THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00337R000200260005-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 24, 2008
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: March 8, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
STATEMENT BY
DR. JAMES C. FLETCHER
THE UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH
CHAIRMAN, DEFENSIVE TECHNOLOGIES STUDY TEAM
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
(98TH CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION)
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I am pleased to provide a written statement for your
deliberations on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). By way
of background I chaired the Defensive Technologies Study which has
been used by the Department of Defense and the Department of
Energy as the technical guidance for the SDI. I would like to
preface my remarks with my firm conviction that our conclusions,
as set forth in the Defensive Technologies Study reports,
represent the most comprehensive and technically valid analysis
possible. To a person, I am convinced that we had available those
most familiar with the technical issues and most able to produce
an accurate and unbiased assessment. I have never worked with a
more impressive or dedicated group of people than were assembled
for the Defensive Technologies Study. The conclusions of the
study fully warrant your consideration as the best technical
assessment possible.
I will not review the technical details of our study, other
testimony you have heard today and will review in the coming
months will cover those areas. I would, however, like to preface
my remarks with a discussion of the groundrules we used for our
work. First, we concentrated on what I call the "long-poles in
the tent." By this I mean that we recommended intensive efforts
only on those technical issues upon which the ultimate feasibility
of an effective ballistic missile defense hinges. As a corollary
to this, we recommended deferring development of well understood
technologies until they are needed. For example, if we choose to
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deploy boost-phase systems we will most likely need upgraded space
launch systems. However, my colleagues at NASA assure me that new
launch vehicles could be developed in less than ten years. For
this reason we did not recommend an immediate effort on this area.
Correspondingly, we were not asked for, nor did we recommend
resources for assuring readiness for responding to a Soviet ABM
"breakout." Such needs, if justified, would require separate
funding. We did, however, recommend that ongoing development in
some areas, even though it may not be needed until later, not be
subject to precipitous adjustment. For example, terminating
ongoing programs which are nearly complete, but which must be
restarted in a few years at great costs, was not considered
prudent. Finally, we firmly believe that it is essential to
preserve substantial resources, at least 5%, for new and
innovative technologies. Just as the technologies which appear to
make effective ballistic missile defense conceivable have only
emerged in the last few years, we believe that the technologies
which may eventually be incorporated in such a defense have
probably not yet been developed. I feel that the latter ground
rule is of paramount importance, particularly with regard to
involving our academic communities. I urge you to work hard to
preserve this vital resource which has so often in the past been
sacrificed in the interest of near-term requirements.
I want to emphasize that we did not recommend a system
development and deployment program. Rather we recommended a
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research and technology program which will provide essential data
on which future Presidents and Congresses will be able to make
decisions.
I would like to relay our general conclusions to you word for
word. These conclusions were worked out by the study team panel
leaders with great care. These are conclusions which I am
confident represent the concensus of the team:
o Powerful new technologies are becoming available that
justify a major technology development effort that provides future
technical options to implement a defensive strategy.
o Survivability is an especially critical issue whose
resolution requires a combination of technologies and tactics that
remain to be worked out.
o The deployment of directed-energy weapons in space by
either or both sides: not only requires significant technical
advances but also poses difficult policy issues which need to be
addressed.
o Technologies currently within the state-of-the-art will
not provide solutions to unconstrained, long-term threats.
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o Focused development of technology for a comprehensive
ballistic missile defense will demand strong central management,
dedication, and perseverance.
o The most capable systems have multiple layers. Of these
layers boost-phase intercept has the greatest leverage but is also
most difficult to achieve.
o Significant demonstrations of critical ballistic missile
defense functions can be performed in the next ten years which
will also provide visible evidence of progress toward in-depth
ballistic missile defense.
I would like to elaborate on these points and respond to a
number of misconceptions which may have been promulgated by both
advocates and opponents.
First, the entire study team strongly endorsed the
requirement for strong central management. The technologies which
we are pursuing are so broadly based and so require long-term
commitment, that they must be centrally managed. By this I mean
that the program must be structured so that its manager can shift
resources from less promising to more promising areas. The
program manager further must be able to budget and plan for multi-
year programs based solely on SDI requirements. Research and
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technology for the SDI must not be traded every year against
detailed operational needs. Finally, the SDI manager must be able
to have direct and frequent access to national decision makers, as
well as streamlined communications to the government and industry
labs doing the work.
Many of my colleagues ask me why we are reopening an issue
which they believed was forever closed during the ABM debate in
the mid 1970s. First, I don't believe that the issue was ever
closed for the Soviets. The data which we saw, and which I'm sure
you will review in the months ahead, provided us with striking
evidence that the Soviet Union has pursued with vigor all of the
technologies we have recommended and many which we do not even
understand yet. Secondly, those technologies which are essential
to a truly effective defense against ballistic missiles are just
emerging. In the 1960s and early 1970s we had no way to
effectively perform boost-phase intercept; we had insufficient
means to discriminate between decoys and warheads; we could not
simultaneously manage thousands of engagements; and we were forced
to consider the use of nuclear warheads at such low altitudes
within the atmosphere that collateral damage to the defended area
would have been substantial. Now, directed energy and even
"hypervelocity" kinetic energy weapons appear promising for boost
phase intercept. Precision sensors make unambiguous detection and
descrimination of warheads from decoys and debris possible. New
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electronics advances make it possible both to manage tens of
thousands of engagements simultaneously, but also, when coupled
with precision sensors make it feasible to perform "hit-to-kill"
intercepts without requiring nuclear warheads for the defense.
These reasons provided the team with compelling rationales for
reexamining the technical issues associated with achieving an
effective ballistic missile defense.
The popular press has emphasized the exotic nature of certain
technologies included in our study. I feel compelled to set the
record straight on this illusion. Our recommended program does
not concentrate on so-called "Star-Wars" weapons. The directed
energy area, which I suppose has elicited the most such attention,
is less than a fourth of the program. The largest portion of the
recommended effort is to develop effective surveillance,
acquisition, tracking, and assessment sensor systems. These
technologies are vital to the nation not only with regard to
strategic defense but also for strategic and tactical warning.
Many of my scientific colleagues (not in our study group) are
skeptical about whether an effective ballistic missile defense is
feasible. Moreover, many believe such systems would be
prohibitively expensive. I would like to say at the outset that
no one knows how effective defensive systems can be made, nor how
much they might cost. I do know that the technologies we reviewed
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make such an effective defense conceivable. Whether an effective
defense is possible is the primary reason for embarking on the SDI
program. With regard to cost, we do not know ultimate cost. But
perhaps the major aspect of the investment in defensive
technologies is to make it less expensive to stop a warhead than
it is to get it to its target. Clearly, in such cases the cost
tradeoffs from defensive deployments could favor them over
offensive deployments.
One of the most important findings of our study was the
critical nature of space element survivability. While, in the
early stage of our effort, we do not know the extent to which
space-deployments might be needed, it is likely that at least
highly survivable surveillance and tracking sensors will be
needed. While these systems must survive an opponent's first
strike against them, this is a difficult but certainly a feasible
task, and one which warrants considerably more effort than
currently devoted to it. There is no magic offensive weapon which
renders space systems unsurvivable. Popular countermeasures such
as the so-called "space-mines" may be countered through both
tactics and technology. For example, spacecraft may be placed at
such depths in space that it may take many hours or even days to
reach them.
Another often stated opinion is the idea that any defensive
deployment could readily and cheaply be countered. We looked at
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the countermeasure issue very carefully, and we believe that the
technologies we are working on will lead to a multi-tiered system
which is extremely difficult to countermeasure. For example, we
will be working on surveillance technologies which would observe a
potential target using multi-colored infrared, visible, and radar
radiation. Although a decoy could be cheaply constructed which
would mimic a warhead to any single sensor, a decoy which would
mimic real warheads for a variety of sensors would be almost as
heavy and sophisticated as an actual warhead. There is thus no
incentive or payoff to an opponent in proliferating such decoys.
Similarly, an attacking missile might be successfully launched
against a single weapon, for example a laser, at the cost of
considerable decrease in payload and accuracy. However, other
weapons, perhaps a missile launched kinetic interceptor, would be
unaffected by the same countermeasures. The combination of
different weapons and sensors in three or more layers would at the
minimum drive an opponent to extremely expensive, and
significantly less capable missiles, a positive result in its own
right. These questions and options have, therefore, played a
central role in our recommended research and technology program.
Some of my scientific colleagues are concerned that a focused
US strategic defense research program could be both destabilizing
and lead to a dangerous space arms race. The Future Security
Strategy Study, the policy counterpart to our Defensive
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Technologies Study, considered these issues in detail and came to
a wholly different conclusion. However, from my perspective I do
not feel that these opinions are directly relevant to the program
we proposed. The Soviet Union has pursued defensive technologies
at the "technology limited"-pace for several decades. It is
unlikely, since it is technology-limited, that they could
accelerate their effort more than they have, whatever we do. How
a US effort could incite them to greater efforts in defensive
technologies is unclear.
At the close of our study we worked out a summary statement
for our work. I would like to relay portions of it to you because
it succinctly states the opinions of those Americans most familiar
with the technologies of strategic missile defense:
"The Defensive Technologies Study Team reviewed, evaluated,
and prioritized the technological issues underlying the ballistic
missile defense of the continental United States and it allies.
We reviewed a set of defense system concepts and supporting
technologies in various stages of development and created both
fiscally constrained and technology-limited programs to evaluate
these technologies."
"We took an optimistic view of newly emerging technologies
and with this viewpoint concluded that a robust, multitiered
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ballistic missile defense system can eventually be made to work.
The ultimate utility, effectiveness, cost, complexity, and degree
of technical risk in this system will depend not only on the
technology itself, but also on the extent to which the Soviet
Union either agrees to mutual defense arrangements and offense
limitations."
"We urge that a vigorous research and technology program,
broadly based but highly goal oriented, be pursued. This program
would permit informed decisions on whether to initiate, in the
early 1990s, an engineering validation phase leading to a deployed
defensive capability after the year 2000. Certain intermediate
technologies can, and should be demonstrated. as part of the
evolutionary research and technology program."
In closing, I would like to leave you with two opposite but
equally compelling rationales for proceeding with our recommended
program. From a pessimistic view, for an opponent to achieve
effective missile defenses without a corresponding US defensive
capability would as I said earlier be catastrophic to our
strategic posture. Our techological analyses this summer showed
us that effective defenses are now conceivable. Available data
shows us that the Soviet Union is already pursuing these
technologies at the fastest pace which their technology allows.
The United States and its allies must, at a minimum, pursue a
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vigorous research and technology program to provide future
governments with information on possible defensive moves by our
opponents. From an optimistic viewpoint, which I share, strategic
relationships based on a balance of offensive and defensive forces
is not only morally correct, but can lead to a safer world. The
awesome threat of nuclear weapons can only be lessened if we have
in hand technical capabilities at least as valuable as the nuclear
armed ballistic missile. Our work has shown that defensive
technologies offer a rich promise for such capabilities. The
Strategic Defense Initiative will provide future options for the
nation to enhance our and our childrens safety and security.
There is no way to avoid facing this issue - the program deserves
your strong support.
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