitutes one of the principal production functions of the U.S.
Intelligence Community. As we develop and deploy our own strategic forces,
it is important that military planners and defense policymakers understand
present and future Soviet strategic capabilities and comprehend likely
Soviet responses to our policies and actions. The arms control negotia-
tions of the past decade have given impetus to the efforts of the
Intelligence Community to improve the quality of its estimates.
Planners and policymakers must, however, bear in mind the limitations
of estimative intelligence, as Klaus Knorr points out in one of the later
readings:
Although the future, within some framework of
particulars, can be estimated, it cannot, of course,
be known. To estimate is to guess in order to reduce
uncertainty dictated by lack of knowledge. The
assumptions and preconceptions about reality that
structure the guesswork can be more or less rigorously
deduced from past behavior. But--as the historical
record discloses.. .--even the most sophisticated
assumptions can lead threat perception astray. To
depend wholly on any one preconception or set of
assumptions is to court surprise. This risk is
magnified by the tendency that the selection of an
assumption about the real world becomes an act of
cognitive closure that easily leads the perceiver
to be close-minded and to ignore or explain away
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discrepant information. It must therefore be
accepted that although good estimates can reduce
uncertainty about the future, even the best cannot
be depended on to prove it.
Knorr also identifies several kinds of redispositions that intervene to
affect the selection of assumptions and receptivity to incoming information
and which are apt to distort estimates. Among these are emotions, strong
ideological commitments, bureaucratic behavior, and wishful thinking.
Bear these considerations in mind while you review the controversy
over U.S. intelligence estimates of Soviet strategic forces in the
readings. We will have an opportunity to explore them more deeply
during the lecture on weapon system analysis as applied to Soviet
strategic estimates. Two of the historically controversial subject
areas of these estimates--Soviet strategic bombers and ICBM's--will be
highlighted to illustrate the techniques of weapon system analysis.
READINGS:
Assigned:
"Debate Over U.S. Strategic Forecasts: A Mixed Record"
"The National Intelligence Estimates A-B Team Episode
Concerning Soviet Strategic Capability and Objectives"
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