THE CENTRAL AMERICAN OUTREACH EFFORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R001200340020-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 93
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2008
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: April 17, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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VAIt
TRAN'SMiTTAL SLIP
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REMARKS:
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April 17, 1984
PUBLIC LIAISON
I would like to bring you up-to-date our efforts to increase
public awareness of Central America an to develop support for
the Adm nistration's policies in the reg on.
Since lag
brief ings
which has
published a
myths about
May, the Office of Public Liai on has conducted weekly
n Central America, establishe a Speakers' Bureau
ent spokesmen to 150 platfor s nationwide, and
pries of eight White House Di ests which counter the
The weekly out
private foundati
they disseminate
briefings feature
ach briefings provide su
n leaders with key up-to
through their writings
distinguished spea
top Administration s
ers from outside th
speakers include th
Minister Eugenia Cha
speakers at the Wedne
The Speakers' Bureau w
requests for speakers
-? ~. .f J.ll ..1 l
WILLIAM J. CASEY
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEYl~'
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
President, Dr. He,
les of Dominica.
day meetings is
n Central
professiq
received from business
community and religious
date we have placed 150
speakers placed by the Off
peake
ce
portive business and
date information which
and speeches. The
okesmen, as well as
Administration. Past
ry Kissinger and Prime
A list of all featured
to respond systematically to
erica. These are being
al, governmental, academic,
ons throughout the country. To
's in 68 cities. A list of
Public Liaison is attached.
The White House Digests are hort factual papers addressing key
aspects of the Central rican issue. They give us the
ammunition we need to co ter the falsehoods and misconceptions
about Central America. opies of all Digests published so far
are attached, as well A a list of the papers awaiting final
Support for the esident's Central American initiatives depends
on the accurac and timeliness of information the American people
receive. O effort is designed to meet that vital need. We are
constantly seeking new ways to increase our effectiveness and
welcome your advice.
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ganiza
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1984 SPEAKERS
FOR THE
WHITE HOUSE OUTREACH WORKING GROUP ON CENTRAL AMERICA
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 4, 1984
General John W. Vessey, Jr.
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
TOPIC: "CENTARL AMERICA AS PART OF A LARGER GLOBAL
STRATEGY"
Dr. Constantine C. Menges
Special Assistant to the President and
Senior Director for Latin American Affairs,
National Security Council
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 11, 1984
William C. Doherty, Jr.
Executive Director
American Institute for Free
Labor Development
TOPIC: "THE STATUS OF AND PROSPECTS FOR THE LABOR
MOVEMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA"
Dr. Michael A. Ledeen
Senior Fellow in INternational Affairs
Georgetown Center for Strategic and
International Studies
TOPIC: "REVELATIONS OF THE CAPTURED GRENADA DOCUMENTS"
Dr. Constantine C. Menges
Special Assistant to the President and
Senior Director for Latin American Affairs,
National Security Council
TOPIC: "CENTRAL AMERICA UP-DATE"
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 18, 1984
Mr. Arnaud de Borchgrave
Author: The Spike, Monimbo
Dr. Constantine C. Menges
Special Assistant to the President and
Senior Director for Latin American Affairs,
National Security Council
TOPIC: "CENTRAL AMERICA UP-DATE"
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WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 25, 1984
Senator Jeremiah Denton
United States Senator From Alabama
TOPIC: "REPORT ON MY TRIP TO CENTRAL AMERICA"
Senor Wycliffe Diego
Miskito Indian
TOPIC: "HUMAN RIGHTS AS PRACTICED BY THE
SANDINISTAS"
Dr. Constantine C. Menges
Special Assistant to the President and
Senior Director for Latin American Affairs
National Security Council
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1984
Mr. Herbert Romerstein
Member, Inter-Agency Working Group
on the Grenada Documents
TOPIC: "THE GRENADA DOCUMENTS: SOVIET ACTIVE
MEASURES VIA CUBA"
Mr. Richard Holwill
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Congressional and
Business Affairs
Department of State
TOPIC: "MY TRIP TO CENTRAL. AMERICA','
Dr. Constantine C. Menges
Special Assistant to the President and
Senior Director for Latin American Affairs
National Security Council
TOPIC: "CENTRAL AMERICA UP-DATE"
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1984
Ambassador Harvey Feldman
Washington Representative to United Nations
Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick
TOPIC: "UNITED NATIONS" VIEWS ON POLICIES, INFORMATION
AND DISINFORMATION ABOUT CENTRAL AMERICA"
Mr. Ramiro Gurdian
President, National Agriculture
Producers of Nicaragua
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TOPIC: "ECONOMIC SITUATION AND RELATION OF PRIVATE SECTOR
WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF NICARAGUA"
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1984
Father Falvian Mucci
Catholic Priest and Educator
TOPIC: "CAUGHT UP IN THE CROSSFIRE: THE FATE OF THE
NON-COMBATANTS"
Geraldine O'Leary Macias
Former Maryknoll Nun
Jacqueline Tillman
Executive Assistant to United Nations
Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1984
Mr. Bruce Cuthbertson
Vice President, Association of American Chambers of
Commerce in Latin America
TOPIC: "BUSINESS PERSPECTIVE ON CENTRAL AMERICA"
Stan Atkinson
TV Journalist
TOPIC: "CENTRAL AMERICA THROUGH THE NEWSMAN'S LENS"
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 29, 1984
Mr. James H. Michel
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Inter-American
Affairs, Dept. of State
TOPIC: "LEGAL REFORM IN CENTRAL AMERICA"
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 7, 1984
Mr. Arnaud de Borchgrave
Author: The Spike, Monimbo
TOPIC: "INFORMATION AND DISINFORMATION"
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Jacqueline Tillman
Deputy Director for Latin American Affairs
National Security Council
TOPIC: CENTRAL AMERICA UPDATE
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 14, 1984
Stanley Levchenko
Former Soviet Official
TOPIC: "SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES"
Jose Manuel Casanova
United States Executive Director
Inter-American Development Bank
TOPIC: "MULTI-LATERAL ECONOMIC AID IN CENTRAL AMERICA"
Colonel Louis Alonso Amaya
General Coordinator
National Commission for Area Restoration
(CONARA) El Salvador _
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 21, 1984
His Excellency Marco Revelo
Bishop of Santa Ana
President of Episcopal Conference of El Salvador
TOPIC: "THE SITUATION IN EL SALVADOR TODAY"
The Honorable Eugenia Charles
Prime Minister of Dominica
TOPIC: "TO SET A NATION FREE"
WEDNESDAY,-MARCH 28, 1984
Colonel John A. Cash
United States Army
Former Military Attache in El Salvador
TOPIC: "THE MILITARY IN EL SALVADOR"
Steve Dachi
Director, Office of American Republics Affairs
United States Information Agency
TOPIC: "PUBLIC OPINION IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN IN REGARD
TO U.S. POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA"
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Jacqueline Tillman
Deputy Director for Latin American Affairs
National Security Council
TOPIC: "CENTRAL AMERICA UPDATE"
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 4, 1984
Dr. Howard Penniman
American Enterprise Institute
TOPIC: "THE ELECTIONS IN EL SALVADOR"
Reverend Monsignor John P. Foley, Editor
The Catholic Standard and Times
TOPIC: "REFLECTIONS OF AN OBSERVER"
Mr. William Perry
Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Georgetown University
TOPIC: GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE EL SALVADORAN ELECTIONS"
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 11, 1984
Daniel James
Director, Americas Coalition
TOPIC: "QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE EL SALVADORAN ELECTIONS"
Francis X. Gannon
Advisor to the Secretary General
Organization of American States
TOPIC: "CENTRAL AMERICA: A DEMOCRATIC PERSPECTIVE"
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1983 SPEAKERS
FOR THE
WHITE HOUSE OUTREACH WORKING GROUP ON CENTRAL AMERICA
Wednesday, May 25, 1983:
Mrs. Jacqueline Tillman,
Executive Assistant to Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick,
United States Representative to the United Nations
TOPIC: "The Sandinistas"
Dr. Roger W. Fontaine,
Director for Latin American Affairs,
National Security Council
TOPIC: "El Salvador"
Wednesday, June 1, 1983:
The Honorable Richard McCormack,
Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of
Economic and Business Affairs
TOPIC: "Changes at the Department of State"
Mrs. Jacqueline Tillman,
Executive Assistant to Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick
TOPIC: "Central American Update"
Mr. Robert Baldwin,
Executive Director,
Central American Freedom Alliance
TOPIC: "Outside Coalitions"
Wednesday, June 8, 1983:
The Honorable H. Eugene Douglas,
U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs
TOPIC: "Where the Refugee Problem is Headed"
The Honorable Richard McCormack,
Assistant Secretary of State
Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs
TOPIC: "The Economics of the Central American Struggle"
Senor Adolfo Calero,
Director, Fuerza Democratica Nicaraguense (FDN)
TOPIC: "Flight from Nicaragua"
Mr. Stedman Fagoth Mueller
Miskitos Sumos Ramas Indian Organization
TOPIC: "Persecution of the Miskito Indians by the Sandinistas"
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Wednesday, June 15, 1983:
Dr. John Lenczowski,
Staff Member, National Security Council
TOPIC: "The Soviet Effort in Central America"
The Honorable Nestor Sanchez,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Inter-American Affairs
TOPIC: "The Contra Offensive in Nicaragua"
Wednesday, June 22, 1983:
The Honorable Richard B. Stone,
Ambassador-at-Large
TOPIC: "The United States Policy in Central America"
Wednesday, June 29, 1983:
Senor Miguel Bolanos Hunter,
Nicaraguan Defector
TOPIC: "The Soviet~.Influence Over Nicaragua"
The Honorable Vernon A. Walters,
Ambassador-at-Large
TOPIC: "U.S. Policy in Latin America and Why"
Wednesday, July 6, 1983:
Dr. Richard Wirthlin,
President, Decision Making Information, Inc.
TOPIC: "How the American Public Sees Central America"
Wednesday, July 13, 1983:
The Honorable J. William Middendorf, II,
Ambassador and U.S. Permanent Representative
to the Organization of American States
TOPIC: "Central America from the Perspective of the
Organization of American States"
Wednesday, July 20, 1983:
Rabbi Morton Rosenthal,
Director of Latin American Affairs,
Anti-Defamation League
TOPIC: "Persecution of the Jewish People in Central America"
Mr. Isaac Stavisky,
Nicaraguan Jewish Refugee
TOPIC: "The Sandinistas Against the Jews"
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Wednesday, July 20, 1983 (continued):
Mrs. Jacqueline Tillman,
Executive Assistant to Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick
TOPIC: "PLO and Libyan Activities in Central America"
The Honorable Ronald W. Reagan,
President of the United States
TOPIC: "Central America"
Wednesday, July 27, 1983:
Congressman Thomas F. Hartnett (R-S.C.)
Congressman Mark D. Siljander (R-Mich.)
TOPIC: "Central America Visited"
Congressman Vin Weber (R-Minn.)
TOPIC: "Central America, a View from the Congress"
The Honorable Langhorne Motley,
Ambassador,
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
TOPIC: "Central American Policy, Where Do We Go From Here?"
Senor Juan Vincente Maldonado,
Executive Director
National Association for Private Enterprise in
El Salvador
TOPIC: "Central America from the Businessman's Point of View"
Wednesday, August 3, 1983:
The Honorable John Lehman,
Secretary of the Navy
TOPIC: "The Strategic Importance of the Caribbean Sea Lanes"
Wednesday, August 10, 1983:
Mr. W. Dennis Suit,
Free-lance photographer - ABC News
TOPIC: "A View of El Salvador from the Other Side of the Lens"
The Honorable Fred C. Ikle,
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
TOPIC: "Prospects for Central America"
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Wednesday, August 117, 1983:
The Honorable M. Peter McPherson,
Administrator
Agency fo;r International development
TOPIC: ."United States Economic Assistance to Central America"
Colonel (Ret.) Samuel T. Dickens, USAF,
Director, New World Dynamics
TOPIC: "El Salvador Today"
Wednesday, August 2;4, 1983:
The Honorable Vernon A. Walters,
Ambassador-at-Large
TOPIC: "Central America -- Background and Prospects"
Wednesday, August 31, 1983:
The Honorable John 0. Marsh,
Secretary of the Army
TOPIC: "Soviet and Cuban Influences in Latin America"
Wednesday, September 7, 1983:
Lieutenant General James A. Williams, USA,
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
TOPIC: "Central America Today"
Wednesday, September 14, 1983:
Mme. Monique Garnier-Lancon,
Deputy Mayor of Paris, RPR-France
TOPIC: "A European Looks at Central America"
His Excellency Ernesto Rivas-Gallont,
Ambassador of the Government of El Salvador to the U.S.
TOPIC: "El Salvador"
Wednesday, September 21, 1983:
The Honorable Richard McCormack,
Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs
TOPIC: "An Overview of Central America"
Mr. Peter Romero,
Special Assistant to Ambassador Otto Juan Reich
TOPIC: "An Overview of Central America and a Comparison
of the Carter and Reagan Administration Policies"
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Wednesday, September 28, 1983:
The Honorable Verne Orr,
Secretary of the Air Force
TOPIC: "Central America - A View from the Air Force's
Perspective"
Senor Adolfo Calero,
Director, Fuerza Democratica Nicaraguense (FDN)
.TOPIC: "Nicaragua Today as Viewed by a Nicaraguan Freedom
Fighter"
Wednesday, October;5, 1983:
Mr. Kenneth Bieakley,
Deputy Chief of Mission, United States Embassy, El Salvador
TOPIC: "El Salvador Today"
Mr. Donald R. Hamilton,
Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy, El Salvador
TOPIC: "How the Press Covers El Salvador"
Senor Mario Rietti,
President', COFINSA
TOPIC: "Honduras as a Balancing Factor in Central America"
Wednesday, October, 12,; .19,83:
Colonel Earl J. Young, USAR,
TOPIC: The El Salvadoran Military and the United State's
Advisory Effort
Wednesday, October 19, 1983:,
Mrs. Geraldine O'Leary Macias,
former Maryknoll Nun
TOPIC: "Nicaragua, Witness to the Betrayal of a Revolution"
Wednesday, October 26, 1983:
Mr. Irving Brown,
Director
Department of International Affairs, AFL-CIO
TOPIC: "A Perspective on the Communist Threat"
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Wednesday, November 2, 1983:
The Honorable James H. Michel,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter-American Affairs
TOPIC: "Grenada"
Mr. Robin Luketina,
Father of Sgt. Sean Luketina (the most seriously
wounded of the American casulaties from the Grenada
rescue mission)
TOPIC: "Freedom Isn't Free"
Miss Lynne Burtan of Saddle River, New Jersey,
Student - St George's University Medical School-Grenada
Mr. Dennis Sheridan of Glen Head, New York
Student - St. George's University Medical School-Grenada
Mr. Robert Shapiro of Butler, Pennsylvania
Student - St. George's University Medical School-Grenada
TOPIC: "Rescue from Grenada"
Wednesday, November 9, 1983:
Senor Eduardo Torres,
Student, Jose Matias Delgado University, El Salvador
Miss Ana Victoria Morales,
Student, Albert Einstein University, El Salvador
TOPIC: "Life in El Salvador, As Seen by Its Youth"
Dr. Constantine C. Menges,
Special Assistant to the President and
Senior Director of Latin American Affairs
National Security Council
TOPIC: "Central American Update"
Wednesday, November 16, 1983:
Senor Eden Pastora,
"Commandante Zero"
TOPIC: "The Anti-Sandinista Activities of ARDE"
Dr. Constantine C. Menges,
Special Assistant to the President and
Senior Director of Latin American Affairs
National Security Council
TOPIC: "Central American Update"
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Wednesday, November 30, 1983:
The,Honorable Jay F. Morris,
Deputy Administrator, Agency for International Development
TOPIC: "Economic Rehabilitation for Grenada"
Mr. Arnaud de Borchgrave,
Author, Monimbo, The Spike, and Lecturer
TOPIC: "KGB Dis' nformation n the Media and Other Soviet
Active Measures"
Wednesady, December 7, 1983:
The Honorable John D. Negroponte,
United States Ambassador to Honduras
TOPIC: "Honduras Today and Its Prospects for Tomorrow"
Mr. Daniel James,
Author/Lecturer
TOPIC: "Mexico, the Untold Story"
Wednesday, December 14, 1983:
The Honorable Elliott Abrams,
Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of Human Rights & Humanitarian Affairs
TOPIC: "Human Rights in Central America"
Dr. Constantine C. Menges,
Special Assistant to the President and
Senior Director of Latin American Affairs,
National Security Council
TOPIC: "Central American Up-date"
Wednesday, December 21, 1983:
The Honorable Langhorne Motley,
Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs
TOPIC: "Central America: Its Economic and Strategic
Importance to the United States"
Dr. Constantine C. Menges,
Special Assistant to the President and
Senior Director of Latin American Affairs,
National Security Council
TOPIC: "Central American Up-date"
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OFFICE OF PUBLIC LIAISON - CENTRAL AMERICA
SPEAKERS BUREAU ACTIVITY REPORT
PAST/PRESENT/FUTURE
28 The Latin American Parlimentarians Delegation
Speakers: Otto Reich, Jacqueline Tillman
OEOB 191
7 The Farm Bureau State Presidents Briefing
Speakers: John Lehman, Nestor Sanchez
Capitol Holiday Inn, Washington, D.C.
13 The American Legion Pennsylvania State Convention
Speaker: Nestor Sanchez
Pittsburgh, PA
13 U.S. Business Leaders Briefing
Speakers: Ambassador J. Kirkpatrick, Ambassador W.
Middendorf, Roger Fontaine, Richard McCormack
OEOB 474
15 American Le',gion Maryland State Convention
Speaker: Ambassador Middendorf
Ocean City, MD
19 Captive Nations Briefing
Speakers: Roger Fontaine, Col. Lawrence Tracy
OEOB 450
20 U.S. Jewish'Leaders Briefing
Speakers: Jacquiline Tillman, ** President Reagan
OEOB 450
21 U.S. Women''s Leaders Briefing
Speakers: Ambassador J. Kirkpatrick, Ambassador
Douglas, Col. L. Tracy
OEOB 450
21 Queen's County Republicans Briefing
Speaker: D;., Droge
VFW, Queens;, NY
21 Girls Nation Finalists Delegation Briefing
Speaker: Ambassador J. Kirkpatrick
OEOB 474
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JULY (CONT.)
26 Latin Americans for Freedom Vigil
Speakers: Ambassador W. Middendorf, Asst. Sec. E.
Abrams, C. Johnstone
Simon Bolivar Park, Washington, D.C.
28 Religious Broadcasters Briefing
Speakers: Sec. J. Lehman, Ambassador E. Douglas,
Major O. North
OEOB 450
9 St. John's College
Speakers: Deputy Sec. of Defense, Nestor Sanchez
Santa Fe, NM
16 West Germany Young Leaders Briefing
Speaker: Col. L. Tracy
OEOB 194
18 Peace through Strength/AIM Briefing
Speakers: Geraldine Macias, D. Droge
Sharon, MA
19 Peace through Strength/AIM Briefing
Speakers: Geraldine Macias, D. Droge
Manchester, MA
20 American Legion National Convention
Speakers: Nestor Sanchez, ** President Reagan
Seattle, WA
25 Special Briefing for Alan Nairn PBS-Flimmaker
Speakers: Peter Romero, D. Droge
Department of State
26 American Security Council National Speakers Bureau
Briefing
Speakers: Ambassador E. Douglas, Dep. Sec. Gary
Matthews, Und. Sec. Def. Dr. Fred Ikle, Peter
Romero
OEOB 474
27 A.S.C. Speakers Bureau Central America Workshop
Speakers: Jacqueline Tillman, D. Droge, Col.
Sam Dickens
Boston, MA
27 Cuba, Independent, Democratic National Convention
Speaker: Dep. Coordinator, Richard Krieger
Los Angeles, CA
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1983
SEPTEMBER
1 Special Briefing for President & Secretary Treasurer of
International Union of Police Associations
Speaker: Col. L. Tracy
OEOB 194
2 Latin America Chambers of Commerce
Speakers: Sec. F. Ikle, Admin. Peter McPherson
New Orleans, LA
2 Sun Oil Executive Board CEO Briefing
Speaker%: Sec. N. Sanchez, Major O. North,-Peter
Romero (DOS)
DOD, Washington, D.C.
2 National Convention of U.S. Naval Reserve
Speaker: Ass. Sec. Cox
Phoenix, AZ
3 California State American Legion Executive Committee
Speaker: Ambassador V. Walters
Palm Springs, CA
8 Washington Semester American University Briefing
Speaker: D. Droge
OEOB 194
9 Kiwanis Annual Meeting
Speaker: D. Droge
Leisure World, MD
9 Literary & Debate Society of University of Virginia
Speaker: Col. L. Tracy
Charlottesville, VA
13 National Republican Hispanic Assembly
Speakers: Ambassador J. Kirkpatrick, Ambassador L.
Motley, Ambassador O. Reich, Admin. P. McPherson,
Col. L. Tracy
Crystal City, VA
14 Hispanic Evangelical Leaders Briefing
Speakers: Ambassador O. Reich, Major O. North, Kerry
Ptacek (IR & D)
OEOB 450
15 Metal Bellows Corporation and Entire Factory Work Force
Briefing
Speaker: D. Droge
Sharon, MA
16 Farm Bureau Federation of Utah
Speaker: Dep. Sec. N. Sanchez
Salt Lake City, UT
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1983
SEPTEMBER (CONT.)
17 VFW National,Commander's & Executive Board Briefing
Speaker: D. Droge
VFW Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
17 American Legislative Exchange Council Annual Meeting
Speaker: Ambassador E. Douglas.
Philadelphia;,; PA
18 Eagle Forum National Speakers Workshop
Speaker: D. Droge
Washington, D.C.
20 Rotary Club of Alexandria
,Speaker: D.'!Droge
Alexandria, VA
21 American Lutheran Church Briefing
Speaker: Ambassador 0. Reich, Major 0. North
DOD, Washington, D.C.
21 Robert Morris College Briefing
Speaker: Col. L. Tracy
Pittsburgh, PA
1 New York State RNC Hispanic Assembly
Speaker: Dep. Sec. N. Sanchez
New York City, NY
2 Quarterly Meeting Washington, D.C. American Legion
Speaker: D. Droge (Substitute for Roger Fonataine)
Washington, P.C.
7 Prince William County Virginia Republicans Fall Banquet
Speaker: Ambassador W. Middendorf
Haymarket, VA
8 Michigan Conservative Union
Speakers: Rep. Mark Siljander, General Daniel Graham
Detroit, MI
11 WQXR Radio Interview
Speaker: William Dowd (ASC)
New York Timers Station, New York City, NY
13 Accuracy in Media Conference
Speaker: D.IDroge
Houston, TX
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1983
OCTOBER (CONT.)
14 Accuracy in Media Conference
Speaker: Ambassador V. Walters
Houston, TX
14 Retired Officers Association
Speaker: D.,Droge
Concord, NH
14 San Francisco State University
Debate: Robert Doran
vs Senator Christopher Dodd
San Francisco, CA
15 Freedom Rally
Speakers: G. Macias, General Gordon Sumner
Boise, Idaho
20 New Jersey State Convention of Manufactured Housing
Association,
Speaker: D. Droge
Atlantic City;, NJ
22 North Carolina American Legion State Fall Meeting
Speaker: Col:. Heyward Hutson
Charlotte, NC
22 SW Cattlemen',s Association
Speaker: Ambassador E. Douglas
Laredo, TX
24 International; Conference on Latin American Freedom and
Development
Speakers: Ambassador 0. Reich, Ambassador Dean Hinton
11
Baltimore, MDi
24. The Austin, Texas Council on World Affairs
Speaker: Ambassador E. Douglas
Austin, TX
25 Corpus Christi State University, Hispanic Luncheon,
Press Conference
Speaker: Ambassador E. Douglas
Corpus Christi, TX
26 San Antonio, Texas Media Briefings
Speaker: Ambassador?E. Douglas
San Antonio, TX
27 Dallas WAC and Foreign Affairs Council/Media
Speaker: Ambassador E. Douglas
Dallas, TX
ji
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1983
OCTOBER (CONT.)
27 Sheet Metal Executives Briefing
Speaker: Roger Fontaine
OEOB 474
27 Jefferson Foundation and Arlington, Virginia Young
Republicans
Speaker: D. Droge
Arlington, VA
28 El Paso, Texas/Media Briefings
Speaker: Ambassador E. Douglas
El Paso, TX
28 American University International Relations Course
Briefing
Speaker: D. Droge
Washington, D.C.
28 Foundation for American Communication Conference
Speaker: Steve Bosworth (Substitute for Ambassador
Motley)
Dallas, TX
31 Freedom Federation Briefing
Speakers: C. Menges, P. Romero
OEOB 474
3 American Christian Trust Briefing
Speaker: Dep. Sec. Gary Matthews
NEOB 2010
5 National Security of the Western Hemisphere Seminar
Speaker: Ray Warren (DOD) (Substitute for Roger
Fontaine)
Denver, CO
5 South Carolina American Legion Fall Meeting
Speaker: Col. Heyward Hutson
Greenwood, SC
5 Virginia American Legion Fall Meeting
Speaker: Col. L. Tracy (Substitute for Ambassador
Middendorf)
Norfolk, VA
6 Texas Coalition for Freedom Rally
Speaker: Col. Sam Dickens
City Hall, Houston, TX
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NOVEMBER (CONT.)
7 The Washington Center - Student Workshop
Speaker: D. Droge
Washington, D.C.
8 United Church of D.C. Briefing
Speaker: G. Macias
Washington, D.C.
10 U.S. Catholic Conference and Lay Leaders Delegation
Speakers: J. Lenchowsky, G. Macias, M. Bolanos
OEOB 450
10-11 St. Paul School Convocation & Visits to Classes
Speaker: D. Droge
Concord, NH
14 Princeton University Lecture Series & Media Tour & Area-
Campus Visits: Duquene, Rutgers
Speaker: Ambassador 0. Reich
14 Annual National Board of Directors Banquet of the
Retired Officers Association Briefing
Speaker: D. Droge
Crystal City, VA
15 Rice University
Debate: Dr. David Brody vs Col. Sam Dickens
Houston, TX
15 Birmingham, Alabama Kiwanis/Junior College/High
Schools/PBS Video Taping & Media Tour
Speaker: D. Droge
Birmingham, AL
16 Freedom through Strength Briefing
Speaker: Col. Sam Dickens
Littleton, NH
16 Annual Meeting of Military Order of World Wars
Speaker: Michael Skol
Annapolis, MD
17-18 University of Oregon Briefing
Speaker: Col. L. Tracy
NW Area Tour of 10 Colleges
17 D.A.R. Luncheon
Speaker: Ambassador 0. Reich
Washington, D.C.
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NOVEMBER (CONT.)
19 National Security Affairs Conference
Speaker: Roger Fontaine
Portland, OR
19 Radio Clubs of America Convention
Speaker: Ken Tomlinson
New York City, NY
22 Humboldr College
Speaker: Col. Sam Dickens
Eureka, CA
28 Yale University
Debate: Robert Dornan vs Senator Christopher Dodd
New Haven, CT
29 The 19th Hemisphere Insurance Association Conference
Speaker: P. Romero
San Francisco, CA
1 Moral Majority Interns
Speaker: D. Droge
OEOB 208
5 James Madison University Briefing
Speaker: Col. L. Tracy
All Campus, Harrison burg, VA
6 Iowa State University
Speaker: Col. L. Tracy
Ames, IA
10 Special Central America Security Conference
Speakers: Ambassador Middendorf, C. Menges
Valley Forge, PA
1984
JANUARY
8 New Jersey Inter-Faith Coalition
Speaker: Col. L. Tracy
Westfield, NJ
9 American Legislative Exchange Council Briefing
Speakers: Ambassador 0. Reich. C. Menges, Ambassador
Middendorf
OEOB 450
12 The National Conservative Foundation
Speakers: Ambassador Middendorf, Ambassador
Kirkpatrick, Ambassador E. Douglas
OEOB 450
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JANUARY (CONT.)
21 Western Hemisphere Security Foundation
Speaker: Roger Fontaine
San Antonio, TX
24 The Pomfret School - Convocation & Visit to Classes
Speaker: D. Droge
Pomfret, CT
26 Virginia Commonwealth Republican Women
Speaker: D. Droge
Alexandria, VA
27 George School
Speaker: Steven Tomchik (DOS)
Newtown, PA
1 National Convention of Religious Broadcasters
Speaker: Ambassador 0. Reich
Washington, D.C.
10 Iowa Agriculture Delefation
Speaker: D. Droge
OEOB 175
11 Rocky Mountain Forum
Speaker: R. Fontaine
Denver, CA
11 Cardinal Mindszenty Foundation Conference
Speaker: D. Droge
Los Angeles, CA
14 American Legion
Speaker: Dep. Sec. N. Sanchez
Santa Fe, NM
14 Amerian Program Bureau
Speaker: D. Droge
Boston, MA
16 Latin America/Central America Conference
Speaker: G. Macias
San Antonio, TX
19 Business Executives Conference, Gene Sit Associates
Speaker: Ambassador Middendorf
Scottsdale, AZ
22-23 Peace through Strength Conferences
Speaker: D.Droge
Bradford, VT and Littleton, NH
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FEBRUARY (CONT.)
27 American Legion National Security Conference
Speakers: J. Tillman, Col. Earl Young
Washington, D.C.
28-29 Middlebury College - Convocation & Class Visits
Speaker: D. Droge
Middlebury, VT
3 Cardinal Mindszenty Foundation Conference
Speaker: D. Droge
Chicago, IL
5 American Legion National Auxiliaries Conference
Speaker: D. Droge
Boston, VA
5 Kissinger Briefing
Speaker: Dr. Henry Kissinger
Washington, D.C.
6 Christ the King Seminary - Diocesan Priests
Speaker: R. Reilly
Buffalo, NY
8 Iowa Farm Bureau Delegation
Speaker: D. Droge
OEOB 175
15 Jefferson Foundation Briefing
Speakers: C. Menges, Sec. Abrams, U. Belli, G. Macias
OEOB 450
16 American Catholic Conference Delegation
Speakers: Ambassador Motley, J. Tillman, U. Belli, G.
Macias, Admin. Adelman, S. Kraemer (NSC)
OEOB 450
19 National Jewish and Christian Leaders
Speakers: Ambassador Middendorf, Dep. Sec. N. Sanchez,
J. Tillman
OEOB 450
19 Catholic Union of Missouri
Speaker: R. Reilly
St. Louis, MO
22 Peace through Strength/AIM Coalition Conference
Speaker: D. Droge, B. Yoh (AIM)
Concord, CA
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1984
MARCH (CONT.)
22 Association of Military Colleges and Schools
Speaker: A. de Borchgrave
Rosslyn, VA
26 Southeast Asia Captive Nations Delegation
(Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam)
Speaker: Col. L. Tracy
OEOB 450
27 Chattanooga, Tennesse Kiwanis/High Schools/College
Speaker: D. Droge
.Chattanooga, TN
29 Catholic University - Jefferson Foundation & Catholic
School of Politics
Speaker: G. Macias
Washington, D.C.
29 Valley Community College Rally
Speaker: R. Dornan
Van Nuys, CA
29 Washington Semester American University
Speakers: D. Droge, E. Lynch
OEOB 175
29 Moral Majority Interns
Speaker: D. Droge
OEOB 175
30 Iona College Delegation Briefing
Speaker: D. Droge
OEOB 175
31 International Youth Year Commission Briefing
Speaker: E. Lynch
OEOB 175
31 University of Idaho
Speaker: Roger Fontaine
1 State Convention of College Republicans
Speaker: TBD
Birmingham, AL
1 Young Americans for Freedom, Niagara University
Speaker: TBD
Niagara, NY
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APRIL (CONT.)
3 Peace through Strength/AIM Coalition
Speaker: D. Droge
Mobile, AL & Ocean Springs, MS
5 Bucks County Community College
Speaker: E. Lynch
Newtown, PA
6 St. Johns College
Speaker: Col. L. Tracy
New York City, NY
7 Western Hemisphere Security Conference
Speaker: Mark Falcoff (AIE)
Montreal, Canada
9 Northwood Institute
Speaker: D. Droge
Midland, MI
11 Lockhaven University
Speaker: Dr. William Walsh
Lockhaven, PA
13 Central America Conference
Speaker: G. Macias
Omaha, NE
17 University of Georgia
Speaker: Melville Blake (UN & DOS)
Athens, GA
T Univeristy of Mississippi
T University of Arkansas
T Louisiana State University
Yale University Political Union
NYU YAF
University of South Carolina
Harvard Law School
4 Eagle Forum
Speaker: D. Droge
St. Louis, MO
18 Association of U.S. Army, Northern New Jersey Chapter
Speaker: Col. L. Tracy
Edison, NJ (Requested by Congressman Chris Smith)
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MAY (CONT.)
21 Sons of American Revolution
Speaker: D. Droge
Whitestone, VA
1 Peace through Strength/AIM Coalition
Speaker: D. Droge
San Diego, CA
31 Eagle Forum & Hofstra University
Speakers: D. Droge, G. Macias, Col. L. Tracy
& Pope's Visit to Nicaragua Video
8 National Fur Farmers of America Convention
Speaker: D. Droge
Seattle, WA
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a-- =b
WHITE HOUSE
:D (D1:2 0
U
WHITE HOUSE DIGEST
is a service provided by the
White House Office of Media Relations and Planning April 4, 1984
The Strategic and Economic Importance of the
Caribbean Sea Lanes
The Caribbean Basin includes Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and
some two dozen small developing nations in Central America, the
Caribbean and northern South America.(1) These countries are
our close neighbors -- Washington, D.C., for example, is closer
to Costa Rica than to San Francisco -- and form, in a very real
sense, our "third border."
The major shipping lanes crisscrossing the region-make it
one of our major lifelines to the outside world, and, as a
result, an area of crucial importance to the continued prosperity
and security of the United States. The defense of the Caribbean,
however, is complicated by hostile forces in Cuba and Nicaragua
within easy reach of these shipping lanes.
Economic Importance
Nearly half our total exports and imports, representing over
two-thirds of our seaborne foreign trade, pass through the vital
commercial arteries of the Panama Canal, the Caribbean, or the
Gulf of Mexico. Of the 11,000 ships that pass through the Panama
Canal each year, over 60 percent are carrying cargo to and from
U.S. ports, providing one-quarter of our nation's total seaborne
imports.
1. The group of Caribbean Basin countries is not the same as the
group included in the Administration's Caribbean Basin Initiative
(CBI).
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I&
Last year, the four principal U.S. Gulf ports -- Houston,
Galveston, New Orleans and Mobile -- alone accounted for over
one-third of our seaborne exports and one-quarter of our seaborne
imports. The port of Miami, situated on the strategic Straits of
Florida, handled about an eighth of our seaborne exports and a
tenth of our seaborne imports.
In addition to these southern ports bordering the Caribbean
Basin waterways, every other significant U.S..port is connected
to the network formed by the major Caribbean shipping lanes. The
port of New York, for instance, not only relies on the Basin's
waterways for its trade with the region itself, but also depends
on these same Caribbean sea lanes, including the Panama Canal, as
the vital links for its extensive commerce with Asia.
The Caribbean trade routes are of particular importance to
the U.S. economy since they carry three-fourths of our imported
oil. While some of this imported oil comes from the Caribbean
Basin area itself, most notably from Mexico and Venezuela, much
is shipped from the Persian Gulf and other producing areas to the
approximately dozen Caribbean ports that serve as transshipment
points for supertankers bringing petroleum destined for U.S.
refineries.
The supertankers must offload oil at these transshipment
points to smaller tankers since the U.S. eastern seaboard has no
deep water port which can handle the very large tankers. Other
supertankers deliver crude oil to the numerous refineries located
within the Caribbean itself. Facilities such as those in Curacao
and Aruba can process approximately five million barrels of crude
oil per day.
The refined products are then transported by smaller tankers
to East and Gulf Coast ports in the U.S. In addition, almost one
half of Alaskan crude oil shipments pass through either the
Panama Canal in small tankers or the newly constructed pipeline
across Panama to be loaded onto smaller tankers in the Caribbean.
This pipeline provides an easy target for terrorists.
Apart from our oil lifeline passing through the Caribbean,
over half our imported strategic minerals pass through the Panama
Canal or the Basin's sea lanes. Virtually all (over 90 percent)
of the U.S. supply of cobalt, manganese, titanium and chromium,
all vital for industrial or military use, comes either directly
from Basin countries or from Africa, with the normal trade route
passing through the Caribbean. The Caribbean states also provide
three-fourths of our nation's aluminum requirements.
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The Basin's shipping lanes also provide a vital sea link to
the significant U.S. economic interests found in the region.
U.S. direct investment in the Caribbean Basin countries accounts
for over 8 percent of the total U.S. direct investment abroad --
some $19 billion at the end of 1982.
In addition, U.S. trade with Basin countries is about
one-eighth of the total U.S. world trade (exports plus imports),
and again the dollar amounts are substantial -- almost $68
billion of exports and imports in 1982.
U.S. imports from the region include significant amounts of
oil, sugar, coffee, bauxite and meat while our major exports
include transport equipment, industrial machinery, chemicals and
grain.
Finally, the economic importance of the Caribbean Basin to
this country has increased dramatically over the past decade as
the U.S. has shifted its dependence on imported petroleum from
the Middle East to Latin America.
For the first quarter of 1983, only 30 percent of U.S. oil
imports came from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries (OPEC), down from 70 percent in 1977. As imports from OPEC
have decreased, those from Latin America and the Caribbean have
risen. Excluding OPEC member Venezuela, the share of U.S. gross
imports of crude oil and refined products from Latin America and
the Caribbean increased from 17 to 38 percent between 1977 and
1983.
When Venezuela is included., the total jumps to 45 percent.
Oil imports from Mexico, in particular, have assumed greater
importance, rising from 2 percent of the total in 1977 to 20
percent now.
Strategic Importance
World attention has recently focused on the possibility of a
closure of the Straits of Hormuz, the vital choke point of the
Persian Gulf. Less well known, but of at least equal importance
to the security of the U.S., is the possibility of a disruption
by our adversaries of the strategically and economically crucial
Caribbean shipping lanes.
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Both the strategic importance and the vulnerability of the
Basin's sea lanes have long been recognized. Thomas Jefferson,
for instance, understood the strategic value of the Caribbean
area when he observed that whoever controlled the island of Cuba
could exercise effective control over all shipping bound for, or
leaving, the port of New Orleans.
We as a nation are not accustomed to thinking of security
threats in our own neighborhood, but examples from the past
suggest that such threats could appear. During World War II our
defenses in the Caribbean were so weak, our lifeline so exposed,
that during the first six months of U.S. involvement, a handful
of Nazi submarines, without a naval base in the area, sank more
tonnage in the Caribbean (114 allied ships) than the entire
German fleet did in the North Atlantic.
These German submarines acted with such impunity that they
shelled refineries in Aruba and lay in wait for ships to transit
the Panama Canal and enter the Caribbean. The logistical impor-
tance of the Caribbean soon became evident as over 50 percent of
the supplies and reinforcements bound for the European and
African theaters passed through ports in the Gulf of Mexico.
Today, in the event of a European crisis, a significant
number of NATO reinforcements and half of the resupply material
needed to reinforce .the NATO allies would originate at these same
Gulf ports.
It is not a coincidence that the Soviet Union is increasing
dramatically its military support for Cuba. In both 1981 and
1982, deliveries of military equipment to Cuba were triple the
yearly average of the previous twenty years and were higher than
any year since the 1962 missile crisis. Deliveries in 1983 have
fallen off some but are still well above pre-1981 levels.
Cuba, which sits astride the vital sea lanes of communica-
tion, has become the most significant military power in the
region after the U.S. Within its military arsenal are modern MIG
jets and missile and torpedo patrol boats. Additionally, Cuba
has three attack submarines in its Navy. Soviet combat ships
regularly make port calls to Cuba. Cuban ground forces include
950 tanks.
In short, Cuba has become a significant military force with
the potential for delaying the reinforcement of NATO in time of
general war. Given the conventional imbalance that exists
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, such a delay could be decisive.
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The USSR sees the southern flank of the U.S. as NATO's
"strategic rear" and consistent with its military doctrine, is
attempting to exploit what Soviet planners correctly see as a
highly vulnerable area, affecting U.S. force projection and
economic well-being.
Like the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean Sea is, in a strate-
gic sense, virtually an inland sea that can be bottled up by
hostile air and naval power deployed in or near the strategic sea
lines of communication.
The 53 mile wide Windward Passage, for instance, passes
between the eastern tip of Cuba and Haiti and is by far the most
important shipping lane between the Panama Canal and U.S. East
Coast ports. Similarly, the narrow St. Vincent Passage in the
Eastern Caribbean, only 27 miles wide, provides one of our most
valuable lifelines to the Persian Gulf, Southern Africa, the
Indian Ocean and South America -- all areas of crucial economic
and strategic importance to the United States.
The crucial strategic and logistic link provided by the
Panama Canal, which can be used by virtually all U.S. naval
vessels except the large attack carriers, is similarly vulner-
able, especially with Nicaraguan airfields only 400 miles away.
Some of these airfields are being upgraded to accommodate sophis-
ticated jet fighters, such as Soviet MIGs.
The 52 mile long Canal, with its numerous mechanical locks,
could be effectively and fairly easily closed by a terrorist
group or hostile air power by destroying a single lock or sinking
a ship in transit. The vital trans-Panama oil pipeline provides
an even easier target.
The vulnerability of our southern flank is a matter of
serious concern since our ability to effectively project power to
Europe, the Middle East and the Far East has always been depen-
dent upon having a secure southern flank.
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NEW
MEXICO
KANSAS
RKANSAs
lie
Gulf of
Mexico
Statute Miles
Office of The Geographer
to and from
South America
Ponomo
MnnI
Carlbbcan
Sea
Naw Vork.Maracelbo
2 375 statute m1w
to and from
Europe
'=1fIT AND 1ARRUDA
?
St. VVncenf %
asoae ,ST,, LUCIA
'BARBADOS
THE GRENADINES Southern Africa. the India n
OR ENAOA 4 Ocean. the Persian ulf. etc.
? TRINIDAD
.r ? AND
TOBAGO
Y.7O'
ew Yor
ladeiphla
NEW JER Y
aor 600, so?
The United States' "Third Border"
THE CARIBBEAN BASIN.----'d
Showing Independent Countries
and Major Shipping Lanes
Bermuda
(U.K.)
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WHITE HOUSE
WHITE HOUSE DIGEST
is a service provided by the
White House Office of Media Relations and Planning
February 29, 1984
PERSECUTION OF CHRISTIAN GROUPS IN NICARAGUA
"The religion of the workers has no God, because it
seeks to restore the divinity of Man."
Karl Marx
"Every religious idea, every idea of a god, even
flirting with the idea of a god, is unutterable vileness of the
most dangerous kind, 'contagion' of the most abominable kind.
Millions of sins, filthy deeds, acts of violence, and physical
contagions are far less dangerous than the subtle spiritual idea
of a god."
Lenin
History has shown us that Communist regimes inevitably
seek to either eradicate the Church or to subvert it. Ideologi-
cally, the Church's existence is repugnant to them. Allegiance
to God prevents total allegiance to and subjugation by the State,
which, according to Marx, is the salvific vehicle for the secular
transformation of man into god.
The-Communists cannot tolerate this limitation on their
absolute power. Thus, in the Soviet Union all but a tiny-
per-centage of churches have been closed and religious affiliation
routinely brings the loss of precious privileges and sometimes
brings more serious persecution..
In Nicaragua, the self-admitted Marxist-Leninist (1) leaders
of the government are following the same path. They are seeking
to turn the Catholic Church, by far the largest in Nicaragua,
into an arm of the government.
For additional information on material contained in this
issue of the DIGEST call: PETER ROMERO (202) 632-7023
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A small number of Catholic clergy have the government's
official approval and sponsorship. They are used to generate
support for the government, to spread the idea that only Marxists
are true Christians,.and to defame and divide-the mainstream
Church.
Meanwhile, the Sandinistas have harassed, persecuted and
defamed legitimate church leaders, including Pope John Paul II.
Church telecasts are subject to prior censorship and the Sandin-
istas seek to isolate the Church leadership from the people.
Suppression of minority Protestant groups has been much more
brutal. Dozens of Protestant churches have been burned, Protes-
tant leaders have been arrested, beaten, and deported. Certain
Protestant churches have been officially denounced as instruments
of American imperialism.
THE CHURCH VS. SOMOZA
Under the Somoza dictatorship, which was overthrown in 1979,
the Catholic Church had been in the forefront of those forces
calling for reform. Indeed, in 1979 the prelate of Nicaragua,
Archbishop Obando y Bravo, took the extraordinary step of announc-
ing that the Somoza regime had become intolerable and that
Christians could in good conscience revolt against it.
At that time, the revolution against Somoza was broad based
and included most of the mainstream leadership of Nicaragua. The
revolution was publicly committed to democracy and pluralism.
But, shortly after Somoza's ouster, the Communist faction -- with
the control of the military -- began to consolidate its power.
Despite early danger signals, the Catholic hierarchy was
initially supportive of the revolutionary government.
THE FIRST STEP
But, in October of 1980, the Sandinistas took their first
real step toward the dual Communist goal of a) limiting the
Church's influence, and b) coopting what is left of that influ-
ence for the government.
In a publicly promulgated policy on religion, the Sandin-
istas declared that Christians were not permitted to evangelize
within Sandinista organizations. Moreover, only those religious
who fully accepted the objectives of the Revolution, as put forth
by the Sandinista leadership, were to be permitted to take an
active role in public affairs. (2)
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The Bishops responded swiftly and firmly, saying that such
attempts to limit the influence of the Church were "totali-
tarian." Totalitarian systems, the Bishops argued, seek to turn
.the Church into an "instrument" by tolerating only those activi-
ties the government finds convenient. (3)
Edgard Macias, served the Sandinista government as Vice
Minister'of Labor, but left Nicaragua when he realized the
Sandinistas were intent on establishing a totalitarian Marxist-
Leninist regime. Of the Sandinistas' attempt to turn the Church
into an "instrument" Macias writes:
"The FSLN (the governing Sandinista organization) has
had its plan of action drawn from the beginning, including
unremitting harassment and the reduction and suppression of
the social programs of the churches... They wish to reduce
them [the churches] to a strictly liturgical function, which
would be to keep them within their temples...the social
pastoral of the churches should not exist since it generates
an influence that 'interferes' with the unique leadership
that the Front pretends to be." (4)
For some time after this exchange between the Bishops and
the Sandinistas, the Church went out of its way to say concili-
atory things about the regime, hoping to salvage a relationship.
The Sandinista leadership is attempting to publicly represent
itself as being pro-Church, something the overwhelming majority
of the Catholic clergy seriously doubts. The historical record
underscores these reservations. .
PRIESTS AND POLITICS
In 1981, responding to Pope John Paul II's desire to keep
the Church free of political entanglements, the Nicaraguan
Bishops called on all Catholic clergy to limit their political
activities to something less than full time devotion to the
regime, or to any political faction.
A long controversy ensued. The Sandinista clergy refused to
leave their posts. The Bishops, stymied, agreed that the Sandin-
ista priests could temporarily remain in government as long as
they did not exercise their priestly functions.
These high-ranking Sandinista priests that chose to discon-
tinue their priestly functions while continuing to occupy politi-
cal office are: Miguel D'Escoto, Minister of Foreign Affairs;
Fernando Cardenal, director of Sandinista youth organizations;
and his brother Ernesto, Minister of Culture.
Since that time, the Sandinistas campaign to rigorously
support church factions responsive to its interests steadily
intensified. Priests who have expressed a desire to leave the
regime have been told by the Junta.that they cannot resign from
their posts, according to Edgard Macias.
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THE "PEOPLE'S CHURCH"
The first step was to coopt and expand a unique Latin
American institution called the Christian base community.
The base community is a neighborhood group of Catholics who
meet for prayer and religious services but who also work together
for social and political reform. Over the years, most of these
groups have not been Marxist, but have worked for reforms that
most Americans would recognize as basic.
However, the bishops had long recognized that the base
communities have had the potential to become "prisoners of
political polarization or fashionable ideologies which want to
exploit their immense potential." (5)
The Sandinistas began to exploit that potential. Many base
communities have remained loyal to the Catholic hierarchy, but
many have been made instruments of the revolution, part of what
the Sandinistas refer to as "the People's Church," a church
subservient to the government.
The Sandinistas began to speak openly of two churches, one,
the "Popular Church" which is the friend of the people, and the
other which oppresses the people.
Macias again:
"It is ridiculous to see the 'revolutionary commanders'
(who are declared Marxist-Leninists) using Christian
terminology and even ... giving homilies on what the role of
religion and the bishops should be. They say that while
there is Sandinismo (FSLN) there will be Christianity,
letting it be understood that outside of themselves there is
no Christianity ...No better example of how a political group
can 'appropriate' religion and model it to its objectives
can be found... Remember that the structure of the FSLN as a
political party is fascist and anti-democratic, where the
National Directorate has been artificially mythified..."(6)
In reference to the traditional and "popular church",
Sandinista junta member Sergio Ramirez stated that one of these
"churches" was not revolutionary, but the other church was:
"[A] church of change. This church became the people's
ally. This church boosted the revolution and committed
itself to this revolution. This church is participating in
the revolutionary process and is incorporating the patriotic
and revolutionary priests of whom we are very proud into the
government."(7)
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In response, Archbishop Obando y Bravo has condemned "those
who are trying to divide the Church" and spread the idea that
there is "one bourgeois church and another church for the poor."
The Vatican has become so alarmed at the attempt of.the Sandin-
istas to divide the church in Nicaragua that the Pope issued a
Pastoral letter on June 29, 1982 which criticized advocates of
the "popular Church" for their
"...infiltration of strongly ideological connotations
along the lines of certain political radicalization of the
class struggle, of acceptance of violence for the carrying
out of political ends. It is not through a political role,
but through the priestly ministry that the people want to
remain close to the Church."
THE CHURCH AND THE SECRET POLICE
One of the first steps the Sandinistas took was to combine
many of the so-called Sandinista Defense Committees with Christ-
ian base communities. The Defense Committees provide a network
of informers and neighborhood surveillance, and have the authority
to bestow certain privileges, such as internal travel permits or
rationed items. These basic units of totalitarian control are
also found in the Soviet Union, Eastern Bloc.and Cuba.
Acco=ding to Edgard Macias these these "people's churches,"
made up of the combination of the base communities and the
defense committees, are under the supervision of interior Minis-
ter Tomas Borge, whose portfolio includes the internal security/-
secret police apparatus.
The People's Church accounts for only a minority of Nicar-
aguan Catholics.. But the Sandinista controlled media pays
enormous attention to their every action in support of the
regime. The government endorses "liberation theology," the
doctrine of the People's Church that portrays Christ as a Marxist
revolutionary.
An underground publication from Honduras designed for group
study, entitled "Reflections of an Honduran Christian Marxist,"
gives the typical perspective on "liberation theology": "[love
for the poor] consists not only in giving them food, but in doing
away with the cause of their poverty, that is their capitalist/-
imperialist system. And in order to do this a Christian not only
can be, but must be a Socialist, Marxist-Leninist, violent
revolutionary."
Geraldine O'Leary Macias, Edgard's wife,. was for many years
a Maryknoll missionary in Nicaragua where she worked for social
reform. She has seen first hand the Communists' attempt to coopt
genuine Christianity for their own purposes:
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'The Marxists have been very astute in using liberation
theology to make it appear Marxist, making being a Christian
synonomous with being a Sandinista, and defining revolution
as Marxism. The only major change in this approach has been
brought about by the non-Nicaraguan Marxists. As the
Cubans, Bulgarians and East Germans have taken major roles
as advisors to the police, army and militia, their
anti-religious fervor has made apparent the very real
contradictions between what the people of Nicaragua want and
what the Sandinistas want."(8)
CENSORSHIP
While publicizing. the People's Church, the Sandinistas, by
July of 1981, had begun to cut off the Church's access to the
media. Customarily, the Archbishop, or a priest designated by
him, had celebrated mass every Sunday on Managua television,
giving a sermon in the course of the Mass.
But in July, 1981, the Sandinistas announced that televised
Masses would be rotated among Catholic priests. The Archbishop,
seeing that pro-Sandinista "priests" would be chosen, refused.
The televised Masses were cancelled.
According to Macias:
"The Archbishop's television Mass was suppressed
when Commander Tomas Borge, Minister of the Interior,
decided to impose a system that would eliminate his
presence, substituting him for Sandino-Christian priests.
The strategy was to substitute the authority of the
Archbishop and his faculty of leadership of his faithful
with the authority of the Supreme Chief of State Security
[Gorge] and his small group of loyal priests." (9)
Catholic Radio has since fallen under heavy daily censor-
ship. Since March 1982, the independent newspaper La Prensa,
through which the Archbishop also communicated with the people,
has fallen under censorship at times far more severe than that of
the Somoza dictatorship. However, the Archbishop is still
permitted to publish his homily in La Prensa.(10)
By Easter of 1982, church leaders were required to submit
their homilies to the Ministry of the Interior to be approved for
broadcasting.
CENSORING THE POPE
In June 1982, the Pope sent a pastoral letter to the people
of Nicaragua denouncing the government's attempts to establish a
parallel Church, but publication of the letter was initially
refused.
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Archbishop Obando y Bravo has commented extensively on the
Pope's letter. His comments shed light on some of the specific
groups and mechanisms the Sandinistas have used to.create a
parallel church:
"I believe that there is a true internal intention of
dividing the Church as is mentioned by His Holiness. When
we speak of a 'Popular church' we should understand that in
Nicaragua there are several centers that support it. Five
centers have been created, all very well supplied and
organized: Centro Antonio Valdivieso, CEPA, Eje Ecumenico,
CEPAD, and-the Instituto Historico Centroamericano. Their
resources are abundant, they have full-time employees,
theologians and laity, recording and printing facilities and
abundant international aid. These groups enjoy exclusive
access to the State communications network which runs 100%
of the television channels, 90% of the radio stations and
two out of three newspapers...."
"The virulence of their attacks has already reached the
extreme of physical violence against some bishops.
Externally the promoters of this popular church have mounted
vast international propaganda campaigns... Vehicles for this
are the international editions of Barricada...also their
connections with other or ans of Liberation Theo o and
n religious groups distributed throughout the world (1
aki . 1)
-
(Emphasis added.)
Several of the Centers the Archbishop mentioned are often
cited in this country.
According to Edgard Macias, the Sandinistas are even trying
to create a new religious rite, the Sandino-Christian rite,
complete with icons to Augusto Sandino, prayers to a new pantheon
of martyred Sandinistas who are to be revered as saints, and even
the beginnings of a cult of resurrection:
"Hung on the, front of the old cathedral in Managua
[was] an enormous picture of General Sandino in his most
characteristic pose, but drawn within a white host, which is
bordered by the red and black colors of the FSLN flag...The
Nicaraguans were not over being surprised by this when on
radio and television the campaign for the third anniversary
of the revolution was spearheaded by a short ad in which the
dead are no longer simply Sandinista heroes, but are now
'the Sandinista saints.' One named Navarrito, it is said
'died with worms eating his feet but he arose the same day,'
thus comparing him with Jesus Christ, who, as we all know,
took three days to do the same."
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The most brazen use of the "People's Church" was made during
John Paul II's visit to Nicaragua when he said Mass at a huge
open square in Managua. Film taken by the Sandinista television
network clearly shows that the Sandinistas used the.occasion to
stage a demonstration against the Pope during Mass.
As happens nearly everywhere the Pope goes, he was received
with fervent enthusiasm by the crowd. During his homily he was
interrupted again and again by friendly applause and cheers and
shouts of "Long live the Pope!" The applause was particularly
strong during those parts of his homily in which he denounced the
"People's Church."
However, as the Sandinistas' own television film makes
obvious, the places in the square nearest to the Pope were
reserved for Sandinista activists, preequipped with microphones.
As the Pope came to the end of his homily these activists
began to chant political slogans. When the Pope reached the most
sacred part of the Mass, the Consecration of the bread and wine,
the activists equipped with microphones actually began to make
speeches, nearly drowning out the words of Consecration. The
speakers demanded that the Pope insert into the Mass a prayer for
the Sandinista martyrs -- perhaps as part of the plan to legiti-
mize the Sandino-Christian rite.
The pine Sandinista "commandantes," who hold the real power
in Nicaragua, stood on a platform near the Pope. They urged the
demonstrators on, shouting slogans themselves and raising their
fists in the air. At one point, uniformed men led the shouting
activists in a protest march around the altar. Later, reliable
sources revealed that the microphones used by the activists were
actually being controlled by the same Sandinista technicians
controlling the Pope's microphone.
UNDERMINING THE CHURCH HIERARCHY
The Sandinistas have begun to interfere with the hierarchy's
right to assign priests to parishes. There are reports that
replacement priests appointed by the Archbishop have been har-
assed by Sandinista controlled mobs. These mobs, organized by
the Sandinista defense committees and the internal security
forces, are referred to as las turbas divinas -- "the divine
mobs."
Priests who do not preach or accept Marxist "theology," have
been harassed by the mobs. Especially in the countryside,
legitimate priests often have their services interrupted.
Sometimes the mobs will turn the Mass into a political meeting.
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In Managua the Sandinistas have staged physical attacks
against the legitimate clergy, including the Archbishop Bosco
Vivas,'the auxiliary bishop of Managua, who was shoved and pushed
to the ground by a Sandinista mob last August. (12)
The Sandinistas have also mounted campaigns to discredit
Church leaders, such as Father Bismark Carballo, the director of
Catholic Radio and public spokesman for the Archbishop. Having
been called to the home of a parishoner, he was forced to disrobe
by security force personnel and then forced into the street in
front of T.V. cameras and Sandinista mobs planted in advance.
After the pictures of the incident and the story were
printed in the Nicaraguan. press, the Sandinistas were badly
embarrassed by this transparent attempt to frame a major Church
spokesman.
By September 1982 the situation had gotten so serious that
Archbishop John R. Roche, the President of the U.S. National
Conference of Catholic Bishops, issued a statement criticizing
the Sandinistas:
"In recent weeks, institutions and persons of the
Church, including bishops, have been subjected to attacks of
a serious, at times disgraceful nature...We cannot fail to
protest in the strongest possible terms, the attempted
defamation and acts'of physical abuse directed at prominent
clerics, the inappropriate exercise of State control over
the communications media, including those of the Church, the
apparent threats to the Church's role in education, and,
most ominous of all, the increasing tendency of public
demonstrations to result in bloody conflict." (13)
Edgard Macias sums up well the treatment of the Catholic
Church by the Sandinistas:
"It [religion] is something to be provisionally
permitted because it already exists and despite their
wishes, has to be permitted as a 'lesser evil' that cannot
be immediately eliminated. But it has been sentenced to a
gradual and progressive extinction."(14)
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PERSECUTION OF PROTESTANT GROUPS
Persecution of Protestant groups has been even more direct
and brutal because their smaller size has left them.more vulner-
able.
While the Sandinistas were still consolidating their power
immediately after the revolution, they did little to harass the
Protestant groups. According to Humberto Belli, a former editor
of La Prensa, the only independent newspaper in Nicaragua, up
throug 1981 there was little persecution except for harassment
of some village pastors.
Says Belli:"the Protestant pastors ...were conscious of their
vulnerability and tried to abstain from any kind of commentaries
touching the political field. Some of them even preferred to
reassure the government of their loyalty." (15)
Occasionally groups of "revolutionary Christians" published
leaflets attacking Protestant denominations as agents of U.S.
.imperialism. The government controlled media often propagated
these charges.
In 1982 these attacks became direct. According to Belli:
"In March, just a few days before the government
cancelled all individual rights and decreed a state of
emergency, Barricada, the official newspaper of the
Sandinistas, pubis ed two front-page, 8 column reports on
the Protestants, entitled: 'The Invasion of the
Sects.' ... In that Report many Protestant denominations such
as the Mormons, the Seventh Day Adventists and the Jehovah's
Witnesses were protrayed as groups of fanatics and
superstitious people who liked to manipulate people's
emotions and were part of a world-wide strategy of cultural
penetration orchestrated by U.S. imperialism."
"Shortly after these publications the attacks grew more
and more vocal and the first physical threats were issued.
Commander Tomas Borge...said there would be religious
freedom for those who were with the revolution, but for
those who were deceiving people and preaching negative
attitudes their days were numbered."(16)
On July 30, 1982, Radio Sandino covered a speech on the
subject by Borge. According to Radio Sandino:
"Borge said that the religious sects -- the Jehovah's
Witnesses, the Adventists, the Mormons and other groups
opposed to the revolution -- are under investigation ...He
noted that a bill is being submitted to the State Council
that will require religious sects to register with the
authorities before they begin operation."(17)
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-11
In a speech on July 17 Borge had said:
"There are a large number of sects that Are being
funded by the CIA...Some of them'have mother churches in the
United States. The most famous sects -- and it is best for
the people to know their enemies -- are: Jehovah's
Witnesses, the Mormons and the Adventists ... Other.sects are
the Voice of Acclamation and the Wesleyan Church, whatever
the hell that means...It is evident that we have to make a
serious study to counteract their diversionist activity
financed by the CIA of the United States and take measures
of a police nature according to the laws of the revolution
in order to control and neutralize certain activities that
disrupt the country's internal order. To begin with, a
large number of these sects are not registered
with the pertinent government offices, thus making them
illegal."(18)
Burge encouraged mob action against the Protestant churches.
By August 1982 more than 20 Managua Protestant Churches had been
seized by the "divine mobs." Some, but not all, of the confis-
cated properties were returned, but only on condition that the
ministers refrain from criticizing the government.
Among the Christian organizations forced out of Nicaragua is
the Salvation Army, whose charitable and religious activities
there ended in August, 1980 after "ominous verbal threats from
authorities, and,, finally, instructions to close up the program
and leave the country." (19)
Religious persecution has also affected the small Jewish
community in Nicaragua. The community had been so intimidated by
Sandinista actions and rhetoric during and after the revolution
that virtually the entire community has fled the country. An
article by Shoshana Bryen in the Wall Street Journal summed up
the situation well when it said:
"There are some who believe the actions taken against
Jewish citizens were the result of severe Sandinista
anti-capitalism, but the death threats, the immediate
confiscation of businesses and private property, the
torching of Managua's synogogue (and later its confiscation)
and the arrest and harrassment of Nicaragua's Jews were not
examples of burgeoning socialism... Other small, politically
vulnerable communities in that area may suffer a fate
similar to the Jews in Nicaragua, where the PLO is assisting
the Soviet Union in the export of revolution and
anti-Semitism."(20)
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RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION OF THE INDIANS
Perhaps the most tragic case of persecution perpetrated by
the Sandinistas is that inflicted on the Miskito, Sumo, and Rama
Indians of Nicaragua's isolated Atlantic Coast.
Most of the members of these tribes are members of minority
Protestant Churches, especially the Moravian church. Living in
isolation from most of Nicaragua, they have had little to do with
any government. The Moravian missionaries filled the gap by
providing most of the schools, hospitals and support organiza-
tions that maintained the area.
The campaign of persecution against the Indians has thus far
been directed largely at their religious leaders and institu-
tions. In attacking the Indians' religious leaders, the Sandin-
istas are attacking their source of unity and strength more than
attacking their religion itself.
As Belli explains,"When the Sandinistas came to power in
1979, they immediately announced that their top priority was to
'rescue' the Atlanitc Coast." Cuban and Nicaraguan personnel
began to flood into the area.
The Sandinistas began a heavy-handed attempt to redesign the
lives of the Indians along Marxist lines, and "started to replace
the people's own leaders with [the Sandinistas'] own authorities
-- many of whom were Cuban teachers and strangers." Resentments,
repression, and riots followed in short order. Reports Belli:
The Sandinistas blamed the events on counter-
revolutionary and CIA inspired forces, and began attacking
the most influential Moravian pastors. Some of them were
jailed and others expelled, stimulating new waves of protest
and repression. [The government] stepped up its attacks and
dismantled the network of charitable organizations that,
after a century of work, the Moravians had established."(21)
The Sandinistas sealed off the entire Atlantic coast.
Travel to the region was allowed only by special permit. Indians
were drafted into the militia. Those who refused were shot or
forcibly relocated. Villages were forcibly evacuated and them
burned. According to Edgard Macias, by midsummer 1982 the
Sandinistas had destroyed 55 Moravian churches.
Ministers who are still allowed to preach in the region must
submit their sermons to local Sandinista censors. Indian leaders
have been rounded up and jailed,. The three-tribe umbrella organi-
zation created to represent the Indians' interest to the govern-
ment was shut down.
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.`.Two of the most prominent Moravian leaders, Rev. Norman Bent
and. Rev.'Fernando Colomens had been prevented from staying in the
Atlantic Coast area. The Moravian Social Action Committee has
been closed by the FSLN.
In November of 1982, the Misurasata Council of Ancients
(elders), the legitimate representatives of the people of the
'three tribes, officially denounced the Sandinista government
before the organization of American States.
In that denunciation the Ancients explained that, despite
their "active participation in the struggle for liberation
(against Somoza] and our decided support for the revolutionary
government headed by the Sandinista National Liberation Front...,"
their people had been subjected to "intense repression, lack of
respect for our religious beliefs and traditions, imprisonment of
our leaders, massive captures of peasants, women, the aged and
children, rapes, beatings, torture, and the death and disappear-
ance of prisoners...
"The situation has progressively worsened... They have
expelled us from the land we received from our ancestors...
Thousands of members of our communities are at this time kept, on
Nicaraguan territory, in concentration camps under strict mili-
tary vigilance, while more,-than 1,500 Indians have been obliged
to seek refuge in the sister republic of Honduras...
"They live in refugee camps, almost. at the mercy of the
elements, with grave health and nutrition problems especially
amongst the children who walk around practically naked and suffer
from parasites and many illnesses."
The details of this persecution are particularly horrifying.
According to the Council of the Ancients, in January and
February of 1982:"the FSLN with the pretext of 'spreading national
sovereignty' destroyed 49 communities, burning more than 4,000
houses, and then, so that no one could return to their land of
origin, cut down the fruit trees, shot all the domestic animals
and forced the persons that lived there to begin a forced
march that took 11 to 15 days in order to arrive at the different
concentration camps.."
"During the forced march the invalids, lame, blind and
paralyzed persons were gathered together in the village of
Tulinbilia, they were put inside the Church and they were burned
-- 13 persons thus died."
In February also, Rev. Sandalio Patron, the leader of the
Sumo Indians, was imprisoned.
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Throughout the year the same story was repeated. In the
third week of March, according to the Ancients, four more vil-
lages were burned, all the houses, churches, and domestic animals
destroyed..
In. April, religious leader Rev. Abel Flores and 13 deacons
were arrested, mounted into a government helicopter and whisked
away. No one is told where they were taken. A community called
Suma de Kuahbul was occupied by the military. The villagers were
forbidden to leave their homes, making normal life, including
food gathering, impossible.
In May all churches in North Zelaya were told they must
submit all messages for publication to the approval of State
Security. The Indian community of Raity was destroyed; half the
population fled to Honduras.
In June the Sandinista troops carried out the massacre of
Musawas. Only the direct words of the Council of Ancients can
adequately convey what happened in Musawas:
"On June 29, 1982, another military regiment of about
40 men appeared at about 9:00 PM. They captured [abducted]
Mrs. Aquilina Robin, Calilda Lopez [and] Virginia Benjamin,
and placed them in the church; about 30 minutes after,
another group of soldiers brought two girls of 12 years
each,[Maria Hernandez and Lodena Lopez] and they too were
placed in the church. The women began to scream; about 11
o'clock that night, the relatives of the three women and two
girls, filled with indignation and family love, approached
the church and asked why they were ill-treating the women.
They were also taken prisoners and brutally conducted into
the church.0
'Sometime around 12 o'clock that night, the Sandinista
troop took the women out of the church. The girl, Maria
Hernandez, of 12 years, was dragged out; because, after she
was violated by the troop, she was unable to walk..."
"After the five women were carried outside the church,
they were placed face down on the ground; one of the
soldiers yelled 'not even as women are they any good; not
even satisfaction can they give; I still remain with the
desire, stinking daughters of sluts.' Presently a group of
soldiers came out of the Church and machine gunned them."
Over the next 24 hours, 15 more villagers were murdered by
the troops. "This act dispersed the community of Musawas. They
went to the woodland looking how to save their lives. Thirty-
three were captured and held hostage."
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"The Community of Musawas presently in refugee camp in
Mocoron is witness to all that took place at Musawas."
In July martial law was declared in the communities of
Tuara, Sisin, Ruaquil, Boomsirpi and Yulotigni. The villagers
were not allowed to leave their homes or celebrate religious
services. According to the Indian elders, eight armed Sandin-
istas raped the 12 year old daughter of Rev. Serminio Nicho, a
religious leader in Ninayeri Sandebay North.
According to the Ancients, the "months of August, September
and October are a true Calvary for the 10 Indian communities of
Puerto Cabezas. The communities are put under a state of siege.
The villagers are prohibited from fishing in the ocean, communal
lands are expropriated, villagers are forbidden to leave the
village. Masses and religious services are frequently closed
down or can be celebrated only with previous permission."
The tactic of restricting the villagers to the village and
of prohibiting them from. fishing in the ocean or from using their
communal lands is devastating because it can put the villagers on
the brink of starvation. (22)
The Indians have given the Organization of American States
(OAS) many pages of detailed eyewitnesses accounts of torture and
murder by the Sandinistas. There is no need to recount all the
gruesome stories here.
CONCLUSION
As the Nicaraguan Defense Minister Humberto Ortega has made
clear, "Marxism is the scientific doctrine that guides our
revolution-... our doctrine is Marxism-Leninism." (23) Conforming
to that doctrine, the Sandinistas are systematically attempting
to coopt religious organizations that might threaten the FSLN's
ability to dominate Nicaraguan political and social life.
Due to the strength of the Catholic Church, the Sandinista
strategy has been to infiltrate, censor and control, rather than
to eradicate outright.
At times, particularly when the weight of foreign opinion
has been high, the Sandinistas have backed off, at least overtly,
their persecution of the Church. During this five-day period,
however, the following actions were taken against the Church:
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Midnight, Oct.29, 1983: Mobs began to demonstrate at twenty-
two churches in the Managua area, and at an unknown number of
churches outside Managua. The mobs, which ranged in size from 50
to 200 persons, interrupted Masses, chanted at churchgoers, and
in several cases threatened priests.
0800 Oct. 30: A mob armed with clubs arrived at Saint Jude
church in Managua. According to the pro-government press, the
mob was acting against a church planned demonstration against the
new national military service law. The mob interrupted Mass, and
reportedly struck Father Silvio Fonseca. The mob refused to
allow Monsignor Bosco Vivas to enter the Saint Jude area. A
second mob prevented the holding of a church bazaar (kermesse)
later that day.
1030 Oct. 30: Catholic Church leadership (Curia) decided to
cancel Masses for the day. Curia was unable to contact some
priests, who carried out scheduled activities.
1700 Oct. 30: A mob armed with clubs interrupted Mass at the
San Francisco church in the Bolonia area of Managua, breaking
church windows and vandalizing cars.
Night of Oct. 30: A mob gathered in front of the Santa Maria
church in the San Juan neighborhood of Managua. Another mob
burned a tire on the front steps of the Santa Carmen church.
Oct. 31: The government revoked the residency of two foreign
priests, in effect exiling them. The two priests were Luis
Corral Prieto, of Spain, and Jose Maria Pacheco, of Costa Rica,
respectively the director and assistant director of Salesian
school in Masaya.
Oct. 31: The Government announced the arrest of a Father
Antonio (a citizen of Italy) for allegedly preaching against the
national military service and advocating counterrevolutionary
activities.
Nov. 2: The Catholic Church leadership postponed religious
services for November 2, (All Souls' Day), calling instead for a
day of fasting and prayer. The postponed masses were held
November 3.
Sixty-five years of applied Marxist-Leninist doctrine have
shown that communism will not accept co-existence with any
religion that does not concede supreme authority to it. To the
extent that Marxist-Leninist regimes allow churches to operate
they do so because they are forced to, as in Poland, or for
tactical reasons aimed at the ultimate objective of eradicating
religion from society.
The overwhelming evidence of the wide-spread persecution of
Christian Churches in Nicaragua is a sad reminder of the some-
times forgotten nature of Marxism-Leninism and its total-anti-
pathy for freedom of religion.
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FOOTNOTES
1. See for example: August 25, 1981 speech of Humberto'
Ortega; Managua Domestic Service (Radio) 23 April, .1982 (Foreign
Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) 28 April, 1982 p. P9);
Managua Radio Sandino 26 February, 1983 (FBIS 28 Feb., 1983 p.
P17)
2. "Communicado Oficial de la Direccion Nacional del
FSLN sobre la Religion," Barricada, October 7, 1980.
3. "Contestacion al Comunicado del FSLN sobre la
Religion (October 17, 1980)," Revista del Pensamiento Centro-
americano, July-December, 1980.
4. Macias, Edgard; "The Sandinista Revolution and
Religion" presented to the White House Outreach Working Group on
Central America; (July, 1983).
5. "Jesucristo y la Unidad de su Iglesia en Nicaragua,"
(Carta Pastoral, October 22, 1980), Revista del Pensamiento
Centroamericano, July-December, 1980.
6. Macias, op. cit.
7. Radio Sandino, Managua, June 10, 1981.
8. Geraldine O'Leary de Macias; "Christians in the
Sandinista Revolution," (January, 1983).
9. Macias,. op. cit.
10. Washington Times, July 26, 1983.
11. Archbishop Obando y Bravo, "Comments on the Papal
Letter," La Prensa, Managua, August 14, 1983.
12. Archbishop John R. Roche, comments on the United
States Catholic Conference, Washington, D.C., September 9, 1982.
13. Roche, op. cit.
14. Macias, op. cit.
15. Humberto Belli, "Persecution of Protestants in
Nicaragua: The Neglected Story," 1983.
16. Belli, op. cit.
17. FBIS Central America, August 2,
1982, p. 7.
18. FBIS, Central America, July 21,
1982, p. 13.
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19..Letter, September 12, 1983 from Salvation Army LTC
Ernest A. Miller.
20. Shoshana Bryen, The Wall Street Journal, August 24,
21. Belli, op, cit.
22. Miskito Indian Council of Ancients of Misurasata.
Testimony presented to the Organization of American States, May,
1981 - October, 1982.
23. Humberto Ortega, quoted by Branko Lazitch in Est at
Ouest (Paris) August 25, 1981.
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WHITE HOUSE
I :D (B:2 0
WHITE HOUSE DIGEST
is a service provided by the
White House Office of Media Relations and Planning
U
AUGUST 24, 1983
NICARAGUAN REPRESSION OF LABOR UNIONS
In Communist countries throughout the world, trade
unions serve not to advance the interests of the workers, but to
serve the political interests of the rulers. They serve not to
organize strikes but to forbid them; not to improve wages and
benefits but to restrain them; not to bargain. collectively on
.behalf of the workers but to organize the collective submission
of the workers to their employer -- the state.
This same path is being pursued by the Communist
leaders of Nicaragua. The primary purpose of labor unions in
today's Nicaragua is to assist in the forced transformation of
society along the lines determined by the Sandinista
leadership.l/ Existing independent trade unions are being
harassed, their members blacklisted, threatened, and sometimes
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jailed. Most of the unions and most of the union members in the
country have been pressed into Sandinista labor confederations
subservient to the government. These confederations have
surrendered hard won contract concessions and have forced lower
pay and inferior working conditions on their members. Strikes
have been forbidden; collective bargaining has become a farce.2/
REDUCED TO OBJECTS
Edgard Macias, Sandinista Vice-Minister of Labor
before he was forced to seek asylum for criticizing the regime,
has summed up the situation well:
"Thus the Nicaraguan workers have been reduced to
being objects...the workers cannot choose, free of
fears, either their labor union, or their central labor
organization, their ideological option, [or] their
political party."3/
Immediately after the revolution, the Sandinistas
formed two large labor confederations -- the Sandinista Workers
Central (CST) for non-agricultural workers and the Rural Workers
Association (ATC) -- to replace the Somocista labor organizations
and to compete with the two leading democratic labor
confederations, the Nicaraguan Workers Central (CTN) and the
Confederation for Labor Unification (CUS), both of which opposed
the Somoza dictatorship.
At first, the CST, the Sandinista non-farmworkers
confederation, worked for traditional labor goals -- better
wages, better working conditions.
LABOR "DISCIPLINE"
But by late 1980 it had shifted its emphasis toward
organizing political support for the government and enforcing
government economic policies.. It endorsed Sandinista policies
blocking wage increases and forbidding strikes. The Sandinista
Ministry of Labor participates in all collective bargaining
negotiations and must approve all final agreements.4/ The CST
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cooperates with the Ministry's policy of revising labor
agreements to deny workers wage and benefit increases previously
secured -- even when the employers are willing to maintain the
original, costlier contracts. It pressures members into taking an
active role in "defending the revolution" and into joining the
Sandinista militia.5/ The ATC similarly adheres to Sandinista
labor policies.6/
In 1981 the CST joined the Moscow-led World Federation
of Trade Unions, and since has signed friendship and cooperation
agreements with the Soviet Central Council of Trade Unions. It
receives technical and training assistance from the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe.
"RECRUITMENT"
In spite of their refusal to pursue their members'
interests, the Sandinista confederations are overwhelmingly the
largest in the country. Workers who refuse to join and labor
leaders who refuse to affiliate with Sandinista labor
organizations are subjected to punishments ranging from
harassment, unemployment, threats, and official denunciations all
the way to arrest, destruction of personal property, and
beatings. In Macias's words:
"the [Sandinista front] and its central
organizations unleashed a war against all other
central organizations, using all of their resources
including the Ministry of Labor, the army, the
militias,and the manipulation of the right to a job...
against the CTN and... the CUS."7/
"PERSUASION FIRST"
Government favoritism toward Sandinista labor
organizations is the simplest method of persuasion.
The Sandinista unions have access to official
government communications outlets, which are used to promote the
Sandinista unions as well as to attack the independents. Also the
is
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Sandinista unions have the use of government buildings, meeeting
places and offices free of charge.8/
The Ministry of Labor has, in effect, a veto over the
workers' choice of unions. It expedites agreements between
workers and Sandinista unions while interfering with those
between independent unions and workers.9/ In some cases it has
even forcibly removed members of legitimately elected unions from
their workplaces. In other cases it has created dummy
pro-Sandinista unions, enrolled a few workers in them and
arbitrarily designated the dummy unions as the bargaining agents
for enterprises at which a majority of the workers belong to
independent unions.10/
Workers have been denied social benefits or
jobsll/ -- especially in nationalized enterprisesl2/ -- for not
belonging to a Sandinista labor organization. And, as mentioned,
when an independent union does reach a favorable settlement for
its workers, the Ministry of Labor can void the agreement, thug
severely punishing the workers for their choice of unions.
TWO WORLDS
Leaders of the independents have repeatedly been denied
the right to carry on the normal activities of a free trade
union. They have been forbidden to hold normal meetings, to
collect dues, to bargain without government intervention, to hold
seminars, to organize, or to leave the country without the
explicit approval of the Council of State.13/
To quote Macias again:
"There are two different labor worlds in Nicaragua: On
one side the workers who are protected and privileged
by the FSLN, and on the other side those who...belong
to the "second class" labor unions and for whom life
is much harsher."14/
But, short of real terror, perhaps the Sandinistas'
most potent weapon is political intimidation. In a totalitarian
society, expressions of disapproval from the government transmit
fears that we as free people find it difficult to comprehend.
II
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Since coming to power, the Sandinistas have loudly and
consistently labeled the independent unions
"counter-revolutionary," "destabilizing," and "conspiratory."15/
The charges are false -- the independent trade unions
were in the vanguard of the opposition to Somoza. But the charges
mark the independent unions as enemies of the ruling clique,
which is sufficient to frighten many workers away.
Even so, outright terror and repression of the
independents have been common all along. From the start of the
CST organizing drive, CST representatives -- in reality
Sandinista activists with little or no trade union experience --
would arrive at union meetings accompanied by armed militiamen,
whose very presence intimidated the workers into favoring the CST
in affiliation votes.
GOVERNMENT MOBS
Government directed mobs have attacked the homes of
union officials and painted their properties with denunciations.
Union property has been destroyed by the police.16/ Articles
favorable to the CUS or the CTN have been censored from the
newspapers.
Union meetings have been disrupted and broken up by
mobs. Independent trade union organizers have been threatened by
the police, the army, and Sandinista organizations, and sometimes
jailed.. The CUS headquarters in Chinandega and Esteli were taken
over by the local police and Sandinista groups.17/ It is
dangerous even to protest these activities, for critics of
government policy face prosecution.18/
CORINTO
The case of the stevedores union for the key strategic
port of Corinto is illustrative of Sandinista labor practices.
Immediately after the revolution, when unions were affiliating en
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? -6-
masse with the CST, the Corinto stevedores union did so as well,
though even-the original affiliation may have been a result of
heavy pressure, including the arrest and detention of the
secretary general of the union.
The stevedores were soon dissatisfied. In early 1983
they moved to disaffiliate with the CST. In mid-March the union's
executive board voted to switch the stevedores to the CUS. The
Sandinistas responded by sending militia to occupy the union's
headquarters. The all-powerful Ministry of Labor voided the
executive board's decision, ruling that only a two-thirds vote of
the membership could effect the switch.
A."WELCOMING COMMITTEE"
But the Ministry avoided an immediate vote by trumping
up charges of corruption and forbidding any elections until the
charges were "investigated." Eventually elections were scheduled'--
in June. But on May 21, when CUS officials came to Corinto to
meet with several hundred stevedores, they were attacked, and
forced to flee, by a Sandinista mob, some of whom were armed and
wearing militia uniforms.19/
The Sandinistas then packed the June 1 assembly with
hundreds of non-members of the union.. The bona fide union members
voted overwhelmingly for the CUS, but the government recognized
the CST as the victor and now there are two organizations
purporting to represent the workers. At least six union
leaders were later arrested. The government refused to give an
explanation for the arrests. Although some were later released,
the union claims that many activists subsequently lost their
jobs. 20/
Though Corinto is a classic example it is far from the
only'one:
In August 1981, the President of the CTN, Juan Rafael
Suazo-Trujillo was abducted by a group of thugs identifying
themselves as "members of the young forces against
reactionaries." He was forced into a car bearing government
license plates and pistol whipped. His abductors called him a
? 'i
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traitor and an agent of the CIA, told him the beating was small
punishment for his crimes and let him go.21/
In March 1982, the Secretary General of the Federation
of Health Workers, a union that has for the most part cooperated
with the Sandinistas, was arrested by government agents and taken
to the offices of the Sandinista police and interrogated with a
pistol at his head. His captors interrogated him for nine hours,
repeatedly demanding he sign a blank sheet of paper, while they
impugned his role in the union as counter-revolutionary. He has
since taken refuge in the Venezuelen embassy.22/
"PROVISIONALLY" FREE
After a lengthy campaign of harrassment, five leaders
of the CTN union "Aldo Chavarria" were arrested in the Nueva
Guinea municipality in May 1982 by police and army officials.
Before a public assembly they were accused of being
counter-revolutionaries and threatened with a firing squad.
Several days later they were told it was all a mistake and
"provisionally" freed.23/
Bonifacio and Armando Ramos Matute, members of the
Executive Committee of the CTN in Jalapa, have been continually
harassed by the Sandinista Defense Committees for the area. They
were told that if they did not affiliate with the Sandinista
National Agricultural and Cattle Union they would be "cleaned
out" of the area.24/
Days before the Sandinista declaration of the State of
Emergency in September 1981, Rosendo Solorzano Fonseca and Javier
Altamirano Perez, two CUS leaders from the Western region were
arrested, and threatened and beaten by a mob that included
members of the police. The two fled and took refuge in the
headquarters of an independent union in Chinandega. The
Sandinista police tracked them down, arrested them, stripped them
_and took them to a place in Chinandega where they were further
interrogated and threatened with reprisals if they told anyone of
their experiences.25/
I a
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WORKERS TOO
Many more incidents have been reported, including not
only harassment of labor leaders, as in the cases mentioned here,
but of ordinary workers as well. The aim is clear -- to render
the independents impotent without risking the bad publicity from
officially outlawing them. Indeed, according to a February 14,
1980 statement signed by Carlos Huembes Trejos, Secretary General
of the CTN, Tomas Borge, Sandinista Minister of the Interior, has
said that the CTN would be wiped out.26/
AS IN POLAND...
To quote Macias a final time:
"There are many mechanisms to enroll workers in
organizations which appear to be labor unions, but ...
lack the intrinsic quality of labor unions -- their
freedom of choice and action"27/
That is the classic Communist labor strategy -- replace
legitimate labor unions devoted to the good of the worker with
pseudo-unions devoted to the convenience of the rulers. That
strategy has kept Poland on the front pages for nearly three
years -- but the same tragedy is being played in Nicaragua today.
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1. Annual Labor Report:"Labor Trends in Nicaragua;" p.l.
2. The Permanent Committee for Nicaraguan Human
Rights: "A Union Report On Nicaragua." (This committee is one of
the few remaining bodies in Nicaragua with the right to criticize
the government.)
3.Macias, Edgard (former Sandinista Vice Minister of Labor);
Statement of February 11, 1983: "Labor Relations in the
Sandinista Regime;" p.14.
4. Op. Cit., "Labor Trends;" p.15.
5. Ibid, p.6.
6. Ibid, p.8.
7. Op. Cit., Macias; p.13.
8. Op. Cit., "A Union Report"
9... Op. Cit.,. "Labor: Trends;." p-.16
10. Op. Cit., Macias; p.6.
11. Verbal report from Latin American area advisor, Bureau
of International Labor Affairs, U.S. Department of Labor.
12.. Petition of the Leaders of the United Confederation of
Workers to Sandinista Commandante Bayardo Arce Castano, p.2.
13. Unclassified attachment to 3/1/83 AFL-CIO letter to
Bureau of International Labor Affairs, U.S. Department of Labor.
14. Op. Cit., Macias; p.10.
15. Op. Cit.,"Petition;" p.5.
16. Op. Cit., "A Union Report."
17. Op. Cit., "Petition;" p.4.
18. Op. Cit., "Attachment to AFL-CIO letter."
19. State Department Cable, Managua 2268, unclassified
paragraphs 2, 3, and 4.
20. Confederation of Central American Workers: Press
release; June 13, 1983; San Jose, Costa Rica. Also cable from
American Embassy, Managua, 3294, July 29, 1983, unclassified.
21. Op. Cit., "A Union Report."
22. Ibid
23. Ibid
24. Ibid
25. Ibid
26. Ibid
27. Op. Cit. Macias; p.12.
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WHITE HOUSE
0
WHITE HOUSE DIGEST
is a service provided by the
White House Office of Media Relations and Planning
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CUBA
2
AUGUST 10, 1983
Since Castro's coming to power, Soviet supported Cuba has
been violating her neighbors' right to self determination by
attempting to "spread the revolution" throughout Latin America --
recruiting Communist and other radical leftist insurgents and
providing them funds, arms, advisors, and organization. The
Cubans and their Soviet allies are attempting to subjugate the
entire Caribbean basin into a second Eastern Europe.
Cuban intervention has helped establish a
pro-Soviet/Cuban regime in Managua. Today, the Communist leaders
of Nicaragua are threatening the fledgling democracy in El
Salvador. Cuban agents have tried to destabilize Guatemala for
two decades. To fully understand what Cuban aggression means to
the people of the region, it is important to to-look at the
Castro government's appalling record on human rights.
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CLASSIC TOTALITARIANS
In over two decades, that record has shown no sign of
improvement. Like other Communist countries, Cuba is a tightly
controlled, highly centralized, totalitarian state. The
government fiercely represses those it identifies as being "in
opposition to the state," wantonly violating their human rights.
Over the years Castro has jailed thousands of Cubans
who opposed or were suspected of opposing or criticizing
Communist rule. Most sources place the current number of
political prisoners at up to 1000, some of whom have been in jail
since 1959, making them some of the longest-held political
prisoners in the world.
Prisoners are treated brutally. In defiance, several
hundred prisoners, known as "Plantados," have refused
"reeducation" and refuse to wear uniforms that would identify
them as common criminals. As punishment they have been denied
food, medicine, and clothing.
TORTURE
Beatings are common. Prisoners are sometimes punished
by being held, naked, in cold, dark isolation cells for long
periods. According to reports received by Freedom House, the
non-partisan human rights organization, the Cubans, like the
Soviets, are using psychiatric hospitals as prisons.
Recently a long-time political prisoner, poet Armando
Valladares, gave the world a chilling first hand account of Cuban
treatment of political prisoners. In December 1982, Valladares,
only lately released, testified in Congress that repression of
Cuban political prisoners is "ferocious." According to
Valladares, the Cuban police forced his mother to write a letter
denouncing him. The letter was dictated by a Cuban secret
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policeman holding a court order that would have sent Valladares'
sister to jail had her mother refused to cooperate.
Valladares testified that the imprisoned include
children and that physical and psychological torture is common.
While-in prison, he was brutally beaten and at one point was
denied food for more than 40 days, losing the use of his legs as
a result.
Amnesty International has transmitted a report that
last year 29 prisoners were executed for political offenses.
CUBAN DISSIDENTS
Though Castro claims that Cubans are free to emigrate,
and though some emigration, as in the Mariel exodus in 1980, is
strongly encouraged, the Cuban government routinely refuses to
allow citizens to leave the country. This restriction is applied
especially, though not exclusively, to political opponents of the
regime, and especially to opponents who have been imprisoned.
Cuban poet Angel Cuadra Landrove was released from
Castro's prisons in April 1982. Though he holds several foreign
visas, the Cuban government will not allow him to leave the
country. Andres Vargas Gomez, a Cuban intellectual and diplomat,
also served many years in Castro's political prisons. Now out of
prison, he is still denied the exit permit required for
emigration.
The case of Cuban Ambassador Gustavo Arcos Bergnes is
especially instructive. Arcos fought and was wounded at Castro's
side during the famous July 26, 1953 attack on Bastista's Moncada
barracks. When Castro took power, Arcos was named Cuban
Ambassador to Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. But, in
the mid-1960s, he was recalled and imprisoned for four years for
his democratic beliefs.
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In 1979, his son was gravely injured in a motorcycle
accident in Florida. The U.S. Congress appealed to the Cuban
government to allow Arcos to leave Cuba to visit his son. The
appeal was refused. Months later, Arcos was charged with
attempting to leave the island without the necessary papers and
was given a seven year prison sentence.
The reverse policy, forced emigration, can be just as
cruel. Suddenly, in 1980, the emigration gates were opened.
During the rush that followed out of the port of Mariel, when
125,000 Cuban "boat people" fled to our shores, the Castro
government shipped along many of Cuba's psychiatric patients. The
American Psychiatric Association denounced this action on
September 28, 1980, saying it was:
"deeply concerned about the plight of numerous recent
refugees who have been identified as mentally ill.
There is growing evidence that many of these Cuban
citizens were bused from Cuban mental hospitals to the
Freedom Flotilla to the United States. If this is the
case, the transplantation of these patients constitutes
a grossly inhumane act since it deprives the patients
of their right to psychiatric treatment within the
context of their culture and primary language."
DISAPPEARED
American citizenship has been no protection. Several
dual-national Cuban Americans have been arrested while visiting
relatives in Cuba. In eight cases the United States has not been
given access to these Cuban Americans.
As in the Soviet Union, in Cuba opposition political
parties, like all forms of dissent, are outlawed. There is no
freedom of the press or of speech. All print and electronic media
are owned and censored by the Ministry of Culture. Freedom of
expression is further hampered by a widespread informer network,
part of which is institutionalized in the neighborhood
"Committees for the Defense of. the Revolution."
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"ARTISTIC" STANDARDS
Artists have been jailed for not conforming with the
government's artistic guidelines. In 1977, for instance,
journalist Amaro Gomez was arrested and sentenced to eight years
in prison for possessing his own unpublished and uncirculated
poems and plays. Freedom House states that "writing or speaking
against the system,.even in private, is severely repressed-."
Though literacy is growing in Cuba, less and less can be written
or read.
Those who practice religion are excluded from the
Communist Party and thus from responsible positions in the
government or the army. The religious also face discrimination
in employment, housing, and schooling. Some believers have been
prosecuted for their differences with the government. Others have
lost their jobs or have been excluded from universities. All
Catholic Church-run schools have been closed and the church is
forbidden its traditional role in education.
JAILING WORKERS-
Free trade unions, collective bargaining, and strikes
are all forbidden. In the last year, over 200 workers have been
prosecuted for trying to organize strikes in the sugar and
construction industries. Five trade unionists were condemned to
death. But, according to reports, their sentences were reduced to
30 years after their cases became public knowledge. The Cuban
government, after at first denying the facts, has said the
"terrorists" received severe sentences.
At the recent conference of the World Federation of
Trade Unions in Prague, the Cubans defended the sentences,
explaining they were necessary to block any possible attempts to
set up a Solidarity-style organization.
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Rather than permit citizens to join independent groups,
the government enrolls people in mass organizations such as the
five million member Committee for the Defense of the Revolution.
These. non-democratic groups are used to channel the people's
energies toward party-approved goals and to isolate people from
more fruitful, but to the Party, dangerous associations.
As a result of 24 years of Communist control, more than
one million Cubans, more than 10 percent of the island's
inhabitants, have fled their homeland. An estimated 200,000 more
have applied to emigrate, even though those who apply are usually
stripped of their jobs,- their ration cards, and their housing,
and their children are forbidden to attend school.
THE GREAT CUBAN "EXPERIMENT"
All-in-all the great Cuban "experiment" has developed
into nothing more original than a tropical version of the Soviet
Union, complete with political prisoners and total government
control of human fredoms. And that is precisely what those who
are trying to spread revolution to other Central American
countries have in mind for the entire region.
It is no wonder then that in Nicaragua there is growing
opposition to the Sandinista regime, nor that the people of El
Salvador, 80 percent of whom voted in recent elections, are
resisting the attempts of Communist terrorists to destroy
democracy in that country.
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WHITE HOUSE
WHITE HOUSE DIGEST
is a service provided by the
White House Office of Media Relations and Planning
THE PLO IN CENTRAL AMERICA
July 20, 1983
The Palestine Liberation organization is an active
ally of Communist revolutionaries throughout Central America.
The PLO supplied training and materiel for the Sandinista
revolution in Nicaragua, and is.still supplying military aid
and advisors to the Communist Sandinista government. For
their part, Sandinista revolutionaries were fighting beside =
their PLO comrades in the Middle East as early as 1970,
are anti-Semitic and are dedicated to the destruction of
Israel.
Right now, the PLO is giving the Salvadoran Communists
the same sort of help. Since the late 1960s, the PLO has
been working with Fidel Castro and his network of Latin
American revolutionaries and has developed ties to revolution-
ary organizations in a number of Latin American count:_es.
"BLOOD UNITY"
Though this alliance has received little attention in
the press, neither the PLO nor its Latin Communist allies
trouble to deny it. On June 7, 1979, six weeks before t:.e
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Sandinistas came to power, Sandinista press spokesman Jorge
Mandi delivered a particularly strong testimonial to the
alliance:
There is a longstanding blood unity
between us and the Palestinians. Many
of the units belonging to the Sandinista
movements were at Palestinian revolution-
ary bases in Jordan. In the early 1970s,
Nicaraguan and Palestinian blood was
spilled together in Amman and in other
places during the Black September Battles.
It is natural therefore, that in our war
against Somoza, we received Palestinian
aid for our revolution in various forms.
Mandi also made it clear that the Sandinistas had
participated in PLO terrorist acts such as.hijacking.l
START WITH CUBA
Cuba has been the great organizing center and
supply depot for Communist revolution in Central America.
Fidel Castro introduced the PLO into the region and has
vigorously promoted and supported the PLO's activities there.
Until the mid-1960s, Castro supported Israel. But,
in 1966, Castro sponsored the First Conference of the Organi-
zation of Solidarity of the Peoples of Asia, Africa, and
Latin America, bringing together revolutionary leaders
from three continents in order to get them to work together.
PLO representatives attended, and Castro began efforts
to make the PLO a part of international revolutionary activities,
especially in Latin America.
By 1968, Cuban intelligence and military personnel
were assisting the PLO in North Africa and Iraq. By 1969,
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 Cuban officers were in joint training with PLO officers in
the U.S.S.R. In June 1969, Cubans from that training class
participated in a joint raid with the PLO in the Sinai
desert.2
In 1972, Castro met with PLO leaders in Algeria and the
two sides agreed to step up their joint activities-3 The
PLO undertook to augment Cuban training of Latin American
terrorists with specialized training in Lebanon, South Yemen,
and Libya. In 1973, Castro broke relations with Israel.
Cuba had become one of Israel's most dedicated enemies. In
1974, the PLO opened its first Latin American office in
Havana.4
Since being introduced to the region by Castro, the
PLO has developed ties with revolutionary groups in nearly
half the countries in the region.
BOUVIA.
"E.LN."
ERITREA
"ERITREAN
UBERATION
FRONT"
WEST
GERMANY.
"BAAOER
ME1NNOf9
..RED ARMY
FACTION"
GUATEMALA.
"MR.1T
IRELANO.
"IRISH
REPUBLICAN
ARMY"
HOLLAND
.'RED
HELP'?
CHILE.
..MIR"
Inta4II sa s informado has flaked the PLO with tenorlstt said haerrft ortsaisndos wooed the world.
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SPAIN-
BASQUE "SENTA"
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- 4 -
THE NICARAGUA CONNECTION
Cooperation between the Sandinistas and the PLO goes.
back at least to 1969, seven or eight years before most
Americans had. heard of the Sandinistas. That year, some 50
Sandinista guerrillas went to Tyre for training under the
PLO.5 Other Sandinistas went to train in terror at PLO
camps in Algeria.6
The Sandinista terrorists fit right in with their PLO
counterparts. It has been reported that Pedro Arauz, a
Sandinista who had hijacked a Nicaraguan airliner in 1969,
trained under the PLO in 1970.7 As the quote from Jorge
Mandi makes clear, Sandinista troops fought beside the PLO
against King Hussein of Jordan in 1970.8
Thomas Borge, Interior Minister of the Sandinista
regime, has confirmed that he and other Sandinist-leaders
were trained by Al Fatah, the leading PLO group, prior
to 1970. Borge repeatedly spent much of the early '70s
working for Castro, and was frequently in the Middle East,
where he used Libyan money and PLO assistance to obtain arms
for Central American guerrilla movements.9
The first official confirmation of the PLO-Sandinista
alliance came in February 1978. The two groups issued a
joint communique in Mexico City that affirmed the "ties of
solidarity" existing between the two revolutionary organiza-
tions. They were united in their hatred of what they called
the "racist state of Israel."
In a similar incident in March of 1978, the Sandinistas
went so far as to join the Democratic Front for the Liberation
of Palestine in a joint "declaration of war" against Israel.
As the Sandinistas became more confident of victory, PLO
aid became more concrete. Early in 1979, shortly before the
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final Sandinista victory, the PLO sent an arms shipment to
the Sandinistas but it was intercepted by the government of
Morocco.10 During the final weeks of the revolution, several
large shipments of arms arrived from the Middle East. 11
According to one source, Thomas Borge arranged for a shipment
of guns to be sent from North Korea on a ship owned and
operated by the PLO. 12
Within two weeks of the Sandinista victory in July
1979, the Sandinistas sent a mission to Beirut to establish
official contacts with the PLO. The PLO facilitated a
$12 million loan to the Sandinistas.13 Today, Nicaragua
is one of the few countries in the world where the PLO
mission is officially designated as an Embassy and the
ranking PLO official is referred to as "Ambassador" -- a
testimony to the importance the Sandinistas attach to their
PLO connections.
THE STORMS OF REVOLUTION
In 1980, on the first anniversary of the Sandinista
Communist takeover, Yasser Arafat came to Managua as an
honored guest. Thomas Borge proclaimed, "the PLO cause is
the cause of the Sandinistas." And Arafat replied, "the
links between us are not new; your comrades did not come
to our country just to train, but to fight. . . .Your enemies
are our enemies?14
The PLO information bulletin, Palestine, commented:
There is no doubt there is a common
line between Nicaragua, Iran, and
Palestine. A common front against
a common enemy. . . .
The Palestinian revolution understands
the international dimensions of its
struggle and its international task of
supporting, within its capabilitiesl5
international liberation movements.
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Current estimates suggest that there are about 50 PLO
personnel in Nicaragua. Some are involved in training
Sandinista military in the use of Eastern Bloc weapons, some
training pilots and flying helicopters, maintaining aircraft
and training Salvadoran guerrillas to export Communist terror
to that country.
IN EL'SALVADOR
There is also a strong alliance between the PLO and
the'Salvadoran Communist guerrillas. The Salvadoran
Communists, like the Sandinistas, share the PLO's fierce
opposition to Israel.
One of the first clear signs of sympathy between the
two groups emerged when one of the major Salvadoran Communist?
guerrilla groups, the'Popular Liberation Forces (FPL)
kidnapped and murdered the South African Ambassador to
El Salvador. The FPL demanded, as part of the ransom,
that the Salvadoran government break relations with Israel
and establish official relations with the PLO.
Just a month later, the People's Revolutionary army
(ERP), another Salvadoran communist guerrilla group, bombed
the Israeli embassy in San Salvador to show "solidarity
with the Palestinian people," and demanded that the government
recognize the PLO.
In May 1980, a delegation from Revolutionary Coordination
of the Masses (CRM), the unified political front for all the
important Salvadoran Communist groups, met in Beirut with
one of Yasser Arafat's deputies, Abu Jihad, and with George
Habash, head of the terrorist Popular Front for the Libera-
tion of Palestine, and arrived at agreements for training
programs and arms purchases. The first group of Salvadoran
trainees finished a "course" in-PLO-style terrorism at an
Al Fatah camp in June, 1980.16
tV
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On July 23, 1980 representatives of the Salvadoran United
Revolutionary Directorate (DRU) which was then the unified
military command for the various Salvadoran Communist groups,
met with Arafat in Managua. Arafat promised them arms and
aircraft.17 Later in the year, Arafat did send some arms to
the DRU,18 and according to published reports, PLO fighters
were sent to El Salvador in September19
The alliance picked up steam in 1981. In March,
Shafik Handal, a Salvadoran of Palestinian descent and
head of El Salvador's Communist Party, met with Arafat
and representatives of Habash's Popular Front in Lebanon.
The meeting resulted in a joint communique that, among other
points, included an agreement to continue cooperation between
the unified Salvadoran guerrilla groups and Habash's group-20
By early 1981, according to Congressional testimony
from Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs John Bushnell, there had been "a massive influx of
arms from Soviet and other Communist sources. Radical Arab
states and the Palestine Liberation organization, and the
terrorist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine have
furnished funds, arms, and training.
In January 1982, Arafat said publicly that PLO guerrillas
were serving in El Salvador.21 And documents captured in
Beirut during the summer of 1982 reveal that there were
Salvadoran guerrillas in PLO camps in Lebanon.
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
Though these fragments of information have left a
clear trail, even without them there would be no doubt
about the relationship between the Central American Communists
and PLO terror, because both sides have loudly proclaimed it.
In 1981, Yasser Arafat spoke in words too clear to be mis-
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understood or explained away:
we are a great revolution that can
never be intimidated. We have
connections with all the revolution-
ary movements throughout the world,
in E1 Salvador, in Nicaragua -- and
I reiterate Salvado52 - and else-
where in the world.
FOOTNOTES
1. Al Wa= (Kuwaiti newspaper) June 7, 1979.
2. Palestine (PLO Information Bulletin), June, 1980.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Hadar, The Jerusalem Post, August 14, 1981.
6. Washington Post, July 12, 1979.
7. Bell, Human Events, November 25, 1978.
8. Israeli Defense Force-paper, "Report -- The PLO and
International Terror," March 1981.
9. Newsletter, Jewish Insitute for National Security Affairs,
June, 1983.
10. State Department paper, "Communist, PLO and Libyan
Support for Nicaragua and the Salvadoran Insurgents."
May 25, 1983.
11. U.S. News and World Report, September 1, 1980.
12. Op. cit., Hadar.
13. London Daily Telegraph, December 2, 1981.
14. Off. cit., Israeli Defense Force
15. Palestine, July 16-31, 1980.
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Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Briefing, May 16, 1982.
17. U.S. Department of State Special Report #30, Feb. 23, 1981.
18.. Op. cit., Israeli Ministry.
19. Op_ cit., U.S. News.
20. 0O. cit., Israeli Ministry.
21. 2a. cit., Palestine, July 16-30, 1980.
22. Associated Press, April 14, 1981.
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WHITE HOUSE
WHrr HOUSE DIGEST
is a service provided by the
White House Office of Media Relations and Planning
July L3, ]983
CENTRAL AMERICA: FACTS NOT WIDELY KNOWN
MAY AND JUNE IN NICARAGUA
The first step in figuring out what is at stake in Central America
is understanding the Sandinista regime. Are the Sandinistas merely
"leftwing" reformers whose tilt.towards Marxism is balanced by an
equally strong commitment to Catholicism?
Or, are the present rulers of Nicaragua dedicated strong-Cuban
Communists, enemies even of democratic socialism, and allies
intent on subverting Central America. into the Soviet bloc?
Knowing the answer is essential to understanding the threat, if any,
to El Salvador and the rest of the region.
Unfortunately, it is increasingly clear that the present Sandinista
government is a Communist one, ready and willing to bring the region
into the Soviet orbit. The evidence has been mounting for several
years, but even a brief selection of events from the past two months,
which we-give here, is revealing.
TRUE DEMOCRATS ABANDON SANDINISTAS
Much evidence comes from former allies and supporters of the
Sandinista revolution. The case of Eden Pastora, Commander Zero,
has been well known for some time. But only a month ago, on
May 19, 1983,Misael Brenes, Nicaraguan Consul to Choluteca, Honduras
defected to that country, requesting political asylum. When the
Sandinistas charged that Brenes had been kidnapped, he called a
public press conference to refute the charge. He explained that
he had abandoned the Sandinistas because he was "convinced that
Communism has advanced in Nicaragua to the point where there is no
other path than armed struggle to detain it." He added:
I am not the first and I won't be the last of the
officials in the Nicaraguan foreign service to break
with the regime of the nine Sandinista commandantes;
I am just one more. I assert that presently Nicaragua
is a zclcny of the Communist countries where the Russiar-s
and the Cubans are the owners of the Nicaraguan people.
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2
There are 1500 to 2000 Cuban military and security advisors, and
an additional 100 from the Soviet Bloc. There are 6,000 Cuban
"civilian" advisors and 200 Soviet Bloc advisors.
REVOLUTION FOR EXTORT
One former Sandinista ally who is not a Nicaraguan recently gave
even stronger testimony. Efrain Duarte Salgado had been chief
of the most active cell of a Honduran terrorist group, the Popular
Revolutionary Forces (FPR). He disappeared suddenly in May, then
surfaced at a May 27 press conference in Guatemala. He not only
called upon his former colleagues to give-up armed struggle and
pursue democratic means. to power, he also detailed the history of
foreign influence over 1iis group.
The Sandinistas started providing economic support to his cell soon
after it was founded in 1980. But the Nicaraguan aid "was always
conditional in the sense that we had to undertake different violent
acts to estani 1ze- a Honduran government and try to create a
Marxist-Leninist reg~mmee. "
He also explained that intelligence and paramilitary training was
easily available from Cuba, and that while in Cuba he had established
contact with the Armed People's Revolutionary Organization (OPRA),
a Guatemalan terrorist group. He claimed responsibility for the
armed attack against the US Embassy in Tegucigalpa, Honduras in 1980,
and for placing explosives in the offices of IBM and the Salvadoran
airline, TACA, in 1982.-1/
Among Central Americans, there is little doubt about the Sandinistas'
willingness to export the revolution. One recent example is a poll,
taken by a reputable local firm in March of Costa Rican citizens.
in this peaceful, democratic country 70 percent of the people see
Nicaragua as a military threat and 56 percent say Nicaragua is trying
to weaken the Costa Rican government. Interestingly, 50 percent
see Cuba as responsible for conditions that could lead to war in the
region and 40 percent say-the same of the Soviet Union.
-ELECTIONS?
If the Sandinistas seem eager to export Communism, their treatment
of their own people is far more typical of Communists than of
democratic socialists.
The Sandinistas came to power in 1979 promising elections that have
yet to be held; they have been promised for 1985. But just last month
according to the offidial Radio Sandino, Interior Minister Thomas
Barge threatened to postpone them again, blaming the threatened delay
on American "aggression.."2/It should be noted that during the first
year and a half after the revolution the American government fully
supported the Sandinistas with $118 million in aid, vet there was no
,move to. hold elections.
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INTERNAL REPRESSION
Elections aside, the Nicaraguans have increasingly denied their
people basic liberties, substituting Communist attitudes towards
rights for western ones.
On May 26, the Council of State extended the state of emergency for
one year, until May 30, 1984, permitting the government to continue
prior censorship of the media and to hold prisoners indefinitely
without recourse to. habeas co us.3/ The sate of emergency has
been in effect since. March 1982.
On May 18,. Nicaraguan immigration authorities refused to allow
Luis Rivas Leiva, president of the opposition Social Democratic
Party, to leave the country.- They stopped him " at the airport as
he was about to leave for a trip to Costa Rica.4/
In late May, the Sandinistas- expropriated a banana plantation
belonging to Ramiro Guardian, president of an agricultural private
sector organization, for political. reasons. Commenting in an
interview in La.Prensa, on American restrictions on Nicaraguan
sugar, Guardian has said, "The United States and Nicaragua are both
sovereign and independent ountries and each has the right to buy
and sell. as they see fit." / The junta responded by taking his
farm. Junta member Sergio Ramirez explained, "We think that this
gentleman cannot be associated with the revolutionary state because
we need proprietors that are clear about the dangers represented
by measures from the United States."fi/
SOLIDARITY?
Finally,. the Sandinistas have fallen into the contradiction that
afflicts all Communist governments -- the workers' state has been
persecuting the working man. and his right to organize freely.
Further, in a typically totalitarian move the Sandinistas have
outlawed strikes.
Again, there have been many examples, but the most recent involves
the stevedores' union of the Pacific port of Corinto. After the 1979
revolution, the union affiliated with the Sandinista Workers Central
(CST), a Sandinista-controlled union. But many dissatisfied union
members wish to switch to the Confederation for Labor Unification (CUS)
an independent organization that belongs to the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions and has strong ties to the AFL-CIO.
The Sandinistas have used arrests, mob action, threats, and other
forms of intimidation to keep the union allied with the CST. Some
union leaders have been forced to flee Nicaragua, and one, Zacarias
Hernandes, has become a leader in the exile labor movement. Amnesty
International has adopted two of the arrested stevedores as cases
of svecial interest..
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In mid-March, when the union's executive board attempted to
switch from CST to CUS,the. Sandinistas responded by having militiamen
occupy union headquarters. And the Ministry of Labor disallowed the
executive board's decision, ruling that only a two-thirds vote of
the membership could effect the switch.
The. Ministry, however, prevented a vote by initiating an audit of
the union's books, forbidding it to hold a congress until the audit
was completed. Turning up nothing of substance, the Ministry allowed
the union to schedule a congress for June..
But on May 21, when leading CUS officials, including Secretary
General Bayardo Lopez, traveled to Corinto to meet with several
hundred stevedores, they found the entrance to the meeting place
blocked by a Sandinista mob. Some were armed and wearing militia
uniforms. The mob attacked the CUS leaders with fists and sticks
and forced them to flee.Z/ Since then, nine union leaders have been
arrested .L/
Even this brief selection of incidents, all taken from a period
of only a few months, illustrates the character of the Sandinista
junta.. It is not a collection of "leftists," or democratic
socialists, or "Christian. Marxists," but of totalitarians, dependent
on the Soviets and eager to bring Central America into the totalitarian
world.
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N. 0 T E S
1. Unclassified State Department cable, Tegucigalpa 5570.
2. Radio Sandino, May 16, 1983.
3. State Department cable, Managua 2320, unclassified
paragraph 1.
4. Panama City radio station ACAN, May 18, 1983.
5. La Prensa, May 12, 1983.
6. Barricada, May 26, 1983.
7. State Department cable, Managua 2268, unclassified
paragraphs 2, 3, and 4.
8. Press release, 13 June 1983 from the Confederation of
Central American Workers, San Jose, Costa Rica.l.
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WHITE HOUSE
0
U
WHITE HOUSE DIGEST
is a service provided by the
White House Office of Media Relations and Planning
July 6, 1983
This edition of the White House Digest focuses on Soviet
and Cuban activities in the Caribbean region. In three
parts, the information contained herein provides a brief
outline of the basic facts about the extent and nature of
that activity.
1. Soviet/Cuban Threat and Buildup in the Caribbean
Since 1978 we have seen an ever increasing Soviet presence in
the Caribbean Region. The USSR through its surrogate--Cuba--
has been able to establish a permanent presence in the western
Hemisphere.
The Characteristics of the Soviet/Cuban Build-u : Men, Monev, Material
- The Soviet Union maintains and reinforces its presence by:
-- Deploying its long range Bear reconnaisance and anti-submarine
warfare aircraft to the region on a regular basis.
-- Deploying its naval combatants for joint training exercises
with Cuba.
-- Providing a Soviet Brigade of approximately 3,000 men stationed
near Havana and an additional presence of 2,500 military advisors.
-- Providing Cuba with 8,000 civilian advisors.
-- Maintaining the largest intelligence mcnitoring/telecommunications
facility outside the USSR.
- In 1982, the Soviets and Cubans had 50 times as many military
advisors in Latin America as did the US. Last year the Soviets
increased their military advisors in Cuba by 500.
- The USSR has also provided a steady stream of military equipment
to Cuba. In 1981 alone, Moscow provided 66,000 metric tons in military
assistance valued at $600 million., Deliveries in 1982 exceeded 1981
by 2,000 metric tons and amounted to over $1 billion in military
assistance in the last two -ears.
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- Cuban armed forces have grown to a size disproportionate for
defensive needs:
Cuba possesses an Army of over 225,000; a Navy of 11,000 and
air defense forces of 16,000, not including 500 thousand para-
military troops.
Cubans have well over 200 MIG fighter aircraft.
Castro has about 65,000 Cubans serving overseas: 40,000
military (25,000 troops in Angola, about 12,000 in Ethiopia)
and 25,000 civilian technicians.
Cuba has 2.3% of its population in the regular armed forces,
one of every 20 Cubans participates in some security mission.
- Moscow underwrites the activities of its Cuban surrogate at a cost
exceeding $4 billion annually (1/4 of Cuba's GNP) and supports efforts
to collect funds, arms, and supplies from the communist bloc for
guerrilla activities in Central America and the Caribbean.
- The number of Soviet Bloc academic grants offered annually to
Latin American students jumped from 400 in the 1960's to about
7,000 now. In 1979 Moscow admitted to sponsoring 7,000 Cubans
for studies in the Soviet Union. Last year 700 Nicaraguans were
reported studying there and an additional 300 scholarships were
being provided. Scholarships include free room, board, tuition,
transportation, medical care and a small stipend.
- About 3,000 Latin American students, including 1,600 Nicaraguans,
are studying in Cuba. Cuba has constructed 17 schools for foreigners,
each costing about $2 million to build and about $600,000 to operate
annually.
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II. Spreading Soviet/Cuban Intervention Throughout The Region
- The implication of the Soviet/Cuban buildup is that it provides
a platform for spreading subversion and supporting guerrillas through-
out the region.
- It was Cuba that acted as the catalyst to organize and unify the
far-left groups in El Salvador, assisted in developing military
strategy, and encouraged the guerrillas to launch the ill-fated
"final" offensive in January 1981. Cuba continues to be vital in
training and supporting continuing offensives in El Salvador by
funneling weapons and supplies via Nicaragua to rebel forces in
El Salvador.
- Castro is actively engaged in converting Nicaragua into another
Cuba. There are approximately 5,500 Cuban civilian advisors and
about 1,750 Cuban military and security advisors in Nicaragua.
- The Sandinistas themselves have about 75,000 men under arms in
their active armed forces, reserves, militia, police and security
forces. At its present strength, the Sandinista Army represents the
largest military force in the history;of Central America. The
Sandinistas have built 36 new military garrisons since Somoza's
downfall.
- Approximately 70 Nicaraguans were sent to Bulgaria for training
as pilots and mechanics. Existing landing strips in Nicaragua are
being lengthened and will be able to accommodate the most sophisticated
Soviet jet aircraft. MIGs could be flown in. quickly from Cuba.
- In Grenada, which has a strategic location in the eastern
Caribbean, we are concerned because the Soviets and Cubaii& are
constructing facilities, including an airfield, the eventual use
of which is unknown.
- In Suriname, the Cuban Ambassador is a senior intelligence officer
who was formerly Chief of the Caribbean Section of the Americas
Department of the Cuban Communist Party. The America department is
responsible for Cuban covert activities, and is much more important
in formulating Cuban policy toward Latin America than is the Cuban
Foreign Ministry. The Cuban..Ambassador maintains a very close
relationship with LTC Desire Bouterse, Suriname's military leader,
and has continuous access to key leaders.
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The Threat Posed by Soviet Expansionism
- Such communist expansion could lead to an extensive and permanent
Soviet presence and an increased Soviet strategic capability in the
region. This would create significant military consequences for
the US:
-- It could place hostile forces and weapons systems within striking
distance of targets in the US.
-- It could provide bases for use in covert operations against the
US and our neighbors.
-- It could provide for prepositioning of Soviet equipment, supplies
and ammunition in our hemisphere.
-- It could allow the Soviet Pacific and Atlantic fleets to
operate near our shores without having to return to the USSR
for maintenance.
-- It could threaten our Caribbean Sea Lines of Communication
through which a large volume of our goods pass; thus endangering
the economic well-being of our nation.
-- And finally, it could cause the US to divert scarce resources
in manpower and materiel from other areas of the world to protect
an area previously considered militarily secure. _
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WHITE HOUSE
WHITE HOUSE DIGEST
is a service provided by the
White House Office of Media Relations and Planning June 1, 1983
NICARAGUA'S SANDINISTAS: HAVING IT ALL WAYS
When the Nicaraguan revolutionaries succeeded in over-
throwing the reviled Somoza regime in 1979, they received
enormous support from within and outside of the country because
of their promises to replace a dictatorship with a democracy.-
The Sandinista regime that subsequently came to power in
Nicaragua promised elections, respect for human rights, a mixed-
economy, and other long-sought reforms. But as President Reagan
pointed out:
The Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua turned out to
be just an exchange of one autocratic rule for another,
and the people still have no freedom, no democratic
rights, and even more poverty. Even worse than its
predecessor, it is helping Cuba and the Soviets to
destabilize our hemisphere.
Yet, the Sandinistas still claim extensive overseas support
because of their ability to "have it all ways" in the court of
international opinion. Distinguishing the myths and realities of
the Sandinistas is vital to understanding the nature of-many of
the so-called "national liberation movements" in Central America.
WESTERN AID/COMMUNIST ARMS
Many Americans were misled by the Sandinistas because the.
coalition that overthrew Somoza was broad-based and.contained
many democrats, including representatives from labor, the press,
political parties, the business community and the church. But
from the beginning, many of the best-organized revolutionaries
were armed Marxist-Leninists with long-standing ties to Fidel
Castro, the PLO, the other anti-democratic groups. When the
coalition finally overthrew Somoza, the democrats and communists
pursued different goals.
Various members of the international community also sought
different objectives in Nicaragua. The United States and other
Western countries rushed economic assistance to the battle-torn
nation while the communist bloc sent arms and military advisors.
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At the end of the revolution, Nicaragua's economy was
devastated; 40,000 people had lost their lives, and many more
were homeless. In the first 10 weeks, the U.S. provided $14.6
million in emergency relief such as food, medical supplies,
housing assistance and a grant to the grain stabilization
institute. During the first year and a half, the U.S. govern-
ment authorized $118 million in economic assistance for the
Sandinista government from the U.S. -- more than from any other
developed country.
In addition, the U.S. actively supported all loans to '
.Nicaragua from international lending institutions, helping them
receive $262 million from the InterAmerican Development Bank,
about twice what Somoza received in total between 1960 and ?1979.
But while the U.S. was helping Nicaragua recover economic-
ally from the revolution, the Soviet bloc helped to arm the
Sandinistas. Because of the buildup of military supplies, the
Nicaraguan arsenal now includes advanced weapons such as Soviet-
made T-55 tanks, amphibious ferries, helicopters, and transport
aircraft. Airports are being upgraded to accommodate sophis-
ticated jet fighters, such as Soviet MIG jets. And the entire
society has been militarized, with a new secret police, an
expanded army and militia, more reservists and new neighborhood
bloc committees.
Nicaragua, with a population of 2.7 million, now has 22,000
active duty forces -- at least twice the size of Somoza's
National Guard -- and with its 50,000 reservists and militia, has
forces under arms larger than the armies of the rest of Central
America combined. To accommodate and train this force, 36 new
Cuban designed military garrisons have been built, adding to the
13 inherited from Somoza. Sandinista soldiers are trained by
Cubans, the PLO, Bulgarians, and other Soviet-bloc soldiers; arms
...are supplied by Vietnam, Libya, the USSR and their allies.
In all, the West provided Nicaragua with about $1.5 billion
in economic aid while the Soviets helped the Sandinistas build up
a military arsenal far beyond its defense needs. The U.S.
offered assistance not only because of its traditional humani-
tarian principles but also because it hoped the democrats would
prevail with Western support. On the other hand, the Communist
bloc hoped that by militarizing the country, they would further
Soviet expansionist policies.
Unfortunately, U.S. assistance and the good faith that came
with it had no moderating effect on the communist Sandinistas in
the new government. As is often the case, those with the guns
won the power struggle and the communists defeated the democrats.
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C) . y
INTERNAL REPRESSION/EXTERNAL RESPECTABILITY
Many Americans are also confused about the nature of the
Nicaragua regime because the Sandinistas enjoya degree of inter-
national respectability that such a repressive regime would
ordinarily not receive. Nicaragua won a seat on the U.N.
Security Council in 1982 and hosted a preparatory meeting of the
Non-Aligned Movement last winter. They continue to receive
support from the Socialist International and many Western
countries, despite the repressive measures used to consolidate
their totalitarian control over the nation's population and
institutions.
The Sandinistas worked hard to attain their international
standing. The Nicaraguan foreign minister and other government
officials during extensive travels abroad stressed the alleged
Sandinista commitment to non-alignment, pluralism and peace. The
worldwide Cuban and Soviet propaganda networks also provided
extensive aid to the Sandinistas.
Yet while Sandinista diplomats are hailed internationally,
their government at home has systematically abridged the most
basic freedoms of the Nicaraguan people.
For example, despite their promises to hold "the first free
elections (their) country will have in this century," the
Sandinistas now say no elections -- certainly no elections of a
kind we would recognize -- are in sight. They originally said
their countrymen would be allowed to choose their own leaders in
1985, but a member of the Directorate recently said that
elections may not be held even then. In the meantime, government
decisions are made by the Sandinista-dominated Council of State,
which ratifies the decrees of the nine-member Directorate.
Furthermore, the Sandinistas have harassed independent
political parties, denied them permission to have political
rallies, and attacked their headquarters. Leaders from MDN, the
Social Democratic Party, and the Democratic Conservative Party
are now living in exile.
The Sandinistas have also nearly extinguished the freedom of
the press. La Prensa, for years the voice of opposition to the
Somoza regime, has been closed repeatedly; it and other indepen-
dent news services are now heavily censored. Government-con-
trolled newspapers and the media publish news as ordered by the
Ministry of Interior.
The freedom of religion is also under attack. The Sandin-
istas banned Archbishop Obando Baravo from performing mass on
television, and have shut down the Catholic Church's radio
station several times. Clergy have been attacked and harassed.
And in an eight page letter of support to the nation's Bishops,
Pope John Paul II described the Sandinista attempt to organize a
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parallel "People's Church" as "absurd and dangerous" and a "grave
deviation." When the Pope visited Nicaragua in March 1983, his
mass was interrupted by heckling and chanting, insulting the
Pontiff in a manner unprecedented in modern history. A variety
of Protestant sects, including Evangelicals, Mormons, Adventists,
Jehovah's Witnesses, and Moravians, have been attacked; their
centers taken over by the Sandinista Defense Committees and in
some cases, they have not been returned to the sects. The
Sandinista military has burned more than 50 Moravian churches in
the Atlantic Coast area.
The Sandinistas' totalitarian attempts to control every
aspect of Nicaraguan life has been especially tragic for the
Miskito, Swno, and Rama Indians on the country's Atlantic Coast.
The government has tried to'replace the traditional governing
Councils of Elders with Sandinista Defense Committees. Villages
that resist and even some that do not have been burned to the
ground. Indians have been moved from their traditional homelands
to detention centers. Many Indians and Indian leaders have been
arrested or killed; more than 15,000 are in exile in Honduras.
The business community,' too, has been under attack by the
Sandinista leaders. In October, 1981, the Sandinistas arrested
leaders of COSEP, the umbrella private sector organization, and
jailed them for four months because they issued a statement
criticizing official policy. Moreover, economic freedoms are
subject to the whims of the Directorate: . the government has
expropriated so many businesses that it now owns close to half
the economy. Predictably, shortages and rationing of basic goods
are chronic.
Labor organizations have fared little better. The
Sandinistas have harassed independent labor unions as they
attempted to organize, and have beaten and arrested their
leaders. Tightly controlled Sandinista labor and peasant
organizations have been established to take the place of
independent groups.
Since all this adds up to a disheartening human rights
record, it is not suprising that about four years after the
Sandinistas took power, there are still 3600 political prisoners
in Nicaragua. Allegations of political arrests and disappear-
ances have increased since Somoza's fall. And human rights
leaders who opposed Somoza have been persecuted by the new regime
as well because they continue to call for the end of repression.
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AGGRESSOR/VICTIM
Another popular myth concerning the Sandinistas is their
charge that they are the victims of U.S.-sponsored aggression and
intervention. They make this claim repeatedly to justify their
internal repression, their military build-up, and their intran-
sigence in negotiating with neighbors seeking peaceful recon-
ciliation in the region.
But the plain truth is that the real victims of aggression
and intervention in Central America are Nicaragua's neighbors:
Costa Rica, Honduras, and El Salvador. The real aggressors in
the region are the Sandistas.
Within two weeks of coming to power, the Sandinistas were
sending large shipments of arms to the communist guerrillas in El
Salvador. By January 1981, more than 200 tons of military
material had been sent. The Sandinistas began providing training
and support to-the guerrillas within months of taking power. It
was not long before the Sandinistas were assisting and directing
guerrilla military, logistical, and support actions in El
Salvador from command and control centers inside Nicaragua.
The arms shipment to the Salvadoran guerrillas continually
violate the sovereignty and territory of Honduras. Worse, the
Sandinistas helped establish a new communist guerrilla front
that, from the safety of Managua, Nicaragua, declared war against
the democratically-elected government of Honduras. The Sandin-
istas have also stocked arms inside Honduras; more than ten tons
of explosives, thousands of rounds of ammunition, small arms, so-
phisticated communications equipment, uniforms, passports, propa-
ganda, and trucks and cars for transporting arms were uncovered
in safe houses by Honduran authorities by the end of 1982.
The Sandistas have also harassed Costa Rica. They try to
deny the Costa Ricans the use of the San Juan River, violate
their border, and make arrogant threats that would deny Costa
Ricans the right to develop and use their own territory. The
Costa Rican government was forced to expel at least one
Nicaraguan diplomat assigned to Costa Rica because of direct
involvement in the San Jose bombing of a SAHSA airline office on
July 3, 1982.
The real threat to the Sandinistas is not from their neigh-
bors but from the Nicaraguan people themselves. The rage,
anguish, and frustration borne of the betrayal of Sandinista
promises for democracy has been exacerbated by the controlling
presence of international communism. No one denies that there
are Nicaraguan patriots who oppose the Sandinista regime. But
they are not an "invading force." They are the same democrats who
had joined the Sandinistas to rid their country of dictatorship
and now hope to pressure them into fulfilling the commitment to
democracy made in 1979.
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U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS
Some of those who opposed Somoza simply wanted freedom and
democracy; others wanted to create communist dictatorship. The
friends of freedom lost and a communist state was established in
the heart of Central America.
The Sandinistas accomplished these feats through lies and
threats and through misuse of the good will of the Western world.
They managed to have it all ways: to receive humanitarian
assistance from the West and military hardware from the
communists, to repress their own people but gain international
respectability, and to portray themselves as the victims of
continuing aggression while they themselves were destabilizing
their neighbors.
The Soviet and Cuban backed Sandinista campaign to overthrow
the other Central American countries and eventually to incor-
porate the region into the Soviet orbit is a direct threat to the
national security of the United States.
It is also a potential human tragedy for the citizens of
Central America, since communist regimes invariably produce
misery and desolation for the people they subjugate. Communist
countries do not bring freedom; they create refugees fleeing
the Communist dictatorships. They pursue aggression instead of
peace and produce deprivation instead of prosperity. As
freedom-loving humanitarian people, Americans should care deeply
what happens to our neighbors.
As President Reagan has said:
Are democracies required to remain passive while
threats to their security and prosperity accumulate?
Must we just accept the destabilization of an entire
region from the Panama Canal to Mexico on our southern
border? Must we sit by while independent nations of
this hemisphere are integrated into the most aggressive
empire the modern world has seen? Must we wait while
Central Americans are driven from their homes like the
more than a million who have sought refuge out of
Afghanistan, or the 1 1/2 million who have fled Indochina,
or the more than a million Cubans who have fled Castro's
Cuban utopia?...
The national security of all Americans is at stake in
Central America. If we cannot defend ourselves there, we cannot
expect to prevail elsewhere. Our credibility would collapse, our
alliances would crumble, and the safety of our homeland would be
put in jeopardy.
We have a vital interest, a moral duty, and a solemn
responsibility.
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