PAPUA NEW GUINEA: SELF RULE READY OR NOT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130097-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2008
• Sequence Number: 97
• Publication Date: September 6, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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'r - . I y,. R--
Confidential
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Papua New Guinea: Self Rule, Ready or Not
Confidential
6 September Be
No 72
. 2064/72
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
6 September 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Papua New Guinea: Self Rule, Ready or Not
Australian-administered Papua New Guinea, like so many other former
colonial areas, is leap-frogging toward self-government long before it has
attainQd the attributes normally associated with nationhood. Although the
schedule is not certain, complete control of internal affairs may come by the
end of 1973 and full independence by 1976.
Most of the area's people lack formal education, few have economic or
political skills, and a significant minority can be classified as primitive.
Among such a population, there is virtually no sense of national identity;
tribal and regional loyalties predominate.
On the positive side, the economy is expanding, education is improving,
any' a tiny educated elite with a balanced and moderate attitude toward
self-government is emerging. A new territorial cabinet selected from a pop-
u:arly elected legislature has been created and given some real responsibility.
Prospects for progress in tackling the area's many problems are relatively
good, given Papua New Guinean determination and Australian patie..~ce and
assistance. There is less reason to be sanguine about the longer range,
post-independence picture, although even then the outlook is for stability
rather than disintegration.
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordi-
nated with the Office of Economic Research and the Office of National Estimates.
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A Few Facts
Papua New Guinea is made up of two jointly administered territories,
which are being prepared as a single entity for self-government: the UN Trust
Territory of New Guinea (formerly German New Guinea and later a League
of Nations mandate), which Australia has administered since 1921, and
Papua, which has been an Australian territory since 1906. Included in the
territories are a number of islands, the largest of which are New Britain, New
Ireland, and Bougainville. The western half of New Guinea-West Irian-is
part of Indonesia.
The two and a half million people of Papua New Guinea are immensely
diverse. They belong to numerous and frequently antagonistic tribes and
speak between 500 and 700 languages. Thirty-seven languages are used by
tribes numbering 10,000 or more. The fragmentation of the people results in
large part from the area's geographic features-high mountains, vast swamps,
and jungle. About half of the territory's people live in a series of wide,
well-watered valleys in the New Guinea highlands; these highlanders tend to
be more backward than the coastal dwellers, who are more exposed to
outside influences.
Papua New Guinea suffers not only from tribal but also from regional
antagonisms. The people of Papua dislike those of the Trust Territory of
New Guinea; the highlanders are suspicious of coastal tribes; and the inhab-
itants of the more developed outer islands look down on those of the
"mainland."
There is considerable variation in the development of the people of the
area. In their education, skills, and knowledge of the outside world, they
range from the relatively well-educated Tolai people of New Britain-who
provide more trained personnel to the territorial adminisi.ration than any
other indigenous group-to those primitives for whom possession of a steel
axe is the one concession to the modern wcrld. Probably fewer than a
hundred persons have a university education. This diverse population is now
engaged in an accelerated movement into the twentieth century and toward
nationhood.
Perhaps the best example of the over-all condition of national political
development occurred in 1971. In that year, the area's name having been
changed and a flag, emblem, and national day having been chosen the
Australian Administrator proclaimed that a significant step had been reached
in the development of the Papua New Guinea nation. His message was
printed in a special government gazette with labored explanations as to just
what a "nation" is.
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Mission School
Goroka Teachers' College
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The Making of a Nation: "Gavmnn Bilong Yumi"
The use of pidgin English is one of the most important elements in
breaking down the barriers dividing Papua New Guinea's multiple com-
munities and in developing a sense of unity. Now officially known as
Neo-Melanesian, pidgin came to New Guinea during the German administra-
tion. The New Guinea version is a derivative of English, German, and
Kuanua-the language of the Tolai. To a considerable extent it is already the
lingua franca of the Trust Territory of New Guinea, and it is gradually taking
over in Papua. Its vocabulary is expanding as linguistic requirements arise,
and it is spoken far more than literacy figures imply. For several years it has
been used widely enough to make possible a territory-wide radio news-
service and several newspapers.
The pwsibilities of pidgin have not been lost on the rising group of
educated, politically minded Papua New Guineaiis. In addition to providing
inter-tribal communication, pidgin serves as a bond among Papua New
Guineans seeking to set themselves apart from the white man. Pidgin is the
language most often used in the Papua New Guinea House of Assembly, and
the oath of office is administered in both English and pidgin-"Mi askim God
long helpim mim." In 1967, the Australian Administrator made several
speeches in pidgin, surprising and pleasing his hearers by the ease of com-
munication with the "Nambawan Gavman."
The Australian administration nevertheless continues to press for the
wider use of English as a common tongue. Since the 1950s the government
has refused to assist Christian mission schools unless they teach in English,
and pidgin is not taught as a subject in its own right in administration or
administration-assisted schools. Although most educated Papua New
Guineans advocate the adoption of pidgin as a national language, the; are
aware of the need for leaders who speak English.
Education and Administration
Australia did little to advance education in Papua New Guinea until the
mid-1950s. Education was left largely to the Christian missions, which
lacked the resources to do more than provide a primary education for a
relative few. The first public high schools were established in 1957, and the
training of native secondary teachers began ten years later; the University of
Papua New Guinea was founded in 1966, and the Institute of Technology in
1968. As a result, it will be another decade or two before the educational
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system will be turning; out enough secondary and university graduates
to meet the minimum requirements.
Current literacy rats:., are not available, but projecting from the 1966
census, literacy in English is believed to be about 16 percent of the popula-
tion and in pidgin 18 percent, although there may be some overlap between
the two groups. Advanced schools, including the university, enrolled over
3,000 students this year, but only about 25 percent of primary- and
secondary-age children are now in school, far short of the goal set for
1971-72 by the Australian administration.
At present about two-thirds of the t::rritorial administration's em-
ployees are Papua New Guineans, but most of them serve at lower levels.
Although the number of Papua New Guineans in senior posts is growing,
there are still only handful. Unless standards are drastically lowered,
foreigners will be required in technical and professional positions for some
years to come.
Toward Self-Government
Not until after World War lI did Australia take the first halting steps
toward preparing Papua and the UN Trust Territory of New Guinea for
independence. In 1949, Canberra passed legislation combining the adminis-
tration of Papua and the Trust Territory. The top official was-and still
is-the Australian Administrator, who is appointed by the Australian Min-
istry of External Territories. An appointed, advisory legislative council,
composed chiefly of white planters and missionaries but including three
natives, was established in 1951. The administrator governed chiefly through
district officers whose subordinate patrol officers selected and supervised
native village authorities. Local government councils advised the district
officers. Canberra's idea was to move Papua New Guinea through a series of
carefully phased steps toward eventual independence.
A combination of circumstances during the past decade, however, has
forced Australia to accelerate preparations for self-government. During the
1960s the United Nations Trusteeship Council, influenced by African and
Asian nations, demanded speedier action. In 1969 the Tolai people launched
a politico-economic movement in the Gazelle Peninsula of New Britain
island, shocking Canberra into realizing that self-government could not be
delayed another 20 years. In Australia the opposition Labor Party
announced in 1970 that if it won Australia's 1972 parliamentary elections
(to be held in November) it would give Papua New Guinea independence
within three years.
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Voting for the Third House of Assembly
Territory-wide popular elections for a House of Assembly-empowered
to legislate for the "peace, order, and good government of the territory"-
were instituted in 1964. Since then, there have been two elections for an
expanded legislature, the most recent early in 1972. At the demand of the
first elected house, an embryonic cabinet was set up in 1968. A few elected
Papua New Guineans from the legislature were named as ministers and sat on
the Administrator's Executive Council.
Australia informed the UN Trusteeship Council this year that it is
willing to grant full self-government to the territory (luring the term of the
present I-louse of Assembly (1972-76) if "the people so desire it." The Papua
New Guinea adviser to the Australian delegation then told the Council that
the territory desired "immediate self government."
The present thinking is that under self-government, Australia would
retain control over foreign affairs and external defense, but would transfer
internal responsibility to Papua New Guinea. Actually, the Papua New
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The Opening of the 1972 Hcuse of Assembly in Port Moresby
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Guinea elite is itself divided on the territory's future political development.
The largest group wants self-government as soon as possible on a territory-
wide basis; a slightly smaller group would postpone self-government until
greater social development has been achieved; and a much smaller group,
,hiefly in the more prosperous outer islands, wants self-government on a
local rather than a territory-wide basis.
Political Parties and Leadership
Not surprisingly, political parties are a recent development in Papua
New Guinea. The oldest party-also the best organized and best led-is the
Pangu Pati (Papua and New Guinea Union Party) which has been around
only five years. Its leader, Michael Somare, age 35, has been a member of the
House since 1968. A former journalist and broadcaster, he is articulate and
well traveled. His party, with 31 seats, is only the second largest in the
house, but Somare is "chief minister" in the cabinet because he was able to
organize a working coalition. Pangu has tried to develop a territory-wide
organization, but most of its success has been in the "mainland" coastal
towns and in the territory's major trade unions, which it has controlled since
1970. From inception, it has been committed to "immediate home rule" and
early independence, but le envisages a continuing close relationship with
Australia. Pangu's performance in the House of Assembly has been generally
constructive.
With 42 of the House's 100 elected seats, the United Party has greater
parliamentary strength than Pangu; but because of its inability to attract the
support of smaller parties, it has been relegated to the role of parliamentary
opposition. The United Party was established late in 1970 as a vehicle for
conservative opinion. Like Pangu, the United Party has territory-wide
representation, but it draws its princip,!l strength chiefly from New Guinea
highlanders and Australian planters. Members of these two groups founded
the party in response to the Australian Labor Party's announcement that, if
elected, it would give the territory self-government and independence by
1975. The highlanders feared that this would mean the loss of Australian
development assistance, while the Australian expatriates saw independence
as a threat to their economic interests in the territory. The party calls for
more social and economic development before proceeding to self-rule.
Australian expatriates probably do most of the party's decision-making,
although titular leadership is vested in a Papua New Guinean. The United
Party's parliamentary leader is Mathias Toliman.
Two small parties have been formed within the past 18 months; the
People's Progress Party (eight seats) and the New Guinean National Party
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Chief Minister Michael Somare
in a special radiobroadcast to
the people of Papua New
Guinea explaining the new gov-
ernment, May 1972
Some of the people were very cross with their member of the
House of Assembly because he had joined the coalition government.
They have said they will kill their member or hurt him. This is against
the law and anybody who tries to kill or hurt a member of the House of
Assembly will be punished.
There are many important things the government will look at.
These include the problems of land and land ownership. Another
question is when will we have self government? Now that Pangu has
joined the coalition, the coalition government will have to decide this
question, not the Pangu Pati. We will not have self government to-
morrow....
R
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(ten seats). Both are mcmbcts of the coalition government, although they
tend to be more conservative than Pangu. The ethnically based Mataungan
Association of New Britain, formed in 1969 and led by John Kaputin, has
three scats. Although it supports the government coalition, it chose not to
participate in the cabinet, and its political course is unpredictable.
Somare's Government
Chief Minister Michael Somare's 17-man coalition cabinet war approved
in April 1972 by a vote of 51-42. Somare is well regarded by Australians,
who are especially pleased that since coming to office he has moderated his
call for immediate self-government. Somare has had to take into account his
coalition's dependence on the support of minor parties that favor a more
slowly paced movement toward self-government. His latest statements raise
the probability of self-government by the end of 1973, but he left open the
possibility of some slippage.
Somare's political sensitivity has been demonstrated in his choice of
ministers. He chose candidates who, by New Guinea standards, are well
qualified and who represent the territory's major regions. Of the ten min-
isters who sit on the Administrator's Executive Council, five are members of
Pangu, four are from Pangu's coalition partners-the New Guinea National
Party, and the Peoples' Progress Party-and one is an independent.
Somare drew his ministers f-om a House that is generally better
educated than in the past. Although some of the newly elected members are
still functional illiterates, most ha-/e enough English or pidgin to get by in
the normal day-to-day business of the House. At least 20 members have
secondary or university educations and have had experience in public or
community affairs. Elected Australian membership in the House is down
from 20 to eight.
Somare's parliamentary majority is not large, and he faces the possible
defection of the three members of the Mataungan Association and the
independent member of his cabinet, but there is little chance that this could
bring down the government. In general, the cabinet appears to be a strong
team and prospects are .good that it will endure.
Somare has moved quickly on major problems. One of his first acts was
to establish a committee to formulate legislation on land ownership, perhaps
the most contentious issue in the territory. The problem is how to provide a
legal basis for ownership of land in a tribal society and what to do about the
land that is owned or leased by Australians. The cabinet has also authorized
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a constitutional planning committee to consider the kind of government best
suited to the country's needs, with particular attention to the merits of a
parliamentary system as against a presidential system and of central versus
regional administration. Increased education is to be one of the priorities of
his government. 1~omare has stated that Australian money and expertise will
be welcome after self-rule, but only under conditions-as yet unspecified-
laid down by the people of Papua New Guinea.
Law and order is likely to be a recurring problem. Tribal disorders l-avc
been on the increase in the highlands, urban crime has grown as unskilled
workers move into the towns, and New Britain's Gazelle Peninsula is an area
of smoldering discontent. Until the Papua New Guineans take charge of their
own internal affairs, control of the some 3,700 Police will still be in
Australian hands, so unhappiness over police action c.r inaction will be
directed more at Canberra than at Somare.
Regionalism
The most complex problem facing Somare's cabinet is posed by dis-
content among the Tolais in the Gazelle Peninsula. Their complaints focus
on three issues: Australian control of 43 percent of "Tolai land," Australian
control of the civil service, and Australian and Chinese domination of local
business. The Tolais particularly resent the fact that although educationally
they are the most advanced group in the territory, they are deprived of
significant influence in their home area. To promote their objectives, the
Tolais have formed the Mataungan Association. Its leaders have called for
immediate territorial self-government under a presidential system with state-
hood for the major regions of the area. The Mataungans have repeatedly and
violently opposed Australian policy on land usage; an Australian official was
murdered in 1971, leading to a protracted trial this year of five Tolais which
has further soured relations. Chief Minister Somare's early appointment of
committees on land and constitutional planning was obviously directed at
the Mataungan problem.
In Bougainville, a similar mass movement emerged several years ago to
oppose the expropriation of land for a large copper mine. Like the Mataun-
gan Association, the Bougainville group is ethnically based, favors local
self-government, and even speaks of secession. Unlike the Mataungans, it has
lost steam in the past two years; its candidate for election was defeated this
year. Less successful imitators of the Mataungans have appeared in two other
areas, and more will probably surface.
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Politics is no new in Papua New Guinea
that the future role of these local organiza-
tions is difficult to assess. Mataungan leader
John Kaputin has said that "Mataunganism is
nationalism in a raw state." The participation
of the two major local movements in the
elections indicates their interest in the na-
tional movement. Although they appear to be
impediments to unity, the ethnically based
movements may instead prove to be building
blocks to nationalism.
The Economy
John Kaputin
The bulk of the Papua New Guinean population is engaged in sub-
sistence agriculture. A relatively limited modern sector, dominated by Aus-
tralians, is based on estate agriculture, forestry, and mining.
Under pressure to broaden the economy, Australia opened the territory
to foreign investment in the 1960s, and in 1969 launched a five-year
economic development program. Australia still provides more than 90
percent of the territory's investment capital, but much of this has been
channeled into capital-intensive ventures that provide little training and few
employment opportunities for Papua New Guineans. Japan is the second
largest investor, concentrating on timber and fisheries. The territorial admin-
istration has for some, time been reserving the right to hold an equity in any
newly established foreign-owned business in the area. No share has been
fixed, but in practice the Papua New Guinea equity varies from 20 to 50
percent.
Involvement of the Papua New Guinean people in the monetary sector
of the economy had been slowly growing even before inauguration of the
development plan. Some natives earned cash income as workers on
Australian plantations or by growing small quentitities of cash crops.
Employment in government and industry has increased considerably in
recent years, but the number of persons getting regular wages in cash remains
below 100,000. Only a handful of Papua New Guineans hold jobs of even
minor responsibility in business, production, or commerce.
The territory is not economically viable, although economic activity is
increasing and per capita income is high compared with most less developed
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countries. The development program has thus far failed to meet its agricul-
tural and educational targets, although the growth of extractive industries
has exceeded expectations because of the large Inflow of' private capital.
Australia contributes substantial grant aid to the area, with assistance this
year amounting to about US $175 million. Over half of this amount is for
economic development.
Mining holds the principal promise for prosperity in Papua New Guinea.
The largest mining project-and the largest enterprise in the territory-is the
copper mine in Bougainville, which is controlled by a British company
through an Australian subsidiary.
The islands of New Ireland, New Britain, and Bougainville, with about
12 percent of the territory's population, account for 60 percent of its
income-mostly from copra, cocoa, and timber. As copper conies into
production, the income generated in Bougainville will rise sharply, especially
after 1976 when the tax holiday enjoyed by the enterprises will end.
Australia is the territory's principal trading partner, providing more
than half its imports and p+Jrchasing some two fifths of its exports. Japan
and the United States are both increasing their trade with the area; each
accounts for about 11 percent of total trade-double their share five years
ago. Japan is the largest customer for Bougainville's copper.
Papua New Guinea's economic future is bright only if the political
situat-'on remains stable. For some years the terr?tory will have to depend
not only on Australian government aid and trained personnel but also on
Australian and other foreign private capital to develop its resources.
Papua New Guinea and the World
The territory is still so preoccupied with preparation for self-rule that it
has given relatively littl!' thought to external affairs. It is very much aware,
of course, of its neighbor, Indonesia, and remembers the expansionist
proclivities of the Sukarno government prior to 1965. The present
Indonesian government has foresworn military adventurism, but is concerned
ever the fact that some West Irianese who oppose the Indonesian Govern-
ment have sought refuge in Papua New Guinea.
Australia, which has pursued a policy of careful friendslrp with
Indonesia, has played down the resulting cross-border incidents and has
developed a relatively satisfactory relationship with Indonesian authorities
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through low-level border conferences and frequent local contacts. Canberra
has quietly but firmly discouraged West Irianese suggestions of future union
with Papua New Guinea. Papua New Guinea's leaders, aware of their own
country's deficiencies and appalled at the even greater backwardness of West
Irian, are likely to follow Australia's policies toward Indonesia,
Two Australian foreign affairs officers were assigned to Port Moresby
last February to consider candidates for a Papua New Guinea foreign service.
Austral n is moving ahead with plans to place a High Commissioner in Port
Moresby within the next two or three years. The United Kingdom,
Indonesia, and Japan have approached Canberra about opening posts in
Papua New Guinea.
A Summing Up
Despite a heritage of disunity, isolation from the twentieth tsntury,
and lack of preparation for self-government, Papua New Guinea is stumbling
toward nationhood. It is trying to improve communication and under-
standing among its own people, and broadening their acquaintance with the
world. The Somare government appears determined to come to grips with
the numerous problems facing the country. The only genuine territory-wide
political organization is still the Australian administration; the indigenous
political structure is frail and untested. Somare and his colleagues face the
difficult task of gatherir,g loyalties and developing the expertise and
apparatus to make a government work and a nation viable.
Removal of all Australian support is likely to come somewhat slowly,
and the next few years will probably be relatively quiet ones of preparation.
Major dislocations, if they come, are more likely to materialize later when
the country, doubtless still unready, will receive independence.
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