REVIEW AND CLEARANCE OF PAPER: DEVELOPMENT CLAIMS AND REALITIES OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R001900110014-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2008
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: June 26, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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27 June 1984
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United States Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520
June 26, 1984
TO: SARA - Mr. Langhorne A. Motley
INR - Mr. Hugh Montgomery
S/P - Mr. Peter Rodman
EB - Mr. Richard T. McCormack
CIA ~
FROM: S/LPD - Otto J. Reich
SUBJECT: Review and Clearance of paper:
'Development Claims and Realities of
the Cuban Revolution'
STAT
We plan to make this document public in whole or in part(s). I
would appreciate it if your office would review the document
and give us your comments or suggestions by close of business
Monday, July 2, 1984.
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DEVELOPMENT-CLAIMS 'AND REALITIES
z~ -
THE CUBAN REVOLUTION:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
PREPARED "FOR:
THE OFFICE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
FOR
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
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The Cuban revolution has been presented as a challenge to the
rest of the Americas. It is an alternative approach to social and
economic development based on a marxist-leninist model. The loss
of f reedom it entails is justified in terms of what can be
accomplished in meeting basic needs. After 25 years in power, it
is worth asking: flow does Cuba compare? What has been
accomplished?
In this papet, an effort is. made to provide a basis for such
comparison. Some restrictions on the availability of comparative
information from independent sources limited the selection of
indicators. In essence, four groups of indicators were chosen
related to: a) economic growth; b) changes in the economic
structure; c) meeting basic needs in health; and, d) meeting basic
needs in education. There is also a brief introduction on Cuba's
claims and what the basic needs approach means.
The format and scope have been selected to provide a quick
basis for comparison. The data has been drawn basically from the
World Bank's World Development Report for 1983. Perhaps a broader
coverage of indicators would be desirable, but lack of objective
series for comparison limited the scope of indicators that could
be used.
The balance shows that, contrary to the general impression
created by Castro's propaganda, the record is not favorable to the
Cuban revolution. For almost every indicator, other countries
have made more progress than Cuba. What makes this record more
tragic is that these are the areas of success usually mentioned to
justify the loss of freedom imposed by the Castro regime on the
Cuban people.
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CUBA'S CHALLENGE
At the Extraordinary Session of the Interamerican Economic
and Social Council of the' Organization of American States , held in
Punta del Este, Uruguay in August, 1961, Ernesto Guevara, the head
of the Cuban delegation, said the following: "The rate of growth
that is given [by the Alliance for Progress) as a beautiful thing
for all the Americas is 2.5 percent of net growth. Bolivia
announced 5 percent for ten years; we congratulate the Bolivian
representative while telling him that with a little effort and the
mobilization of popular forces, he could say 10 percent. We speak
of 10 percent of development without any fear, 10 percent of
development is the rate that Cuba foresees for the coming years.
[ ... ] What does Cuba expect to have by 1980? A net per capita
income of three thousand dollars; more than the United States
currently has." (Reunion Extraordiuaria del Consejo
lateramericano E'conomico y Social a Nivel Ministerial, Punta del
Este, Uruguay, el 5-17 Agosto 1961. Actas y Documentos. Union
Panamericana, Secretarfa General, Organizacion de los Estados
Americanos , Washington, D.C. , 1962, p. 213)
In 1966, Fidel Castro made the following statement: "In our
system no one works to make profits for any individual; we work to
satisfy the needs of the people, to enrich the country, to raise
the productivity of labor; [... ] because our resources will
increase and it will be possible to take care of the most pressing
needs of the people in the same measure as labor productivity
increases.
These are the things that make our case different from that
of the other Latin American nations. We are ahead of them. And
in a world where the population increases more rapidly than the
output of foodstuffs, how will the underdeveloped nations be able
to face this tremendous problem without Revolution, without doing
precisely what we are doing?" (Fidel Castro Speaks. ed. Martin
Kenner and James Petras. Grove Press, New York, 1969, p. 195)
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These statements were based on several underlying assumptions
and had a number of implications:
a. Economic freedom and individual incentives are not
compatible with the satisfaction of popular needs.
b. Socialist planning is able to identify the needs of the
people more accurately than free expression of
preferences through market mechanisms.
c. Socialist planning ? can allocate resources more
efficiently than other economic systems and,
consequently, will be capable of raising labor
productivity and promoting economic development.
d. Without a Cuban-style revolution, Latin American nations
cannot fight underdevelopment as effectively as Cuba.
As a corollary of these postulates, in terms of human rights,
the Cuban revolution claims to give priority to economic , social
and cultural rights as opposed to civil and political rights.
Nutrition, health, education, social justice and employment are
deemed to be "the true human rights". (cidh, p.5) Claiming
significant advances in meeting "basic human needs", statistics on
Cuban life expectancy, infant mortality, literacy and school
enrolments are presented as positive accomplishments of greater
import than the accompanying stagnating GNP per capita during the
Castro period, not to mention lost freedoms.
THE BASIC NEEDS APPROACH
The basic-needs theory assumes that a direct, public-sector
supported approach to alleviating poverty is required to offset
insufficient consumer knowledge, unequal income distribution and
non-uniform dissemination of productivity-enhancing innovations.
Emphasis is placed on improving health., nutrition and basic
education, especially in rural areas - items intended to build up
a critical minimum level of basic human capital. These
improvements in the stock of human capital are theorized to
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contribute over time to increased productivity and growth.
The central question which has been investigated relative to
the theory is whether-current growth is sacrificed for future
growth while minimum basic needs levels are being attained and, if
so , whether the increased growth in the future is sufficient to
offset egrlier growth foregone." One prominent group states that
the trade-off is likely to take the form of a longer gestation
period for 'inve.stment in assets, held by the poor rather than a
permanent reduction in GNP." (Redistribution with Growth, p. xix).
Thus, the payoff for investing in basic needs is seen to be
overall economic growth as measured by a GNP-equivalent in a later
stage.
Two very broad conclusions have emerged from numerous related
investigations. First, it appears that countries making
substantial progress in meeting basic needs do not' have
substantially lower GNP growth rates. Second, the attainment of a
higher level of basic needs satisfaction appears to lead to a
higher growth rate in the future. (Hicks, p. 992)
The intent of this analysis is to examine and compare Cuba's
performance under the Castro Government to that of other Latin
American and Caribbean countries in light of the basic needs
theory. Such an effort is handicapped by limitations in
availability of data. One of the consequences of the highly
centralized organization of the Cuban society under the
revolution, is that the availability of statistical information is
entirely controlled by the government. The government has not
facilitated the availability of data necessary to appraise Cuba's
economic performance. For example, one glaring deficiency is the
lack of reliable data on national accounts to observe the
evolution of such indispensable indicators as Gross National
Product - or the equivalent GSP indicator used by centrally
planned economies - at constant prices.
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The hypothesis in this paper is that Cuba, at the time of the
revolution, had already attained a relatively high level of
meeting basic needs and could have advanced at that time into the
subsequent stage of economic expansion and growth foreseen by the
theory. Instead, limited attainments in improving satisfaction of
basic needs have been accompanied by lack of growth in GNP. The
resources used for generating greater basic needs fulfillment (in
the form of public-sector supported consumption, especially in
health care and education) and for military expenditures have
diverted resources away from productive investment. In addition,
by breaking away from its traditional markets and alliances, Cuba
deprived itself of the opportunity of sharing in industrial
development resulting from the various integration schemes in the
Americas.
Although in this paper no discussion in depth is made of the
role of the military, it should be noted that in 1980 Cuba spent
6.1 percent of its GNP on military expenditures. This was the
highest percentage in Latin America for that year and a not
uncommon expenditure for Cuba during the last 25 years. Higher
average expenditures were recorded only for Warsaw Pact countries
and the Middle East. (Sivard, p. 33-35) Another indicator of the
militarization of Cuba and its economic impact is that annual
income per capita has been higher for military positions than for
state-supported civilian positions or private farmers. "By 1977
the average military wage was 17 percent above the civilian one."
(Mesa-Lago, p. 155) Further, for the period 1970 through 1982,
military employment fluctuated between 6 and 9 percent of the
total labor force. (Wharton, p. 10) These rates are several times
higher than those of any other country in Latin America and the
Caribbean. For example, the percentage of overall population in
the military in 1981-82 in Cuba was 2.32, while in Brazil it was
.22, in Argentina .66 and even in Chile only .82. (Cuban Armed
Forces and the Soviet Military Presence, p. 2)
The tables selected illustrate Cuba's advanced position in
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the region before the revolution, as well as its position
approximately twenty~years_.later. In comparing Cuba's performance
to that of other countriis,? in Latin America and the Caribbean , a
key measurement, of.te.n... .conveniently overlooked, is that of
percentage improvement relative to the 1960 base. In most cases,
we have utilized this relative percentage improvement to rank the
performance of all countries .surveyed. Under this approach,
countries starting at high levels in 1960 and making small
increases would- not have high. rankings in percentage change in
tweeting basic needs. However, under basic needs theory such
countries should demonstrate strong growth in GNP per capita.
That is, they have moved to the stage when minimum basic needs can
be met along with increased investment.
Cuba has performed well in some indicators but neither
percentage improvement nor absolute levels of basic needs
attainment have been accompanied by acceptable GNP growth given
Cuba's advanced beginning position. On the other hand,
significant progress has been made by countries following western
development models both in terms of GNP growth and basic needs
attainment, without the loss of individual freedom experienced in
Cuba. Lack of adequate information has prevented a comparison on
employment. It should be recognized that this is an indicator
where Cuba's progress is acknowledged to be substantially better
than in the other countries in the americas.
COMPARISON OF SELECTED INDICATORS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
The first group, Tables 1-4, deals with GNP performance,
energy consumption per capita and an average index of food
production per capita. Table 1 ranks the twenty-one countries
included according to average annual percentage growth in GNP per
capita between 1960 and 1981. These range from Brazil with an
average 5.5 percent per year,.to Cuba with.a -0.6 to +0.5 percent
yearly average over the; period. Thus, Cuba's GNP per capita has
basically been stagnant since the revolution while countries with
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both lower and higher absolute initial levels of GNP per capita
(and lower levels of basic human needs attainment) have grown at
faster rates. From this table it is evident that the stock of
wealth available for attending to basic needs has not grown in the
case of Cuba.
Table 2 provides an interesting comparison of changes in
relative r'ankings in GNP per capita over time. Cuba went from
third place in 1952 to fifteenth place in 1981, a decrease of
twelve. Paraguay went from eighteenth place to eighth over the
same time period, the largest positive increase among the
countries surveyed. Cuba's relative position has clearly not been
maintained by the economic policies followed during the Castro
period. Other countries reflect more moderate variations in their
rankings.
Concrete evidence of Cuba's stagnating GNP is provided by the
fact that there are shortages of all sorts of consumer goods
including durables such as automobiles and television sets.
According to Luxenburg, the number of passenger cars went from
159,000 in 1958 to 80,000 in 1976. Television receivers increased
in number from -500,000 in 1960 to 650,000 in 1977, but Cuba's rate
of increase (30 percent) was much less than that experienced by
other Caribbean countries during the sane period. For example,
Puerto Rico went from 173,000 receivers in 1960 to 631,000 in
1977, an increase of 265 percent.
Table 3 covers the percentage increase in energy consumption
per capita since 1960 , a measure of growth in production and
industrial expansion. Cuba ranks fourth from the bottom with a 48
percent increase. Over half the countries have at least a 100
percent increase during the period. As an indicator of growth,
energy consumption may have been affected by the conservation
policies resulting from the oil crisis. However, it is known that
Cuba has had limited access to more energy efficient technology
for i'ts industrial plant. Therefore, even allowing for
- 7 -
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conservation measures this growth performance is poor.
Table 4 presents an index of increase in food production per
capita based on comparing the period 1.969-71 with 1979-81. Cuba
shows a growth of six points, a little above the mean for these
countries during this ten-year period.- It should be noted that
these base years were catastrophic for non-sugar agriculture in
the country due to the immense effort necessary to produce the
sugar harvest'of 1970. Presumably, production was higher in
earlier years and Cuba would show even less improvement if the
base period were set before the ten million ton sugar harvest
effort began.
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TABLE 1
GNP Per Capita
(ranked according to percentage increase)
Average Annual
Growth (X)
1981
1960-81
Brazil
2,220
5.1
Ecuador
1 ,180
4.3
Mexico
2 ,250
3.8
Paraguay
1 630
3.5
Dominican Republic
1 ,260
3.3
Colombia
1 ,380
3.2
Panama
1 ,910
3.1
Costa Rica
1 ,430
3.0
Guatemala
1 ,140
2.6
Venezuela
4,220
2.4
Argentina
2,560
1.9
Bolivia
600
1.9
Uruguay
2 ,820
1.6
El Salvador
650
1.5
Honduras
600
1.1
Peru
1 ,170
1.0
Jamaica
1 ,180
0.8
Chile
2 ,560
0.7
Nicaragua
860
0.6
Haiti
300
0.5
Cuba
880-1 ,110a
0.6
- +0_5a
a Although in 1982 the World Bank stopped providing specific
estimates for Cuban GNP per capita, it locates Cuba within this
range.
Source: World Bank, World-Development Report 1983, Oxford
University Press, 1983.
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Relative Position - GNP Per Capita and Change
Venezuela
Argentina
Cuba
Chile
Panama
Uruguay
Brazil
Mexico
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Guatemala
El Salvador
Nicaragua
Honduras
Ecuador
Peru
Paraguay
Bolivia
Haiti
-Rarik '
1952
1
Venezuela
Uruguay
Argentina
Chile
Mexico
Brazil
Panama
Paraguay
Costa Rica
Colombia
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Peru
Guatemala
Cuba
Nicaragua
El Salvador
Honduras
Bolivia
Haiti
Rank
1981
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9-
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Sources: For 1952, "Tipologfa Socioeconoaica de los Pafses
Latinoamericanos", published as a special issue of the Revista
Interamericana de Ciencias Sociales, Vol. 2, OAS, Washington, DC,
1963. For 1981, ranking results from World Development Report
1983 estimates.
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TABLE 3
Energy Consumption Per Capita
(Kilograms of coal equivalent)
(ranked based on percentage increase from 1960)
1960
1980
Absolute
Increase
Percentage Increase
from 1960
Haiti
16
88
72
450
Paraguay
80
300
220
275
Panama
468
1,623
1,155
247
Dominican
Republic
158
517
359
227
Ecuador
216
692
476
220
Brazil
385
1,102
717
186
Costa Rica
311
829
518
167
Bolivia
169
452
283
167
El Salvador
145
357
212
146
Jamaica
654
1 ,440
786
120
Mexico
786
1,684
898
114
Nicaragua
181
362
181
100
Honduras
149
292
143
96
Colombia
519
970
451
87
Peru
433
807
374
86
Argentina
1 ,177
2,161
984
84
Guatemala
180
308
128
71
Cuba
920
1,361
441
48
Chile
833
1,137
304
36
Uruguay
1,020
1,160
140
14
Venezuela
3,014
3,039
25
1
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1983, Oxford
University Press, 1983.
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TABLE 4
Ave-rage Index of Food
Production Per Capita
-
(1969"71=100).
1979-81
Brazil 125
Colombia' 122
Guatemala 116
Argentina 11.6
Paraguay 111
Costa Rica 110
Cuba---------------- 106
Mexico 106
Uruguay 104
Venezuela 104
E1 Salvador 104
Panama 102
Bolivia 102
Dominican Republic 99
Chile 97
Ecuador 97
Jamaica 90
Haiti 89
Nicaragua 87
Peru 84
Honduras 80
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1983, Oxford
University Press, 1983.
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COMPARISON OF SELECTED INDICATORS OF ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
The second group, Tables 5-7, covers a variety of indicators
selected to illustrate the evolution of the economic structure
over time in terms of an increasing proportion of industrial
production and manufactured exports and a decreasing proportion of
agricultural production and primary commodity exports. In very
broad terms, this is generally associated with the progress toward
development. However, oil exporting countries distort the accepted
"normal" progression, toward greater development.
Key indicators of change in production structure available
for cross-country comparison are the percentages of labour in the
main sectors of the economy. It is recognized that the validity
of these indicators may be. affected by changes in labour
productivity.
Table 5 presents the percentage of the labor force in
agriculture relative to the 1960 base. Large percentage decreases
would reflect a change in production structure , allowing for no
major change in labour productivity. Cuba is ranked number seven
with a decrease of 16 percent. The largest decrease was Colombia,
with 25 percent. The smallest was Ecuador with 5 percent. As to
the starting base, it must be noted that in 1960, only Argentina,
Uruguay, Chile and Venezuela had a lower proportion of
agricultural labour force.
Table 6 contains the inverse of Table 5, the percentage of
the labor force in industry and services relative to the 1960
base. Here, Cuba ranks seventh with a 16 percent increase. The
greatest increase was experienced in Colombia, with a 25 percent
increase. Only five countries had an equal or greater percentage
of their labor forces employed in the industrial and service
sectors in 1960 - Jamaica, Venezuela, Chile, Uruguay and
Argentina.
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These two Tables together indicate that Cuba started with a
relatively high percentage of its labor force in the industrial
and service sectors and a'smaller percentage in agriculture. With
this sort of breakdowns Cuba started the period in a good position
to make further progress in changing its economic structure. On
the basis of these indicators, Cuba- shows less progress than many
other countries in the region.
Table 7 presents the comparison among countries for share of
manufactured exports ranked on absolute percentage increase
relative to 1960. Cuba shows no change in the twenty-year period,
although decreased dependence on sugar was a major goal of the
revolution. Cuba is ranked the lowest of all countries for which
data was available. This comparison reflects the price Cuba -has
paid for isolating itself from its neighbours. The progress of
other countries in the region in increasing the share of
manufactures is due in most cases to the various regional
integration schemes. Cuba decided to integrate its economy within
the COMECON and was assigned the role of a basic commodity
producer. Had this not been the case, Cuba would most likely have
experienced increases similar to those of Jamaica (48 percent) or
Costa Rica (29 percent). It is significant that in 1960 these two
countries had exactly the same share of manufactured exports (5
percent) that Cuba had.
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TABLE 5
Percentage of Labor Force in Agriculture
(ranked on basis of absolute percentage decrease
relative to 1960 base)
%
Absolute
% Percentage
1960,
1980 Change
Colombia
51
26
(25)
Panama
51
27
(24)
Costa Rica
51
29
(22)
Brazil
52
30
(22)
Mexico
55
36
(19)
Nicaragua
62'
43
(19)
Dominican Republic
67
49
(18)
Jamaica
39
21
(18)
Venezuela
35
18
(17)
Cuba
-39
----
23-----
(16)-
-_ Peru
52
39
(13)
Chile
31
19
(12)
Paraguay
56
44
(12)
El Salvador
62
50
(12)
Guatemala
67
55
(12)
Bolivia
61
50
(11)
Uruguay
21
11
(10)
Argentina
20
13
(7)
Honduras
70
63
(7 )
Haiti
80
74
(6)
Ecuador
57
52
(5)
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1983, Oxford
University Press, 1983.
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TABLE 6
Percentage of Labor Force in Industry and Services
(ranked on basis of absolute percentage increase
-re"lative to 1960 base)
2
1960
x
1980
Absolute
Percentage
Change
Colombia
49
74
25
Panama
49
73
24
Brazil
48
70
22
Costa Rica
49
71
22
Nicaragua
38
57
19
Mexico
45
64
19
Dominican Republic
33
51
18
Jamaica
61
79
18
Venezuela
65
82
17
Cuba
61
77
16
Peru
48
61
13
Paraguay
44
56
12
Guatemala
33
45
12
El Salvador
38
50
12
Chile
69
81
12
Bolivia
39
50
11
Uruguay
79
89
10
Argentina
80
87
7
Honduras
30
37
7
Haiti
20
26
6
Ecuador
43
48
5
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1983-, Oxford
University Press, 1983.
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TABLE 7
Percentage Share of Merchandise Exports
Manufactures
(ranked on basis of absolute percentage increase
relative to 1960 base)
z
1960
z
1980
Absolute
Percentage
Change
Jamaica
5
53
48
Brazil
3
39
36
El Salvador
6
39
33
Costa Rica
5
34
29
Mexico
12
39
27
Dominican Republic
2
24
22
Guatemala
3
24
21
Argentina
4
23
19
Colombia
2
20
18
Chile
4
20
16
Peru
1
16
15
Paraguay
0
12
12
Nicaragua'
2
14
12
Honduras
2
12
10
Uruguay
29
38
9
Ecuador
.1
3
2
Venezuela
2
2
Cuba --------------5----- 5
------0-
Bolivia
-
3
Panama
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1983, Oxford
University Press, 1983.
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COMPARISON OF SELECTED INDICATORS OF
HEALTH PROGRESS
This subject falls' squarely into the boundaries of basic
human needs 'theory, reflecting the results of public health
policies and improvements in levels of nutrition. Tables 8-11
deal with some selected health' indicators for which comparative
data is available. Table 8 covers population per physician ranked
on the basis of*percentage decreases relative to 1960. In actual
proportion, Cuba still ranks below Uruguay and Argentina. In
terms of progress, Cuba ranks number eleven in this category,
going from 1,060 to 700, a decline of 34 percent. Honduras
experienced the largest percentage decrease , 75 percent, although
it still has a high absolute number of people per physician,
3,120. In addition, it should be pointed out that the figures do
not reflect the net availability of doctors since many Cuban
doctors are sent overseas by the Government.
Table 9 presents percentage increases in life expectancy at
birth. Here Cuba ranks in the bottom one-third in progress during
the period of comparison with a 16 percent increase. Again,
Honduras had the highest increase, 28 percent. As for the
preceding indicator, Cuba started the period under investigation
with a very lavorabie absolute number; only two or three countries
Surpassed it in either indicator in 1960. This suggests that
human needs fulfillment had already reached much more than a
"basic" level before the revolution.
Table 10 covers percentage decreases in infant mortality
relative to 1960. In this category, if we utilized World Bank
figures Cuba would rank number one, with a decrease from 66 per
1000 to 19 per 1000, or 71 percent. Other sources have indicated
(cidh p. 194, Statistical Abstract of Latin America, 1977, p. 107)
that the actual number (for 1955-59) was 32 or 33-per 1000 rather
than 66. If this is so, Cuba's improvement is much less dramatic,
a 41 percent decrease. This places Cuba at number twelve in the
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ranking, with an improvement falling below the mean decrease of 44
percent. Jamaica occupies the number one spot, with a 69 percent
decline, from 52/1000 to 16/1000, the lowest absolute number in
1981 for all countries.
Table 11 presents percentage decreases in the child death
rate. Here, Cuba ranks number four, with an 80 percent decrease,
from 5 per 1000 to 1 per 1000, behind Chile, Costa Rica, and
Panama. Again, in the base period Cuba enjoyed a very low child
death rate; only Jamaica, Uruguay and Argentina had a lower rate.
It is interesting to note that although Cuba began and ended
the period with a relatively favorable rating for each of the four
indicators discussed, there was a good deal of fluctuation in the
incidence of contagious disease during the period. The table
presented below illustrates a variety of situations, from measles,
syphilis and acute diarrhea which steadily worsened over the
period, to hepatitis and tuberculosis which both worsened before
beginning a decline.
Rate of Contagious Diseases in Cuba
(per 100,000 inhabitants)
Measles
Syphilis
Acute
Diarrhea
Hepatitis
Tuberculosis
1959
10.3
0.7
5,707
b
5.0 a
27.6
1967
165.9
13.1
6,165
139.6
37.2
1977
263.3
39.2
7,358
123.2
13.1
a 1961
b 1965
(Mesa-Lago, p. 167)
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Therefore, contrary to the widespread impression that Cuba's
favorable health conditions are a result of the priority given by
the present regime to this basic need, the fact is that Cuba's
progress has been less than that of other countries in the
Americas. In absolute terms, Cuba's position is not too much
better than the high base it started-from. It is perhaps in
making health services available to the rural population that
Cuba's claims are more justified.' Since no data for comparison
among countries-is available, all that can be done is to note the
point.
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TABLE 8
Population per Physician
(ranked on basis of percentage decrease relative to 1960 base)
1960
1980
Absolute
Change
Percentage
Change Relative
to 1960 Base
Honduras 12,620
3,120-
(9 ,500)
(75)
Panama 2,730
980
(1,750)
(64)
Bolivia 3,830
1 ,850
(1 '980)
(52)
Dominican
Republic 8,220
4,020
(4 ,200)
(51)
Costa Rica 2 ,700
1 ,470
(1 230)
(46)
Uruguay 960
540
(420)
(44)
El Salvador 5 ,260
3,040
(2 220)
(42)
Ecuador 2 ,670
1 620
(1 ,050)
(39)
Venezuela 1 ,510
950
(560)
(37)
Brazil 2 ,,670
1 700
(970)
(36)
Cuba 1 ,060 _
700
_(360)_
_(34 )
Nicaragua 2,690
1,800
(890)
(33)
Mexico 1 ,830
1 ,260
(570)
(31)
Argentina 740
530
(210)
(28)
Colombia 2 ,540
1 ,920
(720)
(27)
Peru 1 ,910
1,390
(520)
(27)
Haiti 9,230
8 ,200
(1 ,030)
(11)
Paraguay 1,810
1 710
(100)
(6)
Chile 1,780
1 ,920
140
8
Jamaica 2,590
2,830
240
9
Guatemala 4 ,420
8 ,600
4 ,180
95
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1983, Oxford
University Press, 1983.
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TABLE 9
Life Expectancy at Birth (years)
(ranked on basis of percentage increase)
1960
1981
Percentage
Increase
Honduras
46
5.9
28
Guatemala
47
59
26
El Salvador
51
63
24
Haiti
44
54
23
Peru
47
58
23
Ecuador
51
62
22
Dominican Republic
51
62
Nicaragua
47
57
21
Bolivia
43
51
19
Chile
57
68
19
Colombia
53
63
19
Venezuela
57
68
19
Costa Rica
62
73
18
Paraguay
56
65
16
Mexico
57
66
16
Brazil
55
64
16
Cuba
63
73
16
Panama
62
71
15
Jamaica
64
71
11
Argentina
65
71
9
Uruguay
68
-71
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1983, Oxford
University Press, 1983.
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(ranked on
TABLE 10
Infant Mortality Rate
(aged 0-1)
per 1000 Births
basis of percentage decrease)
1960 1981
Absolute
Decrease
Percentage
Decrease
Jamaica 52
16
36
(69)
Panama 68
21
47
(69)
Costa Rica 83
27
56
(67)
Chile 114
42
72
(63)
Venezuela 85
40
45
(53)
Peru 163
85
78
(48)
Paraguay 86
46
40
(47)
Colombia 103
55
48
(47)
Dominican
Republic 119
66
53
(45)
El Salvador 136
75
61
(45)
Ecuador 140
80
60
(43)
Cuba 32
19
13
(41)
Mexico 91
54
37
(4i)
Honduras 145
86
59
(41)
Nicaragua 144
88
56
(39)
Haiti 182
112
70
(38)
Brazil 118
75
43
(36)
Argentina 61
44
17
(28)
Guatemala 92
66
26
(28)
Bolivia 167
129
38
(23)
Uruguay 50
39
11
(22)
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1983, Oxford
University Press, 1983.
* Statistical Abstract of Latin America, 1977, p. 107.
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TABLE 11
Child Death Rate
(aged 1-4)
per '1000
(ranked on basis of percentage decrease)
1981
Absolute
Decrease
Percentage
Decrease
Chile
18
2
16
(89)
Costa Rica
8
1
7
(88)
Panama
5
1
4
(80)
Cuba
-5-
1
4-
-(80.)
Paraguay
9
7
(78)
Venezuela
9
7
(78)
Peru
38
29
(76)
Dominican
Republic
20
5
15
(75)
El Salvador
26
7
19
(73)
Colombia
14
4
10
(71)
Ecuador
28
8
20
(71)
Honduras
30
9
21
(70)
Nicaragua
30
10
20
(67)
Haiti
47
.17
30
(64)
Brazil
19
7
12
(63)
Mexico
10
4
6
(60)
Argentina
4
2
2
(50)
Guatemala
10
5
5
(50)
Bolivia
40
23
17
(43)
Uruguay
3
2
1
(33)
Jamaica
3
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1983, Oxford
University Press, 1983.
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COMPARISON OF SELECTED INDICATORS OF
EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS
Education is one of the basic needs that are emphasized by
Cuba to justify the regime's success. The final group, Tables
12-15, gives information on a variety of educational indicators
over the twenty-year period. For the tables on school enrollment
a number over 100 percent indicates over-age students in relation
to the specified- age group. This is due to grade repeaters or
late entrants. The comparison can be misleading in the absence of
detailed explanations because a decrease may result from a better
rate of grade promotion. Keeping this warning in mind, the
following comments are made.
Table 12 covers the increase in the number of people enrolled
in primary school as a percentage of a specified age group. Cuba
had a small increase of 3 percent, number fourteen in the ranking.
Cuba began the period with a relatively high percentage , exceeded
only by Uruguay. Colombia made the most impressive improvement
with a 51 percent increase.
Table 13 deals with the increase in the number of people
enrolled in secondary school as a percentage of a specified,
standard age group. In this area, Cuba made more progress,
ranking number one with a 57 percent increase. This reflects
Cuba's comparatively low percentage in 1960, 14 percent of the age
group enrolled in secondary school.
Table 14 presents the increase in the number of people
enrolled in institutions of higher learning as a percentage of a
standard age group. Cuba made some progress in this area also,
ranking number five with a 17 percent increase. It should be
pointed out here that academic freedom is strictly curtailed in
Cuba. Universities are not independent and research conducted
must be approved of by the state and the communist party. This
facilitates state control of research content and results. (cidh,
p. 91-92)
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In addition, relevant for all levels of education, is the
politicized nature of the course work. Primary school students
are taught basic marxist concepts and polytechnic" courses which
attempt to ready them 'for'manual work with tools and machines.
(cidh, p. 223) From that point , through the university, no
independent schools exist and no alternate points of view are
tolerated.. (cidh, p. 229-230)
Table 15 presents percentage changes in the adult literacy
rate based on 1960 status. In absolute terms-, Cuba ranks number
one, with 95 percent. Cuba ranks number six in this category in
terms of progress from a relatively high starting point.
Countries making real progress in this area started with much
lower literacy rates than Cuba. This indicates, once again, that
Cuba had already fulfilled a high level of basic human needs
before the revolution.
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TABLE 12
Educational Indicators - Primary
Number enrolled in school as percent of age group
(ranked on basis of absolute percentage increase
relative to 1960 base)
%
%
Absolute
Percentage
1960 1980
Change
Colombia
77
128
51
Mexico
80
120
40
Nicaragua
66
100
34
Peru
83
112
29
Guatemala
45
69
24
Ecuador
83
107
24
Honduras
67
89
22
Bolivia
64
84
20
Argentina
98
116
18
Haiti
46
64
18
Panama
96
113
17
Costa Rica
96
108
12
Dominican Republic
98
106
8
Chile
109
117
8
Jamaica
92
99
7
Paraguay
98
102
4
Venezuela
100
104
4
Cuba
109----
112
------3-
Brazil
95
93
(2)
Uruguay
111
105
(6)
El Salvador
80
74
(6)
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1983, Oxford
University Press , 1983.
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TABLE 13
Educational Indicators - Secondary
Number enrolled-in school as percent of age group
(ranked on basis of*absolute percentage increase
relative to 1960 base)
Z
%
Absolute
Percentage
1960
1980 '
Change
Cuba
14
71
57
Peru
15
56
41
Nicaragua
7
43
36
Panama
29
65
36
Colombia
12
46
34
Argentina
23
56
33
Chile
24
55
31
Ecuador
12
40
28
Costa Rica
21
48
27
Mexico
11
37
26
Dominican Republic
7
32
25
Bolivia
12
36
24
Uruguay
37
60
23
Brazil
11
32
21
Venezuela
21
39
18
Paraguay
11
26
15
Honduras
8
21
13
Jamaica
45
57
12
El Salvador
13
23
10
Guatemala
7
16
9
Haiti
4
12
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1983, Oxford
University Press, 1983.
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TABLE 14
Educational Indicators - Higher
Number enrolled in school as percent of age group
(ranked on basis of absolute percentage increase
relative to 1960 base)
x
1960
Absolute
% Percentage
1980 Change
3
35 -
32
Ecuador
26
21
Costa Rica
23
18
Panama
Cuba
- 3
20-----
17
4
21
17
Venezuela
4
16
12
Peru
Argentina
11
23
12
3
15
12
4exico
2
12
10
Brazil
Dominican Republic
11
10
9
2
11
9
Colombia
1
9
Nicaragua
4
12
Chile
8
16
Uruguay
1
8
Honduras
1
8
El Salvador
2
9
Guatemala
2
7
?-~~-
Paraguay
Bolivia
.
Haiti
Jamaica
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1983, Oxford
University Press, 1983.
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TABLE 15
'Adult-Literacy Rate
(ranked on basis of absolute percentage increase
relative- to 1560 base.)
z
1960
1980
Absolute
Percentage
Change
Nicaragua
38
90
52
Bolivia
39
63
24
Peru
61
80
19
Venezuela
63
82
19
Colombia
63
81
18
Mexico
65
83
18
Cuba
78
95
17
Honduras
45
60
15
Brazil
61
El Salvador
49
62
13
Ecuador
68
81
13
Panama
73
85
12
Costa Rica
79 a
90
11
Paraguay
75
84
9
Uruguay
85 b
94
9
Haiti
15
23
8
Jamaica
82
90
8
Dominican Republic
65
67
2
Argentina
91
93
2
Chile
84
Guatemala
32
a Organization of American States, Tipologia Socioeconomica de los
Paises Latinoamericanos, Revista Interamericana de Ciencias
Sociales, Segunda Epoca - Volumen 2, Numero Especial, 1963.
b Ibid, percent for year 1957.
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1983, Oxford
University, Press 1983.
- 30 -
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Comision Interamericana de Derechos Rumanos (cidh). La Situacion
de los Derechos Humanos en Cuba Septimo Informe. Washington:
Organizacion de los Estados Americanos, 1983.
Hicks , Norman L. "Growth vs Basic Needs: Is There a Trade-Off?"
World Development, November - December, 1979, pp. 985-994.
Kenner, Martin and James Petras, eds. Fidel Castro Speaks. New
York: Grove Press, 1969.
Luxenburg, Norman. "Comparative Developments in The Caribbean."
Iowa City, Iowa, 1982.
Mesa-Lago, Carmelo. The Economy of Socialist Cuba - A Two -
Decade Appraisal. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico
Press, 1981.
Sivard, Ruth Leger. World Military and Social Expenditures 1983.
Washington: World Priorities, 1983.
Union Panamericana. Reunion Extraordinaria del Consejo
Interamericano Economico X Social a Nivel Ministerial,
Punta del Este, Uruguay, el 5-17 Agosto de 1961 - Actas
y Documentos. Washington: Organizaci6n de los Estados
Americanos, 1962.
Union Panamericana. Tipologfa Socioeconomica de los Pafses
Latinoamericanos. Revista Interamericana de Ciencias
Sociales, Segunda Epoca - Vol. 2, Numero Especial.
Washington: Organizacion de los Estados Americanos, 1963.
United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs.
Cuban Armed Forces and the Soviet Military Presence.
Special Report No. 103. Washington: United States Department
of State, 1982.
Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, Inc. A Description of
the Cuban Economic Analysis and Forecasting System (CEAFS)
with Projections for the Cuban - Economy to 1985.
Pennsylvania: By the Author, 1983.
The World Bank and the Institute of Development Studies,
University of Sussex. Redistribution with Growth. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1974.
The World Bank. World Development Report 1983. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1983.
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