STATE OF PLAY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R001100170015-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2008
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: February 29, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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S E C R E T
DDI_ 01.5
29 February 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Executive Director
Deputy Director for Intelligenc
FROM: John L. Helgerson
Director of African and Latin American Analysis
SUBJECT: State of Play in Southern Africa
1. Action: None. For your background use only.
2. Background: As background for your meeting tomorrow with
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chet Crocker, I thought
you might find it useful to know how we in ALA view recent developments in
southern Africa. I have also suggested some questions that you might wish
to raise with Crocker during our meeting.
South Africa-Angola-Namibia-UNITA
The US-South African-Angolan meeting in. Zambia on 16 February ended
in an agreement for a South African departure from southern Angola, which
is to be monitored by a joint military commission of Angolans and South
Africans. The USG has set up a liaison office in Namibia which will serve
as a go-between. The commission met for the first time last Saturday at
Cuvelai (a town over 100 miles north of the Namibian border) and the
meeting apparently went well. They will set up three 100-man units from
each side, plus vehicles and helicopters, and patrolling is to begin on
1 March. Pretoria said it would withdraw completely within 30 days;
Luanda agreed that it was responsible for controlling SWAPO activity.
This disengagement agreement represents a considerable achievement
for the USG, for which Crocker should be congratulated. The disengagement
itself is very fragile, however, and several factors could derail progress
toward broader issues:
-- Although SWAPO has said that it will honor the disengagement
in southern Angola, it insists it will continue to fight
inside Namibia. Sam Nujoma is quite concerned that the
Angolans will sell him out and he may be trying to act as a
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spoiler. Pretoria says it has an intercepted message proving
that SWAPO sent a 150-man force south into Namibia after the
disengagement. This is probably true, although Pretoria's
claim that SWAPO is sending an additional 800 guerrillas into
Namibia is probably false. However, terrorist incidents in
Namibia increased during February.
-- We think Jonas Savimbi is nervous about being sold out,
despite assurances to the contrary, and his agreement not to
disrupt the disengagement looks vague to us. UNITA has been
coming on strong since the disengagement was agreed to.
UNITA is engaged in a major battle in eastern Angola and
seized a diamond mine last week in northcentral Angola.
UNITA also said last Friday that since it is not
participating in peace negotiations it is intensifying the
civil war, which it said must be settled before Cubans can be
withdrawn.
-- Luanda, for its part, insists publicly ~ that
after Pretoria removes all its troops from Angolan territory,
ends aid to UNITA and begins implementing the UN plan for
ami ian independence, it will address the Cuban issue and
talk to UNITA. We believe that the Angolans actually will
negotiate with the USG about Cubans, but probably will be
unable to act decisively because of the UNITA threat and the
Soviets.
Defusing the military conflict does buy time for more negotiations, but a
disengagement on the Namibian-Angolan border could become a sanctioned
demilitarized zone behind which South Africa continues to maintain control
of Namibia.
South Africa-Mozambique
We think that long-term prospects for US-brokered negotiations in
this arena are brighter. Pretoria and Maputo announced on 20 February
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agreement in principle on a mutual security pact, although several sticky
details remain to be settled.
Both Pretoria and Maputo seem determined at the political level to
abandon their respective insurgencies as part of a broad accord on
security and economic issues. However, a bloody ANC attack could torpedo
negotiations by strengthening hardliners in Pretoria who fundamentally
mistrust the Marxist regime in Mozambique. Similarly, a strong insurgent
campaign by RENAMO--to whom the South Africans reportedly will provide
enough supplies to continue its current level of military activity until
late 1984--could increase reistance in Maputo to Machel's overtures to
Pretoria. But the momentum in the Mozambican arena seems stronger than in
the more complicated nexus of Angolan-Nambian-Cuban issues, and we believe
there is a significant chance--perhaps one in three--that the
rapprochement will come off. Crocker--and his Deputy Frank Wisner--
deserve high marks for their efforts here.
Waiting for the Soviet Shoe to Drop
The Soviet reaction to recent developments has been strangely
muted. fl
We have no evidence of
direct Soviet intervention in either Luanda or Maputo, a somewhat
surprising reaction in view of the Soviet shipment in 1983 of about $260
million worth of military equipment to Mozambique, and between two to
three times that amount to Angola. Although Moscow may see some utility
to a diminution of the security threat to Luanda and Maputo we believe
that a successful outcome to these US-brokered negotiations between South
Africa and its neighbors would certainly represent a significant setback
to Soviet policy in southern Africa. Since we also believe that the
Soviets share that view, we are waiting for some more definitive actions
from Moscow.
Implications
While these recent developments represent significant diplomatic
achievements for the US--and potentially sharp reversals for the Soviets
and Cubans--we believe they represent even more singular achievements for
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the South Africans. Even though they continue to hold on to Namibia, they
have forced their radical, Soviet-backed neighbors to negotiate op IL
with them, an implicit recognition of the legitimacy of white minority
rule in Pretoria. Moreover, this has been accomplished with the visible
presence of the USG, reinforcing the belief of many black Africans that
the US and South Africa are tacit allies. If these fragile arrangements
should break down and the cycle of violence in southern Africa starts up
again, the lasting impression for many in the region may be that of
US-South African cooperation.
3. Recommendations: Questions for Crocker.
-- What do you think Savimbi is up to? Will he observe the
disengagement in southern Angola?
-- How are the Soviets going to react? Don't you find it
surprising that we have not heard much from them?
-- Why do you think the pro-Soviet, mulatto-led hardliners in
the MPLA are going along? What are the chances the MPLA will
agree to a Cuban withdrawal?
-- What do you think the South Africans want from these
negotiations? How significant are the divisions in Pretoria
on these issues?
John Helgerson
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J C U R C i
SUBJECT: State of Play in Southern Africa
Distribution:
Original -- DCI
1 -- DDCI
1 -- Executive Director
1 -- Executive Registry
1 -- DDI
1 -- ADDI
2 -- D/ALA
1 -- C/DDO/AF
1 -- NIO/AF
1 -- Chief, ALA/AF
2 -- Deputy Chiefs, ALA/AF
2 -- ALA/AF (Chrono)
1 -- ALA/AF (Production File)
2 -- ALA/AF/S
4 -- ALA/AF/C
ALA/AF/C
(29 February 1984)
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