NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY TUESDAY 7 JUNE 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000300010051-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 6, 2008
• Sequence Number: 51
• Publication Date: June 7, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of Top Secret
Central
Intelligence
CY# 285
National Intelligence Daily
Tuesday
7 June 1983
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1983 25X1
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Contents
Lebanon-Syria: Beirut's Tactics .............................................. 1
Ell Salvador: Military Developments ........................................ 2
USSR: Andropov's Statements on Arms Issues ...................... 4
Special Analysis
South Africa: Shift in the ANC's Strategy .............................. 6
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Beirut is trying to increase Arab pressure on Syria to accept the
Lebanese-Israeli troop withdrawal agreement, but if this tactic fails
President Gemayel will look again to the US to obtain Syrian and PLO
cooperation on withdrawal.
Lebanon is suggesting publicly that it will soon call for an Arab
summit on the accord. Gemayel knows that moderate Arab states
would be reluctant to participate in a summit because it would reveal
their disunity on several issues. To avoid this, he hopes they will put
more pressure on Damascus.
Beirut believes that parliamentary ratification of the agreement
will place the Lebanese in a better position to negotiate with Syria and
the PLO on troop withdrawal. The parliament began committee
debate on the agreement yesterday, and officials expect the issue to
come to a vote during the next two weeks.
Comment: The government is confident that a majority in the
parliament will favor the withdrawal pact. Gemayel probably will then
ask Syria and the PLO to withdraw their forces once the agreement is
ratified.
Syria is unlikely to respond positively to Lebanon's pressure
campaign unless it is accompanied by Lebanese and US concessions.
Beirut's actions probably are designed to convince the US that it is
doing all it can to produce a Syrian and PLO pullback.
The Lebanese almost certainly believe that at least a partial Israeli
withdrawal is likely some time this summer. After that, Beirut would
expect Western countries to emphasize their commitment to
Lebanon's security by expanding the size and deployment of the
Multinational Force.
If the Israelis do not withdraw, the Lebanese Government believes
that at least a limited Syrian-Israeli conflict is likely in the Bekaa
Valley. Some Lebanese officials probably would welcome such a
conflict and would expect the Israelis to push the Syrians out of
Lebanon.
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Salva
GLiatemala,`
station
yy Cerra,\
.%Cacahautique
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J
complex
,1~ San Miguel
Laguna
plomega
/
y". Mor7zan
North Pacific Ocean
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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SAN SALVADOR, El
dispute
BBahla dad
La Union
H,oftod u ra s?;
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EL SALVADOR: Military Developments
The insurgents destroyed two important government
communications stations serving eastern El Salvador during the past
week.
A guerrilla broadcast says saboteurs destroyed a microwave and
satellite communications complex on San Miguel Volcano in a raid on
Sunday. It claims that 15 of 60 government troops guarding the
station were killed. Long-distance telephone, telex, and television
communications have been disrupted.
Earlier last week insurgents in Morazan Department overran a
government outpost and destroyed a military communications station
at Cerro Cacahautique. Some 40 government soldiers were killed or
captured in that battle. Army reinforcements retook the destroyed
facility on Saturday after heavy fighting.
Comment: Strategic communications apparently have become
priority targets for the guerrillas, along with bridges and electric
power facilities. In both recent attacks, the guerrillas have been able
to overwhelm isolated garrisons by delaying reinforcements with
ambushes. Government units continue to be stretched thin trying to
defend economic targets, leaving them vulnerable to surprise attack
by superior forces.
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USSR: Andropov's Statements on Arms Issues
Arms issues were prominent in General Secretary Andropov's
speech yesterday at a dinner for visiting Finnish President Koivisto.
Andropov praised Helsinki's longstanding proposal for a Nordic
nuclear-weapons-free zone and reiterated. Moscow's willingness to
consider unspecified "substantial measures" regarding Soviet
territory adjoining the zone and to make the Baltic Sea a nuclear-free
area. He also reaffirmed the USSR's determination to take steps in
response to INF deployments, both against the countries in which the
missiles are deployed and against the US.
Comment: Andropov's proposals are not new and fall short of
previous and more specific Soviet offers on a Nordic nuclear-free
zone. In early March, for example, General Staff arms spokesman
General Chervov said publicly that the USSR would be willing to
withdraw its six ballistic missile submarines in the Baltic as part of an
agreement on a denuclearized Nordic region. The speech appears
aimed at assuaging the concern of Nordic governments about Soviet
submarine operations in the area and exploiting anti-INF sentiment in
Western Europe.
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African National Congress Terrorist Operations, 1981- 6 June 1983
Namibia
Zim
Transvaal
20 May
car bombing
PRETORIA
Johannesburg
?Soweto ? .> MBABANE
South
-/
Af,,ica
South
Atlantic
Ocean
Cape Town
Port Elizabeth
East London
Indian
Ocean
Terrorist incident (approximate location)
Note: Number represents more than one incident
0 1981 (47)a ? 1982 (31) ? 1983 (15)
(_> Black homeland
aNumber in parenthesis is the total for the year
0 300
Kilometers
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Cape .
Natal `}Richard s
Bay
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Special Analysis
SOUTH AFRICA: Shift in the ANC's Strategy
The recent car bombing in Pretoria and the discovery of a similar
bomb earlier last month in Durban may indicate a change in the
African National Congress's policy of avoiding civilian casualties.
Pretoria probably will respond by adopting more stringent internal
security measures and intensifying its attacks against locations in
neighboring countries suspected of harboring ANC personnel.
The ANC was established in 1912, and it initially sought change
through legal political action and nonviolent civil disobedience. When
it was outlawed in 1960, it formed a military wing and began a low-
level sabotage campaign against symbols of apartheid. Several years
later the government crippled the movement by imprisoning many of
Other leaders went into exile to rebuild the group. The military
wing recruited thousands of young blacks fleeing South Africa after
the Soweto riots in 1976 and renewed its "armed propaganda"
campaign.
The pro-Soviet South African Communist Party has members in
many ANC leadership positions.
Limited Terrorist Attacks
The insurgents in recent years have pursued an "armed
propaganda" campaign designed primarily to improve the ANC's
standing with blacks and to focus international attention on the
grievances of blacks. The ANC most often attacked energy and
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transportation targets but also struck government buildings and
security personnel and facilities. To increase the impact of its attacks,
the ANC frequently has scheduled them near historic dates, including
16 June-the anniversary of the Soweto riots.
The ANC's operational restraint reflected its leaders' fear that it
might not survive a major South African counterattack. A survey of
ANC literature suggests that it carefully avoided inflicting civilian
casualties in order to be included eventually in talks as a
"responsible" representative of black interests in South Africa. The
moderate strategy helped the ANC win international political support,
particularly from West European countries and from the UN.
This policy of restraint has been a contentious issu
ANC for years. Some black nationalists, who resent whi
control of the military wino. have advocated more aggre
e within the
te Communist
ssive terrorist
tactics,
Tactica
The
30 ANC
l Shift
South African raid on Maseru last December, i
personnel were killed, probably was the most i
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n which about
mportant
single factor that could have prompted a shift in tactics.
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The ANC presumably also has been worried about the South
Africans' recent dialogues with neighboring states, on which it relies
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Implications
Pretoria probably would respond to a bloody campaign by trying
to eliminate suspected ANC members and sympathizers, particularly
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I op aecrez
among South Africa's fledgling black labor movement. Rising terrorist
violence would make it more difficult for Prime Minister Botha to win
approval for his controversial constitutional reform proposals in a
referendum for white voters slated for some time during the next year.
The proposals would grant limited political rights only to Coloreds and
Indians, but many Afrikaners fear that such a move would become a
first step to eventual black rule.
Pretoria also would order additional attacks against neighboring
states that it believes are assisting the ANC. It has issued public
Pretoria will continue to try to intimidate
the guerrillas and their supporters and to reassure South African
whites.
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Too Secret
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