WEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000020003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 23, 2009
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 18, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Weekly Review
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COPY NO
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State Dept. review completed.
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The WEEKLY REVIEW, issued every Friday morning by the
Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes signif.
(rant developments of the week through noon on Thurtsday.
It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared
by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic
Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.
Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and there-
fore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the
contents.
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
CONTENTS (January 18, 1974)
5 USSR: Solzhenitsyn; Brezhnev to Cuba r25X1
Equipment Purchases
7 Communist Propagandists Meet
8 Yugoslavia: University Defiance
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
14
Vietnam: Tot; Amending the
Constitution
15
Cambodia: Military Balance Sheet
16
Thailand: Student Protests
19
Tunisia-Libya: Merger Collapse!.
1
P
t
f
I
2
or
uguese A
rica:
nsurgents
22
Turkey: Finally a Government
23
Chile: Making Haste Slowly
23
Guatemala: Election Prospects
24
Venezuela: Oil and Nationalization
24
Argentina: Labor Problems Brewing
25
Brazil: Geisel Elected
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THE MIDDLE EAST
In Egypt
Throughout Secretary Kissinger's week of
negotiations, the Cairo press has sounded an
optimistic note about prospects for a satisfactory
disengagement agreement. The agreement an-
nounced on January 17 will now allow the re-
sumption of domestic and diplomatic activity
that had been held in abeyance while the ex-
tended negotiations proceeded. President Sadat,
for instance, has apparently been awaiting the
conclusion of this round of negotiations before
moving aliead with an impending cabinet reorgan-
ization, and Foreign Minister Fahmi has had to
postpone a trip to Moscow originally scheduled to
begin last weekend.
Sadat may now also visit several neighboring
states in an effort to bring other Arab leaders up
to date on the status of negotiations and, more
importantly, to coordinate the next round with
Syria. Press sources have indicated that Syria,
Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait will be on Sadat's
itinerary, and President Bourguiba has told the
US Embassy that Tunisia will be included as well.
In Syria
Syria threatened to sever diplomatic rela-
tions with Cairo on Thursday after the announce-
ment of the Israeli-Egyptian disengagement agree-
ment, according to a press report from Damascus.
If the report is true, it indicates President Asad
was pulled up short by hard-liners in the military
and Baath partywho strongly oppose negotiations
with Israel.
Asad's own position may have been seriously
weakened by this turn of events. Only a few days
ago, the Syrian President seemed ready to enter
negotiations. Asad was said to have told a special
conclave of Syrian political party leaders that
Syria would attend the Geneva conference. To
underscore the decision, he reportedly named the
delegation and said he intended to reshuffle the
cabinet. Most prominent among those who had
been rumored for replacement was Foreign Min-
ister Khaddam, a hard-liner who reportedly had
threatened to resign rather than represent Syria at
the peace talks.
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As Egypt and Israel this week pursued a
breakthrough on the disengagement problem, and
Israelis halt supply convoys to the Third Army, because of cease-fire violations
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cease-fire violations continued on both fronts. On
one occasion, sporadic firing on the Golan
Heights escalated into an artillery duel in which
one Israeli soldier was killed. The Israelis also at
least once shelled fedayeen positions inside
Lebanon.
On the Suez front, UN observers reported
violations along the entire length of the canal.
Limited tank and artillery exchanges were re-
ported in both the northern and central sectors.
In response to Egyptian cease-fire violations,
Israeli troops halted several of the daily supply
convoys to Suez and the encircled Egyptian Third
Army. Defense Minister Dayan had publicly
warned on January 14 that Israel might stop the
convoys if the cease-fire violations continued.
Israel has suffered over 150 casualties in the fight-
ing on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts since the
October cease-fire went into effect.
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Algerian Troops to Leave
Algeria may have contributed as many :-,s
four squadrons of interceptors and gruund-attack
aircraft to Egypt and one fighter squadron to
Syria. Some of these aircraft were sent prior to
the October war, and others arrived during the
conflict. At least one Algerian fighter squadron
also was moved to Libya to supplement Libyan
air defenses.
The decision to withdraw them apparently
stems from President Boumediene's desire not to
have Algerian military units at the front during a
prolonged period of negotiation. Boumediene
recognizes that Algeria will have little influence
on the Arab-Israeli talks. He also is annoyed that
he was not consulted by Egypt or Syria on plans
to start the war or to agree to a cease-fire. More-
over, he probably believes that Algerian efforts to
gain the support of nonaligned nations for Arab
demands is now more important than keephig
forces at the front.
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MORE ATTACKS ON SOLZHENITSYN
The official campaign against dissident
author Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn gained impetus
last week. The central press finally took up the
cudgels against him, more than two weeks after
the publication in Paris of Gulag .1 rehipe/ago,
On January 13, franca became the first
major newspaper to weigh in, printing a lengthy
signed article attacking Solzhenitsyn as a
"slanderer." Later in the week, I.itemtuinava
f;rr_rrcr, the juurnal of the Writer's Union, which
expelled Solzhenitsyn in 19G9, featured a similar
major attack. These charges were echoed by other
newspapers and the broadcast media.
Perhaps in an effort to counter the widely
heard Western radio broadcasts, which have given
heavy coverage to Solzhenitsyn and his latest
book, the Soviet campaign focused on charges
likely to arouse domestic sentiment against him.
He was accused of harboring pro-Nazi and pro-
collaborationist views, of denigrating the wartime
sacrifices of the Soviet people, of "consciously"
aiding the enemies of detente, and of harboring a
"pathological hatred" of all things Soviet.
Despite the increasing venom of the attacks,
the Soviets have yet to take, or even threaten,
direct action against Solzhenitsyn. There have
been no specific indications that he will be held
criminally liable, under the provisions of the new
Soviet copyright legislation, even though he has
been accused of sending his books out of the
country illegally.
i\Ieksaudr Solzhenitsyn curl l'runily
The Soviets probably are restrained from
taking any such action by fear that a trial or
imprisonment of the prestigious author could
have an adverse impact on detente. The media
have indirectly hinted as much, and a Pm 'dlu
deputy editor made the point openly in a conver-
sation with US Embassy officers last week.
Moscow probably sees the best solution to
its dilemma in Solzhonitsyn's departure into for-
eign exile. This was the view of the Pm mile deputy
editor, who claimed that Solzhenitsyn would
soon lose his political significance once out of the
Soviet Union. Another Soviet official publicly
asserted that Solzhenitsyn need not fear being
held back if he were to try to settle abroad.
Solzhenitsyn, however, may not cooperate.
He has adamantly refused to leave the USSR for
any reason. The Soviet authorities might never-
theicas attempt to induce him to do so by covert
threats and intimidation, perhaps directed against
his wife and children. According to Western press
reports, Solzhenitsyn's wife has already received
innumerable calls from an indignant "public."
Solzhenitsyn is not permitted the right of per-
manent residence with his family in Moscow, a
fact that might amplify his fea:s for their
safety.
General Secretary Brezhnev will soon arrive
in Havana on his first visit. Plans for the visit were
announced not long after Lrezhnev returned from
the US last summer, a ,ign that lie saw the trip as
a way to demonstrate that l' is not neglecting his
Communist allies.
The occasion will call for some revolutionary
rhetoric, but Brezhnev's private comments to the
Cubans will probably focus on the benefits of
peaceful coexistence. This will not sit well with
Castro, who sees dangers for his regime in Soviet-
US detente.
Despite the generally good state of its rela-
tions with the USSR, Havana is not enthusiastic
about Moscow's pursuit of detente with the US.
The Cuban leader continues to believe lie cannot
afford to case his own anti-US stance. Castro still
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Equipment for the chemical industry ac-
counted for two thirds of the increase from 1972
to 1973. Orders for metallurgical and consumer
goods equipment also rose steeply. Much of the
automotive equipment (second in total value) will
be installed in the giant Kama truck plant. Since
most equipment imports are connected with
major plans for capital expansion, deliveries will
stretch out over several years.
To finance the machinery and equipment,
the USSR has insisted on long-term credits at low
interest rates, guaranteed by Western govern-
ments. Italy extended a $600-million line of
credit early in 1973 and France $350 million in
July. By the end of 1973, the US Export-Import
Bank had given preliminary or final approval for
loans totaling more than $300 million. An equal
amount is to be loaned by private US banks.
Several major projects remain in the discus-
sion stage, including another truck plant, several
chemical plants, appliance factories, tire plants,
and a commercial aircraft plant. Moscow's pur-
chases of foreign ~?quipment thus will continue at
Soviet Machinery and Equipment Orders, by Type
Million US $
Type
1972
197:'3
Chemical
250
875
Motor vehicle manufacturing
285
485
Metallurgy and metalworking
55
330
Consumer goods manufacturing
10
190
f etroleuni refining and pipeline
220
160
Timber and wood processing
110
135
Ships and marine
110
95
Electronics
50
50
Textiles
45
35
Food processing
15
J
Mining and : onstnretion
110
5
Ollie;
320
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points to the "threat" of US aggression in order
to mobilize Cubans in support of regime policies,
and he has used the economic "blockade" to
explain away many of his failures.
Despite this, Brezhnev may take the line that
Cuba would profit from a less intransigent atti-
tude toward the US. The JSSR, which still under-
writes the Cuban economy to the tune of more
than $1 million a day, would benefit from any
shift in Cuban political attitudes that brought an
improvement in the island's economic position.
Brezhnev, however, is not likely to press this
point so strongly as to alienate the Cuban leader.
The Soviets will be eager to obtain Castro's
support for another world communist conference.
Preparations are already under way for a series of
regional meetings of Communist parties, and
there are reports that representatives of several
Latin American parties will meet in Havana dur-
ing Brezhnev's visit.
Economic and military aid will certainly be
discussed during Brezhnev's visit. Moscow's
extensive use of Cuban military facilities could
give Castro leverage in seeking more Soviet arms,
but there has been no sign yet that major new
agreements will be made.
The USSR ordered a record $2.5 billion
worth of machinery and equipment from the
West in 1973-60 percent more than in 1972.
This level of orders in the face of an all-time high
currency deficit reflected the strength of Soviet
demand for advanced Western equipment as well
as Moscow's better access to new sources of
credit-notably in the US.
US firms received orders for $435 million
worth of machinery and equipment, excluding
several large orders awarded to US subsidiaries in
Europe. Italian sales increased the most, thanks to
a $500-million contract for chemical plants. West
Germany and France remained close competitors
with the US for Soviet business, while Japan,
Sweden, and the UK lagged well behind.
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COMMUNIST PROPAGANDISTS MEET
Moscow used the meeting of party propagan-
dists in Prague last week to take another step
toward convening a world "onference of Commu-
nist parties. The Kremlin's interest in seizing the
propaganda initiative is shown by the effort it put
forth to persuade representatives of 67 Commu-
nist Gnd workers' parties-minus Yugoslavia and
the ruling Asian parties-to come to Prague as
well as by the fact that the meeting closely fol-
lows last month's session of top ideologists in
Moscow.
Soviet speakers, as is often the case, left it to
their loyal allies to call for another world confer-
ence and to criticize the Chinese party. Soviet
party secretary Ponomarev, the highest ranking
delegate at the meeting, limited himself to assert-
ing that he "struggle" for detente and the "crisis
of capitalism"-which he claimed has been made
much more acute by the economic and social
dislocations arising from the energy crisis-create
new opportunities to propagandize "real" social-
ism.
These remarks echo Brezhnev's recent em-
phasis on countering the influence of Western
ideas on the Soviet and East European peoples.
Ponomarev, who is responsible for relations with
non-ruling Communist and workers' parties, ex-
horted the delegates to join in the effort. He
lauded the Moscow conference of Communist
parties in 1969, but he only hinted that another
world meeting would be appropriate by alleging
an increasing interest in multilateral meetings of
Communist parties and by citing a need for closer
coordination of policies.
By contrast, Czechoslovak party secretary
Vasil Bilak, a hide-bound conservative, pointedly
called on the delegates to prepare for a future
meeting. H call, the first by any member of the
Czechoslovak hierarchy, is the third such sum-
mons to come out of an East European party in
recent weeks. The Hungarian and Bulgarian party
chiefs urged a similar course last month.
Wenceslas Square in Prague
Bilak's speech further differed from Pono-
marev's in its harsh condemnation of Peking, the
strongest such declaration recently heard from
Eastern Europe. Bilak claimed that "the oIti a-
leftist Maoist leadership has departed for good
from Marxist-Leninist positions and stands on an
anti-Soviet and anti-socialist platform."
The communique summarizing the Prague
talks failed, however, to mention either a future
world meeting or the problem posed by Peking.
Omission of these contentious points probably
reflects Moscow's desire to avoid antagonizing
some parties. Romanian participants, either alone
or together with other conferees, almost certainly
opposed any reference to China in the com ,-
nique.
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YUGOSLAVIA: UNIVERSITY DEFIANCE
The Yugoslav leadership is moving to rein in assigning all students to military training camps
Belgrade University professors, who are among for three weeks each year; previously students in
the few remaining outspoken critics of regime higher education were issued blanket defer-
policies. If mishandled, however, the party's de- ment.
termined effort to tighten control over the aca-
demic community could heighten unrest at the
universities.
The issue at hand is Tito's two-year-old de-
mand for the firing of ultra-liberal professors at
Belgrade University. Previous party efforts to oust
the professors resulted in a stalemate, as the
university has a tradition of autonomy and the
Serb party has been reluctant to use its muscle on
campus. At the end of 1973, however, the federal
party prodded local officials to begin an all-out
drive to purge eight liberal philosophy professors.
The local party is now on the verge of
ousting the professors, but preparations for the
purge have generated unrest among some stu-
dents, whose displeasure cannot be taken lightly.
In 1968, for example, student riots seriously
embarrassed the regime, and any recurrence this
year would be particularly damaging in view of
scheduled national elections and a party congress.
As in 1968, economic difficulties coupled with
the party's heavy-handed tactics could anger and
unify the students.
According to the US Consulate in Zagreb,
the Belgrade affair is threatening to spread to
students in the Croat capital. On January 9, stu-
dents at Zagreb University expressed their sup-
port for the eight Belgrade professors. Zagreb
authorities called for a show of police strength
that apparently succeeded in cowing the students.
Later in the week, party officials at the city's
university charged the dissident students with
links to nationalists whose extremism in 1971
brought on wholesale purges of popular Croat
leaders.
Students all over the country began a
month-long semester break this week, thereby
reducing the likelihood of disturbances in the
near future. When they return to school, however,
the students may have a new cause for dissatisfac-
tion. The regime this week announced a plan for
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EC Council meetings in Brussels this week
focused on discussion of attitudes toward the oil
users' conference in Washingtor next month. The
topic played role in the political consultations
of the Nine in Bonn on January 10-11 as well.
The council agreed that Commission Presi-
dent Ortoli and West German Foreign Minister
Scheel, in his role as council president, would
represent the community at the conference. The
member countries, with the possible exception of
France, will also send representatives. Foreign
Minister Jobert said Paris still had reservations; he
may be seeking to enhance French bargaining
strength in the negotiations prior to the next
council consideration of a common EC energy
position on February 4-5.
Paris is concerned that the Washington con-
ference will confer too important a role on the
US and also lead to a climate of opinion that
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would be unfavorable to the bilateral deals now
being worked out between France-as well as
other consumer states-and the Arab producers.
In constantly warning that the energy action
group could set the consumer countries against
the producers, Paris hopes to gain as much credit
as possible with the latter. The French want to
move international energy consultations into the
OECD-or even the UN-as quickly as possible
and to limit such talks to long-term goals.
In Bonn, the EC political directors had al-
ready agreed that President Nixon's invit?tion was
an important and major initiative. The Nine also
discussed the community's own future relation-
ship with the Arab countries. In the wake of a
political settlement in the area, the Nine foresee
possible aid and cooperative arrangements, as well
as a role :r, guaranteeing the peace.
In Brussels, the council spent long hours
discussing the amount and allocation of a fund
for the development of poor regions in the com-
munity, but agreement remained elusive. At the
earlier Bonr meeting, Paris had made clear that it
objected to the West German proposal, which
would reduce the over-all amount involved, cut
the French share of the payout sharply, and in-
crease the percentage of the fund going to the
three poorest EC countries-Italy, Ireland, and
the UK.
At a parallel meeting of the EC Council of
Agricultural Ministers on January 14-15, the
French demanded-and staged a minor "walkout"
when they were voted down-an immediate EC
price hike for beef and an embargo on beef im-
ports in order to help French producers. The West
Germans had suggested before the meeting that
France's refusal to go along with their proposal
for regional aid would cau'e the council to delay
action that the French wanted in the agricultural
area.
Consultations among the Nine are becoming
wider in scope, both at council meetings and
within the political framework. The meetings alto
promise to be increasingly frequent, although the
lack of a secretariat will hamper the effectiveness
of political consultations.
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It is almost certain that the long-postponed
national referendum to cancel the divorce law will
be held this spring. If no way is found to avoid
the referendum, the accompanying political cam-
paign could destroy the fragile unity of Prime
Minister Rumor's center-left coalition, polarize
political parties, and reverse the "soft" opposition
policy followed for the last six months by the
powerful Communist Party.
The issue has been a contentious one since
1970, when a Socialist-sponsored bill legalizing
divorce was pushed through parliament over the
strong opposition of Italy's largest party, the
Christian Democrats, and the bitter protests of
the Catholic Church. The next year, however,
anti-divorce groups collected enough signatures to
schedule a national referendum on the bill. Poli-
ticians on both sides of the question are unen-
thusiastic about the referendum, and most have
welcomed various postponements that have put
off the vote. The la.t ;hance of avoiding the issue
was ended late last year when the Constitutional
Court upheld the law, thus keeping the referen-
dum on the docket.
Many political leaders fear that the referen-
Jum will force the governing parties into public
battle over an issue that has little bearing on the
country's pressing economic and social problams.
Debate over how to handle the referendum has
already shattered the show of unity that has char-
acterized relations among the parties since Rumor
took office last summer. In recent days, the So-
cialists sharply attacked the Christian Democrats
for their rejection of a Socialist proposal that
would have canceled the referendum by nego-
tiating a substantial change in the law.
By refusing to compromise on the divorce
issue, the Christian Democrats are pitting them-
selves against all three of their coalition partners.
They will also find themselves in the uncom-
fortable position of being on the same side of the
issue as the Neo-Fascists. The Communists and
Socialists will seize on this aspect of the campaign
to transform it into an anti-fascist crusade.
The Neo-Fascists are the only ones eager for
the contest, primarily because it will return there
to the spotlight and allow Them to pose as de-
fenders of the church at a time when their move-
ment appears to be losing momentum.
The Communist Party fears that it will lose
more than it will gain from a divisive battle over
the divorce question. Since the revival of the
center-left coalition formula last July, the Com-
munists have followed a policy carefully tailored
to demonstrate that the country's problems can-
not be solved without their help. Most Italians
realize, for example, that the Communists have
used their influence with organized labor to aid
the government's economic recovery program.
A key elemert of recent Communist strategy
has been to emphasize the goals they share with
Italy's governing parties. They have gone so far as
to propose a "historic compromise" between
their party and the political establishment-as
clear a pitch as the party has ever made to par-
ticipate in the national government. At the same
time, the party has stepped up its efforts to
improve relations with the Catholic Church. The
divorce referendum would reverse these initiatives
by dividing the parties along left-right lines and
accentuating the distance that remains between
the Cowmunists and their major opponents.
Although a portion of the Christian Demo-
cratic rank-and-file is opposed to the referendum,
the party leadership claimed this week that "only
a miracle" could avert the confrontation. A sharp
and sudden deterioration of the economic situ-
ation is one circumstance that could compel the
parties to iron out their differences or at least
wage a more subdued campaign.
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The Year of the Tiger begins next week and
it may tome in like a lamb. Both Communist and
government furces have been placed on alert for
the three-day Tot holiday that begins on January
23. but thee are few signs of significant militar
There are some low-level reports of Commu?
nist plans for major action at TeL but this prob.
abiy it*.fit'cli only an eftoft to eris+}io Comba
readiness. Most of the evidence points to a holi?
day marred only by the usual rash of mino.
incidents--local commanders taking advantage of
a tactical sit ration or actions by enemy units that
never got the official word to stand down.
After Tot. the pace of military action will
probably pick up. COSVN guidelines for 1974
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call for a "strategic raid campaign" to expand
territory. Immediately after Tet, however, the
action may amount to 'iothing more than
co;:iitering South Vietnamese operations and
keeping up Communist pressure in areas whr!o
the fighting has beets heavy for months.
This week's action in Pleiku Provincq is
typical oi the sort that may well continue. (early
!n the waek, elements of the South Vietnamese
22nd Division recaptured Piai Djereng, the bonier
outpost overrun by the North Vietnamese late
la! t SAptember. Communist resistance was light at
first, but heavy fighting is now going on over
Cot'ttrgl of bail) the outpost arid the liiijliw.ay
Fading to it.
The Cor,.munisls also attacked mn Konl urn
Province during the week, probably in an effort
to draw off government troops from western
Pleiku, Local units in Pleikt have also begun
cutting key highways in t:ie province inter.
mittenily.
Amending The Constitution
P.e*:ient Thieu is moving ahead with a series
of co'tstitutional amendments designed to
strengtl en the presidency. The National Assam'
Illy is now considering three: one puU off any
popular election of province chiefs unt'! after Ilia
current presidential term: another changes the
method of selecting Supreme Court justices, and
the third permits him to run for a third term in
1 15. 1fis supporters believe they have the neces,
sary votes and expect al; rhtee amendments to be
approved on January 19,
1hieu reportedly had I! At planned to move
until late this year, but lie apparently fehls he is in
a strung enough potition to go ahead now. lie
may b-linve this is a good 'time to act because any
oppos!b! -)n maneuvering is likely to be over-
chaaovtd by the tot holiday, He may also tear
that if military and ecc:nomic conditions tleterio?
rate later in the year, it would lessen his ability to
push the changes through,
Thief, remains concerned about a posoible
adverse reaction in the US, Partly to head off
critvcism from this ouratter, he is moving to help
at$ opposition party meet stiff re jistration re
quirements, The party, the Social Democratic
Alliance, was gr en provisional status for one year
last March, L. has been hampered by serious
internal rivalry, and there were signs that it might
CAMBODIA: MILITARY BALANCC SHEET
P'ghting centered in the Phnom Pcnh -tea
again this weak, The Cambodian Army's
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counterattack northwest of the capital's airport
faltered in the face of stiff resistance, despite
cuncentratjbd government artillery and air strike .
Khmer Communist troops still hold several vil.
lages within five miles of the airport; Army and
insurgent troops fought to a standoff on Route !i
just above the government oil storage facility five
miles north of Phnom Penh.
Cambodian Army commanders are preparing
for renewrtd Communist action and have sent in
additional unit . Over 5,000 government troops,
blacked by artillery and armor, are now in place.
With mostly all of the army's general reserve force
tied down either northwest or southwest of
Phnom Penh, however. army commanders will be
hard pressed to come up with additional rain-
forcaments if they are needed.
The Communist dry season campaign, which
is only in its sixth week. has produced mixed
results elsewhere, The insurgents have maintained
control over sections of Routes 4 and 5. They
have not made a serious effort to interdict vital
Mekong resupply convoys, however, and have
allowed Phrrom Penh to build up its reserves of
rice and military POL supplies, Aside from
putting pressure on ilia southern provincial cap-
ital of Takeo. the Communists have yet to launch
any strong attacks on major government strong-
holds in the countryside. As long as they con-
centrate on the Phnon. Penh region, the Commu-
nists probably will be unable to mount any of.
fensives against such important cities as Battam-
bang and Kompong Cham.
The Communists' performance thus far in
the dry season indicates that, among other things.
they have not yet been able to offset fully last
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year's heavy losses of experienced personnel,
Nevertheless, the Communists still appear deter-
mined to intensify militniy pressure on Phnorn
THAILAND: STUDENT PROTI,`STS CONTINUE
Lvents of the past week indicate anew that
the student protest movement wl'I remain a fea.
lure of Thai politics for tha foreseeable future,
'the arrival of Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka in
Bangkok on January 9 prompted over 10,000
students to demonstrate against Japanese eco-
nomic "imperialism." The student activists also
used the occasion to criticize the US. claiming the
recent CIA incident to be an example of US
interference in Thai domestic affairs, Some 3,000
students broke away from the main body of
demonstrators to stage an orderly protest in front
of the US Lmbassy.
The students disbanded after being assurer
that their views would be heard by Prime Minister
Sanya, but they are continuing to demand that
the government issue a formal protest to the US.
Anti-US feelings are not confined to Bangkok, In
the provincial capital of Udorn, the site of a
major US air base, some 500 students marched on
the US Consulate to demand the shutdown of all
US Bases in Thailand.
Student activists have long harbored anti-US
sentiments, but until iast week, their preoccupa-
tion with domestic affairs had kept these feelings
from surfacing, Unless the government now
makes some gesture to mollify the students, the
honeymoon may be over.
Army chief Krit Sivara and Prime Minister
Sanya have privately ekpifi:~d concern uvvr the
instability caused by the student demonstrators,
and Krit has said he is ready to use his troops if
the King and the Prime Minister ask hin* to do so.
Unless the demonstrations escalate well beyond
current levels, however, the government will prob.
ably confine itself to public hints of possible
military intervention and hope that this will keep
the students off the streets.
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CHINA: A NEW OLD FACE AT THE TOP
Until lie was topplc-d in 1966. Iotrner party
secretary gr.neral Teng Hsiao?pinq was one of the
most powerful men in China, His return last April
made him the highest ranking official to be to-
,-habilitated since the Cultural Revolution. but he
was given only the limited duties of a vice pre-
mier. At the party congresF last August. long was
named to the party's Central committee. but he
v as riot to hiiy po;illburo position, 'J001 is
step had the potential for dissension. and leaders
i:_,-% --s Mao and Chou probably gave higher prior-
ity to moves aimed at reducing the power of
entrenched regional military commanders.
post-Mao leadership,
Meng, who is in his ;.f'ventirs, is toughly the
sime age as the test of China's aging leaders, fie
and Chou Ln.lai were rivals for power in the past.
but it is likely that thr?y are now essentially in
agreement on policy matters. Chou i, anxious to
get China on the road to nioderni;ation before
Mao's, and his own. demise, tie ti "d,, the help of
a nian like T eng, who i; known for his ability to
get things done, Teng, for his part. owes his
political life to Mao and Chou. and he is likely to
be an important asset to the premier once Mao is
gong, Although Teng's elevation does not alter
the SUCCession picture over the long term. he is
likely to play an important role in the immediate
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TUNI ;IA.LIlIYA: Mr-14 Ell COLLAPSES
it-ni;ian Pt. irtenl Itiutguiha and Libyan
t're;ident (aadhafi announced a surpri;o merger
agtc font is;t weokpnd, but by January It.),
luni; was bar k-pe(laling tat)irlly. Utgpd by hi;
arlvi;or;, irtt.ludrftg Prima Mini;ter Nouita, 13o t=
guiha ha; set pto?cr'nditirn1; that prw.Iudo itnplo'
menI'll ion of tile aqtPelopill ill flip
fututo.
lloutguiba, Ionq a ;uppotlot of /''tab unity,
obviously had not tht,ughl through) tile mptopt
;robes he ;ignr=d flip agteemont with (?arlllafi at a
meeting ill Tunisia, tlourguiha was evidently
;vray'd by (?a(ihafi and by his own foreign mini;=
t't, Mohamed Mastnouili, who has long pushed
fit closer tie; vvi! i Libya. Uuutguiba was ex-
ttomely fitecl whin ho met Qadhafi, a condition
that in flip pa;t ha; ;hottr:notf I outguiba's span of
attention and rtladp hittn tnotp susceptible to sug?
g0;tioll from those around hire. Moteovet, ihtee
key advi;ct; Ili; wife, ;on. and the Prime Mini;,
tat, all of whore would have adviserl against the
rnptrjpr ? fete absent "', lien flip agreetllent was
cirft)cn(l
()orn he had little tot ;4'cond thought; and
con;ullation; vorilh Nouita and othets, (Jourguiba
rnovr(I (fuickI to -.holy' the union. He replacer)
I.Ia,oloudi will) hi; cabinet ditectot and moved
hi; fit;l collcitl an(1 Sit I loyal minister to the
;.rn;+tivo post of dofon;o minister. In rapid Vic.
coc;iur,, flip rnorgnr rpfn?endutn was {tia;t;:i)nett
pmndinq t(-vision of tuni;ia's cootiltilion. file
merger was publicly chatacferi,rerf a; only a
(IpcIatation of ptincipln, and the govevnrnent an.
fountor.f that Tunisia will never unite with Libya
a; fonrJ a; Motocco or Algeria opposes such a
union,
Anticipating adverse reaction to the ro er;al
both at home and '. r.n Libya. the Tunisian Gov.
l:.. . ;Multi; ??. i?, .-:ut:ty ?"o :sure;
throughout the country and has closed the border
with Libya despite protests from Tripoli. On Jan?
ua-y 15. local police broke up a rally at Tunis
University that had anti?I3outguiba overtones. The
students and young professionals believe a rnerger
would offer new job opportunities and a greater
role for Tunisia in Arab affairs. By contrast,
tniddlo r1 J;; Tuni;ian; and probably rho military
rtisttii;t (JarlhL,c and thotpfore oppose the ;inion.
tlotitquiha'; handling of the union affair will
weak on his prestige in Tltni;ia and acc.eletate po-
litical ttlatpuveting by ptesitlentiat hopeful;
around Thin. Ihi; behind-!he-scene; activity will
be increasingly important a; preparation; (.oil,
Untie lot the ninth roogre;; of the ruling Des-
tou-ian socialist Patty next CJctohet, which is to
be followpd by national plection; in November.
Tunisia's effort; to back out of the union
have not drawl an official reaction from ttipoli.
1-or the moment, 1'ro;ident Qadhafi apparently is
trying to mininlile hi; political emhart, meal by
porrnit1inq only low-key pte;; coverage of the
union. According to one media account. Libya
will proceed with a nationwide referendum on
Januaty 18-,'; originally ;r_hedulerl--despite
tunisia'c announcprnent that its teletendutot ha;
been po;tpune(l indotinitely,
Till 1-1 ;\7 I IN pair t 11''11J r-\V
(I it V liftM'F 1Yr.'siltl F ,tl Is!~ ,1I IM"Ill
r11,1
rPV lt',VIS itl'is/lt)'t,\'UI:Utr,\'s7it:11 (
I'i1rr%,I'1111 11 r-\' i 1,\'!`:1111' 1. Irr
(if ci lNl Ntrlll)1 h' ts'liii I t
1
The srlen p (torn Lihya reflect; the thlr+mma
now facing Qa(ihafi. the Libyan leader had orig.
ir.,111:y
restore hi; prettige, which was badly Jatna(tnrf by
the collapse of the Libyan'Lrlyptian union last
Seplemtact. 1 he fia;co surrounding his overture to
Tunisia has instearl only increased hr; r;olation
from the Arab mainstream and t'ndetscored hi;
reputation a; a di;tuplive maverick.
This failure, coupled with the exceedingly
bad press Qadhafi has received as a result of his
t Nl~~ f:L3:i to the Gcne .'r talk; ands ii:; ;?~S j.j, ~.:
for Arab terrorists. will have a strong personal
impact on the Libyan leader, possibly leading to
another round of resignation threats. At this
point, however. Qadhafi apparently intends to
accept Tunisia's rebuff passively while he struq?
gtes to regain his footing
25X1
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P. yc 21
tucivpw tail link;, including recent attack; on tail
line; into Malawi and Nhnde;ia that heretofore
!tail bee;l left untouched.
In contrast, the level of ul;utgpncy in Angola
ha; been (hint;cule_ for more than a year, Heber
force; based in Zambia have been ineffectual bp-
cati of ;ariou; internal frictions that have vir?
Wally patalyzer! their military operation;. A rival
m;rlrgrht gto;Jll based in Zaire also ha; had in=
tetrlal di;pule;, but Ila; tteen held together largely
by faire President Mobiitu'; Support and occa?
signal intervention, At the wine little, however.
Mobutu has been re;training file group'; military
operations into Angola because of his dppendence
on Portuguew- facilities to Iran;part Lair%an
copper.
Blatt:I, I tot(J.'S MAV It 1-11; MANAGE '!r)
I. r:RI;,1.s1: I'/tl .s,tit 711: f r,V T'NI I I I I (:t.1,.SI:. I11'I` I'Itr-11:4I1L1' Vi)'I'
1 ,( ) I'I I RI. ITI ,N 'i IRIr1I'SI>%' I.I'SItfA'S
I"M 'UP I'Itl Sl:fit li Is 'i r R 1( 1:4,
The Arab oil tfmbaoj., i; further com-
plicating Lisbon's problems in Africa, where
much non-esst-ntial military travel has had to be
curtailed. A broad upsutge in guerrilla activity
could seriously strain Portuguese stocks. This has
led Lisbon to fear an insurgent strike against the
Angolan exclave of Cabinda. vhich accounts for a
large share of Portugal's petroleum produc-
tion.
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f'ortuyua;e Africa
CIiTTCfl f'ISOSPECTS FOR INSURGENTS
flip ('ottlrque;e are gtowiriq unea;, over
what 1914 will bring in the long-;t~'-Ina ted in?
;urgencies in their throe African tcttitorie;. I r
fact, rebel force; play well n+anage to increase
ptes;ore on the t'