INTELLIGENCE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R002500090001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 25, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 27, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence
U
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SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES
I have been engaged in the following activities, in response to
the DCI's request that analysts be exposed to the lessons from
the CIA record regarding intelligence successes and failures.
I have been teaching a two-hour unit on the subject to a large
number of analysts -- mostly new hires. I have presented the
unit to the New Analysts Course and to the Analysis Training
Course. I have also been presenting it to all DO Career
Trainees. The unit was also presented to the Military
Analysis Course and I will soon present it to new branch
chiefs (Introduction to Supervision).
This effort, in my view, has worked well in sensitizing the
students to the challenge of intelligence analysis, the
pitfalls, and the need to take seriously the recommendations
of the DCI and the DDI for improved analysis (such as
challenging assumptions and projecting multiple outcomes).
I am also prepared to present a short version of the course to
interested special groups. For example, I will present a
three-hour version to the staff of the Operations Center
at their Conference.
The first running of the 6-day course for analysts is now at
its midpoint. The syllabus and the annotated reading lists
are attached.
The first course has 18 students: 15 from the DI, 1 from
NIC/AG, 1 from DDST/ORD, and 1 from O/DCI (Historical Staff).
The student response so far -- as I judge it and as judged
by OTE colleagues who have sat in on individual sessions --
has been quite positive. After two days of discussion on
the general causes of failure (including a presentation by
based on the recent SRP study for the DCI),
the students presented their case studies on failure.
Task groups of 3 students each presented to the class
what they think caused the failure in Cuba in 1962, the Middle
East War of 1973, and Iran, 1978-79.
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Their presentations were based on readings for the course,
including selections from post mortems, and on interviews
with participants in the failure. On Iran, for example,
the students interviewed
Division Chief at the tim
Analytical Center, and John
NIO.
e responsible OPA
Chief of the Iran
e gerson, then the Assistant
The student presentations generally confirmed the previous
class discussions on the causes of failure. Nonetheless,
the students engaged in the case studies reported that
they had gained a sharper appreciation of the problems
facing the analysts than they could have gotten from
my lectures and class discussion on problems in general.
The students now understand that failure does not happen
only to the other analyst. And I think they now are ready
to take seriously the second half of the course -- a
cost-benefit analysis of DCI and DDI recommendations for
improved analysis.
To supplement this discussion, selected students will
present their findings on "successes" in the work of
their own Offices, or from the general record. Among
the topics chosen are the Andropov succession and
Nicaraguan export of revolution.
Though it is too early to reach a judgment on the course
overall (do the students change enough to justify six
days away from their desk?), the remark from several
of them that their Branch and Division Chiefs should
take the course is a promising sign.
25X1
25X1
U
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INTELLIGENCE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES
Presented by
Analysis Training Branch
Intelligence Training
Office of Training and Education
Course Director
Analysis Training Branch
OTE Course Instructor
Analysis Training Branch
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INTELLIGENCE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES
COURSE SCHEDULE
DAY
UNIT
TIME
1.
1.
Introduction
0900-1030
2.
CIA Record
1040-1200
3.
Interpretations of Intelligence Failure
1300-1415
4.
Barriers in the International Environment
1425-1550
5.
Case Study Assignments
1600-1650
6.
Political and Organizational Barriers
0900-1030
7.
Analyst-Generated Barriers I
1040-1200
8.
Analyst-Generated Barriers II
1315-1450
9.
Senior Review Panel: Causes of Failure
1500-1630
3.
10.
Case Studies of Failure I
0900-1150
11.
Case Studies of Failure II
1300-1450
12.
Summary on Causes of Failure
1500-1630
4.
13.
Coping with International Barriers
0900-1015
14.
Analytical Techniques for Dealing with
Complexity
1020-1200
15.
Coping with Deception
1315-1450
16.
Product Evaluation Staff:
Requirements for Success
1500-1630
17.
Coping with Political & Organizational
Barriers
0900-1030
18.
The Analyst's Responsibility: Lateral
Growth
1040-1200
19.
The Analyst's Responsibility:
Openmindedness
1300-1430
20.
The Analyst's Responsibility:
Relationships
1440-1630
6.
21.
Case Studies of Success I
0900-1150
22.
Case Studies of Success II
1300-1430
23.
Conclusions & Student Evaluations
1440-1630
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INTELLIGENCE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES
COURSE OBJECTIVES
1. To increase analysts' understanding of the causes of
intelligence failure, with emphasis on why and how barriers to
timely forecasting of critical developments have contributed to
past failures (e.g., international complexity, deception, bias,
overconfidence).
2. To assist analysts in critically examining recommen-
dations by veteran intelligence practitioners and outside critics
for improved analysis -- including devil's advocacy, multiple
projections, and stronger ties with policymakers and nongovern-
mental experts.
3. To relate the course's findings on the causes of
failure and requirements for success to the students' current
analytical assignments.
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INTELLIGENCE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES (ISF)
INSTRUCTIONAL UNITS
1. Introduction. DCI, DDI, and ATB purposes in sponsoring
ISF. Review of course objectives. Student introductions and
objectives in taking the course. Ground rules. Definition of
terms frequently used in course.
2. The CIA Record: Perils of Estimating. Where CIA has
generally done well, and where poorly. Why we have had most
failures in anticipating military threats, third world
revolutions, and sharp policy shifts. The perils of
estimating: being wise is not always sufficient for being
right. Comparison of the overall CIA record with that of other
intelligence services, and the performance of other groups in the
US (economists, Wall Street and sports "handicappers," academic,
and journalists).
3. Interpretations of Intellignece Failure. Critical
explanations from the reading material. Student views. Concept
of multiple barriers to correct interpretation of "signals" of an
on-coming crisis or important event (See chart next page).
4. Barriers in the International Environment. "Noise"
(event and data overload). Complexity (the difficulty of
estimating an adversary's moves before he closes his options).
Paradox of Warning (Japan would not have attacked on 7 December
19 1 if it had perceived US alert). Cultural Differences
(thinking like the Politboro). Paradox of Risk (the more
outrageous a risk, the less likely it will be anticipated, the
less risky it becomes -- as in the missile crisis of 1962).
Deception (the key to surprise attack). Student examples from
their current analytical assignments.
5. Case Study Assignments. The students will select
prominent cases of intelligence success or failure (e.g., the
Iran Revolution) to study (readings and interviews) and explain
to the class (see Instructional Units 10-11, 21-22).
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OKKKI&K..? ow
s4naL BaAt a t4 Gene4ated By:
INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENT
+campl.?xLty o j wonL.d a j b a,it.a
+na.t .ona.t cultural di66e'tencee
+mu.l ti.pte a.c tou (awvtogatee )
POLICYMAKING
ENVIRONMENT
+mi4pencepti..on o6 adveh4aM ea
+poticy momentcan
+wL h6u.t thinking ("can-doism")
ORGANIZATIONAL
ENVIRONMENT
+ke6ouf.cc eimitati.on6
+empha.6iA on c LAent tepoWJt9 5
building-beock nteaeanch
ANALYTICAL
ENVIRONMENT
+at togance/timidity in eatcmating
+Ite4A.6.tance to cnULcal uview
8 6eti.ou,6 coohdination
+aubatantLve oven.6pwLoL zati.on
+ovenempha6.i,6 on #n-box
+deni.guttion 06 poticynakeu
S othe't non-anaLybta
Signal Bax'Lehe Genehate.d By:
INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENT
+no,c.6e (data 6 event ovehtoa.d)
+deception i concealment
+pnopaganda
POLICVMAKING
EMVIRONMENT
+bwkeauc.nat.Lc competition:
th'teat .cnitati.on/de6eati.on;
non-ohtvi.Lng of im6oniratLon
ORGANIZATIONAL
ENVIRONMENT
+m.i xed management h i,gna.LL
(take Wk-6 va. play 6aje)
+tuA6 battt.ea (ne6L6tance to
(coond_,wf .on S o66-time unit.6 )
ANALYTICAL
ENVIRONMENT
+bias ea (mi~vton ,cmag cng )
+pne jud,Lce .towandh :
continuity o6 t'tenda;
con6.thming evidence
+)te6i4tance to et'u,tctuJted
a tatyticat methods
+akAU4 limitations (w4iti.ng )
INTELLIGENCE FAILURE
BaAAie-t6 are de6Lned a6 obatacLe.6 to co'vtec,t An.te40etatiOn 06 ai.gnaL6 06
devetopnent,6 o6 # pontance to US A.nteneath (th-teata and oppoktunJ.AC.6).
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6. Political and Organizational Barriers. Explanations
from the reading material. Historical examples. Student
explanations and examples. Political and organizational barriers
in perspective: To what extent do the problems for intelligence
analysts (e.g. partisan and bureaucratic competition, unclear
management signals) flow from the inherent character and strength
of the US political system and of large organizations?
7. Analyst-generated Barriers I. DCI and DDI views.
Explanations from the reading material. Arrogance and Timidity
(some analysts are too quick to reach judgments; some, too
slow). Biases (we cannot operate without analytical frameworks
to simplify reality, but even the best frameworks do not
represent reality). Paradox of Expertise (in general, the expert
on nuances of a foreign country is handicapped in anticipating
"uncharacteristic" behavior and therefore "sharp" changes). The
"Lone Ranger" syndrome (negative analyst attitudes toward
critical review, meaningful coordination, and alternative views
of non-analysts). Skill limitations (especially writing, as an
obstacle to integrating useful criticism and handling less likely
alternatives). Student responses.
8. Analyst-generated Barriers II. Above discussion
continued.
9. Senior Review Panel Grou
Intelligence Failure.
lecturer.
Views on Causes of
SRP, guest
10. Case Studies on Failure I. Students will discuss ways
in which case studies validate or require redefinition of prior
class discussion on general causes of failure.
11. Case Studies on Failure II. Procedure same as in number
12. Summary on Causes of Failure. Students to relate their
current views on the causes of failure to their present and
prospective DI assignments: What are the most important barriers
they face? Does intelligence failure happen only to the other
analyst? Who has responsibility to overcome obstacles? General
discussion on how.
13. Coping with Barriers in the International System.
Understanding and adjusting to the limitations to intelligence
analysis: projection of multiple outcomes; using the system
(collectors, methodologists, warning specialists).
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14. Analytical techniques for Dealing with Complexity.
ATB). Distinguishing types of problems. Survey
of analytical techniques.
15. Coping with Deception. ATB). Why and
how deception succeeds. What the country analyst can contribute
to the efforts of the warning specialists, to improve the record
of countering deception. Political and military dimensions.
16. Product Evaluation Staff views on the Requirements for
Intelligence Success. Chief PES, guest lecturer.
17. Coping with Political and Organizational Barriers.
(A) Understanding the policymakers' modus operandi (empathy, role
playing, contact). (B) The need for and the special challenge of
"customized" analysis. (C) Brief history of intelligence
organizations: Does structure matter? (D) Recent CIA changes
(regional organization, Alert Memoranda, NIO warning Meetings).
(E) Possible lessons from the corporate world (In Search of
Excellence).
18. The Analyst's Responsibility: Lateral Growth. The
cognitive and analytical processes. "Quotations" (analytical
building blocks). The importance of writing and briefing skills.
19. The Analyst's Responsibility: Openmindedness. What
does it mean, and how can it be implemented? Cost-benefit
analysis of techniques such as "devil's advocacy," "role playing
the adversary," and emphasis on disproving rather than confirming
judgments. Projecting alternative outcomes. Communicating
levels of confidence. Drawing policy implications.
20. The Analyst's Responsibility: Strengthening
Relationships. With substantive peers throughout the Agency and
Community, with policymakers, with outside experts. Cost-benefit
analysis of taking seriously divergent points of view, including
those of "worst casers" and "best casers". The art of making
reviewers, coordinators, and critics work for you. Why the
consumer is "king.".
21. Case Studies of Succes I. Student task groups will work
to refine class discussion on requirements for success.
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22. Case Studies of Success II. Procedures the same as in
no. 21.
23. Conclusion and Student Evaluations. What have we
learned? Where and why do students agree (disagree) with
critics? With instructor? What should be done; what can be
done: by the analyst, by DI management, through training and
education. Student evaluation of the course.
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INTELLIGENCE SUCCESSES & FAILURES:
READING SELECTIONS: VOLUME I
A NOTE ON THE READING SELECTIONS
The number of readings in this volume and in the companion
classified volume will place a large, and probably unrealistic,
demand on the students. Nonetheless, each selection either
represents a point of view or contains insights of value in
coming to grips with the demanding subject of intelligence
successes and failures.
Please use the annotated Table of Contents to select the
articles you believe will be of most value in strengthening your
understanding of the subject and its component issues and
problems. Please pay particular attention to Tabs F and G in
preparation for the first day of the course.
Selection of an article for the course does not necessarily
represent an endorsement of the accuracy of its facts or the
soundness of its judgments. At times, one article contradicts
another on the issue or problem under discussion.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TAB A. COURSE SYLLABUS, OBJECTIVES, AND INSTRUCTIONAL UNITS.
DEFINITION OF FREQUENTLY-USED TERMS.
STUDENT EVALUATION FORM.
TAB B. BRIEFS ON THE PROBLEMS AND PERILS OF ANALYSTS
Hans Morgenthau, Ron Spiers, Walter Lippmann,
Michael Getler).
TAB C. BRIEFS ON THE CIA RECORD
(William J. Casey, Thomas Powers).
TAB D. THE RECORD ACCORDING TO THE PIKE COMMITTEE (1976).
A convenient and informative, if not always balanced,
review of a series of failures.
TAB E. W.D. HOWELLS, "INTELLIGENCE CRISES" (1983)
A defense of intelligence analysts and of some frequently-
criticized practices by an INR veteran practitioner.
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TAB F. EXPLANATIONS OF FAILURE: PROBLEMS OF COGNITION,
PERCEPTION, AND BIAS:
"COGNITIVE FACTORS IN DECEPTION
AND COUNTERDECEPTION" (1982)
ROBERT JERVIS, "HYPOTHESES ON MISPERCEPTION" (1968)
PATRICK MORGAN, "THE OPPORTUNITY FOR A STRATEGIC
SURPRISE" (1983).
The three selections will enable any interested reader to
construct his own general explanation of intelligence
failure.
a former CIA analyst, presents a clear and compelling 25X1
assessment of the cognitive limitations to analyst
understanding of complex events. The article discusses the
implications of these limitations for coping with deception
(Instructional Unit 15).
Jervis' article represents a synopsis of his groundbreaking
work on misperception, which strongly influenced academic
specialists on the subject.
Morgan has written perhaps the single most comprehensive
review of academic explanations of intelligence failure.
This excerpt complements and at times challenges the above
selections.
TAB G. ATTEMPTS AT GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF FAILURE:
DANIEL GRAHAM, "ANALYSIS AND ESTIMATES" (1980).
PHIL WILLIAMS, "INTELLIGENCE FAILURES IN NATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY" (1973).
RICHARD BETTS, "ANALYSIS, WAR, AND DECISION: WHY
INTELLIGENCE FAILURES ARE INEVITABLE" (1978).
MICHAEL HANDEL, "THE YOM KIPPUR WAR AND THE INEVITABILITY OF
SURPRISE" (1977).
General explanations of failure range in character from
simple to overly elegant.
General Graham, former Director, DIA, articulates the view,
held by many critics of the Agency, that systematic bias is a
major cause of failure.
Williams presents a short and simple framework.
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Betts' insightful explanation is probably the one most widely
read by CIA managers and, because of his many briefings, most
widely known in Congress.
Handel's explanation, at times a bit too complex, is
sprinkled with valuable insights and eye-catching turns of
phrase.
TAB H. "WARNING CYCLES" (1983)
A plea for help from analysts by a DIA specialist on warning
intelligence. To be discussed in Unit 15, on Coping with
Deception.
TAB I. CASE STUDY ON THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962.
Volume II contains related classified articles. Graham
Allison's Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile
Crisis (1971) is available for interested students.
RICHARD LEIGHTON, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS OF 1962 (1978).
Excerpts from the text and chronology provide a useful
framework for understanding the case.
ALEXANDER GEORGE & RICHARD SMOKE, "THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS,
1962" (1974)
Explains the crisis as a failure in deterrence. Insightful
examination of CIA's miscalculations of Soviet intentions and
considerations of risk.
KLAUS KNORR, "FAILURES IN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES:
THE CASE OF THE CUBAN MISSILES" (1964).
In one of the earliest explanations of the difficulties in
anticipating an "unusual" event, Knorr -- a CIA consultant at
the time -- responds to Congressional criticisms of CIA's
performance.
FRITZ ERMARTH, "REFLECTIONS ON THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS"
(1974).
Thoughtful comments on the continuing debate about Soviet
behavior and the meaning for analysis.
TAB J. CASE STUDY ON THE 1973 MIDDLE EAST WAR.
The Pike Report (Tab D.) contains a section on this case.
Volume II contains a related observation. Additional
articles on the case, that address the Israeli rather than
the US failure, are available for interested students.
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UNCLASSIFIED EXCERPTS FROM THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF
POSTMORTEM ON THE PERFORMANCE OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
PRIOR TO THE OCTOBER 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR.
COMMENTS ON THE POSTMORTEM (1977)
RICHARD BETTS, "OCTOBER 6, 1973: THE OCTOBER WAR" (1982)
Places the failure into the context of his general
explanation of intelligence failures.
RAY CLINE, "POLICY WITHOUT INTELLIGENCE" (1974)
An indictment of Secretary of State Kissinger by former
Director of INR.
JANICE GROSS STEIN, "THE 1973 INTELLIGENCE FAILURE: A
RECONSIDERATION" (1982)
Perhaps the most illuminating explanation of the Israeli
failure. Many valuable insights on the causes of
intelligence failure in general.
TAB K. CASE STUDY ON IRANIAN REVOLUTION, 1978-79.
Volume II contains related selection. Additional articles by
US policy participants and critics are available for
interested students.
HPSCI STAFF REPORT, IRAN: EVALUATION OF US INTELLIGENCE
PERFORMANCE PRIOR TO NOVEMBER 1978 (1979).
MARVIN ZONIS, "IRAN: A THEORY OF REVOLUTION" (1983)
Stresses the continuing lack of understanding about the
dynamics of 1978-79.
GARY SICK, "WASHINGTON'S ENCOUNTER WITH THE IRANIAN
REVOLUTION" (1982).
Former NSC staff member points to "policy momentum" as a
barrier to analysis, and indicates that academic experts did
no better than the analysts.
NICHOLAS WADE, "IRAN AND AMERICA: THE FAILURE OF
UNDERSTANDING: (1979).
More on the record of academics.
ABUL KASIM MANSUR, "THE CRISIS IN IRAN: WHY THE US IGNORED A
QUARTER CENTURY OF WARNING" (1979)
Former State Department official (using a pen name) defends
the wisdom of the experts, and states that Khoemeini has
almost no chance of gaining power.
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TAB L. DEALING WITH POLITICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL BARRIERS.
Volume II contains related selections. Thomas Hughes'
perceptive short book on the relationship between
intelligence and policy (The Fate of Facts in a World of Men)
is available for interested students.
RICHARD BETTS, "INTELLIGENCE FOR POLICYMAKING" (1980).
Observations on the responsibilities of both communities.
ANGELO CODEVILLA, "COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE OF
DOCTRINE AND ORGANIZATION" (1980).
Survey of foreign intelligence services and a call for
organizational change in the US.
IN SEARCH OF EXCELLENCE: LESSONS FROM AMERICA'S
BEST RUN COMPANIES.
An excerpt from the DCI's speech of January 1984.
TAB M. THE ANALYST'S RESPONSIBILITY
Volume II contains related selections.
RICHARD BETTS, "WARNING DILEMMAS: NORMAL VS.
EXCEPTIONAL THEORY" (1983).
A thoughtful explanation of the need for openmindedness.
ROBERTA WOHLSTETTER, PEARL HARBOR: WARNING AND
DECISION (1962).
This book was available for analysts responsible for the
Cuban Missile and Arab-Israeli assessments. The excerpt on
Japanese calculations of risk in the attack on Pearl Harbor
could have served as a caution to "mirror imaging."
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SECRET
INTELLIGENCE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES
READING SELECTIONS: VOLUME II
A Note on Security
Those students who do not plan to return to their offices
after each class day should bring this classified volume to class
only when they anticipate a specific need for it: e.g., in
connection with a case study exercise. In those instances, the
Course Director will be able to provide temporary secure storage.
TAB N. REFLECTIONS ON THE CIA RECORD
"HOW -.:,RE-r- WE 11
LST I. tiTC~- N 1-WRONG,
STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE, 12:1 (WINTER 1968).
(19 ))
HOWARD STOERTZ, ON THE SOVIET STRATEGIC THREAT (1982).
Theo and Stoertz articles are indirect responses to
the Graham article in Volume I, Tab G.
TAB 0 CASE STUDY ON THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962.
SNIE 85-3-62: THE MILITARY BUILDUP IN CUBA.
SHERMAN KENT, "A CRUCIAL ESTIMATE RELIVED" (1964).
A defense of the analytical process that underlay the
estimate.
THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: TWO VIEWS OF THE EVIDENCE
(1964).
TAB P. CASE STUDY ON THE 1973 MIDDLE EAST WAR
RICHARD KERR, INFORMAL NOTE ON THE 1973 MIDDLE EAST WAR.
A participant on the problem of conflicting evidence.
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J~1_1 1
TAB Q. CASE STUDY ON IRANIAN REVOLUTION, 1978-79
Robert Jervis, academic specialist on misperception
(Volume I, Tab F), was the principal author. Probably
the most authoritative postmortem, with insights into
the difficulty of anticipating and monitoring a
revolution.
ROBERT GATES, "AN OPPORTUNITY UNFULFILLED: THE USE AND
PERCEPTIONS OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS IN THE WHITE HOUSE
(1980).
On overcoming isolation (ours) and suspicion (theirs).
` "ON ESTIMATING REACTIONS" (1965).
An old artform that reduces the barrier between
intelligence and policymaking after a given policy
course has been determined. Used frequently during the
Vietnam War.
TAB S. ROBERT GATES ON THE ANALYST'S RESPONSIBILITY
"THE PREDICTION OF SOVIET INTENTIONS" (1973).
On lateral growth, openmindedness, and other
requirements for improved analysis
EXCERPTS FROM DDI REMARKS 13 JANUARY 1983.
On multiple projections and other correctives.
EXCERTS FROM DDI NEWSLETTER, 28 JULY 1983 & 12 JANUARY
19814.
On relations with the policymaker, multiple projections,
and lateral growth.
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OTE 83-6825
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Executive Director
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Administration
Director of Training and Education
Analysis Training Branch, Office of
Training and Education
SUBJECT: Intelligence Successes and Failures (ISF):
Status Report on Syllabus & Reading List
REFERENCE: Your Memorandum to the D/OTE, dated
7 April 1982, Subject: Training in
Intelligence Analysis
1. This memorandum is in response to your request for
a status report on plans for a course for analysts on the
lessons of intelligence successes and failures. I welcome
the opportunity to solicit your suggestions for shaping the
syllabus and reading list to support the objectives you had
in mind in your memorandum to Director of Training and
Education of 7 April 1982 recommending such a course. I have
already discussed goals and general approaches with the
Deputy Director for Intelligence, the Senior Review Panel,
and the Product Evaluation Staff, as well as with other
interested parties in the DI and in the Office of Training
and Education (OTE).
2. The primary objective of the course, as I read your
memorandum, is to use the CIA record to illuminate the
causes of failure and the requirements for success--in a way
that motivates analysts to improve their on-the-job
performance. In other words, the course will elicit from
the record (e.g., from " bad estimates and good estimates")
the changes in attitudes and practices that will prepare
analysts to deal more effectively with tough intelligence
problems, especially anticipation of military attack,
revolutionary overthrow of key regimes, and sharp shifts in
policy by present and potential adversaries.
/00
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/11/25: CIA-RDP86M00886R002500090001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/11/25: CIA-RDP86M00886R002500090001-8
SUBJECT: Intelligence Successes and Failures (ISF):
Status Report on Syllabus & Reading List
3. The Tentative Syllabus for Intelligence Successes
and Failures (ISF) contains a list of specific course
objectives and sketches out 36 hours of seminars, exercises,
and guest speakers to illustrate the planned thrust of the
course (Attachment A).
4. The selection of reading materials for ISF is still
in an early stage. The annotated preliminary list of case
studies and commentaries by veteran practitioners and
outside critics provides a general view of the range of
materials under consideration for the course (Attachment B).
5. Subject to final approval, I plan to offer the
course in January and April 1984--to test its effectiveness
in achieving your objectives. In response to the DDI's
recommendation, I am also incorporating the essence of ISF,
as a two-hour unit, in other OTE courses. This already has
been done for the current running of the Analysis Training
Course (DI Career Trainees), the New Analyst Course
(recently-hired DI analysts), and Introduction to the DI (DO
Career Trainees). Additionally, I will, in May 1984,
prepare a memorandum for you and the DDI on the implications
for management and training of my research findings and
instructional experience regarding intelligence successes
and failures. The final goal is to fine tune the ISF course
and the two-hour unit for regular presentation by OTE
starting in July 1984.
Attachments:
As Stated
DDA/OTE/IT/ATB
(24Oct83)
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee, Watts
1 - DDCI, Watts
1 - ExDir, w/atts
1 - Exec. Reg. w/o atts
1 - DDI, Watts
1 - DDA, Watts
1 - D/OTE Watts
1 - OTE Reg. w/o atts
2 - ATB/IT/OTE, w/att
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 Approved For Release 2008/11/25: CIA-RDP86M00886R002500090001-8
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
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 Approved For Release 2008/11/25: CIA-RDP86M00886R002500090001-8
ULV1\L I
OTE 83-6825
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Executive Director
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Administration
Director of Training and Education
Analysis Training Branch, Office of
Training and Education
SUBJECT: Intelligence Successes and Failures (ISF):
Status Report on Syllabus & Reading List
REFERENCE: Your Memorandum to the D/OTE, dated
7 April 1982, Subject: Training in
Intelligence Analysis
1. This memorandum is in response to your request for
a status report on plans for a course for analysts on the
lessons of intelligence successes and failures. I welcome
the opportunity to solicit your suggestions for shaping the
syllabus and reading list to support the objectives you had
in mind in your memorandum to Director of Training and
Education of 7 April 1982 recommending such a course. I have
already discussed goals and general approaches with the
Deputy Director for Intelligence, the Senior Review Panel,
and the Product Evaluation Staff, as well as with other
interested parties in the DI and in the Office of Training
and Education (OTE).
2. The primary objective of the course, as I read your
memorandum, is to use the CIA record to illuminate the
causes of failure and the requirements for success--in a way
that motivates analysts to improve their on-the-job
performance. In other words, the course will elicit from
the record (e.g., from " bad estimates and good estimates").
the changes in attitudes and practices that will prepare
analysts to deal more effectively with tough intelligence
problems, especially anticipation of military attack,
revolutionary overthrow of key regimes, and sharp shifts in
policy by present and potential adversaries.
Approved For Release 2008/11/25: CIA-RDP86M00886R002500090001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/11/25: CIA-RDP86M00886R002500090001-8
SECRET
SUBJECT: Intelligence Successes and Failures (ISF):
Status Report on Syllabus & Reading List
3. The Tentative Syllabus for Intelligence Successes
and Failures (ISF) contains a list of specific course
objectives and sketches out 36 hours of seminars, exercises,
and guest speakers to illustrate the planned thrust of the
course (Attachment A).
4. The selection of reading materials for ISF is still
in an early stage. The annotated preliminary list of case
studies and commentaries by veteran practitioners and
outside critics provides a general view of the range of
materials under consideration for the course (Attachment B).
5. Subject to final approval, I plan to offer the
course in January and April 1984--to test its effectiveness
in achieving your objectives. In response to the DDI's
recommendation, I am also incorporating the essence of ISF,
as a two-hour unit, in other OTE courses. This already has
been done for the current running of the Analysis Training
Course (DI Career Trainees), the New Analyst Course
(recently-hired DI analysts), and Introduction to the DI (DO
Career Trainees). Additionally, I will, in May 1984,
prepare a memorandum for you and the DDI on the implications
for management and training of my research findings and
instructional experience regarding intelligence successes
and failures. The final goal is to fine tune the ISF course
and the two-hour unit for regular presentation by OTE
starting in July 1984.
Attachments:
As Stated
DDA/OTE/IT/ATB
24Oct83)
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee, Watts
1 - DDCI, Watts
1 - ExDir, w/atts
1 - Exec. Reg. w/o atts
1 - DDI, Watts
1 - DDA, Watts
1 - D/OTE Watts
1 - OTE Reg. w/o atts
2 - ATB/IT/OTE, w/att
Approved For Release 2008/11/25: CIA-RDP86M00886R002500090001-8