SHIFTING SOVIET EMPHASES IN THE GULF - HARDER TIME FOR IRAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R001300180012-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 21, 2008
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: June 7, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
NIC 03333-84
7 June 1984
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Graham E. Fuller
National Intelligence Officer for NESA
SUBJECT: Shifting Soviet Emphases in the Gulf--Harder Time for Iran?
1. I am concerned that a series of developments are taking place in the
Gulf Region which possibly suggests tougher Soviet attitudes towards Iran, a
stronger Soviet defense role in the Gulf, and the development of scenarios
which could affect Iran's independence. In brief, the USSR may be resolved to
increasingly intimidate Iran, willing to stimulate internal instability in
Iran and be prepared to take advantage of Iranian chaos to exert its power in
Iranian Azerbaijan.
-- While this is not a "probable scenario," I believe the
prospects of an unstable Iran in the years ahead offer major
opportunities to the USSR--a prospect we must watch closely.
Increased Soviet frustration in Afghanistan will also stimulate
tougher Soviet policies towards Iran.
2. The Soviet's Gulf Strategy. The Gulf war has been an overall net
loss for Soviet interests.
-- Iraq has been drifting towards the West, improving its relations
with the US, supporting Egypt, supporting the moderate PLO, and
maintaining moderation towards the peace process.
-- Iraq has been at loggerheads with the Soviet's other major ally,
Syria.
-- The war has distracted attention away from the Arab-Israeli issue.
-- The Gulf states have joined together in a defensive alliance of
some value.
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-- The Gulf states have looked to the West for overall defense.
-- The war could offer the US opportunities for intervention in the
Gulf.
Faced with these negative developments, I believe the Soviets in the last few
months may have resolved to protect their own interests and to turn the
situation around to some extent. Although the Soviets have been gravitating
towards a pro-Iraq, anti-Iran position for nearly two years, they may have
decided to come down much harder on these issues recently.
-- The Soviets seem determined to stop Iraq's drift towards the
West--and Iraq's public statements about the US have been notably
cooler.
-- The Soviets are committing themselves to intensified arms
deliveries to Iraq.
-- The French believe that the Soviets are trying to eliminate French
influence in Baghdad and perceive a growth of pro-Soviet elements
in the government.
-- The Soviet press and academics no longer have anything good to say
about Iran.
3. Soviet Goals. In deciding to land four-square on the Iraqi side of
the conflict, the Soviets probably have the following goals in mind.
-- Arrest Iraq's gravitation towards the West and reassert their own
influence there.
-- Weaken or eliminate French influence over Iraqi policies and arms
purchases.
-- Demonstrate to the region that the USSR in times of trouble can be
relied upon to deliver the military goods--unlike the US and its
Congressional restrictions on arms support to the Gulf.
-- Demonstrate to Iran that failure to heed Soviet desires for good
relations will now bear a high price; the Soviets will arm Iraq
heavily and make them a major threat to Iran down the road. The
message to Iran is that the Soviets are no longer willing to use
carrots to establish good relations but will rely now on the big
stick.
-- This runs the risk of possibly forcing Iran into the arms
of the West, but the Soviets probably safely calculate
that Iran is hardly about to make up with the US, the Great
Satan.
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-- Demonstrate to Gulf powers that the USSR is willing to use arms
deliveries to Iraq as a major factor in blunting the Iranian drive
against Iraq.
4. The Threat to Iran. Not only will it be in the Soviet interest to
arm Iraq heavily against Iran, but the USSR may also demonstrate its
"protective role in the Gulf" by attempting to intimidate Iran along its
borders. The Soviets are able at any time to mount military exercises on the
Caucasian and Central Asian borders or Iran at virtually no costs to
themselves--unlike the US which has to fly 8,000 miles to show its military
might to Iran.
-- The Soviets may calculate that they are getting nowhere with the
Khomeini regime and that it will not hurt to shake it up. If the
government of the Ayatollah is shaken, the emerging chaos is bound
to produce a government more favorable to Soviet interests than
the present one.
-- Whether or not the Soviet Union induces turmoil in Iran, turmoil
may come into being anyway in any future power struggle in Iran.
-- We cannot overlook clause 6 of the 1921 Soviet/Iran agreement in
which the Soviets retain the right of military intervention in the
case of "usurpation" of power or threat to the USSR from "third
parties" in Iran. These clauses equally apply to threats against
the USSR or its allies. The "usurpation" language is vague and
either Iraq or Afghanistan could be considered "Soviet allies."
-- With the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, Soviet borders with Iran
have been doubled in size. Moscow's ability to threaten or
militarily intervene in Iran have greatly increased--especially if
Iran openly supports the insurgency in Afghanistan.
5. Soviet Use of Border Nationalities. Soviet ability to use its border
nationalities against its southern neighbors has many precedents. The last
fifty years have seen not one, but two different Soviet Republics established
in Iranian Azerbaijan. A scholar currently studying the Soviet Azerbaijan
Azeri-language press reports that there has been an increase in the last year
of emphasis upon a "national unity movement" in Azerbaijan which explicitly
refers to union between north (Soviet Azerbaijan) and south (Iranian
Azerbaijan). The Soviet press is more critical of Khomeini's stifling of
cultural freedom in Iranian Azerbaijan. Soviet Azeri-language publications
refer to the fact that the Gulf war is hindering the move towards cultural
autonomy in Iranian Azerbaijan. In short, a mechanism exists and may be
growing for Soviet manipulation of, if not intervention in, Iranian
Azerbaijan.
-- Under circumstances of normal internal turmoil in Iran the
possibility of a break away movement by Iranian Azerbaijan is
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always present. Such a movement could be quickly exploited by the
USSR if the appropriate groundwork is laid now through Soviet
autonomy and unity campaigns.
6. The Afghanistan Factor. As the Soviets come to feel greater pressure
from lack of progress in Afghanistan, the Soviets will feel increasingly
compelled to threaten Iran as well as Pakistan for its support of the
insurgency. Soviet nationality studies of other Iranian border minority
groups--especially the Turkmen--also provide opportunity for encouragement for
other break away movements in Iran. This is facilitated by the Soviet
presence in Afghanistan.
7. In summary, we may be reaching a time of increased turmoil in the
Gulf with heavy pressures building on Iran from outside and inside the
country. The West is in a way contributing to those pressures. The Soviets
are in a better position to intensify these pressures against Iran both from
Iraq and from within the USSR. The Soviets may welcome the development of
these pressures and may be in the process of asserting Soviet power against
Iran both to pose as protector of the Gulf against the Khomeini revolution and
to facilitate conditions in Iran which could lead to increased Soviet pressure
and influence, or even Soviet intervention in Iran.
(This paper represents hypotheses of my own on the potential looming problems
of Iran and the USSR in an unstable environment. The paper has been shown to
Fritz Ermarth and parts of it may be incorporated in a broader paper on Soviet
strategy towards the Middle East.)
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