EGYPT: SADAT'S DILEMMA DEEPENS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130056-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2008
• Sequence Number: 56
• Publication Date: May 3, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIP.ECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Egypt: Sadat's Dilemma Deepens
Secret
i. Y
3 May 1972
No. 0862/72
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
3 May 1972
In
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Egypt: Sadat's Dilemma Deepens
The first quarter of 1972 has been bleak for
Egyptian President Sadat. Last year, his proclaimed
"year of decision," ended without the bang he had
promised. His attempts to explain away his failure
to produce a decision have proved disastrous. Speak-
ing to the nation on 13 January, Sadat laid bare
his essential impotence by attributing the failures
of 1971 to a "fog over Egypt" (i.e., extraneous
events, like the Indo-Pakistani war, which obscured
the Egyptian cause). This speech seriously eroded
public confidence in him and made him the butt or
considerable derisive humor. More fumbles followed.
He appointed a "confrontation cabinet," only to see
it greeted with widespread disbelief; then came
student riots, protesting the state of "no war, no
peace" and presenting Sadat with his first manifes-
tation of open dissent.
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the office
of Current Intelligence and coordinated within CIA.
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Foreign Policy Difficulties
1. President Sadat's overriding concern, of
course, is his inability to show any progress toward
a resolutio:- of the Arab-Israeli impasse. Sadat has
been able to arrest or ameliorate some of the domes-
tic inequities that prevailed during the Nasir era,
and this has been noted with satisfaction by the
general public. But he has failed to come up with
any believable plan for regaining the occupied ter-
ritory or for attaining the peace that virtually
all Egyptians desire. Progress in reaching these
two objectives is considered by most Egyptians to
be the measures of pclitical success; since he can-
not make progress, Sadat faces growing unrest.
2. Sadat has attempted to obscure his failure
and give the illusion of movement by a series of
diversionary tactics. For example, during March
and April, Egyptian officials initiated a series
of meetings and contacts with their Arab counter-
parts. Sadat traveled to a number of neighboring
'apitals, lower ranking Egyptian officials visited
still others, and Cairo announced new political
initiatives that were to include "total Arab mobili-
zation on the various fronts." Additionally, a
succession of domestic meetings was held during
which Egyptian officials tried to arouse increased
support for government policies. All of this added
up to very little and it was obvious to many Egyp-
tians that the regime was merely treading water.
3. Sadat has been less than successful in
other foreign policy ventures. There is a general
lack of enthusiasm for Egypt's participation in
the Confederation of Arab Republics, which is con-
tinuously headlined in the Egyptian press. Al-
though the confederation provides greater access
to Libya's coffers, many Egyptians maintain that
the energies expended on this venture could be
better utilized to deal with the myriad domestic
problems facing the average citizen. Sadat's
decision to sever diplomatic ties with Jordan
was apparently intended in part to provide
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a harmless divertissement for the Egyptian public.
If the move had any impact at all on public opinion,
it was further to estrange citizens who hold that
Egypt has done enough for the Palestinian cause and
should turn its attention to Egypt's own problems.
4. Many Egyptians are doubtless disappointed
that Sadat's dealings with the USSR and the US have
been less fruitful than they had hoped. There is a
general feeling in Egypt that Sadat committed his
prestige to an effort to improve US-Egyptian rela-
tions last year, but was let down by Washington.
At the same time, there has been a surge of public
questioning about the role of the Soviet Union in
Egypt and the extent of the Soviet commitment to
Cairo. Some Egyptians see the influx of Soviet
military advisers into their country as a new form
of colonialism. Encounters between Egyptian civil-
ians and Soviet advisers are not always happy; one
common Egyptian complaint i;; the parsimony of their
Soviet guests. Sadat is aware of the uneasiness
generated by Egypt's dependence on the Soviets.
He is frequently forced to reiterate for the public
the beneficial nature of the relationship and to
assure his countrymen that Egypt's reliance upon
Moscow does not constitute subjugation.
Domestic Troubles
5. The overpowering need to confront Israel
dictates Egyptian policies in other areas, adding
to the frustrations of the President. It results,
for example, in a commitment to build up the Egyptian
armed forces, and this is one of the major factors
that helps to perpetuate economic stagnation. And
economic weakness has directly affected the aspira-
tions of middle- and upper-class Egyptians. Indeed,
this need forces Egypt into a poor cousin relation-
ship, not only with the Soviet Union but also with
other Arab states and the East European countries.
Moreover, the fear of renewed warfare with Israel
has discouraged the flow of foreign funds that
Egypt is seeking.
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6. Efforts to curb a chronically escalating
wage bill have fueled the restiveness of Egyptian
workers. in order to undercut worker grievances
and forestall labor support for student demonstra-
tions in January, the government ordered a number
of austerity measures aimed almost exclusively at
upper-income groups while granting the workers
concessions,such as salary increases for hazardous
occupations and more housing and services. Never-
theless, Prime Minister Sidgi ran afoul of resentful
laborers in inid-March who were apparently protesting
measures than cut into their overtime pay. His car
was stoned by the workers, and a clash resulted.
Some 150 workers were arrested, and although the,
incident was localized, it was another embarrassment
for the regime. It indicated worker dissatisfaction
was such that they might make common cause with
other oppositionists, like the students.
7. But more serious for Sadat was the outburst
of student hostility that followed his speech on 13
January. Concentrated at Cairo's main universities,
the student demonstrators voiced sometimes contra-
dictory complaints, but persistently questioned the
direction in which Sadat seemed to be going. Some
of the demonstrators called for an immediate na-
tional commitment to military action against Israel,
but most appeared to be venting their frustration
over the "no war, no peace" situation. Their dis-
illusionment with Sadat was clear. In the end, the
government had to employ force to halt the demon-
strations. Since these demonstrations, the students
have been quiet; they did get concessions, such as
better housing and some stringent economic controls
to prepare the nation for conflict. But many of
their grievances remain unanswered: freedom of the
press is still restricted, the opportunities for
satisfying and productive employment after gradua-
tion are extremely limited, and the prospect of
long service in the armed forces faces every grad-
uate.
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8,. The Sadat regime subsequently mounted a
concor~.ed effort to direct future expression of
student, discortc:'nt into more manageab. e ^hannels.
Egypt'; only legal political orgdinizat..o'.,, the
Arab Socialist Union, has moved to link student
organizations more closely to itself . Several
leaders of the Egyptian student federation have
begin arrested or drafted into the armed forces,
and the government appears to have succeeded in
gaining effective control of the organization.
To back this up, Sadat has publicly ',Yarned that,
while students could debate the issues, he would
tolerate no more demonstrations.
9. Egyptian officials have refused to admit
any responsibility for the conditions that gen-
erated the student unrest. Instead they hav3 at-
tempted to put the blame on foreign-inspired agi-
tators. Among those alleged to have stirred up
the students were Moscow-oriented supporters of
former Vice President Ali Sabri, a sprinkling of
Maoists and Palestinians, and members of the out-
lawed Muslim Brotherhood. A few of these people
in fact did take part in the demonstrations, but
only as casual participants.
10. Still, the government has worked hard to
conjure up the spectre of subversive groups at
work within Egypt. The discovery of several small
anti-regime cells has been given wide publicity,
although these groups apparently posed no real
threat to the government. One group, the Egyptian
National Front, was charged with having sent sub-
versive leaflets into the country, some attacking
the Soviet presence in Egypt and others aimed at
President Sadat himself. Although the organiza-
tion's backers have not been positively identified,
the regime has labeled it a creation of Israel.
Sadat has stretched this accusation to link the
student demonstrations to the Israelis, warning
that any further unrest would play into the hands
of the enemy.
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S 117, l I IZ 11 rr
11 Journalist,., men of letters, and artists,
as a group, have been another embarrassment to Sadat.
For example, a storm cf criticism arose during a
meeting of journalists in March. The experience
caused Sadat to order the reinstatement of journal-
ists who had been transferred from their posts since
1964. Egypt's most prominent newsman, Muhammad
Haykal, chief editor of the semi-official al-Ahram,
is said to be disillusioned with President Sadat.
Haykal's standing in Egyptian politics fluctuates.
At times he is the confidant of the President; at
others he loses access to the inner circle. At all
times, however, his standing as the most widely
read journalist in the Middle East guarantees him
a tangible measure of influence. Haykal's current
estrangement from Sadat, therefore, represents yet
another diminution in the assets of the President.
A Latent Opposition
12. The political opponents who Sadat attacked
as "centers of power" in May 1971 have today vanished
from sight. What remains is an amorphous collection
of leftists, who strangely enough, retain some in-
fluence despite the decimation of their ranks during
the Ali Sabri purge of May 1971. The positions they
hold, primarily in the public media, provide them
with a platform from which to criticize government
policies. They remain largely unorganized, however,
and their capacity to harm Sadat directly is limited.
At present, they seem unable to do more than provoke
an occasional awkward incident, such as the abortive
attempt in early February to free Ali Sabri from
prison.
13. The traditionalist Muslim Brotherhood,
potentially another opposition group, has been able
to maintain itself even during periods of active
suppression. Nasir considered the Brotherhood the
primary threat to his regime, but Sadat is less
hostile. He has eased some of the restrictions on
its activities and has attempted to establish con-
tact with it. The Brotherhood
probably
dces not have the btrength or inc ination to chal-
lenge Sadat seriously at this time.
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14. The most crucial element in the Egyptian
power structure, and the one about which there is
perhaps the least hard information, is the armed
forces. The senior leaders, War Minister Sadiq
and Chief of Staff Shazli, appear to be loyal to
President Sadat. Shazli is, however, reputed to
be an extremely ambitious man. There may well be
differences with Sadat's policies at some levels
of the military.
The regime
is naturally sensitive to the pivotal position of
the military and has attempted to ensure its loy-
alty by granting it numerous favors. As a result,
the military is probably the most privileged class
in c:irtemporary Egyptian society.
15. Problems within the government apparatus
present Sadat with additional concerns, although
less pressing ones.
Prime Minister Sidgi evidently is widely disliked,
and his handling of economic matters has provoked
open protests.
differences
of opinion among political leaders concerning Egypt's
over-all strate ma well exist.
16. As if this were not enough, prominent
former members of the government and military
establishment are said to be unhappy with Sadat.
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17. The first few months of 1972 witnessed
a rare debate of regime policies in Egypt's legis-
lative body, the People's Assembly. The assembly
rejected an executive order adversely affecting
rural landowners and objected to government at-
tempts to appoint officials to elective positions.
Although so far the criticism from this side has
been directed against less important policies,
the questioning of executive authority is new and
a somewhat embarrassing development for Sadat.
It could tempt critics of the regime to use this
channel for further exploitation of Sadat's weak
points.
In a sense,
Sadat has been his own worst enemy, bringing upon
himself a number of the problems he is facing.
The failure to put lny teeth into his threats con-
cerning the "year of decision" and the "zero hour"
undermined his credibility with the Egyptian masses.
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The "fog over Egypt" speech of 13 January was another
serious blunder that helped precipitate the student
riots a week later. Other such blunders are all too
likely in view of the fact that talk is one of the
few options still available to Sadat. He has, in
fact, recently set himself yet another deadline.
During a speech marking the birthday of the prophet
Muhammad on 25 April, he vowed to liberate the oc-
cupied territory within a year.
Strengths and Prospects
19. There is little prospect that Sadat will
find relief from his multitude of difficulties.
Nevertheless, he can count a number of favorable
factors. If his health, nerve, and luck hold up,
he can perhaps hold his own for some time.
20. While his many critics grumble steadily
that he has failed to produce, they are themselves
unable to come up with constructive suggestions on
how to proceed. There are few, if any, individuals
who possess the respect necessary to win the support
of all those elements whose help, either active or
passive, would he needed to bring about a change in
leadership. And, just as important, there are few,
if any, claimants to Sadat'-, mantle who are really
eager to assume the tremendous political and man-
agerial burden Sadat has been willing to bear.
21. For the moment, Sadat to all appearances
holds the allegiance of the leac:ers of the nation's
armed forces and security services, the vital fac-
tor in his tenure. These two groups, but partic-
ularly the security services, continue to monitor
and control the activities of malcontents who might
threaten Sadat's position.
22. Support from the Soviet Union is another
important plus in Sadat's staying power. Although
Moscow has had its misgivings about the President
and is far from enthusiastic about him, it probably
regard: him as preferable to an even less predict-
able successor. Moreover, despite some flirtation
with the West, Sadat has worked to improve Soviet
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relations with both Libya and the Sudan and was the
first "nonaligned" president to sign a treaty of
friendship and cooperation with the USSR.
23. As long as the nation's economic situation
does not deteriorate and basic foodstuffs are readily
available, the regime will probably be able to pro-
vide the minimum benefits necessary to maintain at
least the passive support of Egyptian labor. Student
unrest can probably be controlled by either closing
the universities or drafting larger numbers of stu-
dents into the armed forces.
24. The diffusion of Sadat's opposition im-
proves his chances of hanging on. No single group
of anti-regime elements appears to have sufficient
strength or determination to challenge his authority,
and there has as yet been little evidence of coopera-
tion among them. Moreover, no issue has yet arisen
on which all the opposition elements could effec-
tively focus.
25. So long as these factors operate, the
opposition will remain weak and Sadat should manage
to hang on.. There is, of course, a limit to the
time Sadat can arrange to distract the Egyptian
people with his juggling acts. It would, for ex-
ample, be difficult for him to handle a student-
labor uprising that was supported by other segments
of the population.
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