FAILURE OR FOOTHOLD? URUGUAY'S LEFT ASSESSES THE ELECTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130034-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2008
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: February 17, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Failure or Foothold?
Uruguay's Left Assesses the Elections
CIA
DOCUMENT SERVICES
FILE COPY
on NOT OR,, TROY
Secret .,
17 February 1972
No. 0835/72
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
17 February 1972
Failure or Foothold?
Uruguay's.Left Assesses the Elections
Summary
The deluge of publicity and propaganda accom-
panying Uruguay's general elections last November
focused on the threat posed by a leftist front,
the Frente Amplio. The country was viewed as the
testing ground for the Chilean formula for Marx-
ist success. When the Frente went down to defeat
with less than 20 percent of the vote in a three-
way race, its loss was again the center of atten-
tion.
Concentrating on the drubbing has been partly
an exercise in self-deception. The Frente had
little prospect of gaining the presidency, but its
ability to create the first three-way race in more
than a century was in itself a substantial achieve-
ment.
Since the elections, the left has overcome its
initial disappointment and seems ready to convert
the Frente into an ongoing political mechanism
instead of letting it lapse, as coalitions so often
do in Latin America. Most of the leadership prob-
ably profited from last year's mistakes and s:~ems
intent on maintaining unity. Nevertheless, stresses
and strains are already evident, and some splinter-
ing could take place during the long dry spell be-
tween elections, Most factions, however, realize
Note: This memorandum was produced by the Office of
Current InteZZigence. It was coordinated within CIA.
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they have found a viable strategy and will pursue
it in an attempt to wrest control from the major
parties. Indeed, political and economic condi-
tions in Uruguay point to the probability that
the Frente in one form or another will be back,
and stronger, in 1976.
SEC ER
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PRELIMINARY ELECTION RESULTS
(Some figures remain tentative pending the official recount)
Countrywide Results
Party
Votes
%
Colorados
595,570
40.8
FIDEL (Communist)
E3,291
6.1
Petrie Grande (Enrique Erro)
64,106
4.4
8lancos
585,874
40.1
Christian Democrats
53,949
3.7
Freroto Amplio
271,510
18.6
Socialists
32,306
2.2
Michelini (Colorado Dissident)
27,585
1.8
Others
7
025
-0.5
,
hors
4,273
.4
TOTAL
1,460,456
100.0
TOTAL
271,510
18.6
Congressional Representation
Breakdown Between Montevideo and
Interior Among Major Parties
Party
Senate
1966
Chamber of
1966
Montevideo"
Inteilor"
Deputies
Votes %
Votes %
Cotorados
13
16
41
50
:olorodos
253,587
38.90
341,903
42.27
Blancos
12
13
40
41
Piancos
194,598
29.85
391,376
48.37
Frento Amplio
5
1
18
b
FrenteAmplio
199,760
30.64
71,876
8.87
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The Election Contenders
1. The newly formed Frente Amplio--a coali-
tion of Communists, other leftists, and breakaway
dissidents from the major parties-'-was viewed by
friend and foe alike as the plausible political
heir to the "leftist unity" formula fashioned by
Salvador Allende in Chile in 1970. In many respects,
the Frente provided the election with its ove.-
riding issue.
2. The incumbent Colorados staked their cam-
paign on the President's law-and-order image and
his defiance of the leftist Tupamaro guerrillas.
The Colorados linked the Frente with terrorism and
charged that it was only a Communist tool. The
Frente countered by portraying itself as the new
leftist hope for voters tired of the same old pol-
itics-, inefficiency, and corruption. The other
major party, the Alancos, chose a middle ground
designed to win votes from trose not attracted
to either pole.
3. The preliminary election results (many
absentee and challenged ballots were not counted
for weeks) were read by Uruguayans less as a vic-
tory for Colorado candidate Juan Bordaberry than
as a massive defeat of the left by the democratic
parties. The Blancos and Colorados together gained
almost 81 percent of the vote. Exultation was the
order of the day. On 29 November, the day follow-
ing the elections, Colorados and Blancos paraded
arm in arm through Montevideo, celebrating that
the country had been saved from the Communist menace.
No matter that this was the closest presidential
race of the century between the Blancos and Colo-
rados; no matter that the man in the street would
not know the name of the next president for two
months as an excruciatingly slow official recount
was undertaken--the Frente had lost.
4. The democratic victory was in many respects
an impressive triumph for the major parties. More
Uruguayans voted than ever before, and almost 90
percent of the eligible voters turned out. Although
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the government had been bedeviled for months by the
activities of Uruguay's formidable terrorist group,
the Tupamaros, the administration presided over
elections that were notably fair and that found the
public calm and confident. Despite these pluses,
the pervasive optimism has been overextended.
5. Part of the reason the euphoria has not
yet dissipated is that the election campaign ended
just as the beaches opened for the Uruguayan sum-
mer. After long months of campaigning--and now
comforted by the election results--politician, pa-
tron, and peon deserted the city for the beckoning
seashore. Politics, for the moment, has been aban-
doned.
6. In the aftermath of the election, the in-
ternational press has helped to give the results
a one-dimensional appearance. Foreign media es-
pecially portrayed the outcome as a massive re-
pudiation of the left and proof that radical Marx-
ism would find few converts in Uruguay. Since No-
vember, political news in Uruguay has centered on
the continuing vote count and speculation over the
next administratLion.
Where Did the Frente Go Wrong?
7. The Frente's prospects for a stunning suc-
cess were never very good. Its hopes were bated
on the premise that the Chilean experience could
be transferred to Uruguay when conditions, in fact,
were very different. In the decades prior to Al-
lende's win in 1970, the entire Chilean political
spectrum had moved leftward, easing the transition
to a Marxist-led coalition. Preceding Allende in
the presidency was a Christian Democrat whose pro-
gram was quite leftist. Further, the radical and
leftist voice in Chilean politics has been a tra-
ditional force.
8. In Uruguay, the Frente was an embryonic
coalition that owed its existence in part to the
Chilean experience. it faced a conservative pres-
ident whose objective was to defeat the Frenta so
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that his rightist policies could be affirmed. Fur-
ther, the Uruguayan people, especially those living
in the interior, had repeatedly demonstrated their
strong ties to the traditional parties. Even in
Montevideo, the Communists could not convert their
union muscle into voter strength. In past efforts,
the Communist fronts had hovered at between five
and six percent of the total vote.
9. Some members of the Frente fell prey to
their own propaganda. Their campaign, early start-
ing and well financed, sought to inundate the cap-
ital with propaganda leaflets, press releases, and
broadcasts. In the closing days of the campaign,
especially when the Frente turned out impressive
crowds in thr: capital, its optimism soared. Its
political acr-enalin was flowing so strongly just
prior to the -rote that the showing of 18.6 percent
was a rude disappointment.
10. Nevertheless, most political realists
within the Frente (and especially within the Com-
munist Party) had probably recognized the con-
straints on its aspirations. The conservative in-
terior areas were so hostile to the F.rente--some
of its caravans were stoned--that the executive,
committee decided not to campaign in certain rural
districts. With almost half the population voting
in the interior, there could be no realistic hope
for the presidency or for a strong country-wide
performance. Instead, the Frente concentrated on
Montevideo--an attractive prize in a country with
a single major city that houses fully half the
population. Even here, the Frente had only an out-
side chance. In 1966 its constituent parties,
running as separate entities, had gained 23 percent
of the vote, but some factions--especially dis-
sidents from the major parties- -had lost popularity
in the intervening five years.
11. It was in Montevideo too that the admin-
istration concentrated its counter propaganda,
drumming on the "Red Menace" that the Frente was
said to represent. Anti-Communism became the
Colorados' chief political theme. As the campaign
wore on, the propaganda shifted, from mild insinua-
tion to outright accusation. By election day, the
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Colorado advertisements were asking--"Do you want
to live as a human being or as a Red Slave?" Man-
acled hands and shadowy scenes of Moscow's Red
Square were featured. The Frente's propaganda was
equally shrill but not nearly as effective.
12. With the bursting of the Frente balloon,
there was some casting about for scapegoats in the
days immediately following the election. Bicker-
ing was strongest within the Uruguayan Communist
Party (?CU), which hac reason to be doubly disap-
pointed by the results. Not only were the elec-
tions being read as a general rebuff to the Frente,
but the Communist Party was the only component that
had not dramatically improved its record over 1966.
The Leftist Liberation Front, the PCU's front, had
been the coalition's leading vote-getter, as ex-
pected, but by less than an impressive margin.
The Communists garnered 89,000 votes, but the Pa-
tria Grande coalition headed by Blanco renegade
Enrique Erro totaled 64,000 and the Christian
Democrats 53,000--raising the prospect of a stiffer
struggle for internal leadership. Even the Social-
ists attracted 32,000 votes.
13. The disappointment was sufficient to raise
murmurings about the leadership of the PCU's long-
time and respected chieftain, Rodney Arismendi.
Several of his colleagues said that the Frerite for-
mula ought to be junked, since it had apparently
worked to their party's relative disadvantage.
Most of these misgivings began to fade, however, as
the election date receded.
The rrente Regroups
14. During its Consultative Congress in De-
cember, the Frente leadership evaluated its posi-
tion, taking stock of its electoral performance
and factors that hampered its effort. Some of the
self-criticism was specious; there was some bally-
hoo about election irregularities, but no specific
charges. The congress complained of a lack of
funds and limited time for organization. Despite
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these laments, the Frente was not really damaged
by financial considerations--its outlay in the cap-
ital rivaled and perhaps surpassed that of the ma-
jor parties and its campaign began earlier. Almost
all politicians agreed that money was being fun-
neled from the Soviet Embassy through the Communist
Party. Although the Frente effort was not coordi-
nated, it probably suffered no more backbiting than
did the major parties. In addition, despite its re-
cent beginnings, it had a ready-made political ap-
paratus in the form of the Communist party's ex-
perienced, well-oiled machine. The final campaign
rally in Montevideo, which attracted about 70,000
people, a larger turnout than achieved by the ma-
jor parties, was testimony to the Communists' or-
ganizational skills.
15. It was when the Frente turned to crit-
icism of its own strategy that it uncovered some
serious flaws. The leadership noted that "we
directed ourselves in no small way to those who
were already convinced." Frente propaganda had con-
centrated on Montevideo and particularly on students,
small groups of professionals, and young people--
some of them even below the voting age.
16. Probably more important, the leadership
recognized that it had been blitzed not so much by
the amount but by the theme of its opponents' prop-
aganda. The major parties had cast the election
as a contest of democracy versus totalitarianism,
rather than the Frente's concept of a "fat-cat"
oligarchy versus the people. Not until the fading
days of the campaign did presidential candidate .
Liber Seregni. take full note of the charges of Com-
munism made against the Frente and attempt to re-
fute them. But by then it was far too late.
1.7. The machinations behind the scenes at
the party congress were also significant. There
was no challenge to Arismendi's leadership nor any
movement to depose the losing presidential candi-
date as titular chief. The Communist leadership
gave no signs of having seriously considered with-
drawing from the Frente and instead worked hard
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both to ensure its own continued dominance and to
prevent public airing of any disagreements. More
than 1,500 national delegates, 70 percent of them
Cor,:nunis is , attended the congress, and the mood
was one of determination and optimism. The lead-
ership, organization, and program all were unchal--
]enged. It appeared to be a working congress.
The nuclei of the Frente, the Base Committees, pre-
sented some 500 written reports, discussing future
strategy and tactics as well as possible structural
changes. In sum, no disillusionment was evident.
Behind the Public Performance
18. Maneuvering for political advantage con-
tinues. Colorado dissident Zelmar Michelini has
been the most prominent in attempting to form an
anti-Communist bloc within the Frente. In spite
of his own relatively poor performance and low
vote total in the election, he hopes that he can
use his position as one of the leaders of a fac-
tion stronger than the PCU to regain his polit-
ical clout. Michelini and others boasted before
the elections that the democratic forces would
prevent the Communists from dominating the coali-
tion. The relatively low share of the vote re-
ceived by the PCU has given these forces a lift,
but bickering among themselves may not be ended
by their common antagonism toward the PCU.
19. Even if the "democratic forces" merge
in an informal bloc, the odds are small that they
will be able to match strength with the PCU in
the long run, despite the vote totals. With elec-
tions past, the PCU will presumably retain and
possibly improve its financial advantage over the
other members, given its ability to draw upon So-
viet financing. If the congress was any indica-
tion, the PCU retain control of the Base Commit-
tee mechanism. From the moment the Base Commit-
tees were formed, only the PCU and the 26th of
March Movement (the Tupamaro terrorist-allied
political arm) made a major effort to control
them. The more democratically oriented factions
probably still lack the manpower for any chal-
lenge. Thus, the December congress was largely
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a contest for control between the PCU and the 26th
of March, with the Communists the easy victors on
the basis of delegate strength. The role of the
Base Committees in the Frente structure is still
being debaced and may be a source of considerable
friction if the democratic bloc continues to be
outmaneuvered and outvoted at lower levels.
The Frente's Future
20. Despite disputes, the Frente is not ready
to call it quits and, in one form or another, seems
likely to be a major contender in the 1976 elections.
The left improved its over-all electoral standing
in part because it adapted itself to the rules of
the Uruguayan political game. The Blancos and
Colorados, running candidates from several factions
at once through a system designed to maintain these
parties' electoral cohesion, have been playing the
game for the last century. Like the major parties,
the Frente brought together sometimes hostile bed-
fellows, and attained nearly one-fifth of the vote.
This was the near term objective of Frente strate-
gists and is a reasonable political foothold after
only one year of existence.
21. Although the elections pointed up certain
weaknesses in the Frente appeal--such as its lack
of attractiveness in the interior areas, the Frente
received 30 percent of the vote-in Montevideo and
trailed the Colorado Party by less than ten percent.
A Gallup poll conducted in December and January in-
dicated that 17 percent of the voters had gone to
the polls for the first time. Of these new voters,
those indicating a party preference voted for the
Frente by a more than 2 to 1 margin over either of
the traditional parties. Economic conditions also
helped the Frente in the capital. Montevideo is
the manifestation of much that is wrong with the
country; the long downturn is evidenced in shabbi-
ness, potholed streets, and lack of new construc-
tion. If the country continues in the doldrums
for another five years, the Frente bid will be
even stronger in Montevideo.
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22. The anti-Communist propaganda of the Col-
orado Party had a telling effect on the vote last
year, but the results--with the Christian Democrats,
Erro, and others polling sizable portions of the
vote --may somewhat reduce the Frente's Red tinge.
Moreover, five years from now a leftist coalition
will probably be well established, and it will
therefore be more difficult to vilify as a political
miscreant, seeking to rob the people of their liberty.
23. Within the Frente, disputes are inevitable.
The year of maneuvering and sometimes ill will that
preceded the elections was instructive. The PCU
sometimes papered over the propaganda posters of
other Frente factions, and several of the poorer
groups were incensed by the Communists' control
of the finances. Without the near-term goal of
elections as a rallying cry for unity and with
some of the factions perhaps anxious to test their
political muscle, divisive farces may grow.
24. The major party dissidents, however, have
tied what future they have to the tail of the
Frente. Their prospects within the coalition may
not be particularly bright, but the alternatives
of an independent existence or reconciliation with
their parent parties offer scant hope of political
fortune. Others on the left, such as the Social-
ists, who increased their vote 16-fold in the 1971
elections, will be reluctant to desert the Frente
camp. If breakaways do occur over the next few
years, it is quite possible that the left will
again amalgamate for the next elections.
25. The presumed goal of the Frente in 1976--
to make a strong showing and at least capture Mon-
tevideo--practically dictates that the factions
maintain at the very minimum a loose alliance.
For 15 years, the Communists and other leftist
parties provided irrefutable evidence that sep-
arately they could not challenge the Blanco-
Colorado hegemony. The PCU, even in the first
two months following the elections, has given
evidence that it recognizes the overriding need
for unity and will use its resources to ensure
continued cohesion.
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External Influences
29. Significantly, the Frente was less a
creature of its own making than it was the creation
of outside forces. The Communists had been pushing
a front strategy since the mid-1950s but had failed
to fire either the public or political imagination.
Marxist Salvador Allende's win in Chile helped the
formula along the road to political maturity, and
internal circumstances in Uruguay gave it a fur-
ther boost. A rightist administration purposely
polarized the political spectrum and set the
Frente in high relief. Economic conditions were
also conducive to Oissent. The cost of living in-
dex again began to rise in 1970-71 as the Pacheco
admini:;tration eased its austerity programs. The
official exchange rate Lore no relation to real
market prices. Uruguay's important beef industry
chose to smuggle more of its produce across the
border to Brazil for greater profit instead of
shipping it through Montevideo.
30, These political and economic conditions
do not appear to be transitory. Progress in solving
the country's problems will require a major effort
from the new administration and substantial outside
assistance. Uruguay's most serious economic prob-
lem is structural. An overburdened agrarian sec-
tor is forced to support inefficient industry and
a bloated welfare-oriented administration. The
political situation at this time gives promise of
little immediate change in policy. The next pres-
ident will be Juan Maria Bordaberry, a politician
cut from the same conservative cloth as his prede-
cessor, whose political tactics he apparently holds
in high regard.
31. Before the elections, Colorados and
Blancos talked of forming a government coalition
to avoid the political strife which had stifled
progress. This campaign theme seems unlikely to
become fact. Past political practice seems to
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weigh against it. in addition, with a resounding
democratic victory under their belts, Colorado
and Blanco politicians are not concerned over elec-
tions scheduled for five years in the future.
32. Although the elections in November illus-
trated that the major parties were capable of hold-
ing their own, five more years of terrorism, polit-
ical sniping, and-a return to economic stagnation
would shift the odds somewhat. Guerrilla activities
in the interior, which seem to be on the rise, may
help to spread dissatisfaction. Given these cir-
cumstances the leftist coalition, despite its de-
feat, should be able to mount a more potent chal-
lenge to the traditional parties in 1976.
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