CHINA: DENG'S POLITICAL SYSTEM-AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 13, 2009
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

Intelligence
China: Deng's
Political System
An Uncertain Future
A Research Paper
Secret
EA 84-10086X
April 1984
Copy 2 4 5
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Intelligence
China: Deng's
Political System
An Uncertain Future
China Division, OEA,
This paper was prepared by I of the
Office of East Asian Analysis. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Secret
EA 84-10086X
April 1984
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secret
Overview
Information available
as of 10 April 1984
was used in this report.
China: Deng's
Political System-
An Uncertain Future
Deng Xiaoping sees the question of succession as not simply a matter of
men but of institutions and policies as well. Reform of the political
system-the structure of power and the policy process-has preoccupied
Deng since his return to power.
Deng wants to prevent the emergence of another Mao Zedong and a
repetition of the Cultural Revolution. A more important objective is to
modernize China's political system to meet the needs of economic modern-
ization. Deng's ultimate goal is to provide steady, predictable rule through
a professional bureaucracy.
We believe that, despite major obstacles and setbacks, Deng and his allies
have made some progress toward their political reform goals:
? China's leadership has become more collective.
? Factional struggle has diminished.
? The policy process has become more professional.
? There has been some improvement in the quality of the bureaucracy.
But important aspects of China's political system have not changed:
? It remains highly centralized and authoritarian.
? The Chinese Communist Party continues to monopolize power.
? Power remains vested more in individuals than in institutions.
? The bureaucracy continues to work poorly, especially at provincial and
local levels.
In his efforts to reform China's political system, Deng has:
? Attempted to institutionalize collective leadership.
? Re-created the party Secretariat to play the central role in policymaking.
? Sought to rejuvenate and professionalize the leadership.
? Advocated a rational division of labor between the party, the govern-
ment, and the economic sector.
? Promoted (for a time) a greater degree of "democracy" and freedom in
China.
Because of strong opposition, the process of reform has been slow, erratic,
and subject to frequent compromise.
iii Secret
EA 84-10086X
April 1984
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A key to the future will be the balance between innovators and reformers
and more conservative elements in China's leadership. China could develop
into a highly centralized and orthodox bureaucratic state along the lines of
the Soviet Union. China could also become a more pluralistic, although
still highly controlled, society combining Marxist, Chinese, and even
Western traditions. A third possibility, in our view the most likely, is a
muddled outcome, in which authoritarian politics coexist uneasily with
more liberal, decentralized economic policies.
A darker course is possible, especially if Deng were to die soon. Should the
successor leadership turn out to be weak, a conservative military-civilian
coalition might then take over and lead a backlash against many of the re-
forms promoted by Deng over the past few years.
Addressing the 12th Party Congress in September 1982, Deng disclosed a
new awareness of the long time it takes for successful political reform in
China. It will now take at least until the end of this century, Deng
admitted, to achieve his ambitious reform goals. We agree. Even under the
best of circumstances, the task of modernizing China's political system will
be slow, protracted, arduous, and uncertain.
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The New Constitutions
Decisionmaking
Reestablishing the Secretariat
A New Power Structure
Policymaking
Grappling With Retirement
A New Role for the Party?
"Democratization"
8
The Plan
8
One Year Later
9
Reform at Provincial and Local Levels
9
10
Alternative Paths
10
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China: Deng's
Political System-
An Uncertain Future
If we wait any longer before perfecting our socialist
system, people will ask, "How come the socialist
system cannot solve those problems which the capi-
talist system can?"
Deng Xiaoping
18 August 1980
To Deng Xiaoping, the question of succession is not
simply a matter of men but of institutions and policies
as well. Reform of the political system-the structure
of power and the policy process-has preoccupied
Deng since his return to power.
Deng's reforms are intended to restore the faith of the
Chinese people in "socialism," a faith badly shaken by
Mao Zedong's despotic rule and the chaos of the
Cultural Revolution. When Mao died in 1976, his
political legacy was a Communist party split into
warring factions, a bureaucracy in shambles, and a
cynical and disillusioned population. Reforming Chi-
na's political institutions to prevent the emergence of
another Mao and the repetition of another Cultural
Revolution is a major objective of Deng's program. F_
A second important objective is reform of the political
system to meet the needs of modernization. Since his
return to power in December 1978, Deng has insisted
that administrative reform-establishing a rational,
efficient bureaucracy characterized by functional spe-
cialization, clear lines of authority, formal rules, and
officials selected for competence-is essential for
China's economic modernization. Paralleling adminis-
trative reform, Deng has called for a fundamental
restructuring of China's economic system featuring
decentralization of decisionmaking and increased reli-
ance on market forces to increase efficiency and
productivity.
Setting forth ambitious goals is one thing, however,
and their achievement, another. Political reform has a
long history of failure, in both pre- and postrevolu-
tionary China. Already, there has been a significant
reduction in the pace and scope of Deng's political
Deng Xiaoping-
China's paramount leader
Overconcentration of power in Mao's political system
resulted in extreme dictatorship and the disastrous
policy errors of the Great Leap Forward and the
Cultural Revolution. Overconcentration of power in
one individual, Deng has acknowledged, is deeply
rooted in Chinese culture. It has also been reinforced
by the Leninist political system China inherited from
the Soviet Union. To prevent this from happening
again, Deng Xiaoping has attempted to institutional-
ize collective leadership as a key element in his reform
program.
The New Constitutions
Deng has relied heavily on the promulgation of new
party and state constitutions to institutionalize collec-
tive leadership in China. Reliance on constitutions to
bring about change, however, has never worked in
China. There have been nine constitutions (party and
state) since 1949 and none has basically altered the
way China is ruled.
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General Secretary Hu Yaobang-Deng's chosen
successor
To help prevent the reemergence of another Mao, the
new party constitution adopted in September 1982
abolishes the post of party chairman and forbids any
form of personality cult. It stipulates further that no
party leader is allowed to make decisions on major
issues on his own, or place himself above the party
organization.
To broaden the base of authority, the new constitution
mandates that the party's General Secretary (Hu
Yaobang's new title) be joined on the Politburo
Standing Committee by three other top party office-
holders: the Chairman of the Military Commission of
the Central Committee, the First Secretary of the
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, and
the Chairman of the Central Advisory Commission.
Although it is not required by the constitution, the
state Premier also sits on this committee; thus, all
major institutions of power-the party, the govern-
ment, and the military-are now represented on the
highest decisionmaking organ in China, the Politburo
Standing Committee.
Another institutional check on the power of the party
leader appears in the new state constitution (approved
December 1982) that establishes the State Central
Military Commission. This state organ is tasked with
"directing the armed forces," and its creation removes
the party leader from direct command over China's
military forces. The Army has received assurances,
moreover, that all future chairmen of the party's
Military Commission will be selected on the basis of
military experience.
official guidance has also specified that the
posts of Chairman of the Party Military Commission,
Party General Secretary, and Premier hereafter will
be filled by different individuals
Decisionmaking
The new party constitution, together with authorita-
tive Deng pronouncements, spells out, moreover, how
party committees are supposed to make policy. All
major issues are to be discussed and decided collec-
tively. In decisionmaking, one person will have one
vote and the principle of the minority submitting to
the majority will be strictly enforced. Once a decision
has been made, it will be obeyed unconditionally and
enforced vigorously in accordance with the principle
of democratic centralism.
Collective leadership will also be encouraged by mak-
ing the meetings of the Politburo and its Standing
Committee regular and routine. All offices of Politbu-
ro members, are
to be located in one building to facilitate quick
response to calls for meetings. In addition, the agenda
of Politburo meetings is to be more formal, with fixed
calendar dates to discuss specific issues. Politburo
Standing Committee meetings reportedly are now
held weekly to avoid bureaucratic logjams.
But all of this falls far short, we believe, of institution-
alizing genuine collective leadership in China. Al-
though information on the decisionmaking process
remains vague, available evidence does indicate that
power remains vested in individuals rather than insti-
tutions. A strong party leader, such as Deng Xiao-
ping, can still impose his authority and can sidestep
official party and state structures and intrude wherev-
er he wishes. Most major decisions (for example, the
decisions to launch the recent anticrime and spiritual
pollution campaigns) are still made by a very small
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group of elderly party leaders in the Politburo Stand-
ing Committee. Despite all the talk about democracy
and majority rule, China appears still firmly caught in
the chains of Leninism, which depends on the boot of
a strong man-Deng for now-to resolve conflict. F-
Reestablishing the Secretariat
Deng Xiaoping's most important party reform was his
first-reestablishing the Secretariat in February
1980. As outlined in major speeches by Deng, Chen
Yun, and other top leaders at the time, re-creating the
Secretariat was intended to bring about a major
change in the institutional power structure of post-
Mao China.
A New Power Structure. The intent was to shift power
in both the making and the execution of policy from
the Politburo to the Secretariat. In a metaphor he
would repeat many times, Deng asserted that the
Politburo and its Standing Committee would now
retreat to the second line (where it would concern
itself with major policy issues) and the Secretariat
would advance to the frontline (where it would handle
the day-to-day work of the party). Deng stressed that
the Secretariat would "handle everything ... the
voluminous everyday work affecting the party, the
government, the armed forces, the civilian population,
the educational institutions, the workers, the peasants,
the traders, the scholars, and the soldiers." As in the
Soviet Union, the Secretariat would serve as the nerve
center of China's political system.
Another major purpose of this reform was to transfer
power from the first generation of revolutionary lead-
ers on the Politburo to their younger, more profession-
al successors on the Secretariat. In contrast with the
membership of the Politburo (some of whom are
unsympathetic to Deng's reforms), the Secretariat is
staffed by energetic, competent, and enthusiastic sup-
porters of Deng's modernization program. The ulti-
mate objective of political reform, as Deng pointed
out at that time, is to put in place a successor
generation of pragmatic leaders with specialized
knowledge and expertise capable of directing China's
modernization.
Policymaking. Acting under the supervision of top
party leaders (principally Deng Xiaoping and General
Secretary Hu Yaobang), the Secretariat now plays the
central role in the drafting of policy (see figure 1).
Assisting in the formulation of policy are several
research institutes attached to the Secretariat, most
notably the Policy Research Office, the Foreign Poli-
cy Research Group, and the Rural Policy Research 25X1
for discussion and final decision.
Center. Closely associated with these party organs are
two nonparty bodies-the Chinese Academy of Social
Science and the Chinese Academy of Sciences-
containing China's most prestigious intellectuals,
whom the Secretariat tasks when special expertise is
required in the drafting of policy. Once major policy
documents have been drafted, they are submitted to
the Politburo Standing Committee-in. exceptional
cases to a full or expanded plenum of the Politburo-
After decisions are made, the Secretariat plays a
leading role in supervising the implementation of
policy. Acting with a broad mandate from the Polit-
buro, the concentrated attention of individual secre-
taries on specific areas of responsibility, and the
ability to bring organizational pressure! to bear on
officials, the Secretariat is uniquely equipped to get
results in a cumbersome bureaucratic system that
threatens to undermine China's modernization
program.
Composed of specialists with strong reform creden-
tials and close ties with Deng Xiaoping and Hu
Yaobang, the Secretariat has succeeded, we believe,
in restoring a more professional, empirically based
policymaking process in China. But making policy is
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one thing and carrying it out is another. Although the
Secretariat has had some success in prodding local
leaders into compliance, a number of China's prov-
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resist Deng's policies. How to get China's massive
party and state bureaucracy-which is full of old,
poorly educated people who are resistant to change-
to carry out Deng's reform program is a question that,
we think, has defied solution.
Grappling With Retirement
Deng has indicated in numerous speeches that an
issue high on his agenda is how to persuade China's
elderly party leaders to retire in favor of younger,
more competent successors. The problem with the
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Figure 1
Chinese Communist Party Organizations
National Party
Congress
Central
Advisory
Commission
Central
Committee Military
Commission
Central Discipline General Political
Inspection Department
Commission
Politburo Secretariat Policy Research
Office
Policy Recommendation
StandingCommittee Members
Members Policy Direction Alternate Members
Alternate Members
Foreign Policy
Research
Group
Central Policy Provincial and Rural Policy
Organizations Local Party Research
Organizations Center
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first generation of revolutionary leaders, according to
Deng, is that these leaders lack the energy, the
knowledge, and the experience needed to modernize
China.
Originally, Deng had planned to rejuvenate the party
leadership in two ways. The first way, disclosed in
early drafts of the new party constitution, was to
prescribe age and tenure limits for membership in the
central, provincial, and local committees of the party.
The second way, also appearing in the constitution,
was to establish advisory committees at all levels of
the party to which elderly party officials, having
resigned their frontline leadership posts, could retire
with dignity to provide counsel and advice to their
successors.
When the new party constitution was adopted at the
12th Party Congress in September 1982, however, all
the provisions limiting the age and tenure of party
officials had been dropped. Alluding with surprising
candor to the struggle over the retirement issue,
Politburo member Hu Qiaomu (the principal drafter
of the new constitution) stated in an interview after
the party congress that "after repeated deliberations
in the course of revising the party constitution ... it
was finally decided that no definite restrictions would
be set on the tenure of office for leading cadres."F-
Another discordant note at the 12th Congress was the
refusal of party elders in China's top leadership to
retire to the Central Advisory Commission. Making a
mockery of Deng's vaunted youth program, the new
Politburo elected at the Congress was in fact older
than its predecessor. By no longer talking about his
own retirement, the 79-year-old Deng Xiaoping fur-
ther undermines this program.
Deng's plan to change the generational guard in the
upper echelons of the party has, we think, failed. We
believe that Deng underestimated the tenacity with
which China's older officials would hold on to the
power, prestige, and perks that go with high office in
China. We think, moreover, that Deng has now been
forced to compromise on the retirement issue and to
recognize that the problem of China's elderly cadres
will now take perhaps five to 10 years longer to
resolve than he had originally estimated.
A New Role for the Party?
A prime cause of China's past failures, according to
Deng in a key speech in August 1980, was overcon-
centration of power in the Communist Party. Under
Maoist rule, the party monopolized and intervened in
everything. In order to prevent a repetition of the
Cultural Revolution, it was necessary to inject checks
and balances into China's political system. And in
order to modernize, it was essential to establish a
rational division of labor between the party, the
government, and the economic sector.
As spelled out by Deng's heir apparent, Hu Yaobang,
at the 12th Party Congress, the party in its new role is
supposed to focus on making policy and leave imple-
mentation to skilled professionals in the government
and economic sector. The party will continue to serve
as ideological watchdog and make all decisions con-
cerning the selection, allocation, supervision, and eval-
uation of officials in China. But because the party is
not an administrative or production organization, it
should merely guide and supervise administrative
leaders and economic managers in the exercise of
their functions and powers and refrain from trying to
take over.
There is no evidence this theoretical division of labor
has worked in practice and we doubt it will. There is
abundant evidence that the party still makes all major
policy decisions concerning government and economic
work. In exercising leadership over administration
and production, party officials continue to work close-
ly with government and economic officials, who in
nearly all cases are party members. All party mem-
bers working in government organizations, economic
enterprises, and institutions still have to submit to
party leadership and carry out party policies. With
the party authorized to make policy, provide leader-
ship, stay in close touch, and manage the personnel in
government and production, we think there is little
doubt that it will continue to dominate the political
system and run things in China.
Indeed, the political system outlined by Deng Xiao-
ping and Hu Yaobang strongly resembles the pre-
Cultural Revolution system in China (see figure 2).
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Figure 2
Flow of Political Power in China
Controls
Nominally elects
Politburo
Standing
Committee
National Peoples
Congress Standing
Committee
Party State
Secretariat Council
Central National Peoples
Committee Congress
Provincial Provincial
Party Peoples
Committee Congress
County/City County/City
Party Peoples
Committee Congress
Township/Village Township/Village
Party Peoples
Committee Congress
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Based on the Leninist Soviet model, the party under
this system is all powerful. There are no limits to
party authority, no real separation of powers, and no
checks and balances. The party has units inside every
organization in society, and party power pervades all
phases of life.
Caught within this system, China's reformist party
leaders face a fundamentally insoluble dilemma: how
to restrain the exercise of power while continuing to
monopolize it. reli-
ance on constitutions and laws to limit party power
(for example, the provision in the new State Constitu-
tion that the Communist Party must uphold and obey
the constitution has been greeted with derision by
party cadres In a system
that continues to concentrate power in the hands of a
few leaders and stresses obedience to their decisions,
there is understandably a widespread perception that
laws are immaterial and constitutions irrelevant in
'China.
"Democratization"
Another of Deng Xiaoping's political reforms has
been a short-lived experiment with "democracy."
Mao's harsh dictatorship, culminating in the Cultural
Revolution left the Chinese people in a state of shock.
Confronted by an alienated population, Deng felt it
necessary to allow a greater degree of "democracy"
and freedom in order to restore the confidence of the
people in Chinese Communist rule and in "socialism."
A major purpose of Deng's democratization program
was therapeutic, an attempt to reassure both Chinese
and foreigners that there would be no repetition of the
Cultural Revolution. To prevent the abuse of power
and safeguard civil rights, Deng promised to revitalize
and strengthen the legal system-in effect, to estab-
lish a rule of law in China. The problem was, as Deng
admitted in a major Politburo speech in August 1980,
that up to now the concept of a legal system has been
weak in China, the customary practice being to
regard the words of powerful leaders as law.
A second purpose of Deng's proposal to expand
"democracy" and freedom of expression was to stimu-
late enthusiasm, initiative, and creativity in solving
the many new problems encountered in China's mod-
ernization. Still another was to provide a means of
monitoring, criticizing, and bringing pressure to bear
on Deng's opponents at all levels of the party bureau-
cracy. Although epitomized by the "democracy wall"
movement, there were other Dengist democratic re-
forms during the high tide of reform in 1979 and
1980: the popular election of delegates to county-level
people's congresses; the election of workers' congress-
es in factories; greater freedom for China's intellectu-
als in literature and art; and, for a time, even
authorization for disgruntled groups to openly petition
state and party officials for redress of grievances.F_
Instead of engendering popular support for the new
Dengist regime, however, young Chinese activists
used their newfound freedom to launch an attack on
the party leadership and on the fundamentals of
"socialism." Confronted with worker strikes, student
protests, and growing social ferment, China's leaders
became concerned that what was happening in Po-
land-the ruled challenging their rulers-might also
happen in China. Fearing loss of control, Deng con-
ceded in an important speech in December 1980 that
there had been too much democracy and freedom
during the preceding two years and emphasized the
need to uphold four basic principles-"socialism," the
leadership of the party, Marxism-Leninism-Mao
Zedong Thought, and the dictatorship of the proletar-
iat-to restore order in China.
More recently, Deng has presided over a political and
cultural crackdown-the spiritual pollution cam-
paign-that has frightened China's intellectuals. Al-
though the campaign was called off early this year,
the concern for ideological conformity and social
control that triggered it has not abated. The concur-
rent crackdown on crime, in which (according to
varying estimates) perhaps 5,000 were executed, many
without trial, has further undermined confidence in
the party's commitment to the rule of law. Because
these crackdowns have taken place while Deng Xiao-
ping continues to dominate the leadership, China's
political system will remain, we believe, highly cen-
tralized and authoritarian.
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The ultimate goal of Deng Xiaoping's political reform
program is to establish a system of steady, predictable
rule through a professional bureaucracy. Deng is
convinced that political modernization under party
auspices must accompany any real progress toward
economic modernization.
After 30 years of Maoist rule, China's bureaucracy is
(in Deng's own words) "leftist, swollen, ill educated,
old, and irresponsible." Deng's most frequent com-
plaint is that of "irresponsible bureaucratism"-a
bureaucratic system in which "people just read docu-
ments ... nobody takes charge ... decisions which
can be made very easily are deferred for half a year, a
year, or are never made ... efficiency is very low ...
the people are very unhappy." Cowed by the violence
of the Cultural Revolution and whipsawed by fre-
quent changes in policy, China's officials now routine-
ly defer decisions to their superiors and take refuge in
inactivity.
An even more fundamental obstacle to reform, how-
ever, is the centuries-old Chinese bureaucratic prac-
tice of getting things done through "personal rela-
tions" (guanxi) rather than through institutions. Even
under the advantageous conditions of peace, national
unity, and foreign assistance that obtained in the
1950s, the Chinese Communists proved unable to
escape the personalistic pattern of authority and
factional behavior-which the Chinese term "feu-
dal"-that have long characterized China's political
life.
Recognizing the enormous scope of the task, Deng in
January 1982 called for a bureaucratic "revolution"
in China. Starting with reform at the top, to be
followed by the readjustment of leadership organs at
intermediate and lower levels, Deng proposed to re-
duce the size of the government bureaucracy by a
fourth within two years. Some 5 million officials, most
of them veteran cadres, would be affected. Only in
this way, Deng asserted, would it be possible to
promote younger, professionally competent cadres to
positions of authority and get the effective leadership
needed for China's modernization.
Premier Zhao Ziyang-China's leading
economic reformer
Reform at the Top
In March 1982, Premier Zhao Ziyang disclosed
Deng's plan for reforming the central government
bureaucracy. As indicated in Zhao's report, the pro-
gram is intended to remedy the defects in structure,
personnel, and workstyle responsible for the "intoler-
able inefficiency" of China's bureaucracy.
The Plan. To correct defects in organization, Zhao
called for a drastic streamlining of the central
bureaucracy:
? Reducing the number of ministries, commissions,
and bureaus under the State Council by roughly
one-half.
? Cutting personnel within the central government by
one-third-some 200,000 positions.
? Allowing no more than two to four vice premiers,
two to four vice ministers per ministry, and one or
two deputy chiefs per department.
In personnel reform, Zhao issued guidelines designed
to rejuvenate and professionalize China's central
leadership:
? Imposing an age limit of 65 for ministers and 60 for
vice ministers and department chiefs.
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February
July
Percent
1982
1983
Change
State commissions
13
8
-38
Vice premiers
13
4
-69
Ministers and vice ministers
505
200
-60
Average age of ministers
and vice ministers
64
60
-6
Share of ministers and vice
ministers with a college
education (percent)
37
41
+4
? Stipulating that officeholders in the reconstructed
bureaucracy must be qualified both politically and
professionally (that is, both red and expert).
To effect a change in workstyle, Zhao called for the
establishment of a responsibility system in China's
government administration as perhaps the central
feature of his bureaucratic reform package. To do
away with the endless delays and squabbling charac-
teristic of China's top bureaucracy, Zhao directed
each ministry, commission, and department to delin-
eate clearly lines of authority and responsibility,
including delegation of power to lower levels to expe-
dite decisionmaking. The program appeared to get off
to a smooth start, and in November 1982 Premier
Zhao announced that "the basic restructuring" of
China's national bureaucracy was complete (see
table).
One Year Later. Although the government table of
organization has been redrawn and personnel have
been cut somewhat, Deng's ambitious program to
reform China's central bureaucracy is in trouble
Veteran officials who monopolize the top
leadership posts are still refusing to appoint younger,
better educated, professional cadres to positions of
authority. Lines of authority have not been drawn,
systems of responsibility and accountability have not
been established, and the power to make decisions has
not been decentralized. The problem of irresponsible
bureaucratism-defined as much talk, little action,
and the dread of shouldering responsibility-remains.
In danger of losing momentum, Beijing announced a
"second stage" in its effort to reform the central
bureaucracy in the spring of 1983. The list of objec-
tives-rejuvenation of leadership, reduction in person-
nel, improvement in political attitudes, and greater
professionalism-suggested that a number of govern-
ment departments had paid only lipservice to the
reforms in the first stage of the reorganization. F_
It was then disclosed that a new problem had
emerged-overloading the central bureaucracy (now
reduced in size) with the same burden of economic
tasks as before. Because economic decentralization
had not been carried out, bureaucratic reform had
gotten ahead of and was out of step with economic
reform in China.
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In September 1983,1 a 25X1
central directive ordered that restructuring of govern-
ment organs cease until further notice.. The decision
was necessary, Chinese officials disclosed, because the
process of bureaucratic reform was disrupting the
day-to-day operations of a number of government
departments.
Reform at Provincial and Local Levels
Reorganization and streamlining of the provincial
party and government bureaucracies, initiated in the 25X1
spring of 1983, also appeared to get off to a smooth
start. Following the same pattern as the restructuring
of the national bureaucracy, the stated goals included
reducing the number of offices and size of staffs,
decreasing the average age, and raising the education-
al level of the provincial leadership. Carried out under
close central supervision, the results appeared initially
to satisfy Beijing that its objectives had been met. 7
We think, however, that the effort to reform the
bureaucracy at provincial and local levels ultimately 25X1
will be even less successful than in Beijing. Because
,central control diminishes, the bureaucracy becomes
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more entrenched at each succeeding administrative
level in China. In addition to the operation of personal
networks (in which the protection and welfare of
members comes first), factional alignments forged
during the Cultural Revolution will continue, we
believe, to undermine Beijing's reform program in a
number of provinces
Press articles indicate how seriously Beijing views the
problem of provincial and local factionalism in China.
These articles make it clear that:
? Factional alignments are still critical in personnel
matters, with appointments often made on this basis
rather than on professional merit.
? Policy issues are of secondary importance; the real
differences between local factions are over personal-
ities and old political scores.
? Factions continue to seek and receive the support of
higher level officials, up to and including national
figures. Patrons and clients work together to
squeeze out "strangers" and promote
"acquaintances."
As the reorganization works its way down to the local
level (scheduled to be completed in 1984), factional
problems are likely, we think, to intensify.
Initial guidelines for the three-year party "rectifica-
tion" campaign just getting under way identify "fac-
tionalists" as a main target of the purge. We think
there is little doubt, however, that rectification will
itself become a weapon in factional infighting and will
not significantly advance the political reform effort at
provincial and local levels in China.
After 30 years of Maoist neglect, China under Deng
Xiaoping's leadership has begun the formidable task
of political and economic modernization. To accom-
plish this, Deng is seeking to transfer power from
those who made the revolution-the old guerrilla
fighters and uneducated party faithful-to a younger,
better educated generation of technocrats. China un-
der Deng has entered a period of transition from
revolutionary to bureaucratic Communism.
Because Deng is attempting to redistribute power on a
massive scale, his political reforms have been resisted
in varying degrees by a large proportion of China's
party and state cadres. Deng has encountered resist-
ance from time to time from more conservative
leaders in the Politburo, especially when the reforms
he has promoted produce side effects that appear to
threaten party rule or the basic principles of "social-
ism." Because of strong opposition, the process of
reform has been slow, erratic, and subject to frequent
compromise.
Despite major obstacles and setbacks, we think that
Deng and his allies have made some progress toward
their political reform goals. Compared with Maoist
rule, China's leadership has become more collective;
factional struggle has diminished; the policy process
has become more professional, with decisions based
more on merit; and there has been some improvement
in the quality of the bureaucracy.
Certain aspects of China's political system, however,
have not changed. It remains highly centralized and
authoritarian, with the Chinese Communist Party
retaining a monopoly of power. Power remains vested
more in individuals and personal networks than in
institutions. The bureaucracy continues to work poor-
ly, especially at provincial and local levels where
footdragging, obstructionism, and factionalism under-
mine the implementation of policy.
Some Western observers believe that China's centu-
ries-old tradition of rule by individual powerful men
and personal networks will preclude development of
the institutions and formal rules essential for modern-
ization. Although recognizing the force of this cultur-
al argument, we think that China will conform to the
general pattern of industrializing nations and in time
develop a more modern political system. The more
meaningful questions, in our view, are not so much
whether, but in what form and when.
Alternative Paths
China could develop into a highly centralized and
orthodox bureaucratic state along the lines of the
Soviet Union. Any Chinese leadership fears the conse-
quences of weakened central authority. Deng himself
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has warned that without proper party leadership
China could "retrogress into division and confusion
and be unable to accomplish modernization." Espe-
cially after Deng goes, the inherent authoritarian
instincts in both Chinese and Communist societies
could push Chinese political life into a more orthodox,
centrally controlled, and disciplined direction.
China could also become a more pluralistic, although
still highly controlled, society combining Marxist,
Chinese, and even some Western traditions. The
underlying spur will continue to be a desire to make
headway against bureaucracy, redtape, cadre and
official malfeasance, leftism, and economic inefficien-
cy. Reformist leaders clustered about Hu Yaobang
and Zhao Ziyang believe that further experimentation
with political and economic reform is essential to
achieve a more efficient, dynamic "socialist" society.
A third possibility, and in our view the most likely, is
a muddled outcome in which authoritarian politics
coexist uneasily with more liberal, decentralized eco-
nomic policies. China has a great ability to muddle
through, and we believe the reformers can continue in
this vein for a long time. Efforts to extend reform,
particularly political reform, beyond present levels
will be difficult for many of the same reasons that
have slowed their development over the past three
years. Chinese society remains too divided as well as
fearful of change becoming uncontrolled, we believe,
to allow much further liberalization.
A darker course is possible, especially if Deng were to
die soon. A Hu-Zhao leadership could turn out to be
too weak to control the political pressures and ideolog-
ical passions revealed in the spiritual pollution cam-
paign. A conservative military-civilian coalition might
take over, establish a repressive regime, and lead a
backlash against many of the reforms promoted by
Deng
An important key to the future will be the balance
between innovators and reformers and more conserva-
tive elements in China's leadership. We regard the
recent campaign against "spiritual pollution"-a slo-
gan denoting Western cultural influence-as the lat-
est example of a conservative initiative exploiting the
fear of foreign influence that has long retarded Chi-
na's modernization. Although Deng Xiaoping has
taken an active part in this campaign, we view his
participation as a tactical move perhaps to preempt
his critics. Hu Yaobang appeared to be a target of the
conservatives early in the campaign, but met the
challenge successfully and played a key role in curtail- 25X1
ing the campaign after only two months. That was
time enough, however, for relations between reform-
ers and conservatives to worsen considerably.
Another major factor determining China's future will
be the time remaining in which Deng can play an 25X1
active role. If he has several more years of effective
leadership, his reformist successors--General Secre-
tary Hu Yaobang and Premier Zhao Ziyang-will
have gained valuable time to build their own team and
keep up the momentum of reform.
After Deng goes, we think that Hu and Zhao will be
politically weaker than at present and confronted by
growing conservative pressures. A crucial question
will be whether Hu Yaobang, reportedly regarded as
too "liberal" by some party elders and military lead-
ers, will be able to hold together the coalition forged
by Deng. We think that in any event China's political
life will probably move in a more centrally controlled,
disciplined direction in the immediate post-Deng
period.
Addressing the 12th Party Congress in September
1982, Deng showed a new awareness of the long time
it takes for successful political reform in China. It
will now take at least until the end of this century,
Deng admitted, to achieve his ambitious reform goals.
We agree with Deng. Even under the best of circum-
stances, the task of modernizing China's political
system will be slow, protracted, arduous, and
uncertain.
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