I WOULD LIKE TO INVITE YOU TO A FACE-TO-FACE DINNER DISCUSSION ON TUESDAY DECEMBER 11 1984

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CIA-RDP86M00886R002600010010-5
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RIPPUB
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K
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3
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December 21, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 26, 2008
Sequence Number: 
10
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Publication Date: 
November 26, 1984
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LETTER
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Approved For Release 2008/12/02 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002600010010-5 DCI DDCI EXDIR D/ICS DDI DDA DDS&T ;Chm/NIC Compt D/Pers D/PAO SA/IA AO/DCI C/IPD/OIS Please pass recommendation to Ms. STAT PAO says DCI will not go - someoje from SOVA being asked to go. Approved For Release 2008/12/02 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002600010010-5 Approved For Release 2008/12/02 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002600010010-5 Face-To-Face A program to improve understanding of international issues through direct communication between Government officials and private citizens sponsored the Carnegie Endowment for jointly internatioal Peace and the American Foreign Service Association. Suite 900. 11 Dupont Circle. N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 (202)797-6414 CABLE: INTERPEACE TELEX: 248329 CEIP November 26, 1984 Executive Registry 84. 9816 Dear Colleague: I would like to invite you to a Face-to-Face dinner discussion on Tuesday. December 11, 1984, to hear an address by Dimitri Simes, Senior Associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Simes, a noted commentator on US-Soviet relations, will speak on The Chernenko Politburo: How Serious a Threat, How Credible a Partner. During his address, Mr. Simes will discuss the structure of the present Soviet leadership and what decisions he believes that it can make in the field of US-Soviet relations. In addition to his position at the Carnegie Endowment, Mr. Simes is Professorial Lecturer at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies. He is the author of several books and numerous articles, a regular columnist with The Christian Science Monitor and frequently appears on US and foreign television programs focusing on East-West topics. Mr. Simes graduated from the Moscow State University with a M.A. in modern foreign history in 1969 and received the Soviet equivalent of a Ph.D. from the Institute of World Economy and International Relations at the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1972. He came to the United States in 1973 and was naturalized in 1980. We will meet in the Carnegie Conference Center, 11 Dupont Circle, 8th Floor (entrance on New Hampshire Avenue, across from the Dupont Plaza Hotel entrance). Parking is usually available in the Brookings lot on P Street between 17th and 18th. You are invited for cocktails at 6:30 pm. Mr. Simes will speak at 7:00, followed by discussion until dinner at 8:00. Discussion will con- tinue after dinner until 10:00 pm. Mr. Simes' address will be on-the-record, and the the questions and answers will be off-the-record. We look forward to seeing you on the 11th. Please respond whether or not X21 __plan to attend by calling Betty Katzner (797-6414) no later than Thursday, December 6th. Ver--y, truly yours,. Ronald A. DwVhht Director Face-to-Face Program Approved For Release 2008/12/02 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002600010010-5 Approved For Release 2008/12/02 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002600010010-5 Take Small Steps Toward Moscow By Dmitri.K. Simes WASHINGTON - Now that the Presidential election is over, Amer- icans can at last return to business and politics as usual. Among the pressing issues at hand, few things are more important than relations with the Soviet Union. What's more, for the first time since the Soviet in- vasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. there are tentative signs of im- provement in the American-Soviet relationship. Washington and Moscow, each for reasons of its own, seem to be inter- ested in a limited accommodation. Momentous obstacles remain, how- ever, and an eagerness to do too much too fast could backfire. Campaign considerations alone cannot explain the new American em, phasis on dialogue with Moscow. White House insiders insist that Mr. Reagan believes that his large-scale military program, a renewed Amer- ican geopolitical assertiveness and the new mood of self-confidence have created an advantageous environ- ment for seeking arrangements with the Kremlin. His Secretary of State, George P. Shultz, and national security adviser, Robert C. McFarlane, are known to feel the same way. The meetings be- tween Andrei A. Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, and President Rea- gan and Mr. Shultz went as well as could be expected in today's climate of superpower hostility. Achieving even this modest success required a number of bureaucratic and policy decisions. For example, the report of the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Div armament, which listed possible (and impossible) Soviet violations, was at first withheld and then downplayed. The Administration, both publicly and privately, made clear to the Soviet Union that some mutual rF strains on testing of antisatellite weapons would be considered it Mos- cow agreed to resume talks on strate- gic and intermediate-range offensive systems. Recent Soviet public pronounce. merits and private comments strongly suggest that the Kremlin continues to distrust Mr. Reagan and that no relatively minor changes in American rhetoric, or even action, will change this attitude quickly. Yet, Moscow has signaled that it is rela- tively open to American overtures. There appear to be four reasons be- hind the cautious Soviet willingness to explore a diplomatic relationship with the United States. First, the Rus- sians tried a posture of uncompromis- ing belligerence for months and it backfired - deployments of Amer- ican missiles in Europe go on without much opposition. Beyond that, the septuagenarians damina.ing the Politburo are uncom- fortable with a highly volatile situa- tion of unrestricted rivalry. Soviet leaders would prefer to block a re- newed arms race that could cost the Soviet Union dearly and tilt the mili- tary balance in America's favor. The Soviet leadership situation - while still uncertain - contributes to greater superpower interaction. Kon- stantin U. Chernenko is now firmly enough in charge to speak for the col- lective leadership, and the Soviet decision-making process seems to be functioning more smoothly. The Chernenko Politburo is hardly in a position to undertake a much needed fundamental reassessment of Soviet foreign policy. But it seems capable of conducting routine business, in- cluding superpower diplomacy. Finally, and most importantly, the Russians increasingly fear that (to use their terminology) the interna- tional correlation of forces is shifting against them. Their instinct is to hang tough but to give priority to pro- tecting their own position rather than expanding geopolitically. Nevertheless, neither side is ready for a second detente. During a period of domestic difficulties, the Soviet elite needs Mr. Reagan's America-as an external enemy. In addition, the anticipation of yet another political succession in the Kremlin discour- ages ambitious politicians from ex- perimenting with the bold approaches needed to reach a major agreement with the United States. In Washing- ton, the naysayers maintain great in- fluence inside the Administration. .They will use Mr. Reagan's landslide victory as evidence of a popular man- date for an uncompromising stand against the "evil empire." The Russians, by their rhetoric and deeds, traditionally help American Dmitri K. Simes is senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for lnterna- tional Peace. Momentous obstacles . remain critics of rapprochement. Even U Moscow is willing to bargain ear- nestly on arms control and other issues, it will probably persist in ac tion America= find abhorrent. While Mr. Shultz may prefer to avoid linking Soviet actions with negotia- tions, will the Administration be able to escape it amid public outrage over Kremlin misbehavior? Thus. too ambitious a pursuit of a comprehensive settlement with the Soviet Union may be counterproduc- tive. Fundamental differences cannot be resolved while the Soviet union re- mains a totalitarian, global military empire. And even a more modest compromise may be beyond reach after so much hostility has been accu- mulated on both sides. We should instead focus an small but realistic measures that would make sense in their own right - not as stepping stones to a grander compact - and that would be supported by the American public and would contribute to stability. Ratification of treaties on nuclear threshold testing and peaceful nuclear explosions, urged by Mr. Chernenko, are in both sides' interest and are not terribly controversial in either country. So is Mr. Reagan's suggestion (at Soviet urging) to pur- sue contraints on antisatellite weap. ore and his idea of holding regular, Cabinet- and subcabinet-level meet- ings between American and Soviet representatives. Those inside. and particularly out- side, the Administration who want more are hoping that these small steps would contribute to larger-scale undertakings. Much would depend on Soviet willingness and ability to re- spond. But even if the Russians con- tinued to dig in their heels, marginal but genuine diplomatic arrange. ments would help de-escalate ten- sions in the superpower rivalry. To neglect such opportunities to build a new rapprochement would risk end- ing up with nothing. In cooperating with the Russians, it is wise to aim lower in order to hit higher. Approved For Release 2008/12/02 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002600010010-5