EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: THE COMMUNIST OPPOSITION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130051-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2008
• Sequence Number: 51
• Publication Date: April 18, 1972
• Content Type: IR

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Report
European Integration: The Communist Opposition
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18 April' 1972
No. 0855/72
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
18 April 1972
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
European Integration: The Communist Opposition
Summary
During much of the postwar period, the Communist parties of Western
Europe have strongly opposed the European integration movement, par-
ticularly the European Communities. Only the Italian Communist Party has
accepted integration as a fact to which it must accommodate. It has sought
and achieved meaningful representation in the EC's institutions, which, it
hopes, will increase its influence both in Italy and in the community.
The French Communist Party-the only other party of significance in
the communities-has, on the other hand, been tied to a rigidly anti-EC
position which, until recently at least, Moscow nas also espoused. It has
stayed aloof from the EC's institutional machinery and has sought to prevent
the Italians and the other Communist parties from participating actively. in
opposing "supra-nationalism," the French party has often made common
av.!se with the Gaullists.
The differences in attitudes of these two Communist parties are un-
likely to disappear overnight. But in the longer run it seems probable that
the Italian viewpoint will prevail. As more and more economic, social, and
political issues are dealt with on a European level, the Communist parties-
like other parties-will have to go where the "action" is. Likewise, as
industry in the enlarged community increasingly functions on a multi-na-
tional scale, the Communist-dominated trade unions will find they must
compete with the free trade unions on a European scale. Even more impor-
tant, as Moscow comes to recognize and accept the community structure
based in Brussels, all local Communist parties, however conservative, will
find it expedient to follow suit.
Note: This report was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated
within CIA.
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"We Communists are in favor of a Europe where peace, security, and cooperation prevail,
However, whether the Common Market consists of six or ten countries, it will remain a
"little Europe" reduced to a group of capltal?st countries under the sway of large private
firms and under the tutelage of the United States through NATO. This little Europe was
born as the result of the cold war. It does not ensure peace and security In Europe, but
divides our continent. It does not guarantee our Independence; on the contrary, it tends
to liquidate our independence. "
Georges Marchais-French Communist-March 1972
"Our opposition (to the Treaty of Rome) did not mean that we did not recognize the
h-ccessity of economic and political cooperation among the European countries and
regions. Nor, on the other hand, ha.- our opposition ever reached the point of denying or
ignoring the reality which was coming into being, the reality of a process of economic
integration, even if this process has been concretely controlled by important American
and European monopolistic forces. "
Giorgio Amendola, Italian Communist Party-maiden
speech before European Parliament-March 1969
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1. The first moves toward European unification after Word War 11
were bitterly opposed by the European Communist parties. All of them
followed Moscow's lead in rejecting the Marshall Plan and its implementing
agency, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. They
chaiged tl-, , the program would lead to loss of national sovereignty and
"pauperization" of the working class, and that the real purpose of integra-
tion was the weakening of the Soviet Union.
2. The European community movement, which began with the Coal
and Steel Community, was also anathema to the Communists. The French
party played a prominent role in striking down the European Defense
Community in the early 1950s. In its campaign against the defense com-
munity, general Marxist ideology centering on the ?lass struggle took a back
seat to the emotional issue of national sovereignty. It was the curious
alliance of the Communist Party and the far right that helped kill the defense
'. uamunity.
3. When the Treaty of Rome, instituting the Common Market, was
signed in March 1957, the West European Communist parties again loudly
objected. They saw the EC as still another US tool to strengthen NATO,
establish monopolistic control over West European economies, and weaken
the Soviet Union. The Italian Communists, for example, claimed that the EC
raised "the grave and real danger that the whole Italian economy, except for
certain large monopolistic sectors, would be transformed into a great
depressed area, with grave consequences for an important part of our
population." Arguments against supra-nationalism were linked with anti-
German sentiment to whip up nationalism and to mobilize both the left and
right against the community. Again, the lines of the West European Com-
munist parties followed the Soviet position.
4. The 20th party congress of the Soviet Union in 1956, at which the
concept of differing roads to socialism was formally accepted, spurred on the
divergent ideas of Palmiro Togliatti, leader of the Italian Communist Party.
This provided the basis for the subsequent evolution of the Italian party's
stand on the EC.
5. In late 1957, although the party was still attacking the EC, Italy's
Communist-dominated ;'abor union called for recognition of the possible
benefits of economic integration, arguing that through participation in the
EC, all European workers might be unified. The French Communist-
dominated labor union quickly denounced the Italians for abandoning the
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fight to destroy the EC, but the Italians remained firm in their position and
carried the dispute to the Communist international labor front. At a Com-
munist labor convention at the end of 1961 the Ualians declared: "While
criticizing the method by which economic integration is being realized and
the predominant role played (in it) by the monopolies, our position takes
into account the fact that the Common Market exists and that we must
consider it a reality within which to carry out a united struggle to protect
the interests of the workers."
6. Soon after the Italian union took this radical new position, the
Italian party's (.'no also began to shift. Buttressed by its success in weathering
French Communist and Soviet criticism of its divergence doctrine, the party
became fully committed to a pragmatic approach to the EC. The Italian
party recognized that its best opportunity to influence the course of events
in Italy, and perhaps ultimately to attain a role in the government, lay in
seeking a political ally. Thus, it could not ignore the strong commitment to
the Common Market of all potential allies and their conviction that Italy's
economic gains were attributable at least in part to its EC membership. The
combination of these factors dictated a change in PCI attitudes toward the
community.
The Year of Divergence-1962
7. By 1962 the divergence of Italian Communist views from those of
all the other Communist parties with respect to the EC had become pro-
nounced. This coincided with the initial, substantial progress of the Common
Market, the clear signs of the economic advantages io its members, and Great
Britain's decision to ask for membership. The Soviets, ever fearing a strong
Western Europe unified on a Paris-Bonn axis, held a conference of Com-
munist parties on modern capitalism in August 1962. The Italian party used
the conference to make its strongest declaration yet of a policy of gradual
renovation of the EC through recognition and participation. The French
Communists continued their adamant opposition to the EC.
8. At the conference the Soviet Union had difficulty in straddling the
opposing Italian and French views. The Soviets Joined the French Com-
munists in attacking what they saw as the politicvl and possibly military
objectives of the EC and its supposedly disastrous effects on the workers,
but it also made a polite bow to the EC's contributions to productivity as a
partial vindication of the Italian position. Khrushchev likewise conceded
"the possibility of economic cooperation and peaceful ??ronomic
competition, not only between separate countries with differ-ud social
systems, but also between their amalgamations."
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9. This mild endorsement of the Italian position was set back at the
Communist World Federation of Trade Unions convention in October 1962.
I-lere the issue of whether the EC should be dealt with along the pragmatic
guidelines proposed by the Italians or in accordance with the traditional,
dogmatic approach proposed by the French was resolved in favor of the
French. The Italian union, however, obstinately abstained from voting on
the conference proposals, In addition, it obtained the federation's sanction
for the establishment of a labor bureau, consisting of representatives of the
Italian and French unions and a Luxembourg trade union, in Brussels to
"deal" with the EC. The French and the Luxembourg unions later backed
out of the venture, but the Italians opened the office and, for the first time,
began a dialogue between a Communist-run organization and the EC.
10. The events of 1962 largely established the pattern of Communist
party relations with the European Communities for the next few years. In
spite of the intransigence of the French Communists, the Italian party and
union began an active search for representation in the EC. In 1963 at a
meeting of EC countries' Communist parties, the French party was again
able to prevent the Italians from fashioning a common Communist front in
dealing with the EC. Only the Belgian Communists, perhaps because of the
location of the EC's headquarters in Brussels and because the French stance
had become too static, supported the Italian's call for unified action by
Communist, Socialist, and Catholic forces to reshape the community.
Moves To,.,ard Rapprochement
11. The contrast in the attitudes of the Italian and French parties
toward the European Communities during the early 1960s was partly a
function of leadership and partly a reflection of do ir..stic situations. For
several decades both parties had been controlled by strong men-Pahniro
Togliatti in Italy and Maurice Thomz in France. Each had large and strong
parties comp^ting for a pre-eminent role ;n Western Europe. Thorez toed the
Moscow line in order to advance his leadership goal. Togliatti, while also
following Moscow's lead, adopted the pragmatic, diversified approach re-
quired by his domestic aspirations. The two were personally and ideo-
logically antagonistic, and when both died in 1964, their parties carried on
their ideological squabble.
12. When Khrushchev fell from power in 1964, the two partic,s reacted
to the new leadership in Moscow in characteristically different ways. The
French party after slight hesitatV.on, accepted Khrushchev's fall; the Italians
delayed their final "approval." But at the same time the French began to
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demonstrate more flexibility. In domestic politics, for example, by 1.965
their loose arrangement for joint action with other leftist parties had grown
into an alliance with th-. non-Communist left against De Gaulle in the
presidential elections. This coalition provided the French party some escape
from the isolation it had suffered since its exclusion from the government in
1947.
13. The French party also slightly shifted its position in international
affairs. At meetings with the Italian party in 1965 and 1966, it accepted the
Italians' principle of diversity, at least to the extent of recognizing the
possibility of loose cooperation of the two parties on European regional
matters. The Soviets probably were amenable to this slight change in the
French party's position since they were then seeking "independent" allies in
their dispute with the Chinese. The new leadership of the French party may
also have been assuaging its youth organization, which had openly supported
the Italian position on the EC.
14. In practical terms, this limited rapprochement had little effect on
the French party's activities in the communities. The French Communist
union did subsequently join the Italians in the labor bureau in Brussels, and
the bureau was later officially recognized by the EC Commission. But this
operation remained largely an Italian one. Although in 1969 the French
Government designated Communist union members to an EC advisory group
on the free movement of workers, the French Communists-unlike the
Italians-have yet to obtain representation on the much more important
Economic and Social Council. And, more important, Paris still has appointed
no Communists to the European Parliament, whereas six members of the
Italian Communist Party-appointed by the Italian Government-have been
seated for nearly three years.
15. The "compromise" achieved by the Italian and French parties in
their 1965-66 meetings did not, of course, mean "conversion" to the same
European goals as the community's proponents. At the meeting in 1966 the
two parties declared: "The Communists intend to conduct their struggle
within the European institutions in order that they may prevent integration
from blocking the kind of democratic reform such as nationalization that
individual countries may wish to put through. They intend to strive for a
different policy from that of cartels and trusts, so that Common Market
institutions may lose their technocratic character, through active participa-
tion of representatives of trade unions and r- :iional parliaments vested with
real power against whom there is no discrimination."
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16. Both the French and Italian parties have consistently argued
against any concept of a closed community which could form a basis for an
anti-Soviet bloc. Otherwise, the Communists have remained reserved, not
only about existing community policies, but also about any further con-
solidation of authority and competence at the European level. If the com-
munities should, however, provide a better opportunity for the parties to
achieve their "social" objectives than are afforded by their national govern-
ments, then the Communists may well adopt a much more pro-European
image. They also have argued in favor of diluting the community by making
it an instrument of a broader all-European cooperation.
17. The French and Italian parties are, according to their stated
policies, dedicated to the "democratization" of the EC. By this they mean
that all political forces, including Communists, must be represented in the
community. To attain this objective, they favor direct election of the
European Parliament-the advisory body whose delegates are, under the
present system, named by the national governments from their respective
national parliaments. Because the present French Government has no inten-
tion of offering the 7rench party a quota of seats in the European Parlia-
ment, direct election might very well mean a net gain in total Communist
representation. However, should elections contribute to a general strength-
ening of European institutions-as many of its advocates believe-the power
the Communists now have in Italy and France would be reduced at the
European level because of Communist weakness in other community coun-
tries. Strengthening of European institutions would not aid Communist
efforts to keep the communities "open" toward the East.
18. The performance of the Italian Communist delegation in the Euro-
pean Parliament has thus far given few glues to the effect an enlarged
Communist presence might have. The delegation is too small to allow it to
qualify under the Parliament's rules as a recognized party group that could
propose policies and positions on its own. The delegates generally have
joined their non-Communist Italian colleagues in defending Italy's industrial
and agricultu-al interests when these have seemed endangered by the
integration process. They have also voted against EC association agreements
with Tunisia and Morocco, arguing that such agreements should be approved
by the member parliaments, not by "Eu, ' ?opean" agencies. To judge by the
limited experience to date, aspirations for respectability and sensitivity to
specific constituent interests may in the long run become as important as
ideology in determining how the Communists will conic down on specific
community issues.
sEURE'r
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19. European integration in the 1970s will create formidable challenges
for the West European Communist parties. Among the issues they will have
to face are: how to influence the European Communities as they not only
enlarge but also proceed from economic integration toward closer political,
foreign policy, and perhaps military cooperation; how to establish effective
cooperation with other parties of the left in trying to influence the com-
munities' development; Y.z)w to ensure for themselves a leading role in a
community-wide labor organization; and, finally, how to adapt to the
evolving relationsv p between a unifying Western Europe and the countries
of Eastern Europe-both in the immediate context of the projected Con-
ference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and over the longer term.
20. At present, all the Communist parties except the Italian, oppose
the EC's enlargement. The French party is particularly vitriolic in its de-
nunciation of the entry of Great Britain, raising the specter of advancing
supra-nationality and "continued" American dominance of Europe. All the
Communist parties in the candidate-countries, including the British party in
tandem with the Labor Party, also oppose EC entry. Only the Italians see
potential benefits from a combination of labor and leftist forces within the
21. Whether the opportunities will be as great as the Italian party
anticipates will depend on how the community evolves. The existing coin-
munity, although no doubt contributing to the national economic gains
which Italy has scored in recent years, has been no great help in resolving the
regional economic and social problems that are a factor in the Italian party's
continued strength. The EC's enlargement may very well aggravate the
problems of some industry sectors and geographic regions. On the other
hand, enlargement may make it possible for the EC to adopt industrial,
regional, and social policies that would more equally distribute economic
gains and co-opt local Communist issues. Many Italian Europeanists in fact
believe that the escape from the present malaise of the Dalian national
government is a two-way devolution of authority-downward to the regions
and upward to European institutions.
22. What happens in the area of Suropean trade union organization
will be especially important to the Communists. With the non-Communist
labor movement still fractionalized in both the international and European
regional arenas, a united front of labor-led by the Communists-offers great
attractions. The free trade unions of the community have made only feeble
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moves in the direction of trans-national collective bargaining. But the Coin-
munists have their own local problems. Prospects for the unification of the
Communist and non-Communist Italian trade unions, which might have
inspired a similar trend at the European level, seemed fairly good a few
months ago, but the tensions aroused by the Italian election campaign have
again postponed any action.
23. Above all, the attitude of the Soviet Union toward the EC will
continue to have a crucial bearing on the role of the Communist parties in
the organization. Moscow's proposal for a Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, which was partly motivated by the Soviets' desire to
slow the advance of integration in the West, has been dutifully supported by
all of the West European parties. The Communist parties have also been
involved in Soviet efforts to rally support in the West for such a conference.
Various proposals for "peoples' conferences" are meant to serve as a vehicle
for "united front" activities, which could be useful domestically as well as
internationally.
24. Should Moscow come to recognize the "reality" of the European
Communities-as Brezhnev's speech last month suggests-most of the West-
ern parties would have to re-examine their own positions. As recently as
January, the French, British, Danish, Norwegian, West German, Dutch,
Austrian, and Finnish parties all denounced the communities and their
projected expansion. Only the Italians and Belgians were asserting that
abolition of the EC was no longer the point. The implications of a shift in
the Soviet position would be especially apparent in the case of the French
party. But it would also be significant elsewhere-in Britain, for example,
where the Communists were a factor in the anti-EC position of the Trade
Union Congress, and in Finland where the Communists have been busily
organizing the campaign against any assnriative arrangement with the com-
munities.
25. Moscow's acceptance of the EC could also have consequences, for
the relationship between the Communist and the non-Communist parties. De
Gaulle's special brand of Europeanism-independent and nationalistic-often
had found favor with Moscow, and so helped assure a more quiescent French
Communist Party. As Pompidou has slowly modified De Gaulle's European
concept, however, the grumblings on the Communist left, as well as the
ultra-right, have become increasingly audible. If Moscow should now accept
the "reality" of the EC, the French party may have to pull in its horns.
26. On the other hand, the French party's opposition to the com-
munities has long been an obstacle to the emergence of an anti-Pompidou
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coalition on the left. Although the French Communists-after visible squirm-
ing-have decided to campaign for "no" votes and the Socialists for absten-
tions in the French referendum on Britain's accession, a new Soviet position
on the EC may help narrow the gap between the positions of the two groups.
Such a change on Moscow's part could thus lead even the most intransigent
of the Western European parties to adjust their positions, lest they, rather
than the Italians, be considered out of step.
"The press comments extensively on Leonid Brezhnev's statement that the Soviet Union
does not ignore the real situation in West Europe, particularly the existence of such an
economic grouping of capitalist countries as the Common Market. 1, for my part, want to
stress that this statement is an indication of the profound realism of Soviet foreign policy.
We French Communists also take into account the fact of existence of this organization.
We demanded at one time that representatives of Communist parties of West European
countries should attend Common Market assemblies. This is not of course in order to
support the policy of capitalist monopolies but in order to fight it more effectively. "
Jacques Duclos?-French Communist Party, after Brezhnev Speech
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