WEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000050005-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2009
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: April 19, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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U~o MML U PY 25X1 -l? Secret
RETURN TO IN-1107
Weekly Review
State Dept. review completed.
Top Secret
19 April 1974
Copy
25X1
N2 421
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The WEEKLY REVIEW issued every Friday morning by th9
Office of Current lntellig&i:_e, reports and analyzes significant
developments of the v,eUk, through noon on Thursday. It
frequently includes material coordinated with or Fx_-pared,by
the Office of Economic Research, the Office, of= Strategic:
Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology:
Topics_requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore
published', separately as Special Reports are listed In the
contents.
1 Syria-Israel: A sad in Moscow
6 Laos: The Pathet Lao Hold Forth
7 Cambodia: Some Unwelcome Fireworks
8 China: Restoring the Old
9 Taiwan Stands Firm on Air P--f
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13 China-USSR: More Trouble
14 Yugoslavia: Finishing Touches
15 USSR: Sakharov's Rejoinder
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20 UN: Resources and Development
21 International Money
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22 Colombia To Elect a President
22 Prazil: Restless Students
23 Peron and the Terrorists
Nigeria: Slow Motion
Niger: The Military Take Over
Ethiopia: Turmoil Continues
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Syria-Israel
MAKING ASAD HAPPY IN MOSCOW
The Soviets rolled out the red carpet for
Syrian President Asad and opened the Kremlin's
coffers a little wider in a less than subtle attempt
to cement bilateral relations at a time when Mos-
cow is having trouble elsewhere in the Arab
world.
Asad's five-day' Stay in the USSR coincided
with the arrival in Washington of the Syrian del-
egation to discuss disengagement and with strong
anti-Soviet remarks by Egyptian President Sadat.
With this backdrop, the Soviets had more reason
than ever to use the visit to reiterate that Moscow
President Asad and Soviet leaders at airport
must be a party to any negotiations leading to a
viable Middle East settlement.
Moscow also went out of its way, apparently
with some success, to keep Asad from following
Sadat's path away from the USSR and toward the
US. The final communique expressed the resolve
of both sides to "rebuff" any attempts to damage
Soviet-Syrian friendship. This was probably a
muted warning to the US, but more importantly
it implied that Syria will not follow Egypt's ex-
ample of improving relations with the US at the
USSR's expense.
The Soviets were somewhat less reticent
than before in publicly criticizing US-Egyptian
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bilateral negotiations. Brezhnev referred to
"ersatz-plans," concocted by "the aggressor and
its patrons," to substitute partial agreements for
an over-all settlement. He again stressed that the
Geneva conference, where Moscow has a voice, is
the authoritative international forum where a
settlement must be worked out.
The USSR has repeatedly failed to persuade
Asad to by-pass or at least de-emphasize the
Washington bilateral negotiations in favor of
Geneva, and it seems to have had no better luck
this time. Asad's comment that "our points of
view on the main questions coincide" suggests
that there were areas of disagreement, probably
including the disengagement talks. The final com-
munique fails to mention Geneva arid merely
repeats the language used in the one issued fol-
lowing Gromyko's trip to Damascus last month-
that disengagement is a partial step that must be
tied to an over-all settlement, and that Moscow's
participation in all the stages and spheres of a
settlement is important.
Asad, who probably viewed the visit as
necessary to assuage Soviet ensitivities over being
excluded from the disengagement talks, was very
generous throunhout in his praise of Soviet sup-
port for Syria. He characterized the Moscow talks
in general as having consolidated ties of friendship
and cooperation, but he was very bland and non-
committal concerning Soviet warnings against
dealing with "imperialist and reactionary" forces.
In light of Moscow's recent set-back in its
relations with Cairo, Asad may have sensed an
opportunity to obtain generous aid commitments
from the Soviets. Details are not yet available on
the economic, scientific, and cultural agreements
that Asad signed in Moscow, but it seems likely
that they are indeed favorable to the Syrians.
The communique did not mention any
agreement on military aid, but did say that the
two sides had "outlined steps" for the further
strengthening of the Syrian armed forces. It seems
likely that the Soviets will be generous in this area
as well. The communique reiterated an earlier
formula that Syria has the right to use all "effec-
Page 2
tive means" for the liberation of its occupied
lands, but it did not use the Golan fighting as an
occasion for sabre rattling.
Syrian hopes for an early disengagement
agreement seem to have been dampened by the
Israeli cabinet crisis. The Syrian Foreign Ministry
reportedly believes the crisis will delay, if not
prevent altogether, the conclusion of an accord.
Strong suspicions have been aroused in Damascus
that the Israelis are, in fact, deliberately trying to
put off and possibly sabotage negotiations. Presi-
dent Asad, hcwever, is likely to await the out-
come of Secretary Kissinger's current efforts to
bring about an agreement before deciding
whether to increase or relax military tensions on
the Golan Heights.
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Several high-level Syrian Foreign Ministry of-
ficials are said to believe that if Tel Aviv had
really wanted to conclude a disengagement
accord, it would have delayed publication of the
Agranat report and thereby avoided a domestic
crisis at this time. These officials are said to fear
that, if Israeli leaders are unable to put together a
new government quickly, th' disengagement talks
will be postponed until after elections are held,
,probably next fall. In that case, they fear, US
pressure on Tel Aviv to sign an accord will have
lessened because of congressional elections in the
US.
Despite this somber assessment, the Syrian
Government reportedly does not want to touch
off a full-scale war. Syrian leaders are said to have
ordered the recent intensification of the fighting
around Mount Hermon primarily to keep up the
pressure on Tel Aviv to sign a disengagement
accord and for "internal purposes."
Over the weekend of April 13-14, Israeli and
Syrian forces fought their sharpest battles since
the war last October.
The
level of fighting generally decreased early this
week, but on April 17 and 18 Israeli aircraft again
struck at Syrian ground targets in the Mount
Hermon area.
suitably for military operations.
using bulldozers tc build roads on the western
slope where the terrain is less rugged and more
side of Mount Hermon inside Lebanese territory.
The number of Syrian tanks there is not known,
but the Israelis are said to have 40 British-built
Centurions. Both sides are also reported to be
both the
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Vietnam
marked for the central and southern portions of
South Vietnam are sufficient to replace losses and
to maintain most Communist forces for several
months at the low level of fighting that has
characterized the post-cease-fire period. Only
2,000 troops have gone to northern South Viet-
nam, where there has been little fighting, but
Hanoi could quickly augment its forces in this
area. The remainder, more than 22,000 men, were
sent to reinforce combat and logistic units along
the infiltration corridor.
After two days of heavy fighting in the
central highlands, the Communists on April 16
forced government Rangers to withdraw from a
fire support base about 25 miles southwest of
Pleiku City. The South Vietnamese have moved
two regiments from elsewhere in the highlands to
nanoi nas aireaay sent more than /8,000 the area and are maneuvering them into position
I'? ! ~?~~wrti 4yg:4~ la`frx'.J : , yM..: 1# sC >
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the border areas of Binh Duong, Hau Nghia, and
Tay Ninh provinces. A recent shifting of North
Vietnamese main force elements in Military Re-
gion 3 has put the Communists in position to
protect major infiltration corridors leading to Sai-
gon and the delta. Some senior government offi-
cials also see the pressure as an attempt to isolate
Tay Ninh Province.
To counter the Communists, the government
has reinforced its units northwest of Saigon, and
the outlook is for more shay fi htin in this
sector.
In Military Region 3 the governmert's
Ranger base at Tonle Cham on the border of Tay
Ninh and Binh Long provinces finally fell to the
Communists late last week after being under siege
for over a year. The base was the last government
outpost within a major infiltration route north-
west of Saigon. The impact of its loss has been
primarily political, however, as the South Viet-
namese announced on April 16 that they were
indefinitely suspending the Paris talks with the
Viet Cong. They cited the fall of Tonle Cham,
continuing Communist pressure against other gov-
ernment positions northwest of Saigon, and new
attacks in the central highlands as reasons for the
suspension.
As a military retaliation for the fall of Tonle
Cham, the government directed air strikes against
the Communist administration center at Logy Ninh
in southern .South Vietnam and against other
nearby targets. Meanwhile, almost all troops of
the base's former garrison have managed to with-
draw safely to An Loc. The ease with which the
Rangers withdrew supports speculation that the
base commander, in apparent violation of orders,
abandoned the base in return for a Communist
guarantee of safe passage.
Communist pressure in the area northwest of
Saigon is aimed at strengthening their p',sition i;i
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LJ/\
LAOS: THE PA CHET LAO HOLD FORTH
The Lao Communists, wasting little time in
establishing their political and military priorities,
have struck a note of reasonableness within the
new coalition structure. During the inaugural
meeting of the new cabinet, Deputy Prime Minis-
ter and Foreign Minister Phoumi Vongvichit-the
senior Pathet Lao official in the cabinet-empha-
sized that there must be strict coordination be-
tween the cabinet, the advisory political council,
and the Joint Commission to Implement the
Agreement. Phoumi also noted that the Joint
Commission should set up the modalities for the
withdrawal of foreign troops, the dissolution of
"special forces," and the return of refugees. At
the same time, he agreed that the Joint Commis-
sion should investigate cease-fire violations similar
to those that occurred in central Laos on April 7
and 8 when Communist forces captured several
Lao Army positions. On the question of foreign
relations, Phoumi stated that the new government
must define principles governing Lao foreign
policy and foreign aid to Laos.
Phoumi also dwelled on the Pathet Lao's
interests in a frank and highly cordial meeting
with the US ambassador, who assessed Phoumi as
an individual willing to discuss serious matters in
a non-polemical manner. Besides indicating that
the Communists want to maintain good relations
with the US, Phoumi tried play down appre-
hensions of a Pathet Lao take-over in Laos by
stressing that the two sides should work calmly
and amicabl*' toward reconciling their opposing
political viewpoints. Phoumi also stated again that
it was essential for all foreign soldiers to leave
Laos, and he hinted that the Pathet Lao may
request aid for refugee resettlement.
Other Lao Communist members of the new
coalition government have also been working hard
to project an image of cooperation and cordiality.
Minister of Economy and Plans Soth Pethrasy, for
example, has told his subordinates that he has no
plans to make any personnel changes soon be-
cause this would "frighten" the ministry's direc?
tors and rightist elements in Vientiane. In addi-
tion, Soth admitted that he has much to learn
about his new -esponsibilities and that he there-
fore would depend on his secretary of state from
the Vientiane side to organize the ministry. Soth
evidently has some clear ideas about the minis-
try's orientation, however. He complained that
Laos is too dependent or Thai rice and petroleum
products and noted that he would like to see
more imports from socialist countries.
The Lao Communist officials' relatively dis-
arming performance may help to dispel some of
the gloom that has settled over various non-
Communist elements upset by the presence of
large numbers of well-armed Pathet Lao security
forces on the streets of Vientiane and Luang
Prabang. Sume Lac Army officers and rightist
politicians have been concerned over the Com-
munists' high-profile and have complained that
Prime Minister Souvanna has "sold out" to the
Pathet Lao.
INN
Phoumi: Vongvichit
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CAMBODIA
Some Unwelcome Fireworks
The Khmer Communists dampened Buddhist
New Year celebrations in Phnom Penh this week
with their first sustained rocket attacks in over a
month. Fifteen rockets fell on the capital be-
tween April 13 and 15-most of them near the
presidential residence-killing and wounding over
30 civilians. At the same time, a flurry of Com-
munist ground attacks forced government troops
to abandon outposts along Route 5 some ten
miles north of the city and along the Bassac River
just below Phrom Penh Skirmishing continued in
both areas late in the week as Cambodian Army
units tried to retake the lost positions.
In the countryside, the Communists are still
block ding Kampot's outlet to the sea and are
shelling the southwestern coastal city sporad-
ically. Ground prr.,sure has slackened, however,
and government reinforcements are having little
trouble working their way overland from the
coast. The Communists have kept Kampot under
siege for over a mcnth, and they may soon begin
to experience shortages of ammunition and other
supplies. Moreove-, many insurgent units pres-
ently at Kampot jaw action on other fronts ear-
lier in the dry season and may be tiring.
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Some Welcome Attention
Prince Sihanouk, who recently has been tak-
'ng a bark seat to his touring "defense minister,"
Khieu Samphan, began his annual visit to Pyong-
yang late last week. In his major address in North
Korea, Sihanouk acknowledged Samphan's
growing political prominence by describing him as
the "authentic representative of our people."
Although Sihanouk was pessimistic about the
prospects for a Khmer Commurist military vic-
tory this dry season, he again ruled out any nego-
tiations with the Lon Nol government or with any
third force. He did not mention the possibility of
direct talks with Washington-a theme he revived
last month during his visit to Laos. 25X1
Samphan, meanwhile, is touring China's
provinces, evidently killing time while arrange-
ments are being made to expand his foreign itin-
erar .
Samphi n
apparent!, ' believes that the propaganda mileage
from suc, visits outweighs his continued absence
from Cambodia riiirinn +ho dry-season fighting.
Cambodian mortar crew takes a hit
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I I
CHINA: RESTORING THvS OLD
The rehabilitation of veteran civilians who
were ousted during the Cultural Revolution has
long been a sensitive political issue in China. The
struggle between those who favor bringing back
former leaders and those who oppose the idea has
been complicated by the related question of re-
placing military men in top party and government
posts with civilians. It appears to be easier for
feuding central leaders to agree on removing sol-
diers than on whc should rep%ce them, bi:t the
recent appointment of a new provincial leader
demonstrates that progress is being made.
On April 15, e Peking broadcast describing
the c7ening of the Spring Canton Trade Fair
identified Chao Tzu-yang as the new party and
government leader in Kwangtung Province. Chao
headed the Kwangturg party committee prior to
the Cultural Revolution, but was ousted after
attacks by lefti3t Red Guards in 1967.
His tortuous return to power has been typi-
cal of others who have been rehabilitated. Chao's
initial post - Cultural Revolution provincial ap-
pointment was in Inner Mongolia. He then reap-
peared in Kwangtung in April 1972, but was not
named a secretary until January 1973. When the
late-December rotation of military region com-
manders vacated the top Kwangtung party and
government posts, there were several candidates
for the positions, including politburo member
Hsu Shih-yu, the new Canton Military Region
commander. Chao was elevated over two other
Kwangtung secretaries who outranked him.
Chao is the first appointee to a top provin-
cial party post previously held by one of the
rotated regional comrr:anders. The displacement
of provincial military men has inc.eased markedly
in the last few months, and many sol(+.i ;rs are now
targets of critical wall posters. It seems clear that
civilians will fill most of the slots vacated by
military men.
lution, was restored to the Politburo. Teng's ele-
vation apparently took place in the face of sl.rong
opposition, as did his return to public view in
April 1973. Several other high-ranking cadres who
were purged or demoted during the Cultural Rev-
olution have also returned to official favor, but
reports suggest that others who were candidates
for rehabilitation, such as former Central South
Bureau leader Tao Chu, have been successfully
blocked.
The rehabilitation question is clearly part of
the anti-Lin, anti-Confucius campaign, and the
issue appears to have been addressed by both
sides. Depending on the context in which they are
presented, media articles criticizing Confucius for
wishing to "restore t,-~e old" can be read as thinly
veiled attacks on either: pre - Cultural Rev-'? on
civilian officials, such as Teng or Cnao, any ?.ose
who wish to rehabilitate them; or those who wish
to bring back people brought down in the later
stages of the Cultural Revolution, most of whom
were leftists. The trend in favor of the rehabili-
tated veterans is a favorable sign for Premier
Chou, who has led the eff g there back.
I '')r_V-I
The rehabilitation controversy continues to
be hard-fought at both the central and provincial
levels. Last December, Teng Hsiao-ping, the sec-
and highest ranking victim of the Cultural Revo- Chao Tzu-yang
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Taipei last week underscored its tough stand
on the impending China-Japan civil air agreement
and put muscle into its threat to close Taiwan's
airspace to Japanese planes by putting the Na-
tionalist Air Force on alert.
A few days before the alert, Foreign Minister
Shen publicly repeated Taiwan's demand that the
present civil air agreement between Taipei and
Tokyo be maintained. He warned that Taiwan
would give up air links to Japan and refuse per-
mission for Japanese aircraft to enter the Taipei
Flight Information Region and Air Defense Zone
if the Japanese unilaterally altered the existing
agreement ;n order to secure a civil air pact with
Peking.
Premier Chiang Ching-kuo is hoping that by
cooperating on the air issue with the right-wing
Seirankai group of Japan's ruling Liberal Demo-
cratic Party, he can help damage politically Prime
Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira.
Chiang long ago wrote off both men as too pro-
Peking and would prefer a more conservative cabi-
net in Tokyo. Chiang's estimate of the situation
within the party clearly overstates the strength of
Seirankai as well as his own influence on events in
Tokyo.
A by-prc uct of Chiang's course of action
has been an increase in anti-Japanesr feeling on
Taiwan. This atmosphere, which stems from the
Nationalists' sense of grievance against Japan- se
"perfidy," makes eventual comprorrise more
difficult.
The Nationalist Air Force has been in-
structed to he prepared to intercept intruding
Japanese aircraft, but the high command is aware
of the potential of a Taiwan-created air incident.
Orders for an interception would have to come
from the highest level of the government. The
Nationalists apparently are assuming that the
Japanese wilt not attempt to enter Taiwan's iir-
space once Taipei ae.nounces it is closed,
not completely closed the door to negotiation,
nor has he specified the exact conditions that
would trigger a rupture in air service. The points
at issue in retaining air links with Japan have been
reduced to two: the presence of Nationalist air-
line personnel in Japan and the conditions for
maintaining necessary ground and business serv-
ices there for Taiwan's airline; and .Japanese
handling of the name of Taiwan's airline. On the
face of it, both points would appear open to
discussion.
In the present turbulent atmosphere, how-
ever, Taipei may lose sight of the Iona-run neces-
sity of maintaining good political and economic
relations with Japan. It might precipitate a rup-
ture that will embitter Nationalist-Japanese rela-
tions in general, and make future working ar-
rangements more difficult.
Prime Minister Tanaka, for his part, is com-
mitted to an air agreement with Peking and is
unlikely to change course as a result of Taipei's
tough stand. It is now planned to sign the agree-
ment un April 20. Tanaka will then promptly
submit it to the Dict for early ratification, which
seems assured.
Taipei's new tactics have nade it harder for
Tanaka to se,ore rapid approval of an agreement
in the councils of his own party and in the cabi-
net. While there is good evidence that key fac-
tional leaders, notably Finance Minister Fukuda,
have decided against using the issue in an overt
challenge to Tanaka's leadership, the Seirankai
hopes to use the issue to force Ohira's resignation.
The antagonistic Nationalist attitude will,
nonetheless, encourage the ruling party's more
ext ?eme ri_'ht-wing and pro-Taiwan elements to
make sharp attacks on Tanaka and Foreign Minis-
ter Ohira, who has staked his personal prestige on
achieving the agreement with Peking. If the right
wing makes a case that Ohira has failed diplomat-
ically by his inability to preserve air link, with
Taiwan, he may be compelled to assume the
Despite his adamant public stand, which has
aroused misgivings among his advisers, Chiang has
blame and resign.
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Peking may bring charges of espionage
against the Soviet helicopter crew that was cap-
tured in northwestern China last month. The
tria; would heat up the Sino-Soviet polemic. Chi-
nese exploitation of the incident has thus far been
measured, and Moscow's reaction has been mainly
low key.
There have been hints that the Soviets
pressed
Peking to release the crew. Soviet heli-
copters
apparently
overflew Sinkiang in early
April,
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strong anoviet stand is is po politically important in
China at this juncture, however, and there is no
sign the Chinese plan to give up the crew soon.
Rallies in Sinkiang, where the helicopter landed,
have linked the incident with the anti-Confucius,
anti-Lin campaign. Peking also has tied the heli-
copter to an alleged Soviet espionage case last
January, in order to develop a pattern of Soviet
misbehavior regarding China.
Should a trial be held, it is likely that the
Chinese will give heavy publicity to this addi-
tional "indication" of Soviet meddling in Chinese
affairs. There were a number of indications that
Peking contemplated linking important indi-
viduals in China with Soviet espionage even be-
fore the helicopter incident. It is uncertain, how-
ever, whether Peking would jail or repatriate the
crew following a trial.
were the first to publicize the helicopter 25X1
incident in an apparent effort to pre-empt a
massive Chinese publicity campaign. Now they
seem resigned to the prospect of a trial, but intent
on limiting the damage such a trial might have on
the Western-primarily US-appreciation of Sino-
Soviet relations.
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Moscow w-,',t probably he restrained in its
treatment of any trial unless Peking forces its
hand by staging massive public demonstrations.
This would be in line with current efforts to keep
Sino-Soviet affairs in a low key.
YUGOSLAVIA: FINISHING TOUCHES
Tito's program to re-establish the Commu-
nist Party as the country's most powerful unify-
ing force will take a giant step toward completion
at the tenth party congress next month. The
party's authority to make national policy and to
exercise closer institutional control over the rank-
and-file will be sharply increased.
The last touches are now being applied to
the report that will guide party policy fo; the
next four years, and proposed changes in the
party statutes are also under final scrutiny. Much
of this was probably accomplished last week
when party secretary Stane Dolanc, who is chair-
man of the congress' preparatory commission,
and Edvard Kardelj, the country's top ideologist,
held sever-! days of discussions with Tito. Kardelj
subsequently indicated that substantial changes in
the central party machinery are in the works.
One of the key changes would abolish the
largely advisory Permanent Conference and re-
establish a fuii-fledged central committee-which
was dissolved in 1969-as the main repository of
party authority between congresses. In the ab-
sence of a central committee, Tito has sometimes
found the presidium, the party's top policy-
making body, to be insufficiently responsive to
changing poiicy needs. Re-establishment of the
central committee, which will probably have
around 165 members selected from regional
parties and the military, appears mainly intended
to bolster the party's control, stability, and con-
fidence.
There also is a proposal to enlarge the nine-
man executive bureau, which has strongly sup-
ported Tito's plans to recentralize the party. With
increased staffi:ig, the bureau will be in an even
better position to oversee and direct the activities
of the party rank-and-file. In addition, the new
party statutes enhance prospects for increased
party controi by abandoning the efforts, initiated
in 1969, to create autonomous parties in Yugo-
slavia's constituent republics. Regional party
congresses-now almost over-have already re-
organized local party units to dovetail more
closely with the functional subdivisions of the
central party apparatus.
The party remains very tight-lipped on the
subject of personnel "rotation," which normally
accompanies congresses. The key question centers
on Stane Dolanc, the current head of the party's
executive bureau, who by statute cannot succeed
himself. This theoretical obstacle can easily be
circumvented, of course, but the way this prob-
lem is worked out could provide valuable clues to
Tito's wishes r,:garding the still-unsettled question
of party succession.
Tito's reassertion of party dominance and
Sc 'iet-Yugoslav rapprochement have, in fact,
helped to strengthen his pet*ntial successors
against . oth foreign and domestic pressures. Un-
derlying Tito's effc,is is also a strong national
rededication to Yugoslavia's unique form of so-
cialisin and independent foreign policy. This in
itself speaks against any major shifts in the coun-
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USSR: SAKHAROV'S REJOINDER
Academician Andrey Sakharov, in a retort
on April 3 to exiled novelist Aleksandr Solzhenit-
syn, moved away from total confrontation with
the regime. He now supports Soviet detente
policy while still dissenting on the lack of
democratization of the Soviet Union. His new
position provides a badly needed focal point for
reformist forces in Soviet society and finds partial
common ground with the "modernizers" in the
regime itself.
The full text of Sakharov's statement, issued
in response to Solzhenitsyn's September "letter
to the Soviet leaders," is not yet available in
Washington. Excerpts, however, show it to be an
elaboration of the dialogue developinq in dissi-
dent ranks, which differentiates the inward-
looking orthodox nationalists (Solzhenitsyn)
from the outward-looking modernists (Sakharov,
Roy Medvedev, et al). This dialogue reflects the
divergence in Soviet society between the West-
ward-looking modernizers at one end of the spec-
trum, and the conservative, isolationist national-
ists at the other end.
These two strains of thought can also be
found in the different attitudes of Soviet leaders
and in the contradictions of Soviet policy. Thus,
the regime is encouraging Western-style modern-
ization through detente, while trying to maintain
all barriers against democratization. Sakharov
adopted a very dangerous strategy last year when
he divorced himself from all aspects of the re-
gime's policy by arguing against trade with the
West unless it was accompanied by democ-
ratization. Now, in supporting detente-albeit
ultimately for reasons of democ-
ratization-Sakharov moves back closer to official
opinion, z rid his words gain added weight.
Sakharov has provided a strong and balanced
counter-argument to Solzhenitsyn's views on the
future development of Soviet-and, for Solzhenit-
syn, principally Russian-society. While Solzhenit-
syn disdains scientific progress and favors a simple
authoritarian society based on Russian national-
ism and the Russian Orthodox Church, Sakharov
rejects mysticism and overemphasis on id?ology.
He argues in practical terms for :he harnessing of
science to serve arid better the lot of mankind and
Sakliarov
for the expansion of contacts between the Soviet
Union and the West.
SakharGv sees no absolute good in Russian
traditional values, in contrast to Solzhenitsyn's
mystical belief in them, and argues that Soviet
democratic activists should be equally concerned
about the suppression of non-Russian peoples in
the Soviet Union. He takes Solzhenitsyn to task
for his view that an authoritarian system based on
the benevolent patriarchy of the church would be
most suitable and healthy for the country. Sakh-
arov states his belief that only in a democratic
system can national and human character be fully
developed. He sees no insurmountable barriers to
the possibilities for democratic c avelopment,
either in Russian history or in the Russian
character.
Sakharov is particularly hard on Solzhenit-
syn for arguing that Russia needs to pull away
from the evil influence of the West and to develop
itself in "splendid and simple" isolation. He rea-
sons that the world's problems are so immense
that one nation cannot solve them alone. He
mentions a variety of issues, ranging from disarrna-
ment to environmental protection, in which in-
ternational cooperation is essential.
Sakharov makes a strong case, in this re-
spect, for expanded trade, scientific and cultural
exchanges, free travel into and outside the coun-
try, and the free movement of people and ideas
across national boundaries. He relates this to the
development of a more democratic system in the
Soviet Union, and brings in his theory of conver-
c,ence ti argue that both voluntary measures and
outside pressures can act as catalysts for henAfi-
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I I
NIGERIA: SLOW MOTION
With only two years still to go before the
target date it set in 1970 for returning Nigeria to
civilian rule, General Gowon's military govern-
ment has made little headway in laying the
groundwork for a transfer of power. The key to
more rapid progress is the availability in the near
future of census figures, and Gowon's handling of
this politically sensitive matter wily shed light on
how serious the military is about returning to the
barracks.
The preliminary results of the census that
was completed last December have not yet been
released, although in January Gowon promised
the figures would be ready by the end of March.
If the delay is due mainly to tardy processing, the
results probably will be released shortly. If, how-
ever, the figures are in fact available but, as some
suspect, are regarded by key lez;uvrs as unaccept-
able because they are disadvantageous to one or
another of Nigeria's three major ethnic groups,
the delay will continue until a consensus solu-
tion-such as a time-consuming recount-is
thrashed out. Controversy over the results of the
1963 census heightened ethnic tensions and was a
major factor in the political breakdown that pro-
duced two military coups in 1966 and a civil war
a year later.
The census is one part of a nine-point pro-
gram of political and economic changes that
Gowon outlined four years ago for the military' to
accomplish by 1976. So far, Gowon has moved
forward on only two other points: launching a
development plan, and reorganizing the military.
Some of the remaining six tasks can be glossed
over, but three of them-writing a constitution,
establishing national political parties, and holding
elections-must be completed before power can
be transferred. Final census figures are essential to
proceeding with these critical items. Meanwhile,
public debate over the shape of future political
institutions is growing.
It is apparent that Gowon and his colleagues
have not yet decided on what actions they will
take to fulfill their program. The military has
generally insisted that it intends to step aside for
civilians, and some spokesmen have stressed the
need to honor the target date. Others, however,
President Gowon
seem to hedge by emphasizing the importance of
first putting the nine points fully into effect. For
his part, Gowon appears to be striving to get a
major military re-equipment program-including
purchases from both Communist and Western
sources-well under way in advance of 1976.
The regime may soon give closer attention to
the matter of restoring civilian rule. Gowon re-
portedly )ians to hold monthly meetings, starting
in late April, with key senior officers to discuss
outstanding political questions and to float pro-
posals before the civilian Federal Executive Coun-
cil, which performs some cabinet functions.
Many Nigerians suspect Gowon will not
complete his program by 1976 and will use this as
an excuse for delaying a full return to civilian
rule. They speculate that Gowon may mark the
occasion by putting on civilian garb as head of an
interim government of soldiers and civilians,
thereby stretching out the process of transferring
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Lieutenant Colonel Kountche, Niger's armed
forces commander and leader of the coup on
April 15 that ousted President Harnani Diori, has
formed a new government composed entirely of
army officers. Kountche, who heads a 12-man
Provisional Supreme Military Council, has stated
that he is not considering changing Niger's close
relations with France.
Kountche's decision to move against L iori,
who had led the country since it became inde-
pendent in 1960. was probably motivated in large
part by dissatisfaction with the government's in-
ability to overcome impoverished Niger's chronic
economic stagnation. The country's plight has
been compounded in recent years by the serious
drought that has spread throughout mulch of
western Africa. The new regime, however, does
not appear at this time to be any more capable of
coming to grips with Niger's serious economic
problems than was Diori's government.
CHAD r
SUDAN
ZAIRE ` rTnu NOI ,
AN2AM'.,
I ZAM81A
90UTIlr,
noun.. ?ooE9
role.
There is no sign of any internal opposition
to the new regime. A number of student groups,
which had long been critical of Diori's leadership,
have staged marches to demonstrate their support
for the military leaders.
Some of Niger's neighbors in west Africa
may be slow to accept the new regime. Nigeria's
General Gowon and Ivory Coast President Hou-
phouet-Boigny both had close ties with the de-
posed leader.
Widespread unrest continues among the mili-
tary and other groups despite the government's
promise of far-reaching social, economic, and po-
litical reforms. So far, there is no concerted effort
to force out the Endalkatchew cabinet, but the
unrest is straining government administration.
In a policy statement issued on April 8, the
government addressed many of the demands of
dissident groups, particularly the crucial issues of
land reform and corruption. The government pro-
poses to prohibit any one person from holding
more land than he can reasonably be expected to
develop and to abolish public land grants to
people who do not work on the land. New laws
are promised to regulate, on an equitable basis,"
the relationship between tenants and landlords.
These proposals, if carried out, will disrupt
Ethiopia's traditional land-tenure system and ulti-
mately change the fabric of society. The measures
will require the break-up of the estates that have
provided the base of the economic and political
position of the nobles and landlords, who have
been powerful conservative forces. The Coptic
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Church and the imperial family, two of the larger
landowners, probably command enough prestige
to ensure their continuing influence. Abolishinn
public land grants, however, will deny Haile Selas-
sie one of his most valuable methods of rewarding
loyal followers.
Local noblemen and landlords are likely to
use all the influence they can muster to delay and
deflect the reforms. Their anger at what amounts
to a revolution in their relations with the peasants
will probably be matched by the pe,;ants' im-
patience to have their own farms.
The government proposes to deal with cor-
ruption by requiring officials to declare their
property holdings, including land acquired while
in office. Ministers' personal finances will also be
subject to scrutiny. Meanwhile, demands for the
prosecution of officials already charged with cor-
ruption and for the dismissal of additional senior
officials continue to pcse a problem for the gov-
ernment.
The policy statement also provides for re-
forms in government administration, education,
development, wages and prices, and taxes. So far,
however, it has had no perceptible effect on wide-
spread labor unrest. Municipal employees in
Addis Ababa went on strike for several days,
forcing the resignation of the capital's mayor,
whom they accused of corruption. A strike by
railway workers has virtually ended traffic on the
link between Addis Ababa and the Red Sea port
of Djibouti, Ethiopia's life-line for vital exports to
world markets. Customs and Finance Ministry
employees conducted a four-day strike and forced
the removal of three senior ministry officials. Bus
and taxi drivers are also on strike in Addis Ababa;
workers in four provincial capitals have con-
ducted short strikes.
The strikers, encouraged by government con-
cessions to other workers last month, mainly
want higher wages or the redress of other par-
ticular grievances, such as the right to form their
own union or the removal of unpopular admin-
istrators. Few of the groups say they have lost
confidence in the government's willingness to
fulfill promises to improve workers' economic
conditions, They are simply impatient to gain as
many concrete benefits as possible while the gov-
ernment's bargaining position is weak.
Reformist military elements, meanwhile, are
keeping up pressure on the government. Junior
and nor.-commissioned officers of the Tenth
Mechanized Br;.;;ade, thn army's most prestigious
unit, took over the city of Jijiga in eastern Ethi-
opia for four days Iasi. week. They arrested several
senior officers and some customs officials for
alleged corruption. The troops returned to their
barracks after the government reportedly prom-
ised to curb rising grain prices. A few days earlier,
troops of the Third Division succeeded in forcing
the removal of the deputy chief of staff of the
Ethiopian Aimy. Police units in several areas,
having grievances similar to those of the soldiers,
also registered their complaints by jailing their
officers until their demands were met.
Haile Selassie stated on April 14 that his
21-year-old grandson, Tara Yacob, was in the line
of succession, which n- ay take some of the heat
out of at least one potentially divisive issue. It
reduces the chances of a struggle-and possible
civil strife-among other claimants who might
have stepped forward if Haile Selassie became
incapacitated and Crown Prince Asfa Wossen were
unable to assume the emperor's duties. Asfa
Wossen suffered a stroke a little over a year ago,
and cabinet officials and military leaders doubt if
he could perform effectively. The added legiti-
macy given Zara Yacob's position has set the
stage for Asfa Wossen to be eased completely out
of the line of succession on the grounds of pcor
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25X1
The first phase of the UN's General Assem-
bly on raw materials and development, which
opened on April 9, will end on April 23 after the
last addresses to plenary meetings of the assem-
bly. The second, working phase, however, has
already begun with the establishment earlier this
week o', an open-ended, ad hoc committee and a
working group to review drafts of a declaration of
principles and an action program prepared by the
nonal;gned and developing states. These states,
under Algerian leadership, have been the driving
force behind the UN session. Work in both the ad
hoc committee and its working group has been
slow, and there is some doubt that the committee
will complete its work by April 29 when the
special session is expected to adjourn.
The paragraph-hy-paragraph examination of
the draft declaration has revealed several difficult
issues, the most contentious being "permanent
soverei,- ty over natural resources." This call for
the right of states to nationalize their natural
resources and be the sole judges of compensation,
which has been a central theme of the developing
states' program, is opposed by the developed
states. To date, most differences in negotiating
the declaration have occurred between the devel-
oped states--including the USSR-and the devel-
oping states-to which China claims membership.
This split is reflected even on those points of the
declaration on which some progress has been
made:
? improving terms of trade for developing
states;
? reform of the international monetary
system to favor developing states; and
? granting developing states preferential
access for their goods to the markets of devel-
oped states without reciprocal preferences for
the developed states.
Real differences, however, also exist among
the developing states. The poor oil-importing
states have been the most adversely affected by
the increase in oil prices and have looked to the
oil producers for relief. The solidarity of the
nonaligned and deve'iopitig group could well de-
pend on resolution (f this issue. As many as ten
different proposals have ;peen made-ranging from
multi-tier oil pricing to oi' right grants and low-
interest, long-term lowrs from oil earnir:;s re-
cycled through the Inter,iational M,iiietary
Fund-but few commitments have been received
on funding. The oil-importing states, perhaps still
hopeful of receiving direct bilalar,~! aid from Arab
oil producers if multilateral aid is not forth-
coming, have generally refrained from sharp criti-
cism of the oil producers. Many of their speeches
have noted the example set for suppliers of oth.;r
raw materials by the oil producers with their
embargo and price increase. They could, however,
still break the ranks of the nonaligned and de-
veloping group if they see no support coming
from their more fortunate brethren.
While the proposal of the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries to establish an aid
fund has not caught fire, support may be in-
creasing for an internationally administered aid
program to be financed, in part, by excess Arab
oil revenues. The managing director of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund expressed qualified opti-
mism about this approach after his recent tour of
several Arab states, including Saudi Arabia.
The UN session itself will clearly riot resolve
the very peal conflicts of interest inherent in trade
in raw materials and its relation to the larger and
longer term question of economic development.
The generally restrained tone of the session and
the raising of several proposals for global ap-
proaches to the development problem may never-
theless serve as a springboard for future examina-
tion of specific issues in forums more suited to
the particular problem.
Moreover, although the nonaligned - devel-
oping country group commands enough votes in
the UN to force a resolution endorsing its pro-
gram, the possibility of a confrontation is miti-
gated somewhat by awareness that the industrial-
ized states might retaliate by withholding aid to
the least developed of the poor countries.
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The complex political and economic cross-
currents were, of course, reflected in the -- creches
to thEl session. Algerian President Bou, ~diene,
who called for the UN meeting last Januar /, set a
more business-like tone for the session than many
observers had expected. While he avoided iii;1am-
matory and provocative rhetoric, Bou-nediene
nevertheless was uncompromising in his call frr a
new world economic order and his condemnation
of existing economic disparities between develop-
ing and developed states.
Soviet Foreit_~, Minister Gromyko expressed
solidarity with the developing states and rejected
attempts 4.o polarize the world into camps of rich
and poor countries-where the socialist states
would be lumped together with the 'est's devel-
oped economies. Chinese Vice , iemier Teng
Hsiao-ping, on the other hand, called for the third
world to overthrow super power control and
viciously attacked the Soviet Union as being an
especially exploitative, neo-colonialist plunderer.
Secretary Kissinger's speech was generally
well received, with most countries expressing sat-
isfaction with his call for recognition of world-
wide interdependence and endorsing the US pro-
posals for liberalized trade, sharing of food-pro-
ducing technology, and increased aid for the
poorest developing states. Iran, however, criti-
cized the speech as a "gross mis.?epresentation" of
the causes of high oil prices, repeating Tehran's
standard argument that the main reasons for high
retail prices are excessive oil company profits and
high taxes levied by consumer countries. Tehran
alleged that the Secretary was calling for con-
sumer nations to band together to prevent further
action by producer cartels-an idea Iran labeled a
INTERNATIONAL MONEY
Central bankers are increasingly uneasy
about international money market prospects. A': a
closed meeting last week in Basel, centrai bank
governors expressed concern that growing politi-
cal and economic uncertainties in Italy and
France will lead to massive speculative move-
ments of capital from these countries. Such out-
flows, the governors believe, would complicate
the market's task of recycling surplus oil-producer
revenue to consuming countries.
Bank of Italy officals were optimistic that
capital outflows from their country can be con-
trolled, but this view was not shared by the other
bankers. Administrative measures aimed at curb-
ing these outflows have not be'n effective in the
past. In addition, the central bankers feel that
Rome will have to end its costly defense of the
lira, even though a decline in its value probably
would provoke further speculative outflows of
funds.
The Bank of Italy has used the proceeds of
recent massive Eurodollar loans to support the
lira. Market intervention in the first quarter cost
about $3 billion, or twice the present foreign-
exchange reserves. Because indebtladness now ex-
ceeds $10 billion, Italy will find further borrow-
ing more difficult and expensive.
The franc is much stronger than the lira
because of France's relatively healthier balance of
payments, but it is weaker than the mark and
vulnerable to speculative capital movements. The
central bankers apparen-ily believe that fears of an
election victory by Socialist candidate Francois
Mitterrand could lead to sizable capital move-
ments ,rom France. Similar fears during the last
presidential election intensified market pressure
on the franc.
25X1
Investors already are seeking safer havens for
their funds, and large capital outflows to London
and Switzerland have been reported. If the trend
continues, Paris will have only two major options:
to accept a weaker franc, at least until after the
election; or to intervene in the foreign-exch_ age
market, which would further deplete France's for-
eign-exchange reserves.
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COLOMBIA TO ELECT A PRESIDENT
Colombia's first authentic presidential elec-
tion in 24 years will take place on April 21, with
Liberal Party candidate Alfonso Lopez Michelsen,
a slightly left-of-(enter reformer, the overwhelm-
ing favorite. The new president will be inaugu-
rated on August 7,
For the past 16 years, Colombian politics
have been dominated by the National Front, an
artificial coalition of Liberal and Conservative
parties that is now ertiing. It was established as a
means of assuring political peace after th D ouster
of dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in 1957. The last
presidential election before Rojas' take-over was
in 1950.
Lopez' principal opponent is Alvaro Gomez
Hurtado, a moderate Conservative whose efforts
to divorce himself from the image of his extremist
father, the monumentally unpopular president
who was deposed by Rojas, have been unsuccess-
ful. Gomez is likely to win about 35 percent of
the vote, to Lopez' 45 - 50 percent.
Also in the running is Maria Eugenia Rojas
de Moreno, Rcjas' daughter and hopeful recipient
of the populist vote among the millions of poor
who once supported her father and the party he
founded, The National Popular Alliance
(ANAPO). Changing times, the advanced age and
ill health of her father, the slow but sure collapse
of ANAPO, and resistance to the idea of voting
for a woman have conspired against Mrs.
Moreno's political ambitions. She is not likely to
receive more than 12 or 13 percent of the vote.
Two minor candidates can be expected to share
less than 6 percent.
The campaigning candidates have empha-
sized economic issues, in general refraining from
personal attacks. Lopez has assailed the inflation,
food shortages, and budget deficits that have
plagued tthe incumbent Conservative adminis-
tration of President Pastrara. Gomez has been
vague and defensive, championing generalized
economic develo?)ment. Mrs. Moreno has pro-
moted herself as an alternative to the Liberal-
Conservative establishment and has appealed to
the lower classes with a promise of "Colombian
socialism."
Scattered acts of violence have marred the
campaign, but this has come as no surprise in a
country which experienced open political warfare
between Liberals and Conservatives during the
1940s and early 1950s. President Pastrana, whose
assiduous aloofness from the campaign has out-
raged some of his Conservative colleagues, can be
expected to control this s oradi electoral vio-
lence. 25x1
BRAZIL: RESTLESS STUDENTS
Student unrest has led to large demonstra-
tions and other forms of political activity, which,
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if they continue or intensify, could lead the
administration to reinstitute repressive measures
against the dissidents.
For some time, University of Sao Paulo stu-
dernts have been dissatisfied with a number of
administrative policies at the school. The latest
outLreak, however, was sparked by the arrest of
some 30 of their colleagues suspected of trying to
organize a subversive student movement. Security
officials charge that some of those arrested have
links with outlawed revolutionary groups.
Another cause of the increased student ac-
tivism may have been the arrest of seven Sao
Paulo union leaders whose activities had aroused
government suspicions, The seven were accused of
being subversives, or at least of being under the
influence of alleged subversive elements within a
church-connected social organization working
with them.
The university students have organized a
"Committee for the Defense of Political Pris-
oners," whose purpose is to aid those detained by
the government. The committee also calls for
freedom of assembly and speech, and other forms
of liberalization. Other student groups are seeking
the support of workers, churchmen, and opposi-
tion politicians in their quest for a variety of
political aims.
Throughout the ten-year history of the mili-
tiiry regime, significant opposition-to the extent
that there has been any-has come from students,
liberal clergy, and some labor groups. The admin-
istration is undoubtedly concerned that these
groups may have misinterpreted its intentik i to
seek a limited easing of politicai controls and are
taking liberties. That possibility is likely to give
weight to the argument of security officials that
firm action is needed now to prevent the spread
25X1
PERON AND THE TERRORISTS
The shooting and kidnaping of a USIS repre-
sentative in Cordoba by Marxist terrorists
apparent;,, signals a shift in tactics to include
atf-?icks on US Government officials in Argentina.
The Peron government, viewing the accelerating
tempo of violence with a mounting sense of
alarm, is urgently seeking a dramatic break-
through in its campaign to stamp out terrorism.
As the level of confrontation edges r:p a notch,
however, a fresh wave of violence seems in-
evitable.
The ubiquitous terrorists have been un-
daunted by the government's proclaimed in-
tention to crack down on them. The best organ-
ized of the groups, the Marxist People's Revolu-
tionary Army, has shown little inclination to let
up its pressure, and its hand is evident in many of
the bombings, kidnapings, and political assassina-
tions that have become a part of everyday life in
the country. The Marxist group, which has now
targeted members of the US mission in Argentina,
was probably responsible for recent telephone
threats afgairist military officers assigned to the US
Eml?assy in Buenos Air^s. Although these terror-
ists are not likely to eschew attacks against for-
eign businessmen, their change of focus is prob-
ably attributable to the swelling exodus of alien
executives and the staggering success of their ear-
lier ransom and extortion efforts.
By taking a new tack, the Marxist gr'iup may
hope to obtain additional publicity fc r its an-
nounced aim of attacking "imperia;lsm." More-
over, abductions of US officials cov?ld be used in
attempts to force the release of imprisoned terror-
ists or to create a further source of embarrass-
ment for the Peron government. 25X1
By generating an
atmosphere of political confusion and uncer-
tainty, the left-wing extremists hope to ft;,., the
groundwork for chaos after Peron's death. The
reasoning appears to be that if civil war can be
provoked, the left might have a chance to rise to
power. While this prospect seems remote, the
Marxist group nevertheless has shown a remark-
able ability to operate virtually unchecked.
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Meanwhile, Peron is atternptiroy to inject
now blood into the government's counterterrorist
program and is urging more aggressive action.
Another shuffle was made in the federal police
hierarchy after it became clear that the President
was dissatisfied with its failure to produce results.
Ironically, these frequent command changes, to-
gether with internal dissension and poor morale,
seem to be contributing to police ineffectiveness.
As a result, a drarnatic victory against the ex-
tremists continues to elude the security forces.
While Feron is taking steps to eliminate extremist
influence from government ministries dnd the
universities, there are still no signs that he will be
able to reverse the tide of terrorism in the near
future.
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