STATEMENT ON THE PRESIDENT'S STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00337R000200260004-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 24, 2008
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: March 8, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/07/24 :CIA-RDP86B00337R000200260004-1
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
STATEMENT ON
THE PRESIDENT'S STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
BY '
THE HONORABLE RICHARD D. DeLAUER
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
98TH CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION
MARCH 8,1984
Approved For Release 2008/07/24 :CIA-RDP86B00337R000200260004-1
 Approved For Release 2008/07/24 :CIA-RDP86B00337R000200260004-1
.THE PRESIDENT'S STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
(SDI)
In a speech to the American people a year ago, President Reagan
offered the hope of a world made safe from the threat of ballistic
missiles. This hope is based on recent advances of technology which may
offer us, for the first time in history, the opportunity to strengthen
deterrence through effective defenses,'rather than only through the
threat of retaliation. President Reagan is determined that we explore
fully this opportunity.
To guide the efforts of those working toward this important goal,
the President directed an intensive analysis to define a research
program to investigate the technical feasibility of an effective defense
against ballistic missiles, and to assess the implications of such a
program for the prevention of nuclear war, for the deterrence of
aggression, and for the prospects for arms control. This study was
conducted last summer, and concluded that advanced defensive
technologies could offer the potential to enhance deterrence and help
prevent nuclear war by reducing significantly the military utility of
Soviet preemptive attacks and by undermining an aggressor's confidence
of a successful attack against the United States or our allies. The
study also identified a research program that will clarify future
technical options for a defensive system.
Although the study acknowledged that there are uncertainties that
will not be resolved until more is known about the technical
characteristics of defensive systems and the possible responses of the
Soviet Union to U.S. initiatives, it concluded that a research program
should be started now. We must start now because the Soviet Union has
pursued advanced ballistic missile defense technology for a number of
years, and has the only active ballistic missile defense system in the
world. Unilateral Soviet deployment of an advanced system capable of
countering Western ballistic missiles--added to their already impressive
air and passive defense capabilities--would weaken deterrence and
threaten the security of the United States and our allies. Thus, our
research efforts will provide a necessary and vital hedge against the
possibility of a one sided deployment. In addition, our effort could
provide a potentially powerful tool to moderate the development of
future offensive systems and to make the world more stable and secure.
It must be understood that our program is not a system development
program. No decision has been made to develop and deploy any weapons or
other elements of the potential system. Our state of knowledge of the
Approved For Release 2008/07/24 :CIA-RDP86B00337R000200260004-1
 Approved For Release 2008/07/24 :CIA-RDP86B00337R000200260004-1
relevant technologies is inadequate. Consequently, the aim of this
program is to improve our knowledge of the relevant technologies by
providing firm calculations and experimental evidence on what such
technologies could do, and at what cost. Put in other words, our
program is a research effort to provide the evidentiary basis for an
informed decision on whether and how to proceed into system development.
For a full, multi-tiered system, we expect to complete the provision of
this evidentiary basis by the early 1990's. A careful analysis of
defensive strategy and concepts of operation is an essential element of
the basis for an informed decision. Our program also includes such an
analysis.
We plan an aggressive, adequately funded program to pursue the
relevant technologies at the maximum reasonable rate. For fiscal year
1985 we are requesting approximately $2 billion (total for DoD and DoE).
We anticipate that during the fiscal year 1986-89 period, approximately
$24 billion will be required.
It is impossible to estimate now, with any precision, the full
costs of developing and deploying a comprehensive strategic defense
system. If a system were deployed, the ultimate costs would depend on
the technological approaches selected for deployment and the size of the
defensive system required. These factors, in turn, would depend in part
on Soviet reactions and on the nature of future arms control agreements.
It is true that the total costs would be significant in relation to our
overall strategic forces program. These costs, however, would be spread
over 20 years or more and could well be offset, or at least partially
offset, by reduced spending on strategic offensive systems. Most
importantly, costs must be judged relative to expected benefits of a
system that could make nuclear war less likely.
The program is not a "new start" in the usual sense. Substantially
all of the relevant technologies have been funded in previous years, but
not all have been specifically related to defending against ballistic
missiles. To implement the President's Strategic Defense Initiative, we
have focused these previously existing related research efforts into a
single program, and augmented the previously planned level of DoD
funding for fiscal year 1985, $1,527 million, by $250 million, for a
total request of $1,777 million. The DoD request is for 71$ real growth
in relevant technologies from fiscal year 84 to 85, and 16~ relative to
pre-SDI plans for fiscal year 1985. Part of the Initiative includes
technologies involving nuclear devices, which-are developed by the
Department of Energy. Their work in direct support of this initiative
in fiscal year 1985 is a portion of their nuclear research, development,
and test funding. It is estimated at $210 million (It is not a
separate, specific line item.) for a total program of $2 billion.
Approved For Release 2008/07/24 :CIA-RDP86B00337R000200260004-1
 Approved For Release 2008/07/24 :CIA-RDP86B00337R000200260004-1
To manage the DoD's portion of this effort, we are establishing a
Strategic Defense Technology Office, which will be headed by the SDI
Program Manager- who will report directly to the Secretary of Defense.
Mr. Weinberger is presently in the process of selecting him.
The DoD portion of the program has been divided into five technical
areas, and a new program element has been established for each of them.
These program elements are:
1. Surveillance, acquisition, and tracking,
2. Directed energy weapons,
3. Kinetic energy weapons,
4. Systems analyses and battle management, and
5. Support programs.
These are Defense level program elements. The funds will be held in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and will be provided, at the
determination of the SDI program manager, to the individual Services and
Defense Agencies who will execute the individual efforts.
The flight of a ballistic missile can be considered in four phases.
The first is the boost phase, in which the first and second stage rocket
engines of the missile are burning. They produce an intense and unique
infrared signature. In the second, or post-boost phase, the bus
separates from the main engines, and the multiple warheads are deployed
from the bus, along with any penetration aids such as decoys and chaff.
In the third, or mid-course phase, the multiple warheads and penetration
aids travel on ballistic trajectories through space, above the earth's
atmosphere. In the fourth, terminal phase, the warheads and penetration
aids reenter the earth's atmosphere, where they are affected by
atmospheric conditions.
Our program seeks to explore technologies enabling the engagement
of attacking missiles in all four phases. of their flight. This would
require a number of capabilities, including global, full=time
surveillance to warn of an attack. There is leverage in engaging the
missiles in the boost phase, because the multiple warheads and
penetration aids have not yet been been deployed. After deployment, we
must be able to discriminate warheads from decoys, so we can target only
the real threats. We must be prepared for the attacking warheads to be
salvage fuzed; therefore, our terminal defenses must engage them at as
high an altitude as possible. And in addition to the individual
Approved For Release 2008/07/24 :CIA-RDP86B00337R000200260004-1
 Approved For Release 2008/07/24 :CIA-RDP86B00337R000200260004-1
engagement capabilities, we must have a survivable battle management
system capable of efficient, global control.
The technologies for the terminal defenses are also likely to be
applicable to defense against the shorter range nuclear ballistic
missiles, such as submarine launched ballistic missiles and theater
range ballistic missiles, which may not have trajectories high enough to
permit their attack with exoatmospheric systems, and which have short
times-of-flight. Such technologies are important for defense of our
allies.
Surveillance, acquisition, and tracking:
Surveillance, acquisition, tracking and kill assessment (SATKA)
includes sensing of information for initiation of the defense engagement
and for battle management and assessment of the status of forces before
and during a defense engagement against nuclear ballistic missiles. It
also includes signal processing and data processing for discrimination
of threatening reentry vehicles from other objects and backgrounds. A
crucial philosophy of design is that surveillance and acquisition should
be autonomous in each phase of the engagement, but that tracking and
kill assessment should be consultative through battle management. These
requirements are necessary so that the contributions to leakage from
missed detections remain independent to insure very high quality
tracking and kill assessment.
The goal of this program is to develop and demonstrate the
capabilities needed to detect, track, and discriminate objects in all
phases of the ballistic missile trajectory. The technology developed
under this program is quite complex, and any eventual system must
operate reliably even in the presence of disturbances caused by nuclear
weapons effects or direct enemy attack.
This program has several component technology development programs
which culminate in hardware demonstrations. A focused effort to study
the observables during each phase is the first major element of the
program. Optical, infrared, and radar signatures of reentry vehicles
and penetration aids will be measured. The new techniques of radar
imaging represent another element. Similarly, optical imaging, using
lasers rather than radar beams, will be pursued. Finally, a substantial
effort is included to develop cooled infrared sensors and near real-time
signal processing.
The technology programs outlined above will lead to a series of
hardware demonstrations. Four key demonstrations have been identified
at this time, with the possibility of more in the 1990s as technology
progresses. One demonstration will be an advanced boost-phase detection
and tracking system. Another major demonstration is designed to track
and discriminate attacking objects in mid-course using advanced Long
Approved For Release 2008/07/24 :CIA-RDP86B00337R000200260004-1
 Approved For Release 2008/07/24 :CIA-RDP86B00337R000200260004-1
Wavelength Infrared (LWIR) sensors. The ability of airborne infrared
sensors to identify and track reentering objects will be demonstrated in
the Army's Airborne Optical System (AOS) development program. Ground
radar imaging and tracking demonstrations will continue as part of the
Army's terminal and midcourse defense programs. As other technologies
mature, such as radar and optical imaging, new demonstrations will be
conducted. As these demonstrations are completed, we will have obtained
the technical information required to decide whether defensive systems
of the necessary capability can be built, considering this key element
of the defense design.
Directed Enemy Weapons:
This program pursues four basic concepts identified as potentially
capable of meeting a responsive threat--space-based lasers, ground-based
lasers, space-based particle beams, and nuclear driven directed energy
weapons. It also provides for establishment of the National Tri-Service
Laser Test Range at White Sands Missile Range, NM. The basic technical
thrusts include beam generators (lasers and particle accelerators), beam
control, large optics, and acquisition, tracking and pointing. Our
request includes funds to search for technological opportunities for new
and innovative capabilities.
The goal of the directed energy technology program is to bring the
most promising concepts for boost and post-boost phase intercept to an
equivalent technical maturity in the early 1990'x. At that point we
expect to be able to demonstrate a readiness for technology validation
in system level demonstrations of the concepts selected to move into
that phase. To achieve that goal we plan to demonstrate the feasibility
of the leading candidate beam generators by the mid 1980's and their
scalability to weapon performance levels in the late 1980's or early
1990'x. In beam control we will ,demonstrate by the end of the decade a
capability to control wavefront errors, maintain beam alignment within
the system, compensate for atmospheric effects; and provide the
components necessary to transmit and control the high intensity beams.
In large optics, we plan by the 1990's to demonstrate several approaches
for providing the large diameter ground and space-based optics required
for most directed energy concepts and all surveillance systems employing
optical and electro-optical sensors. In our acquisition, tracking. and
pointing efforts, we envision in-space tests that verify our capability
to point with the necessary precision, to acquire and track targets of
interest, and to provide early experiments in imaging and designation.
Finally, we are considering integrated technology experiments to show
that we can integrate the weapon subsystems with requisite efficiency.
With these demonstrations completed we will have provided the basis for
a decision whether we -are ready to move into the more complex system
level demonstrations required in the technology validation phase of R&D.
Approved For Release 2008/07/24 :CIA-RDP86B00337R000200260004-1
 Approved For Release 2008/07/24 :CIA-RDP86B00337R000200260004-1
Kinetic Energy Weapons:
Kinetic energy weapons include interceptor missiles and hyper-
velocity gun systems. The primary roles for these weapons include (1)
midcourse engagement of reentry vehicles not destroyed during boost or
post-boost phases, and of post-boost vehicles that have not dispensed
all of their RV's, (2) terminal (i.e. endoatmospheric) engagement of
RV's not destroyed during the previous phases of their flight, (3) space
platform defense against threats not vulnerable to directed energy
weapons, and (4) boost-phase engagement of short time-of-flight, short
range submarine launched ballistic missiles. Additional roles for these
weapons include (1) boost phase intercept from space-based platforms,
and (2) midcourse engagement from space-based platforms. The kinetic
energy weapons will rely on nonnuclear kill mechanisms to destroy the
intended target. The key technologies required to develop these weapons
include (1) fire control, (2) guidance and control, (3) warheads and
fuzing for guided projectiles capable of being launched by missiles or
hypervelocity guns, (4) hypervelocity launchers, (5) and high
performance interceptor missiles.
The goals of the kinetic energy weapons program are: (1) expansion
of the technology data base to support the development of improved and
advanced weapons and (2) development and flight demonstration of kinetic
energy weapons which are designed to satisfy the SDI mission needs
outlined above. Technology programs are planned for endoatmospheric and
exoatmospheric interceptor designs, a hypervelocity launcher design, and
the systems engineering and analysis required to integrate the various
advanced subsystems and components into effective system constructs.
Investigations will also be undertaken in novel and advanced. techniques
which have the potential for a high payoff in performance and/or cost
effectiveness in the design of these weapons systems. Hardware
development and flight test demonstration of a number of kinetic energy
weapons system designs will also be undertaken as part of this program.
Systems Analyses and Battle Management:
This program has been divided into two technology projects. The
Battle Management/Command, Control, and Communications technology
project will develop the technologies necessary to allow eventual
implementation of a highly responsive, ultra reliable, survivable,
endurable and cost effective BM/C3 system for a low-leakage defense
system. This BM/C3 system is expected to be quite complex and must
operate reliably even in the presence of disturbances caused by nuclear
effects or direct enemy attacks. This program seeks to (1) develop the
tools, methods, and components necessary for development of the BM/C3
system, and (2) quantify the risk and cost of achieving such a BM/C3
system to control the complex, multi-tiered SDI system. The systems
analyses project will provide overall SDI systems guidance to weapons,
sensors, C3, and supporting technologies. Tasks include threat
Approved For Release 2008/07/24 :CIA-RDP86B00337R000200260004-1
 Approved For Release 2008/07/24 :CIA-RDP86B00337R000200260004-1
analyses, mission analyses, concept formulation, system conceptual
design, and subsystem requirements definition, system evaluation, and
technology assessment for all levels of a multi-tiered, low-leakage
system.
One of our early tasks will be to conduct a "sanity cheek" on the
defense responsibilities allocated to the various phases of the multi-
tiered system by the Defensive Technology Study. Even though we know
that many of our weapons and sensor concepts will require orders of
magnitude performance improvements to accomplish the President's defense
objectives, we also know that effective overall system guidance will
efficiently focus these technology efforts and help us avoid "gold
plating" and "blind alleys."
Obviously, if such a complex defense system were deployed, it would
require positive control of its operations. We have to assure that we
can turn the system on when it is needed and assure that it is safe when
not needed. Just as importantly, the system must not be regarded as a
"paper tiger" by the Soviets if it is to serve as an effective deterrent
to nuclear war. Therefore, its credibility must be based on a
demonstrated capability to manage the surveillance, tracking and
intercept actions over the multi-tiers of this complex system. The
information processing capability, specifically the development of
complex software packges, necessary to associate outputs from multiple
sensors, performing discrimination and designation, and "birth to death"
tracking, plus kill assessment is expected to stress software
development technology.
Our icmnediate need is for effective approaches and tools for
achieving high performance processors and software, and responsive
communications networks that provide high reliability and fault
tolerance. Evaluation and demonstration of this complex defense system
and its C3 will largely depend upon simulation. Therefore, development
of effective modeling and simulation tools will also be an early
priority endeavor.
Support Programs:
This program element funds a collection of essential efforts
designed to provide timely answers to a variety of critical SDI support
related questions. The Defensive Technologies Study identified two
areas that should receive priority attention in the SDI program.
First, for each weapon concept under consideration, we must develop
the ability to scientifically predict the minimum energy that will be
required, in a variety of engagement scenarios, to kill unhardened,
retrofit hardened, and responsively hardened Soviet systems. These data
will have a large effect on our choice of candidate system concepts.
The feasibility of SDI may well hinge on the results of these efforts.
The Lethality and Target Hardening project of the Support Programs
effort is structured to provide these data.
Approved For Release 2008/07/24 :CIA-RDP86B00337R000200260004-1
 Approved For Release 2008/07/24 :CIA-RDP86B00337R000200260004-1
Second, the ability of any deployed ballistic missile defense
system to survive in the face of dedicated attack and to continue to
function effectively must be established. The concepts, technologies
and tactics necessary to insure continued system effectiveness will be
defined and developed under the Survivability element of Support
Programs. The output from this effort will be fed into all other
elements of the SDI--particularly into the Systems Concepts and Analyses
efforts.
Additionally, support programs will fund development of the
technologies necessary for improved space logistics capabilities. These
include the advanced orbital transfer vehicle capabilities that SDI will
likely require. We will also evaluate the technical feasibility and
cost effectiveness of using extraterrestrial materials for certain SDI
applications.
Many SDI system elements (weapons, sensors, etc.) will require
large amounts of electrical power. The Power and Power Conversion
element of support programs will fund concept definition and technology
development for multimegawatt power systems. This effort will fully
exploit the technologies being developed in the joint NASA, DoE, DARPA
SP-100 program. Both nuclear and non-nuclear systems and technologies
will be considered.
The Department of Energy's Contribution to the SDI program:
Although funded separately, the Department of Energy (DoE) program
is integral to the overall Strategic Defense Initiative program. DoE
funded efforts include concepts for nuclear driven x-ray lasers,
survivability and lethality, and support subsystems. Other efforts,
such as space-based neutral particle beam technology, are being
performed by the DoE laboratories with DoD funds. A memorandum of
understanding, to be signed by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy,
will establish specific relationships between the elements of DoD and
DoE engaged in planning and execution of the SDI. In accord with
current policy, the DoE will have primary responsibility for nuclear
source development, and the DoD for applications, target acquisition,
beam control, and pointing/tracking. The DoE laboratories have unique
facilities and capabilities to address many aspects of these difficult
problems.
In summary, we believe that an effective defense against ballistic
missiles could have far-reaching implications for enhanced deterrence,
greater stability, and improved opportunities for arms control. Hence
we have gathered the existing efforts in the relevant technologies into
a focused program of five DoD program elements, and added emphasis to
some of the efforts, thereby augmenting the planned funding by about
Approved For Release 2008/07/24 :CIA-RDP86B00337R000200260004-1
 Approved For Release 2008/07/24 :CIA-RDP86B00337R000200260004-1
sixteen percent. Our efforts do not seek to replace proven policies for
maintaining the peace, but rather to strengthen their effectiveness in
the face of a growing Soviet threat. The essential objective of the
Strategic Defense Initiative is to provide future options to diminish
the risk of nuclear destruction and to increase overall stability.
By the end of the decade, we will have conducted a number of
ground, airborne, and space experiments. The knowledge gained from
these tests will help to identify those technologies that are most
promising and support decisions in the early 1990's on whether and how
to proceed with development of ballistic missile defenses.
Approved For Release 2008/07/24 :CIA-RDP86B00337R000200260004-1