US NUCLEAR EXPORT AND NONPROLIFERATION POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00338R000300430026-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 21, 2008
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: March 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/10/21: CIA-RDP86B00338R000300430026-6
93 A
,rrA
A quick reference aid on U.S. foreign relations
,gist Not a comprehensive policy statement
Bureau of Public Affairs ? Department of State
US Nuclear Export and Nonproliferation Policy
Background: Halting the spread of nuclear weapons and
development exclusively toward peaceful ends have been
concerns of successive US administrations since 1945.
willing to share our developments in the civil uses of
in exchange for international commitments limiting the
nuclear technology to peaceful purposes.
guiding nuclear
central
We have been
nuclear energy,
application of
On July 16, 1981, President Reagan outlined his Administration's
approach to international nuclear cooperation and reaffirmed the US
commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. He stated the US will:
Seek to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives to additional
countries as a fundamental national security and foreign policy
objective;
Strive to reduce the motivation for acquiring nuclear explosives by
improving regional and global stability and promoting understanding
of the legitimate security concerns of other states;
Continue to support adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Treaty for the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) by countries
that have not accepted those treaties;
View a violation of those treaties or an international safeguards
agreement as having profound consequences for international order
and US bilateral relations and view any nuclear explosion by a
non-nuclear-weapons state with grave concern;
Strongly support and work with other nations to strengthen the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards system;
Work with other nations to combat the risks of proliferation;
Continue to inhibit the transfer of sensitive nuclear material,
equipment, and technology, particularly where the danger of
proliferation demands, and to seek agreement requiring IAEA
safeguards on all nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapons states
as a condition for any new nuclear supply commitment.
Place of nuclear exports in US nonproliferation policy: US ability to
influence the direction of world nuclear development is related to the
size of our role in international nuclear cooperation. In his July
16, 1981 statement, the President announced the US. would not inhibit
civil reprocessing and breeder reactor development in countries with
advanced nuclear power programs where it did not constitute a
proliferation risk. In addition, he initiated an intensive
interagency review of the policies under which the US exercises its
consent rights over reprocessing of US-origin fuel and plutonium use
in other countries. As a result of the review, the President offered
Sr
Approved For Release 2008/10/21: CIA-RDP86B00338R000300430026-6
 Approved For Release 2008/10/21: CIA-RDP86B00338R000300430026-6
to work out procedures with Japan and the European Atomic Energy
Community (EURATOM) for advance long-term consent to retransfers,
reprocessing, and use of nuclear material over which the US has
consent rights in programs that meet statutory criteria. The US would
also provide a statement of our intention to approve such activities
in future programs when it is determined that they meet the necessary
criteria.
These offers require new or amended nuclear cooperation agreements,
subject to congressional review. Approvals would be valid only as
long as the conditions stated in the agreement continue to be met.
They would also be subject to strong commitments by these countries to
nonproliferation efforts and to more effective controls over
plutonium. We are also prepared to consider consent arrangements for
countries, other than Japan and those in EURATOM, for the transfer of
US-origin spent nuclear fuel to the UK and France for reprocessing.
The Administration will maintain its case-by-case approach to US
consent in more proliferation-sensitive regions.
NPT and the role of IAEA: Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of
1978, countries seeking US nuclear cooperation or exports must accept
IAEA safeguards inspections of all their peaceful nuclear activities--
so-called "full-scope safeguards." President Reagan has reaffirmed
that adherence and agreement to the NPT, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and
supplier agreement to full-scope safeguards, as a condition for
significant nuclear cooperation, are prime elements of our
nonproliferation policy. IAEA safeguards serve as a deterrent to
diversion of nuclear material for weapons use and as evidence to
countries that their neighbors are not building nuclear weapons. More
than 100 countries have joined the NPT. Non-nuclear-weapons states
party to the treaty accept safeguards on all their nuclear facilities.
Our goal is to extend this system to all countries.
The IAEA provides the only viable system of?insuring that nuclear
materials and equipment are used only for peaceful purposes. We have
sought to support the IAEA both by providing major contributions of
financial and technical aid and by insisting the IAEA not be diverted
from its task by extraneous political activities. In September 1982,
the US initiated a reassessment of its participation in the IAEA in
response to an illegal challenge to Israel's credentials at the IAEA
General Conference. After several months of intensive review, the US
decided to resume participation in the IAEA in February 1983.
Supplier restraint in transfers of sensitive exports: The US
continues to play a major role in consultations with other supplier
countries in order to develop a common line of restraint for the
export of sentitive nuclear technology. Guidelines for nuclear supply
may need to be tightened, especially for regions of tension.
Security concerns and nuclear proliferation: Denial of nuclear
technology can delay the spread of nuclear explosives; only political
decisions can permanently prevent their spread. Therefore, a
fundamental objective of US policy is to address the local and
regional security concerns that may impel a government to seek to
develop or acquire nuclear explosives.
Harriet Culley, Editor (202) 632-1208
Approved For Release 2008/10/21: CIA-RDP86B00338R000300430026-6