U. S. S. R. HANDBOOK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130005-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 60
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2008
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: March 1, 1972
• Content Type: CH

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Secret
U. S. S. ADN\11 G
Secret
N2 67
No. 0623
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Physical data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
CI irnate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Natural resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Human resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
11. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
Planning and control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Foreign trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Growth rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Income distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Trends in industry and agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Transportation and communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
III. POLITICAL SITUATION AND TRENDS
National expansion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Political history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Communist Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Government organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Judicial system 9
V1. ARMED FORCES
VII. FOREIGN RELATIONS
VIII. US INTERESTS
MAPS
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Over a span of some 50 years the Soviet Union has developed from a
backward, largely agricultural society into a modern industrial and military
power. Successive Soviet regimes have placed emphasis on enabling Moscow
not only to maintain its dorcination over East and much of Central Europe
but also to extend its military arid political influence to areas as distant from
the Soviet heartland as Africa, the Indian Ocean, the Caribbean, and South-
east Asia.
The impressive achievements of the last half century have been costly,
however, in terms of human suffering and lives lost-most notably during the
purges aid the periods of collect ivization,and forced industrialization. More-
over, to achieve and maintain its present position, economic policy and
scientific research have favorc heavy industry and those scient;fic fields
having the most direct irnpact on military capability. As a result, the Soviet
standard of living continues to lag behind the levels of most industrialized
nations, and economic development has been uneven, with performances in
agriculture find light industry trailing those in major Western countries.
Directly or indirectly, the Soviet Union controls most of the resources
of Eastern Europe and dominates important strategic areas-the Polish plain
and most of the Danubian basin. The economies of the Eastern European
Communist nations have remained closely linked to the economy of the
USSR. The Soviet Army's harsh suppression of the Hungarian revolt of 1956
and the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 serve as examples to
would-be separatists. Romania, however, cautiously continues its efforts to
pursue a more independent foreign policy and to lessen its economic de-
pendence on the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries.
An elaborate system of controls has been maintained to perpetuate
within the state the dominant position of the Soviet Communist Party, to
shape public opinion, and to neutralize popular discontent. Some of the
more brutal repressive measur''s which characterized Stalin's rule have been
eliminated by his successors in order to stimulate individual initiative and to
encourage the people to identify themselves with the regime. The ameliora-
tive efforts have not been entirely successful, however, and disaffection and
dissidence have increased among important elements of Soviet society, most
notably among the intelligentsia. The Soviet -adership has responded by a
re-emphasis on "orthodoxy."
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Less than one eighth of the USSR is arable, and a great part lies too far
north for any but Arctic type habitation. In many areas where the climate is
good the soil is poor, and some of the most fertile land lies in regions where
there is inadequate precipitation or where the growing season is short.
Likewise, many of the abundant and varied raw materials in the USSR are
unfavorably located and hard to u-xploit. Most of the great rivers run to
frozen or land-locked seas, and some flow in part through regions unsuited
to settlement. The USSR covers a large part of Europe arid Asia, and its
population has ethnic, religic;.os, and historical ties with both continents. It
has more people than any Western nation, and a sizable number are skilled in
modern industrial techniques. Scientific achievements are high, but adrnin-
istrative and managerial skills are less well developed
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Physical date
The USSR, the largest country in the world, occupies 8.6 million square
miles, extending across much of Europe and all of northern Asia. It is
bordered mostly by the broad North European Plain in the west and by an
almost continuous mountain range in the south; the Pacific and Arctic
oceans are to the east and north. Despite its sire :end extensive coastline, the
country is unfavorably located in relation to the major sea lanes of the
world, and only a few widely scattered ports are open throughout the year.
The surface of the USSR is dominated by interior plains and plateaus
drained by great rivers, the largest of which flow south in the European
USSR and north in Siberia. The area is rimmed in the south and east by a
succession of mountain systems. Plains, broken at wide intervals by hills and
low mountains, predominate in the western half of the country. This area
covers four major zones: tundra in the far north, grass- and scrub covered
plains and deserts in the south, and forested swampy plains and cultivated
plains in between. Most of the Soviet population, the most productive
industries and agricultural areas, and the best developed transportation net
are concentrated in the cultivated plains.
In general, the USSR has a continental climate. The predominant
influences on the climate are the vast Eurasian landmass and the adjacent or
nearby oceans and seas.
Winters-December through February-vary from cool in some Black
Sea regions to extremely cold in much of Siberia. Summers-June through
August-range from cool on the Arctic coast to hot in the southern desert
regions. During the winter, precipitation is mostly in the form of frequent
light snows, and most of the area is covered by snow throughout the season.
Showers account for the greatest monthly amounts of summer precipitation.
Thunderstorms occur largely during the summer, most frequently in June
and July.
Over much of Siberia and the Arctic regions of European USSR,
cloudiness is generally at a maximum in summer and early autumn and at a
minimum in winter and early spring. The reverse is true for much of the
remainder of the country. In general, the poorest visibility occurs during the
colder months and the best during the warmer months.
USSR Mar 72
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The Soviet Union is rich in natural resources. It possesses about one
tenth of the world's water-power resources and one fourth of the world's
productive forests. It also claims some of the world's largest reserves of iron
ore, chromite, lead, zinc, and nickel. The country is largely self-sufficient
with respect to energy, but is entirely dependent on imports for natural
rubber and relies heavily on imports of tin.
For a country the size of the Soviet Union, the agricultural base is
small. Only 27% of the landmass is classified as usable agricultural lard and
only 11% as arable. Compared with the United States, climatic conditions
for agriculture are r)oor.
In terms of total population the Soviet Union is the third most
populous nat!nn in the wor!d, outranked only by China and India. The last
official census, in 1970, listed the total population as 242 million; current
estimates place the population in excess of 245 million. Population density
varies greatly from less rhan one person per square mile in some remote areas
to 480 in parts of the Ukraine. The average density is 84 people per square
mile.
The Soviet population is made up of 170 nationalities, but the Slavs-
Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians-constitute about 77% of the total.
While the Russians still account for more than 53% of the population, the
last census indicated that they are increasing at a much slower rate than the
peoples of the Central Asian republics.
Because of the large Soviet losses during World War 11, the Soviet labor
force of 130 million is more than 51% female. Migration from rural to urban
areas continues to be a noticeable trend, but 32% of the labor force is still
engaged in agriculture. The rest is employed in industry and other non-
agricultural fields. The Soviet labor force is generally regarded as less ef-
ficient than that of most developed Western nations.
No shortage of skl:lled or unskilled labor has been reported.
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Planning and control
Since the beginning of comprehensive economic planning in the USSR
in 1928, the primary goals of Soviet economic policy have been rapid
industrialization of the economy and the development and maintenance of a
strong military establishment. The leadership has pursued-with a high
degree of success-rapid rates of growth in industry, not only to provide
military might but also to support foreign policy by increasing the interna-
tional prestige of the Soviet Union in economic competition with capitalist
nations.
Nearly all economic activity in the USSR is planned and closely
controlled by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the
government. The Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee is the ultimate
authority on economic policy, but it relies on the Council of Ministers, the
highest body of the executive arm of the central government, to implement
policy. Ample ensurance that the party's policy will be carried out by the
government hierarchy is provided by interlocking membership at the top, by
a strategic distribution of party members in government posts at subordinate
levels, and by the existence of a party apparatus which parallels and super-
vises the government organs.
The Supreme Soviet-the highest legislative body-does not initiate
economic measures but dutifully signs into law economic directives that have
been formulated by the party Politburo and transformed into operational
plans by the Council of Ministers through its several staff organizations.
These staff organizations include the State Planning Committee (Gosplan),
the Central Statistical Administration, the Ministry of Finance; and other
more specialized bodies such as the State Committee for Labor and Wages.
Joint party and government control of the economy is enhanced by
state ownership of all natural resources and almost all means of production.
Most of the Soviet economic product originates in the state sector, and
nearly all falls within the socialized sector (the state sector plus the collective
farms). A part of total output still originates in the private sector, largely in
agriculture and trade, where the private share accounts for about 30% and
4%, respectively, of gross output.
State economic plans are established for monthly, quarterly, and yearly
periods, and for periods of five years or more. The multiyear plans are
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elaborated only enough to guide economic development along general lines.
In contrast, the comprehensive national annual economic plan is the opera
tional guide to current decision making and sets forth in great detail the
annual goals for production and distribution, both in physical units and in
monetary terms. The annual economic plan also covers employment, costs,
expenditures for investment and defense, foreign and domestic trade, and
income distribution. The quarterly and monthly plans are sub-elements of
the annual plan. A supplementary technical plan elaborates sp''cific changes
in inputs of materials and capital required to meet the economic plan, and a
financial plan designates the sources and methods of financing the projected
activities. The national plan does not stop at the aggregate national level. It
contains a breakdown by major territorial subdivision (republic, oblast) and
by institution (ministry); it also contains provisions for smaller units down
to and including individual enterprises.
The operations of state enterprises are planned in considerable detail.
Enterprise management participates in the planning process, but the basic
features of the plan are determined in the hierarchy of planning and
supervisory organizations that culminates in the Politburo.
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The essential function of the financial institutions of the USSR is to
channel the distribution and use of resources in accordance with the eco-
nomic plan. The banking system, which handles virtually all transactions
between enterprises, provides short-term credit for working capital, and acts
as agent of the state in disbursing allocations for capital investment, is a
powerful instrument for influencing the operations of the enterprise.
Records of financial flows, moreover, enable the financial institutions to act
as a vast inspection organization to ensure compliance with plan directives.
The principal financial institutions, in addition to the Ministry of Finance,
are the State Bank (Gosbank), the Investment Bank (Stroybank; literally,
Construction Bank), the Foreign Trade Bank (Vneshtorgbank), the savings
banks, and the Main Administration of State Insurance (Gosstrakh)?.
The State Bank performs limited central banking functions, issuing
currency, providing clearing and transfer facilities, and acting as fiscal agent
for the various levels of government. As the source of virtually all short-term
credit, the State Bank directly controls the flow of economic activity. Unlike
central banks in the non-Communist world, however, the State Bank does
not exert independent influence over the volume and direction of credit.
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Foreign trade
The planning of foreign trade, an integral part of Soviet national
economic planning, is designed to procure the imports needed to meet the
requirements of the economy and the exports needed to finance imports and
other external obligations.
Soviet foreign trade is conducted as a state monopoly by specialized
foreign trade corporations. The Ministry of Foreign Trade provides central
planning and direction, preparing the foreign trade plan with the participa-
tion of Gosplan, adjusting it quarterly, arid overseeing its execution. The
Ministry of Foreign Trade also conducts negotiations and concludes com-
mercial treaties and agreements with foreign countries, directs the activities
of the nearly 50 subordinate foreign trade corporations that supervise
day-to-day trade in particular commodities or in particular geographic areas,
and formulates and carries out Soviet customs policy. Also in the area of
international economic relations, the State Committee for Foreign Economic
Relations (GKES) coordinates all matters concerning technical aid, largely
with Communist countries but also with the less developed countries of the
West. I t supervises technical collaboration, aids in the construction of
i rojects abroad, and oversees the training of specialists and the granting of
credits. Seven foreign trade organizations carry out the foreign trade opera-
tions entrusted to GKES.
The State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT) is becoming
increasingly involved in foreign trade. It is charged with procuring arid
introducing into the Soviet economy the latest and most efficient tech-
nology available. In this connection, GKNT and its foreign trade
corporation-Vnestekhnika-are becoming increasingly active in the
developed West.
Soviet foreign trade has grown at a rapid pace in recent years-an
average of 10% annually since 1966. In 1970, total Soviet exports and
imports were valued at about $13 billion and $12 billion, respectively.
Soviet policies are designed to ensure that most Soviet requirements for
foreign goods are met from production within the Communist world. About
two thirds of Soviet foreign trade is conducted with other Communist
countries, and almost 85% of this trade is with Eastern Europe. Trade with
the Eastern European Communist countries is arranged largely through
bilateral agreements.
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In recent years Soviet exports of raw materials to Eastern Europe have
declined as a percentage of total exports, while Soviet exports of machinery
and equipment to that area have grown rapidly. Soviet imports from Eastern
Europe continue to be dominated by machinery and equipment and manu-
factured consumer goods. Trade with Cuba, Mongolia, and North Vietnam
stems mostly from Soviet aid to those countries. Trade with Communist
China has persistently declined over the last decade, reaching a low of $47
million in 1970. Trade with Yugoslavia rose in 1970.
Soviet trade with liar :]-Currency countries has been increasingly in
deficit since 1967, and in 1970 the Soviet debt to these countries reached
nearly $500 million. In order to retain the balance-of-payments flexibility
that they have conventionally sought, the Soviets may be near the point
where they will have to reduce the rate of growth in imports from this area,
especially of goods low in the Soviet priority scale. Prospects for a more
rapid growth in exports in the next few years are poor, although oil exports,
which were stagnating, will increase in value in 1971 as a result of a
world-wide jump in the price of crude oil. For the longer range, the USSR
will continue its efforts to increase exports to the West. Moscow has
proposed more and more contracts for Western financing to develop Soviet
resources, with the credits to be repaid from the new production.
In the past the European Community (EC) countries, the United
Kingdom, and Japan have been the Soviets' most important trade partners in
the developed West, and they are likely to remain so in the foreseeable
future. Trade with the United States rose sharply-to almost $180 million in
1969 and 1970-but still accounted for less than 4% of the developed West's
trade with the USSR.
Soviet trade with the less developed countries spurted sharply in 1969
and 1970 after a period of stagnation from 1965 to 1968. The leading Soviet
trade partners in the less developed areas-Egypt, India, Iran, and Algeria-
are also the major recipients of Soviet economic aid.
Soviet foreign trade will continue to grow in the near future, but not at
the 10% rate of the past four years. The new five-year plan (1971-75) calls
for an average annual growth rate of 6%, but an estimate of 8% annually
seems more realistic.
During the 1960s, GNP grew by 60% and industrial production nearly
doubled. Despite evidence in recent years of a general slowing in the pace of
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growth, the economy continues to expand, supporting rapid industrkali,ation
and rllailltenance of a strong military and scientific establishment, The, Sc`'let
GNP in 1971 was $557 billion, or about 55% of the US GNP. Real GNP has
grown at about 5'/a% per year since 1965.
Compared with the US and other Western nations, Soviet per capita
income, is low. In 1971, per capita disposable income was about 738 rubles,
representing an average annual increase of about 5% over the last 4 years. In
addition to wages and salaries, workers receive e variety of social welfare
benefits, notably insu-ance, medical care, and education. Rents in state-
owned housing are heavily subsidized and cost the worker only 5-6% of his
total income. Budget-financed social benefits, including free education,
amounted in 1971 to an average yearly supplement of 286 rubles to per
capita personal income.
Trends in industry and agriculture
The Five-Year Plan for 1971-75 indicates that the Soviet economy will
be roughly oriented as it has been for the past several years. The plan
projects an average annual growth rate of nearly 6% in the gross national
product, which is only moderately better than the 5'/2% average during
1966-70. No major shifts are apparent in the allocation of resources among
the principal claimants-investment, defense, and consumption. Investment
is to grow at a slightly higher rate than the GNP (61/2%) and consumption at a
lower rate (5%). The plan places some emphasis on improving the lot of the
consumer, but per capita consumption is scheduled to grow by only 4% in
the current plan, slightly less than the rate achieved during the last plan
(1966-70).
During 1971-75 the pace of growth of industrial output is scheduled to
accelerate to an average annual rate of increase of about 8%, compared with
the average rate of just under 7% recorded during the last plan. Among the
major sectors of industry, the output of industrial materials is scheduled to
increase about one half a percent above the rate averaged in 1966-70. But,
with the exception of chemicals, construction materials and forest products,
the planned rates of growth of all industrial material branches are somewhat
lower.
To meet the goal for the new plan, net agricultural production in 1975
would have to be about 21% greater than the 1970 level. This is about the
same rate of expansion recorded in the 1966-70 period.
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Success of the current plat( depends on achieving gains in labor pro.
(luctivity corlsicherably above the rate;, recorde(J (luring the last plan. Indeed,
tour fifths of ecorlornic growth frurn 1971.71,1 is to r(;sul! from greater
f)1 (ii hid Vi ty and only one fif tit Irurn the rise of additional labor,
Even if plililrled gunk; are aichiev(.!(1, Western estirna!'!"; are that the
Soviets in 1975 will fall itbout 10 to 15% short of 1970 US induV;dial and
agricutural production.
Transportation and communication
lire rrlairltenance and orderly c.'Xpi.InsiOll of the transporatiorl and colu-
rntlnicatiorh system are prime objectives of the Soviet goverrllr." rht. Vast areas
of the USSR are characterised by harsh climate, permafrost, and other
conditions hostile to 'he consirtaction and maintenance of transport and
communications facilities. Transportation and telecom rnLill ications are most
intensively developed in the more populated areas of the European USSR,
roughly south of a line from Leningrad to Kazan and west of a line from
Kazan to Volgograd to the Black Sea. Within this area few places are more
than 35 miles from a rail line. About half of all freight originations and
terminations ocr'ir h ire. The area accounts for about 80 percent of all inland
waterway traffic and contains the greatest mileage of paved roads and most
of the ports.
The transportation system of the USSR must deal with a constantly
increasing volume of freight. Although over-all transport growth has been
about 6% a year since the 1950s, the railroads in some areas still operate at
near-capacity and at times are unable to cope with simultaneous require-
ments to transport heavy and perishable freight. The road network, though
gradually improving, remains grossly inadequUte and difficult to maintain.
Greatly increased numbers of suitable types of trucks, as well as service and
repair facilities, are sorely needed. Domestic water and pipeline transport
continue to be developed, but their 3h6.e of the over-all transport volume
has not increased significantly. Railroads continue to handle about 77% of
all domestic freight traffic.
The Soviet railroad system, owned and operated by the government,
occupies the prime position in the transportation industry. There are 83,015
miles of mainline track in the Soviet Union, compared with 212,000 miles in
the US. The density of lines is greatest in the west. Eastward the network
gradually becomes a series of individual lines running to Siberia, Central Asia
and the Soviet Far East.
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Inland waterways sttpplernee(t the rail system and (011T) (!XtUllSi0IlS Of
key ?ighway routes feeding to and radiating from major inland purls. In the
European USSR, the Greater Volga waterway network connects the major
renters of population, industry, and transportation. Waterways suitable for
navigation total approximately 89,000 mill's, much more than in ;limy other
country. Because of free/ing terllperatures, however, the navigation season is
very short in roost of the country.
he highway system is used primarily for shun t-haul movement of
fre,lht and rrtssengers and provides leeder and distribution service to other
modes of transporation. The network is fairly well developed in some
Ei.iropean areas but very sparse irl Asiatic expanses. Only 1 1% of the 934,000
mile system is paved. As of January 1970 the Soviet Union had a motor
vehicle pool of 5.8 million units, about one fourth of which consisted of
passenger vehicles.
Civil aviation in the USSR serves three basic purposes: support of the
economy through domestic and international transportation services, fa^Hlita-
tion of administrative and political contact throughout the Soviet Union and
other Con muniSt countries, and advancement of the Soviet military effort,
Priority among these functions is shifted in accordance will-' Soviet eco-
nomic, political, and military objectives. In 1970 the nation's international
and domestic trunk air route network covered over 370,000 miles. About 70
million passenger; and '1.7 million tons of cargo and mail were transported
by air. The Soviets are attempting to place air travel on a competitive basis
with other modes of transportation and to establish air transport as one of
the primary means of passenger travel within the country. Air travel has
become the principal means of passenger transport for trips in excess of 900
miles. The Ministry of Civil Aviation, a component of the USSR Council of
Ministers, is responsible for all civil aviation in the Soviet Union.
The Soviet regime has developed one of the largest and most complex
systems of public communication in the world, and the Communist Party
has forged an equally elaborate system to control it. Telecommunications are
particularly important in the USSR, because of the need to maintain rapid
communications with civil and military authorities located in all parts of the
vast country. The mdjor national complex of the Soviet Union is the Unified
Communications System of the USSR. This comprehensive and relatively
modern system supports the state requirements and also affords limited
services to private citizens. It includes about 135 AM and 165 FM broadcast
stations and some 1,000 TV broadcast and rebroa, cas+. statiors.
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Norninrrlly, the wle(:ununuuiration system is controlled by the USSR
Council of Ministers through the Mini:;try Of COmmurllcatiOrls aid its coun-
terparts in the rupuf)lics. Transmissions are censured, and incoming traffic is
I IWred tfuough govern;nent cllilt if u:Is. Censorship is primarily the responsi-
bility of the KGB (Cornnlittee for S(-rt(,' Security), which operates under the
Council of Ministers.
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National expansion
Frorrr its beginning the Russian state has been characterized by moves
to expand its territory. Toward the end of the 15th century the prince of
Moscow, partly because of the strategic geographic position of his princi-
pality, emerged (ruin the Mongol occupation as the strongest Russian ruler
and succeeded in consolidating Russian territory into a united state. Ivan the
Terrible (1533-84) extended the territory of the Russian state to the Tatar-
held lands of the Volga Valley; the penetration of Siberia followed im-
mediately afterward and was virtually completed by the middle of he 17th
century.
The annexation of what is now the Ukraine and Belorussia began in
1654, when the eastern bank of the Dnepr as well as the city of Kiev on the
west bank were annexed by agreement with the Ukrainian Cossacks. Suc-
cessive partitions of Poland in 1772, 1793, and 1795 added all of Belorussia,
all of Lithuania, and a considerable part of the Ukraine, which hid been
parts of Poland. Peter the Great ;1682-1725) took Latvia, Estonia, acrd other
territory north of Saint Petersburg (now Leningrad) from Sweden at the
beginning of the 18th century. Catherine the Great (1762-96) wrested the
northern littoral of the Black Sea and the Crimea from the Ottoman Empire
toward the end of that century. The Russian Empire attached to itself the
Grand Duchy of Finland in 1809, annexed Bessarabia in 1812, and took
most of what remained of former Polish territories, including Warsaw, in
1815. As a result of a series of wars with Persia and the Ottoman Empire
between 1801 and 1829, Russia annexed most of the Transcaucasian region.
The conquest of Central Asia, begun a century before, was completed in the
second half of the century.
As a result of World War I and the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917,
the new Soviet state lost the Russian-occupied areas of Bessarabia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, and Poland, including a large part of Belorussia
and the Ukraine. In 1939, however, the L;SSR regained the lost areas of
Belorussia and the Ukraine-except for the Transcarpathian region which was
taken from Czechoslovakia in 1945-and in 1940 it acquired the Baltic
states, Bessarabia, and part of Finland.
After World War II, Stalin extended Soviet influence and control far
beyond the limits of prerevolutionary Russia. In areas overrun by the Soviet
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Army in Eastern Europe, puppet Communist regimes were (. established. For a
tune the Soviet Uriiar1 Iflaintained close ties, based on a CU111f11o11 ICfenlOgy
and a degree of overlapping tuitional interests, with the Chinese Corrlrnllllists.
An(] Soviet Influence Was extended (even beyond this large sphere, since
CornrnUnist parties, closely controlled and financially assisted by Moscow,
were operating in virtually every country of the world.
As the postwar situation stabilized, it became increasingly clear that
Soviet national interests were not always compatible with those of other
Communist nations and parties. In some Eastern European countries the
Soviets were able to maintain their control only by force of arms; in
Hungary and Czechoslovakia they openly intervened. The Chinese rejected
Soviet direction and tutelage, proclaiming themselves to be the true
embodiment of Communism, and smaller Communist regimes and parties
began to exploit the conflict between the two major Communist powers to
achieve a degree of independence from both.
Political history
The government of the Russian state retained its autocratic character
virtually intact until the 20th century. Authoritarian rule was generally
accepted by the masses, who regarded the tsar as their protector against the
oppression of the landlords. Unlike Western monarchs, the tsar faced no
organized social group capable of exacting concessions; his rowers were
much greater than those of his Western counterparts.
The reign of Peter the Great was marked by the concerted introduction
of Western political and social influences. Although these influences
intensified through the 18th and 19th centuries as Russia assumed a role in
the Concert of Europe, internal development lagged behind that in the other
important European powers. After several abortive attempts to introduce
political and social changes, Alexander II freed the serfs in 1861. Reaction
set in, however, especially after Alexander's assassination in 1881, and
reforms thereafter never kept pace with the requirements of orderly social,
economic, and political evolution.
A new political configuration began to emerge in Russia on the eve of
World War I. A constitution granted by Nicholas II in 1905 had established a
nationwide consultative assembly, the Duma, which exerted some restraining
influence on governmental willfulness. However unequal and indirect the
new electoral franchise may have been, all classes of the population partic-
ipated in the voting. Some political parties were in theory illegal, but many
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of thorn, including the Bolsheviks, were still able to organize and to elect
their representatives to the Durna. An independent press developed which,
though hindered by censorship, discussed state problems with considerable
freedom and was in general highly critical of the government.
World War I interrupted these developments, precipitated the rev-
olution, and thereby set into motion a new chain of events. After the
abdication of the monarchy, the fragile political SituE~tion in 191 was made
to order for exploitation by the Bolsheviks. Led by Lenin, they tiasi!y seized
power by appealing to the masses with an initial program of land for the
peasants and by espousing immediate peace.
After gaining control of the country, the Bolsheviks suppressed a
disunited opposition in a savagely contested civil war. Economic chaos,
imposition of new and more rigid bureaucratic controls, and harsh police
rule led to a major crisis in 1921. Introduction of the New Economic Policy
(NEP) in that year relaxed some of the more cumbersome bureaucratic
controls, gave more scope to private initiative, helped to restore the national
economy, and reduced popular resistance. But the party's position remained
insecure in the absence of fully developed political controls.
After Lenin's death in 1924, Stalin gradually gained mastery of the
party by staffing its apparatus with person- loyal to him. He thereupon
resolved the policy disputes which had been raging among top party leaders
by liquidating the NEP (1928) and instituting a policy of planned, rapid
industrialization. The sacrifi,,,s necessitated by forced industrialization and
the collectivization of agriculture greatly increased popular discontent, and
the role of the police became more prominent. During the early and middle
1930s Stalin completed the process of imposing total controls on society. By
and large, the policies he adopted at that time remained in effect until his
death in 1953.
The final stage in the consolidation of Stalin's power came with the
purges of the 1930s, when terror was unleashed against party members for
the first time. Many high- and middle-ranking officials of the government,
party, army, and police, as well as prominent artists and scientists, either
were executed or disappeared. The Old Bolsheviks, including any who in the
past had challenged Stalin's claim to supreme power, as well as potential new
challengers, were persecuted. Stalin emerged from the purges as the
unchallenged leader of the party.
Although the existence of the USSR was gravely threatened by the Nazi
attack in 1941, Stalin eventually succeeded in rallying the Soviet people to
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the defense of their homeland and drove the Germans back into Central
Europe. After the war Stalin gradually became more and more isolated from
the Soviet people and his associates. He tightener) controls and initiated a
new reign of terror. On the eve of his death, Soviet society-inefficient,
stagnant, and ridden with fear and bureaucratic excesses-was gripped by
potentially explosive discontent.
The Communist Party
The Communist Party has been the key to the maintenance of the
Soviet system; it wields supreme political authority in the USSR. Although
the Soviet constitution alludes only to the "leading" role of the party
(Article 126), the party is in practice responsible for the formulation of all
state policies and has ultimate control over their execution.
The Communist Party represents itself as a "voluntary association"
standing outside the formal institutions of government, but in practice it
controls and directs the government, primarily by assigning party personnel
to all important governmental posts. The party's presence is pervasive at all
administrative levels and in all important institutions.
The basic unit of the party is formed in factories, governmental
agencies and institutions, farms, and units of the armed forces. Although the
party statutes provide for the election of party officials, all officials require
the approval of, and are often designated by, higher party authority. Each
organization is answerable to the next higher unit in the hierarchy of party
organizations. Party leaders make some attempts to encourage the initiative
of rank-and-file members and the use of "criticism and self-criticism," but
the most important function of party activity is the faithful execution of
orders from above.
The All-Union Party Congress is nominally at the top of the party
structure. In fact, the congress merely ratifies policies fixed by the Party
Central Committee's Politburo (during 1952-66 called the Presidium).
During Stalin's regime the congress was convened at irregular and in-
creasingly lengthy intervals. Since Stalin's death in 1953, the party leaders
generally have come closer to meeting the statutory requirement of holding a
congress at least every four years. At the 24th Party Congress, which opened
in March 1971, this requirement was changed to provide for a congress at
five-year intervals, presumably to accord with the time span of the Five-Year
Plans.
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The All-Union Party Central Committee and the Central Auditing
Commission are next in the theoretical hierarchy. At the 24th Party
Congress, when elections to these bodies were last held, 396 persons were
named to the Central Committee (241 as full, or voting members and 155 as
candidate members), and 81 persons were named to the Auditing Com-
mission. The Central Committee played a minimal political role during the
latter part of the Stalin era. Ot was convened only three times in over ten
years.) Khrushchev called the Central Committee together far more fre-
quently; from 1956 to 1964 the Central Committee averaged three sessions a
year, each session lasting an average of a little over three days. During
1965-71, Brezhnev convened the Central Committee about as often, bit the
sessions were briefer, averaging a day and a half. Central Committee
members primarily serve the purpose of disseminating and implementing
policy and, as a body, have not significantly exercised their purported
decision-making powers.
The chief policy-making unit of the party is the Central Committee's
Politburo, which presently consists of 15 full and seven candidate members.
A nine-member Secretariat is the party's chief executive body. Its main
functions are described in the party statutes as the selecting of personnel and
checking the implementation of party decisions. The Party Control Com-
mittee, the least important of the Central Committee's ali'ciliary bodies,
oversees party discipline and morality and brings violators to account.
The Politburo is believed to meet at least once a week to consider
questions of national policy. Its members, wh' theoretically carry equal
weight in the decision-making process, have responsibility for initiating
policy recommendations in areas within their competence a. party or govern-
ment executives. The overlapping of functions among individual leaders
undoubtedly complicates the process of policy coordination and formu-
lation, but primary responsibility in any sphere seems to lie with one
specified leader. Thus responsibility in defense matters appears to rest with
General Secretary Brezhnev; he is ex-officio Chairman of the Defense
Council, a civilian-military group which includes some other Politburo
members and makes recommendations oti defense policy in its broadest
aspect. for final decision by the Politburo.
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Since coming to power in October 1964, Br,ezhnev has been either
unwilling or unable to derninate the political scene as Khrushchev once did,
and his position is one of pre-eminence rather than predominance. A
restraint on his power is a ruling which the Central Committee adopted at
the time of Khrushchev's overthrow, barring the party boss from simulta-
neously holding the government premiership. Aside from this check on the
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re-establishment of "one-man rule" (which in any case could be rescinded by
the Central Committee at a plenum, should a political showdown occur),
there are no known institutional safeguards regulating interplay within the
Politburo.
Party controls river central executive agencies are exercised through
departments (otdely) of the Central Committee, which actually function as
the staff !apparat) of the Secretariat. Each secretary, including General
Secretary Brezhnev and the others having Politburo status, directs the work
of one or more departments. Within the bounds set by top leaders, these
departments work out the details of public policy.
Similar staffs with comparable functions are organized under the
secretariats of the republic party central committees. The Russian Soviet
Federated Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.), however, does not have its own
republic party organization; its staff was assimilated into the central party
departments in 1966.
Below the republic level, party control is exercised by provincial
(oblast) and district (rayon) party committees and their bureaus and secre-
taries. They are assisted by departments similar to those assisting the
republic party central committees, though of lesser scope.
Except for a brief period between late 1962 and late 1964, the party
structure has been based on geographical principles, with a party organi-
zation in each geographical unit responsible for almost everything that
happens in its territory.
A key element in the hierarchical system is the primary party organi-
zation, which is vested with control powers over the public institution where
it is located. These "watchdog" organizations are responsible to higher party
committees, not to the administrative chain of command of the institutions.
Signals or warnings concerning activities in institutions in all spheres of
public life are forwarded for action through the apparatus to the appropriate
level of the hierarchy. At each level the party committees are assisted by a
supervisory apparatus consisting of commissions and departments, which
have the responsibility of checking all activities within individual sectors of
public life, such as industry and agriculture. The degree of party supervision
and interference varies, reflecting the interests of the political leadership.
Government organization
The government system of the USSR includes legislative bodies,
executive agencies, and courts. The Soviet regime explicitly reects, however,
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any theory of the separation of powers, The Supreme Soviet and also the
lower soviets are not merely legislative assemblies but bodies combining all
types of governmental functions. The constitution nowhere describes the
soviets as legislatures or parliaments, although they are the only bodies
constitutionally qualified to enact "laws." This provision is of serverl for-
mally.
The constitutional position of the branches of the Soviet Government
contrasts markedly with their real power position. The constitution des-
ignates the Supreme Soviet as the highest organ of power, its Presidiur, as an
ancillary body subordinate to it, and the Council of Ministers as an ap-
pointed instrument subordinate to both. In reality, however, the order of
importance of the three .bodies is rough;y reversed. The Supreme Soviet, for
example, a bicameral body consisting of the Soviet of the Union and the
Soviet of Nationalities, actually has no real importance as a law-making
agency. Normally the Supreme Soviet meets about twice a year for a few
days each time and unanimously passes the budget and other laws placed
before it. Each chamber of the Supreme Soviet has standing commissions
with statutory authority to exercise some legislative initiative and to
supervise the work of the government's executive agencies.
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet has somewhat greater importance.
It directs and coordinates the activities of the standing commissions anc
otherwise conducts business between sessions of the Supreme Soviet. Certain
powers are conferred on the Presidium alone, such as the issuance of edicts,
ratification and denunciation of treaties, appointment and removal of the
command staff of the armed forces, and declaration of war or mobilization.
These acts are not subject to later ratification by the Supreme Soviet. The
significance of the Presidium, however, stems not from its constitutional
position but from the presence in it of persons of undisputed political power
achieved through activities in other more important jobs. The Presidium
consists of a chairman, 1 F deputy chairmen (one from each of the union
republics), a secretary, and 20 other members.
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet officially represents the Soviet
state. Its chairman, presently Politburo member N. V. Podgorny, receives the
credentials of foreign diplomatic representatives, greets visiting delegations
from foreign governments, and affixes his signature to certain international
agreements.
The Council of Ministers is the most important agency in the govern-
mental structure. Its 81 members include a chairman, deputy chairmen,
ministers, and other leading government officials. In addition, the chairmen
of the 15 republic councils of ministers are ex-officio associates.
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In theory, decisions are made by the council meeting as a whole; in
fact, thu, council meets irregularly, and decisions are usually rn..=ide by the
Presidium of the Council of Ministers, a little-publicized "inner cabinet"
which includes the chairman, the first deputy chairmen, all deputy chairmen,
and probably, in most sessions, the Minister of Finance, with the heads of
appropriate ministries or other bodies participating as consultants.
The chief administrative units below the national level are the republic,
the oblast, and the rayon. Most of the republics include at least one
preponderant ethnic group and a number of lesser minorities.
The republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belorussia, Estonia, Georgia,
Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldavia, Russia, Tadzhikistan,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan) have their own constitutions,
supreme soviets (unicameral), and councils of ministers, and have otherwise
been invested with some of the trappings of sovereign states. The powers
listed by the constitution as being solely within the corripetence of the
central government ai so sweeping that the actual autonomy of republic
governments is severely circumscribed. The scope of the activity of republic
ministers, including those concerned with local matters, is often determined
by decisions made by higher authorities in the central party or government
apparatus. All republic ministries are also subject to p arty control by the
republic central committee, exercised through the party organization within
governmental bodies and by direct intervention.
The principal political administrative unit below the republic is the
oblast (region). Oblasts in the RSFSR are roughly comparable to a state in
the United States. The components of the oblast governments, though
bearing different names, correspond to those on higher levels. Their soviets
are analogous to the supreme soviets, and the executive committees elected
by them correspond in function to the councils of ministers. The kray is an
administrative-territorial unit, which exists only in the RSFSR; a kray
usually contains one or more oblasts.
Below the level of the oblast is the rayon, which is generally analogous
to a US county (urban rayons correspond to the boroughs or wards of large
US cities). The rayon is the lowest level at which the subordinate agencies of
the ministerial structure are found and the level with which the citizen most
often deals.
Although all legislative offices in the Soviet Union are filled by direct
popular election, elections are a propaganda device and do not reflect
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popular opinion. The electorate has no meaningful choice because only one
person is permitted to run for each office; the voter may simply approve or
disapprove this candidacy. Not all candidates need be party members, but no
one is able to run for office without the approval of the party bureaucracy.
Judicial system
Soviet courts are theoretically "independent and subject only to the
law." In practice, however, they are greatly influenced by the policies of the
government and the party, which does intervene in court cases even to the
extent of overruling decisions of the Supreme Courts.
There is only one "All-Union" court in the Soviet Union, the USSR
Supreme Court. It serves as the final court of appeals for republic and other
lower level courts which enforce both all-union and republic laws. Prior to
the re-establishment of the USSR Ministry of Justice and its republic
counterparts in 1970, the Supreme Court was also responsible for supervising
and training court personnel and general administration of the court system.
Members of the USSR Supreme Court are elected by the Supreme Soviet for
five year terms and are responsible to the Supreme Soviet. The court has the
power to initiate legislation but it does not have the power of judicial review.
The Office of the USSR Procurator General is responsible for the
investigation, prosecution, and appeal of cases which violate the criminal
code; it sometimes intervenes in civil cases. The USSR Supreme Soviet
appoints the Procurator General who in turn appoints republic and oblast
procurators.
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The Soviet armed forces, as presently constituted, consist of ground,
naval, air, air defense, and rocket forces. The main purpose of each of these
is to develop combat forces along functional lines for coordinated opera-
tions; all five components are highly interdependent.
About 3.5 million men are estimated to be in the armed forces. Almost
two thirds of these or approximately two million men are assigned to the
ground forces. The remainder are believed to be assigned as follows: navy,
474,000; air force, 510,000; and strategic rocket forces, 375,000. In ad-
dition, the border and internal troops of the security forces have a strength
of about 250,000.
These forces are augmented by an effective reserve of 20 million men
between the ages of 18 and 50, part of a total manpower pool of more than
62 million men.
The Soviet Navy has over 210 major naval surface combatants, and
about 350 submarines. In addition, there are over 2,200 other surface
combatants and auxiliaries. There are over 970 combat and reconnaissance
aircraft in naval aviation. The long-range air force has approximately 910
bombers and tankers, while tactical aviation is made up of some 4,000
fighters and light bombers. About 3,200 fighters are assigned to the air
defense forces. An estimated operational inventory of approximately 1,475
intercontinental ballistic missile launchers (over 1,600 missiles) and more
than '700 variable-, intermediate-, and medium-range missile launchers
(nearly 1,200 missiles) are in the hands of the strateyie rocket forces.
In addition to its own armed forces, the Kremlin leadership regards the
military capabilities of other Warsaw Pact states as important to its strategic
position.
The Soviet armed forces are controlled by the Ministry of Defense,
headed by a minister who is normally a military offices on active duty. The
minister of defense is a member of the Council of Ministers within the Soviet
Government and is also responsible to the Central Committee of the CPSU.
He advises the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee on the
requirements and capabilities of the armed forces and is responsible for
implementing decisions of the political leaders. Operational command and
over-all administrative control of the armed forces are exercised by the
minister of defense through the high command made up of the minister of
defense and his deputies.
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The Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy is the
principal instrument used by the party to maintain political control, includ-
ing rigid adherence to party policies and directives, over the armed forces.
The political apparatus is an integral part of all headquarters above company
level throughout the military forces. The Main Political Directorate adminis-
ters and directs the activities of the political officers responsible for political
indoctrination of all personnel, morale-building programs, and surveillance of
political reliability.
In 1970, estimated Soviet defense and defense related expenditures
were about 12% of the total government budget and 7% of the GNP. The
planned defense budget of 17.9 billion rubles for 1972 is identical to the
defense budgets of 1970 and 1971. The published figure, however, excludes
most of the funds for military R & D and military mace which are the most
rapidly growing elements in the Soviet defense effort. Including military
space and R & D, intelligence estimates project total Soviet defense expendi-
tures in 1972 at about 23 billion rubles-the equivalent of about $66 billion
if measured in US costs-an increase of about three percent over 1971.
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VII. FOREIGN RELATIONS
The history of Russian foreign policy, including that of the Soviet
period, has been marked by striking elements of continuity. Thy:-,e elements
include a persistent tendency to expand the boundaries of Russian power
and an ideological exclusiveness that complicates relations with other na?.
tions. The USSR's great physical and military strength has strengthened
these forces, just as the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 added to their fervor.
Communist ideology which assumes the continual growth of power at the
expense of the non-Communist world, remains a significant factor mo-
tivating an expansionist Soviet policy. When the demands of revolutionary
Communist doctrine conflict with the interests of the Soviet state, however,
the problem is usually resolved in favor of the latter.
An intense concern with national security has traditionally charac-
terized Russian policy, and this has remained true during the Soviet regime.
Protection of the homeland is the decisive reason why the Kremlin has given
first priority to retaining tight control over the states of Eastern Europe and
strengthening defenses in the area bordering China. Convinced of the impla-
cable hostility of the outside world, Soviet leaders-like their tsarist pred-
ecessors-have placed heavy emphasis on isolating their state from ideological
"infection" by other cultures. Moscow's assumption that the capitalist world
seeks to expand at the expense of the Soviet empire also has a powerful
impact on the USSR's foreign policy.
The effect of Communist ideology on Soviet foreign policy comes into
play most clearly in the USSR's relations with other Communist states.
Disputes over aid to "national liberation movements," attitudes toward
"bourgeois" nationalist leaders, the sanctity of the Communist camp, and
other contentious issues have led to numerous divergencies within the world
Communist movement. The USSR, with a larger stake in the status quo, has
come to interpret Communist ideology with less fervor than China or Cuba.
Smaller and less powerful countries, such as Yugoslavia and Romania, favor a
less unified world Communist movement and oppose Moscow's efforts to
restrict them to a subservient role. Though a majority of the world's
Communist parties remain responsive to Soviet advice, Moscow has had to
loosen its grip and in some cases has lost control completely.
One of the Soviets' most important problems in their foreign policy is
dealing with their Chinese neighbors along the world's longest land frontier.
Soviet animosity toward China is deeply rooted in political and psycholog-
ical factors. Broad cultural differences, compounded by strong historical and
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racial enmities, have helped to give the dispute a strong emotional cast.
Moscow sees its desires to play a leading role in Asia thwarted by Peking and,
in the ideological sphere, resents Peking's challenge to Soviet leadership of
the world revoluti mary movement.
The Sino-Soviet dispute reached critical proportions in 1960 when
Khrushchev suspended Soviet military assistance to the Chinese. In No-
vember of that year, 81 Communist pWies met in Moscow where the
Chinese, supported by several r thcr Jelegations, attacked the Soviets for
trying to dominate the international Communist movement. The intrabloc
conflict was papered over by the conference's concluding statement re-
affirming the goals of a world-wide Communist system, but Khrushchev
persisted in his effort to read the Chinese out of the movement.
The dispute took a new, dramatic turn in the spring and summer of
1969 when a series of clashes occurred along several sections of the border.
The Soviet leadership combined threats of military action with proposals for
negotiations to force Peking to make efforts toward resolving the dispute. In
the fall of 1969, the Chinese finally agreed to he Soviet demand for talks,
but the negotiations have dragged on with no significant progress. None-
theless, Moscow and Peking have sought to reduce the level of tension that
had prevailed during the border fighting and to put their relations on a more
normal footing. Ambassadorial ties which were disrupted during China's
Cultural Revolution were resumed in 1970, and trade relations have
improved since the 1969 border fighting.
Peking's opening to the US, however, has presented Moscow with its
biggest challenge not only in the Sino-Soviet context but in Moscow's global
relations. The Soviets seemed slow to grasp the implications of Peking's new
diplomacy in the West until the announcement on 15 July 1971 that
President Nixon would visit China. Until then the Soviets were suspicious
but not overly r.oncerned about a Sino-American detente. After the an-
nouncement, the Soviets were clearly worried that Moscow's two rivals
would resolve their differences and team up against the USSR. The Sino-
American dialogue, moreover, seriously damaged Moscow's efforts to soil
Peking's international image and marked the Soviet failure to contain China.
The coincidence of US and Chinese positions during the india-Pakistan war
has intensified Moscow's concern that Sino-American contacts would lead to
meaningful collaboration on political matters.
The Chinese, meanwhile, have taken delight in Moscow's discomfiture
and have done nothing to allay Soviet suspicions. They have sought to
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distract the Soviets through penetration of Moscow's own East European
backyard, and have tried to gain friends in the third world at Moscow's
expense, An article in Pekinp,'s authoritative journal, Red Flag, has justified
the contacts with the US ir, terms of isolating a single "die-hard" enemy,
obviously the USSR. The Chinese also have emphasized Mao's distinction
between "imperialism" (the USSR) which is committing aggression against
China and "imperialist powers" (the West) which are not. The Soviets, in
response, have accused Peking of befriending any country hostile to the
USSR.
Although the Sovie's have castigated Peking for expanding contacts
with the US, they have given every. indication that the Nixon visit to Peking
should not jeopardize Soviet-Atr9rican contacts. in the past several years
there has been forward movement in USSR-US relations, with the two sides
negoti,ting on issues from outer space to the seabeds. The SALT talks, of
course, are the most critical forum. Both sides moved to break the impasse in
these talks on 20 May 1971, when the US and USSR agreed to concentrate
on working out an early agreement for the limitation of anti-ballistic missiles
together with "certain measures" to limit offensive strategic missiles.
Since the announcement of the visit to China the Soviets have con-
tinued and, in some cases, intensified bilateral contacts with the US. In
September 1971 the two sides signed agreements on the prevention of
accidental nuclear war and on a new direct communications link. The
Incidents at sea talks between US and Soviet delegations in October 1971
furnished another instance of positive movement, and the Soviets have-for
the first time-agreed to negotiate a new cultural exchange agreement before
the expiration of the old one. Thus, the announcement of the Nixon visit did
not derail the Soviets from the detente track with the US laid down at the
24th Party Congress in March 1971, but on the contrary seems to have
provided new stimulus for it.
The announcement that President Nixon would visit China appears to
have had a catalytic effect on Soviet dealings in Western Europe, where
Moscow appears interested in getting its relations in good repair. The speed
and flexibility with which the Soviets moved toward a satisfactory agree-
ment on Berlin, for example, may have been influenced by the announce-
ment. Less than two weeks after plans for the visit were revealed, the Soviets
reversed field at the Berlin talks and told the Allies that Moscow wanted an
agreement by mid-August. Although there is evidence that the Soviets-even
before 15 July-were looking ahead to August as the turning point in the
Berlin negotiations, Moscow's alacrity in moving toward a satisfactory agree-
ment on Berlin after more than a year of protracted talks suggests that the
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Soviet leaders were influenced by the news of the visit. Chinese pressure
along the Sino-Soviet border in 1969 seems to have had a similar effect on
Soviet policy in Europe, witness Moscow's sudden receptiveness ~Jt that time
to Willi Brandt's Ostpolitik.
Even before the announcement of the visit, however, the Soviets had
been working to achieve a rapprochement with West Germany. Indeed,
Moscow's signing of a renunciation of force agreement with Bonn in August
1970 marked the beginning of a new period in the postwar history of
Europe. Having obtained Bonn's do facto recognition of the inviolability of
European borders, the Soviets increased their efforts to expand their in-
fluence in Western Europe, to obtain US military withdrawal from Western
Europe, and to prevent further economic unification such as the Common
Market.
The Brezhnev-Kosygin team which ousted Khrushchev in 1964 has
sought whenever possible to reassure Western Europeans that the days of the
cold war are over and that there is much mutual profit to be gained from
accommodation. Moscow has sought to portray the independent policies of
France as an example of the kind of cooperation that has become possible
between West European states and the USSR. The Soviets also are interested
in a conference on European security and are hoping to develop trade and
technical exchanges. Brezhnev has traveled to France with these goals in
mind, and Kosygin has gone to Denmark and Norway.
The warming of Sino-American relations, accompanied by the general
increase in Chinese diplomatic activity, persuaded the Soviets to move
aggressively to counter Chinese inroads in the Balkans. The so-called
Brezhnev doctrine of "limited sovereignty," which alleges that the USSR has
the duty and obligation to intervene in defense of socialism anywhere it may
be threatened, is symptomatic of Moscow's efforts to maintain hegemony in
Eastern Europe. During the past year-and particularly since the 15 July
announcement-the Soviets have demonstrated serious concern over the
influence of China on Moscow's Balkan neighbors. The Chinese had in-
creased their ties with the Romanians and hove promoted better relations
with the Yugoslavs who, as "arch-revisionists," have in the past been sub-
jected to Peking's har hrst criticism. The Soviets have made clear that
flirtatious responses to Peking are unacceptable and last summer embarked
on a major campaign to disabuse Bucharest and Belgrade of any notion that
ties with r'etcing could be used against the USS!i. The Soviets excluded
Romania from a Warsaw Pact meeting in August to underline the danger of
Bucharest's wayward behavior, and Brezhnev visited Belgrade in September
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in order to counter Tito's ties with Washington and Peking. Susceptible to
Soviet influence, the Balkan states apparently have decided not to test the
limits of Moscow's patience.
Moscow's concern to counter the effects of the thaw in Sino?American
relations also contributed to the speed with which the USSR an(' India
revived and brought to completion a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation
on 9 August 1971. This project was first broached by Moscow in 1969 as a
part of a Soviet diplomatic offensive aimed against China, but negotiations
died out the following year. The outbreak of rebellion in East Pakistan in
1970, however, put the Indians under new pressures. Both Moscow and New
Delhi felt isolated by the news of President Nixon's plan to visit China.
Unable to persuade the Indians to conclude a treaty in 1969, the Soviets
were glad to have another chance to gain ground against both China and the
US. In so doing, Moscow took a step toward consolidating its position not
only in India but in Asia as a whole.
During the Indo-Pakistani war the USSR gave complete diplomatic and
propaganda support to New Delhi, and used the opportunity to beef up the
Soviet naval squadron in the Indian Ocean. Soviet personnel were not
involved in the fighting, however, and Soviet ships remained well away from
coastal areas until hostilities ended. Moscow, moreover, did not encourage
Indian military action aimed at the dismemberment of West Pakistan and
quickly endorsed New Delhi's offer of a unilateral cease-fire on the Western
front.
Elsewhere in Asia, Moscow's actions have been taken with an eye to
China. The Kremlin's decision in the winter of 1964-65 to provide sub-
stantial military assistance to North Vietnam was adopted to counter
Chinese influence there, and Premier Kosygin's trip to Hanoi in February
1965 was a direct challenge to Peking's position. During the following year,
Soviet assistance to Hanoi grew, as did the dispute with Peking. Since the
announcement of the Nixon visit to Peking, the Soviets have tried to exploit
Hanoi's increased misgivings with regard to China's actions. Soviet criticism
of recent US bombing attacks against North Vietnam, for example, was
designed to call attention to Peking's dealings with Washington and to
impress on Hanoi that Moscow is a more dependable ally.
j 11 ince or ( 11 1, ar oviet policy toward Japan has
been characterized by ambiguity and caution. Although Moscow recognizes
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Japan's economic strength and is interested in attracting Japanese capital for
the development of Siberian raw materials, the Soviets nevertheless have
viewed the conservative Japanese Government as the US surrogate in Asia
and have displayed increasing concern over Japan's military and political
Elsewhere in Asia and in Africa, the Soviet:; have undertaken a con-
certed political and economic offensive to supplam Western influence and to
align third world countries with the USSR. Military aid, starting with the
first large arms deal with Egypt in 1955, has proved to be Moscow's most
effective instrument, whereas economic aid has been used more sparingly. In
addition to Egypt, Arab states such as Iraq, Syria, and Yemen (Aden) are
nearly totally dependent on the Soviet Union for military assistance. Tradi-
tionally pro-Western states such as Jordan, Lebanon, and Iran are also
receiving arms from the USSR.
Military aid has served Soviet objectives well, and has contributed
significantly to the weakening of Western political influence in many coun-
tries of the third world. The aid has enabled the Soviets to establish a naval
presence in the Mediterranean. Although the USSR has not acquired formal
base'rights in the Middle East, it has obtained operating privileges that
directly support overseas military activities. In Egypt, for example, the
Soviets have storage facilities at Port Said and naval repair facilities at
Alexandria. A Soviet Naval Air Squadron flies reconnaissance flights against
the US Sixth Fleet from Egyptian airfields. Moscow also has obtained access
to port facilities in Syria and Yemen (Aden), and has increased the fre-
quency and duration of Soviet port calls to the Indian Ocean.
the
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Soviets have supped air defense systems to Cuba and North Vietnam,
L The continued improvement of Soviet naval forces, accompanied by
the expansion of airlift and amphibious capabilities, will give the USSR
additional flexibility in any distant operations considerably beyond its
negligible capabilities of only ten years ago.
In Latin America the Cuban revolution in 1959 gave the USSR a chance
to show its support for a socialist country within the shadow of the US. In
the last few years the Soviet military presence in the Caribbean has expanded
significantly, and facilities at Cienfuegos have provided services for Soviet
naval combatants, including nuclear-powered submarines. The military gov-
ernments of Peru and Bolivia have been singled out for praise, marking a
change in Soviet attitudes toward certain military regimes. The Soviets will
continue to watch events in Chile very closely and, if Chilean President
Allende shows some prospects of succeeding, Moscow will probably be more
forthcoming with support.
On balance, Soviet party chief Brezhnev has tightened his grip on the
reins of foreign policy. In the past few years, he has become the USSR's
chief spokesman for detente and has tried to broaden his role to include that
of world statesman. At the same time, he has taken advantage of every
opportunity to expand Soviet power into new areas, particularly into South
Asia and the Middle East. And like his tsarist predecessors, he has maintained
Russia's dominance over East Europe, clamped down on potential sources of
irredentism, and secured German de facto recognition of Soviet hegemony
over Central Europe. Brezhnev also has improved the Soviet position vis-a-vis
the US, and in particular has obtained acknowledgement of Moscow's
nuclear parity with Washington.
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VIII. US INTERESTS
The US has no defense commitments or alliances with the USSR, of
course, but there is a growing network of agreements and cooperative
arrangements in the US-Soviet relationship. Moreover, the US currently is
engaged in a wide variety of negotiations with the USSR, ranging from the
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) designed to stabilize the strategic
balance between the two countries to measures to conserve natural re-
sources. Some of these negotiations, such as those covering disarmament and
environmental issues, are multi-national and will only produce agreements
through a fairly broad consensus among many nations. Others, such as
SALT, the talks aimed at avoiding incidents at sea, and those concerning
trade and scientific exchanges, may eventually produce new bilateral agree-
ments.
The USSR has shown high-level interest in expanding Soviet-American
trade and in obtaining US assistance in developing Soviet mineral resources-
an interest reiterated by Premier Kosygin in his discussions in Moscow in
November 1971 with former secretary of commerce Stans. As a follow-up to
the Stans' visit, a Soviet trade delegation visited the US in January 1972 to
hold exploratory talks on economic relations. The Soviets were seeking the
establishment ot most-favored-nation treatment as well as long-term credits
from the Export-Impost Bank.
Soviet Made with the US increased sharply in 1969, largely on the
strength of Soviet imports of US automotive machine tools and steel.
Exports tothe US went from $43 million in 1968 to $61 million in 1969
while Soviet imports jumped from $57 million to $117 million. In 1970,
export and import totals stayed about the same at $64 million and $115
million, respectively. This was the highest level of trade since 1964, when the
USSR imported substantial quantities of US wheat. In spite of this growth,
the 1970 totals represent less than 4% of Soviet trade with the developed
West.
Prospects are good for an exchange, in 1972-75, of US equipment and
technology for Soviet industrial raw materials in the areas of crude oil and
natural gas. The USSR urgently needs modern petroleum facilities, and
Soviet oil and natural gas probably can be marketed in the US. Similar
exchanges are possible for copper, diamonds, manganese, nickel, and timber.
For the next few years non-Soviet supplies of copper and manganese will be
ample to meet US needs, but some trade in copper could develop after 1975.
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Since the US is wholly dependent on imports for manganese, trade is
possible in the latter half of the 1970s. The US has imported small amounts
of nickel from the USSR in recent years and will increase such imports under
the terms of a contract providing for Soviet annual deliveries of 5,000 tons
of nickel to the US Steel Corporation for the next five years. Prospects for
diamonds and timber are slight because US firms are obligated to other
foreign markets.
The expansion of sales of mining equipment and technology to the
USSR, or direct US participation in Soviet mining ventures, very largely
depends on the willingness of US companies to take payment in raw
materials. US firms will be motivated to accept Soviet raw material if it is
marketable, and if Soviet terms provide a better return on investment than
alternative opportunities in the non-Communist world. A recent $65-million
deal concluded by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade and the SATRA
Corporation of New York has given an initial impetus to expanded trade.
The agreement called for US firms to supply $45 million worth of ore
mining equipment and $20 million worth of drill pipe and tubing, with
payment in Soviet nickel.
Future Soviet economic dealings with the US depend in part on what
Washington does about its restrictions on trade with the USSR. Reduction of
US export controls and credit limitations would contribute to growth in
Soviet imports from the US. For example, the Soviet desire for US truck
manufacturing equipment and technology could rEsult in substantial sales by
the US. Export licenses for some of this equipment have already been
approved, and the Congress has given the President authorization for Ex-
port-Import Bank financing for Communist countries. Granting of most-
favored-nation treatment to the USSR may also bring a rise in some Soviet
e"ports to the US, but it is difficult to predict the extent.
The outlook for trade with the USSR is brighter in the late 1970s and
beyond. The US probably will be obliged to increase its reliance on foreign
suppliers of raw materials as the economy continues to grow. The USSR,
with its extensive resources of many of the necessary materials, could become
an important supplier to US and other Western markets. There is con-
siderable Soviet demand for technologically advanced products, and the US
has a strong competitive position for many of these products. Assuming that
the East-West detente continues, the convergent interests of the two
countries could lead to a significant increase in trade.
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ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS
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The Inrgnr symbols wllhin n cnlego"
denote Iho more
Impurlant producrrs,
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