DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000090019-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 3, 2008
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: January 22, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Developments in Indochina
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
125
22 January 1973
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DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA
(Information as of 1500)
SOUTH VIETNAM
Viet Cong briefings indicate that the Communists
are preparing for action sometime after 24 January
to coincide with a cease-fire announcement. PRG
President Huynh Thanh Phat in a New Year's message
strikes a more militant tone about the future than
Hanoi has been doing lately. Non-Communist political
groups are also maneuvering in anticipation of a
cease-fire.
LAOS
Communist negotiators are eager to get back to
Vientiane. Prime Minister Souvanna is going ahead
with his plans to visit New Delhi. The Chinese
road from Nam Tha is now motorable some 24 miles
to the southwest. The Communists are probing
government positions around Paksong.
CAMBODIA
Sihanouk insists that a cease-fire in Vietnam will
have no effect in Cambodia. Lon Non now controls
the Khmer Krom association.
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SOUTH VIETNAM
The Communists are preparing for increased ac-
tion in anticipation of an early cease-fire announce-
ment. New instructions have been passed to Communist
officials throughout South Vietnam in meetings and
briefings during the past ten days ox so. The or-
ders call for a wide range of pre-cease-ri.re actions
from showing the flag to large-scale, coordinated
attacks against important government installations,
lightly defended population centers and outposts, and
major highways. The objective is to strengthen the
enemy's territorial position as well as to gather as
many more people as possible prior to a cease-fire.
Although some of the enemy briefings describe
plans for major military operations, it still is not
clear just how much the Communists hope to escalate
the fighting. None of their major combat units have
left the country; many, in fact, remain relatively
close to major target areas and some have been noted
moving closer to potential targets. Local units in
some areas have also been detected moving toward popu-
lated areas. It does not appear, however, that the
Communists are in the state of readiness that they
were prior to their spring offensive last year.
there have been some references to combat
units celebrating Tet early--several units near Sai-
gon were allegedly told to celebrate the holida from
20 to 23 January and then be read for battle.
The Communists
appear to be planning about four days of increased
activity between the announcement of an agreement and
the time that it actually goes into effect. The re-
ports indicate that most enemy cadre are being told
that the cease-fire will be observed by the major
military units, but the political action will con-
iniie.
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Many South Vietnamese officials also seem to
think that a cease-fire is imminent. The Thua Thien
Province chief and mayor of Da Nang recently claimed
that there would be a cease-fire sometime between 25
and 30 January. The commander of South Vietnamese
forces in the provinces around Saigon has suspended
his offensive operations and redeployed his units
closer to the major population centers, and units
elsewhere are being shifted to strengthen weaker
areas. Orders for strict leave policies have been
sent to National Police units, and some militar
units are on full alert.'
Phat Looks At the Past and Future
At the PRG's "New Year" meeting earlier this
month the participants heard a long state-of-the-
movement report from PRG President Huynh Thanh Phat.
Phat's peroration--and the only part of his report
picked up so far by the North Vietnamese and Chi-
nese news agencies--follows the meeting's final
communique in emphasizing conciliation, peace, and
a political effort based on a united front. At some
points in his speech, however, his comments have a
far more militant tone than is currently coming from
the Hanoi leadership--a tone which gives the impres-
sion that the PRG is, at the least, planning to keep
up its guard and strengthen its armed forces after
a cease-fire.
Phat delivered a euphoric account of alleged
Communist military "victories" in the last year and
then asserted that the military balance is shifting
more and more in the Communists' favor. In fact,
he said, "the more the war is prolonged, the more
the puppet army declines and disintegrates in an
irremediable way." This is one of Hanoi's standard
lines, of course, but it has been absent from recent
North Vietnamese propaganda. Phat seems to b:' as-
serting, if only for the record, that he believes
the military struggle should continue.
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Phat addressed the question of aid from the
North in a way that suggests that the PRG may have some
worries on this score. Among the reasons he gave
for past PRG "victories" was North Vietnam's "im-
mense and ardent love for the South." Hanoi, he
said, "has always kept its firm oath by assisting
kith-and-kin South Vietnam with manpower and ma-
terials." For its part, Phat pledged the PRG to
fulfill its own obligations toward the common
fatherland and to keep up the fight for the "libera-
tion of the South and the defense of the North."
These passages could be aimed at reminding Hanoi
that it is not absolved of its "oath" until victory
is achieved. Later Phat asserted that "people of
the same country must love one another." The im-
me,liate context of this remark is the need for
unity among South Vietnamese, but the passage is
so worded that it could apply to the North as well.
Phat took a defensive stance when he addressed
the question of Communist political activity in
South Vietnam. He as much as acknowledged that the
PRG has fallen short in this regard, Lut he attrib-
uted any shortcomings to the "insidious tricks" of
the Communists' enemies. The latter, he said, have
made people "commit crimes, have forced people to
take up weapons and kill their compatriots, or have
pressured people into joining the coercive organi-
zations." Even worse, the enemies have been able
to "instill erroneous sentiments" and render people
"unable to see the truth." Nonetheless, he asserted
somewhat lamely, "the overwhelming majority of our
people" remain united in their patriotism. (Phat
says nothing about whether they are also united in
their devotion to the PRG).
Po?iticaZ Forces Seek to Strengthen Their Positions
South Vietnam's major political groups are con-
tinuing to man-uver in preparation for the cease-fire
and in response to the recent presidential decree
stiffening criteria for political parties. Most in-
dependent and opposition elements still appear to be
thinking in terms of operating outside of the govern-
ment camp.
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The An Quang Buddhists continue to worry about
Communist pressure on them when the fighting stops.
One An Quang monk recently told US Embassy officers
that just before the expected cease-fire in October,
Viet Cong cadres had visited many pagodas, even in
Saigon, to demand cooperation on pain of punishment.
The monk said the Buddhists are accelerating efforts
to tighten their organization and to educate young
bonzes on how to counter expected Communist subver-
sion. They are also planning to organize various
social welfare activities in the provinces as a means
of developing more direct ties with the faithful.
Although there continue to be indication that some
An Quang leaders favor cooperating with the govern-
ment to meet the Communist challenge, most remain
unhappy over the decree on political parties.
Catholic political leaders appear to be the fur-
thest along in trying to meet the terms of the decree.
Several Catholic factions associated with Senate
Chairman Nguyen Van Huyen are planning to set up a
new "Freedom Party." Some of the participants are
optimistic that they can bring in non-Catholic groups,
and they already have had contacts with the Farmer-
Worker Party and a faction of the Vietnamese Nation-
alist Party (VNQDD), among others. Nevertheless, the
Catholics admit that many of their politically active
followers have joined the government's Democracy
Party. Many others, they assert, would prefer polit-
ical inactivity to forced affiliation with the govern-
ment party.
The largely southern-based Progressive Nation-
alist Movement also hopes to qualify under the new
decree, although it doubts that it can do so on its
own. One party leader told US Embassy officers that
the party will try to gain the adherence of several
small factions, including Hoa Hao and Cao Dai groups,
a VNQDD faction, and a "right-wing" An Quang Buddhist
element. He asserted that his party will make "every
effort" to maintain its legal existence as a "con-
structive opposition" party.
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The status of South Vietnam's non-Communist
political groupings seems likely to remain in doubt
for some time as the various groups try to adapt to
the new conditions brought on by the cease-fire and
the decree. Some now seem overly optimistic about
forming alliances and remaining a tive as legal and
independent parties. if President Thieu continues
to develop the Democracy Party at the expense of
other groups without making any conciliatory gestures
toward them, some groups could become more alienated
from the government. On the other hand, the pressure
of a confrontation with the Communists could yet in-
duce some factions to join the government camp.
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CI-#I!NA
CHINA
troops
Viong Pau Kh
IVIotO at)le
limit Of
new road
? Communist hold position
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The chairman of the Lao Communist negotiating
team, Phoune Sipraseuth, and four other delegates
apparently will miss this week's session of the
Vientiane peace talks. The Communist delegates
left for Sam Neua on 16 January saying that they
hoped to return by 23 January, but the regularly
scheduled flight from Hanoi to Vientiane on that
day has been canceled. A Communist representative
in Vientiane has requested the International Con-
trol Commission to provide a special flight to
Hanoi and back on 26 january--presumably for Phoune
and his party.
Souvanna Off to New DeZhi
Government officials in Vientiane report that,
peace speculation notwithstanding, Prime Minister
Souvanna Phouma still intends to leave: for New Delhi
on 27 January. Souvanna will spend three days in
the Indian capital where he will discuss continuing
Indian support to the International Control Commis-
sion,, Souvanna will also
seek Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's support in
persuading the Soviet and British governments to
participate in a settlement of the conflict in Laos.
On his way home Souvanna is scheduled to stop off
in Bangkok to confer with Thai leaders for several
days before returning to Vientiane on 2 February.
Chinese Road Construction
Chinese construction crews in northwestern
Laos are continuing work on a road extending south-
west from Nam Tha, a Pathet Lao administrative cen-
ter near the China border. Photography
showed that vegetation has been cleared along
the alignment of old Route 3 to within less than a
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mile of the former government refugee center at
Vieng Pou Kha; the road is motorable for 24 miles
southwest of Nam Tha. Two government battalions
several miles north and south of Vieng Pou Kha
have been trying to retake the settlement from the
Pathet Lao since early December.
Stirrings on the BoZoyens Plateau
The recent lull in the fighting on the central
Bolovens Plateau was broken on 21 January when small
Communist units probed government positions around
Paksong. The attacks probably were carried out by
patrols reconnoitering government defenses near the
town in preparation for larger attacks in the near
future.
North of the Bolovens, troops from a 3,000-man
government force are edging toward Saravane. Enemy
shellings and ground attacks have slowed the irreg-
ular units advancing on Saravane from the southwest,
and the eight-battalion force moving on the town
along Route 16 is also beginning to encounter some
resistance.
22 January 1973
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CAMBODIA
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CAMBODIA
In an interview with a group of journalists
in Peking on 21 January, Sihanouk stated that there
was no question of a cease-fire between Hanoi and
Washington being applied to Cambodia. Without ex-
panding, he also said that the Soviet Union and
France will lose a great deal when Cambodia is
"liberated." Turning to hi. travel plans, Sihanouk
said that at the end of this month he would spend
a week in Hanoi for the signing of a joint declara-
tion. After returning to China, he will make an
official visit to Canton. In May and June, he will
make official visits to Senegal, Guinea, Mali, and
the Congo. En route he will also make unofficial
stops in thr five countries he visited last summer--
Romania, Albania, Yu oslavia, Mauritania, and Algeria.
The Military Situation
Communist pressure against the former government
training camp at Romeas eased slightly on 20 January,
and several groups of Cambodian reinforcements are
continuing to advance toward the town. Elsewhere,
the squadron of armored personnel carriers that had
been supporting the slow movement of government
paratroops down Route 2 toward the encircled village
of Thnal Totung has temporarily abandoned its effort
to break through Communist resistance and returned
to Phnom Penh. Farther south, other government
paratroops have again linked up with the battalion
defending Svay Prey. These forces are now to push
up the highway toward Thnal Totung.
Lon Non Strikes Again
Brigadier General Lon Non has gained control
over the leadership of the Khmer Kampuchea Krom
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Association (AKKK), an organization of Vietnamese-
born Cambodians that includes military and civilian
members. all of
the 20 directors who were recently elected at the
AKKK's annual meeting are supporters of Lon Non.
He evidently rigged the balloting by bribing many
of the voters. Although the AKKK claims a member-
ship of 200,000, less than 1,000 actually voted.
Neutral AKKK leaders--those who do not back Lon
Non--knew that the voting was rigged and have lost
interest in the association. Even though the AKKK
is not politically important, Lon Non apparently could
not resist the opportunit7 to put his personal stamp
on it.
22 January 1973
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