PROSPECTS FOR ANTI-US TERRORISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00176R001500040007-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 23, 2008
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: March 26, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85TO01 76RO01 500040007-0
Prospects for
Anti-US Terrorism
Secret
NI IIM 82-10002
26 March 1982
Director of Secret
Central
Intelligence
Copy 3 0 5
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85TO01 76RO01 500040007-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85TO01 76RO01 500040007-0
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85TO01 76RO01 500040007-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85T00176R001500040007-0
PROSPECTS FOR
ANTI-US TERRORISM
Information available as of 26 March 1982 was
used in the preparation of this Memorandum.
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85T00176R001500040007-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85TO01 76RO01 500040007-0
SCOPE NOTE
This Memorandum is an updated version of IIM 81-10018, Pros-
pects for Anti-US Terrorism, 6 October 1981. Like the earlier version,
it examines the sources and implications of recent terrorist acts and
threats against the United States, and estimates the extent and nature of
the threat posed by the leading perpetrators of these acts and threats. In
particular, it examines the implications of recent developments
concerning:
- The threat by Libyan leader Qadhafi to assassinate President
Reagan and other high-level US officials, which was the first
serious instance of a reported major international terrorist
targeting of officials within the United States in recent years.
- The kidnaping of Gen. James L. Dozier by the Italian Red
Brigades on 17 December 1981, the first such kidnaping of an
American citizen by that group.
- The terrorist attacks on US Charge d'Affaires Christian Chap-
man and Assistant Military Attache Lt. Col. Charles Ray in
Paris.
It should be stressed that there remain a number of intelligence
gaps on several of the specific questions discussed in this Memorandum.
Note: This Memorandum was requested by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and was
produced under the auspices of the Associate Chairman, National Intelligence Council. It was coordinated
with the Central Intelligence Agency; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency; the
Federal Bureau of Investigation; and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Energy, the
Treasury, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and the Marine Corps.
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85TO01 76RO01 500040007-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85TO01 76RO01 500040007-0
CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ........................................................................................................... iii
KEY JUDGMENTS .................................................................................................... 1
DISCUSSION .............................................................................................................. 3
The Implications of Recent Anti-US Terrorism ................................................... 3
Libya ...................................... 4
The Palestinians ...................................................................................................... 6
The Red Army Faction .......................................................................................... 8
The Italian Red Brigades ....................................................................................... 9
The Paris Attacks and the Heightened Threat in Western Europe .................... 10
Latin America ......................................................................................................... 10
Other Threats ........................................................................................................... 11
The United States: Principal Target of International Terrorism? ...................... 11
Prospects for Terrorism Within the United States ............................................... 12
V
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85TO01 76RO01 500040007-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85T00176R001500040007-0
KEY JUDGMENTS
The terrorist threat to President Reagan and to other senior US
officials in the United States and abroad remains serious. The most
immediate threat to the President is Libyan inspired, and will probably
continue.
Overseas, the threat to US targets, particularly to lower level US of-
ficials and to military personnel and facilities is also serious, and may
actually have increased. There are reasons to anticipate an increase in
anti-US terrorism in the Middle East, particularly in the event of an
Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon, and in Latin America and
Western Europe.
Within the United States, the t
remains low except to senior US official
Libyan-inspired terrorist attacks may be carried out in the future by
American, as well as by foreign, proxies.
The Libyans, the radical Palestinians, the West German Red Army
Faction (RAF), and the Italian Red Brigades pose the most immediate
major terrorist threats to the United States, but other terrorists harbor
strong anti-American feelings and have the ability to strike US person-
nel and interests.
There continue to be numerous ties among terrorist elements,
including Libyans, Syrians, radical Palestinian terrorists, and some in
Western Europe. These ties will probably increase, and some collabora-
tion among certain of these elements in future attacks is likely.
It is our judgment that the major terrorist attacks of the last year
against US targets-including the Ramstein (Germany) bombing, the
attack on General Kroesen, Colonel Qadhafi's threats against US
personnel and facilities, and the kidnaping of General Dozier-spring
1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85T00176R001500040007-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85TO01 76RO01 500040007-0
generally from disparate conditions and causes. It remains uncertain
who was responsible for the murder of Lt. Col. Charles Ray and the at-
tempted assassination of US Charge d'Affaires Christian Chapman; it is
possible that these attacks were Libyan inspired.
We have no hard evidence of a Soviet hand behind recent anti-US
terrorist events. We conclude, however, that this lack of hard evidence
is not itself proof of Soviet noninvolvement in these incidents. The
Soviets certainly bear some responsibility for anti-US terrorism in
general. The USSR supports governments (including those of Libya,
Cuba, South Yemen, and some East European states) and entities (such
as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) which, in turn, sup-
port or conduct terrorism. The Soviets' support for training (particularly
in the Middle East) which benefits some terrorists, their provision of
weapons to patrons of terrorism, their anti-American propaganda
campaigns, and their efforts to foster cooperation between groups which
undertake terrorist acts all provide a backdrop which in some cases
favors anti-American terrorism.'
2
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85TO01 76RO01 500040007-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85TO01 76RO01 500040007-0
DISCUSSION
The Implications of Recent Anti-US Terrorism
1. US personnel and property have been targets of
several prominent terrorist attacks and threats during
the past year. These incidents include:
- Libyan threats to assassinate President Reagan
and other senior US officials.
- The kidnaping of Gen. James Dozier by the
Italian Red Brigades.
- The attack on US Charge d'Affaires Christian
Chapman and the assassination of Assistant Mili-
tary Attache Lt. Col. Charles Ray in Paris.
- The bombing of the headquarters building of the
US Air Force, Europe, at Ramstein Airbase in
West Germany.
- The attempted assassination of Gen. Frederick
Kroesen, Commander in Chief of US Army,
Europe, near Heidelberg.
- Reported contingency plans by radical members
of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Pales-
tine (PFLP) to organize attacks against US and
other targets in Western Europe and elsewhere.
- The attempted murder of US servicemen in
Turkey.
- The attack on the US military training team in
Honduras.
- The attack on the Marine guards at the US
Embassy in Costa Rica.
2. The most important elements in these situations
are:
- A change of strategy by the Italian Red Brigades,
to target US persons and interests
- The reactivation of the Red Army Faction (RAF)
in Germany.
- The growing opposition to US and NATO secu-
rity policies-including the US "neutron bomb"
3
SECRET
and NATO's INF modernization decisions-es-
pecially on the left of the West German political
spectrum, and efforts by West German radicals
and terrorists to exploit these sentiments and
draw public attention once more to themselves
and their activities.
- The reactivation of extremist elements in Fatah
after a relatively dormant period, and of radical
Palestinian splinter groups.
- A perception by many Palestinians and other
Arabs of US association with Israeli activities,
including Tel Aviv's aerial attacks on Iraq and on
Palestinian targets in Lebanon, and its annex-
ation of the Golan Heights; Palestinian frustra-
tion at the reelection of Prime Minister Begin;
anger at the resumption of deliveries of military
aircraft by the United States to Israel; and inter-
necine Palestinian and Arab quarrels.
- An increasingly confrontational stance by Libya
toward the United States, intensified by media
allegations of US activities against Libya and by
the US-Libyan military clash over the Gulf of
Sidra.
3. American interests have been and will continue
to be targeted by terrorists because:
- Terrorism is perceived to be a legitimate political
weapon and instrument of foreign policy by
numerous countries and groups that are anti-US
in their ideology.
- US interests are worldwide, highly visible, and in
many cases easily accessible to terrorists.
- The US presence, notably its military and diplo-
matic aspects, is widely regarded by leftist and
radical elements as the visible symbol of
"imperialism" and "neocolonialism."
- Attacks against US interests and personnel will
often serve to embarrass a host government
because they will receive publicity and so serve
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85TO01 76RO01 500040007-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85T00176R001500040007-0
sometimes to highlight alleged government in-
competence and vulnerability.
- The occurrence of spectacular terrorist acts, such
as the kidnaping of General Dozier, tends to have
a "demonstration effect." Terrorist groups,
which may have nothing in common other than
visceral anti-Americanism, are prone to emulate
one another as each event receives publicity.
4. A question of particular importance is the degree
to which various international terrorist groups and
states hostile to the United States may work together
against US interests. In this regard, of particular
concern is the possible expansion of links among
Libyan terrorists, radical Palestinians, and terrorists in
Western Europe:
- Other supporters of anti-US international terror-
ists include Cuba and South Yemen. Moreover,
for some time there have been contacts among
West European terrorist groups; more recently,
some Italian Red Brigadists showed interest in
establishing operational coordination with other
West European terrorist groups. Such initiatives
may presage more coordinated anti-US terrorism
than is currently the case.
5. There is evidence, for instance, that Libya and
radical Palestinians-either separately or in concert-
have initiated planning for a new campaign of anti-US
terrorism.
6. We have no hard evidence of a Soviet hand
behind recent anti-US terrorist events. We conclude,
however, that this lack of hard evidence is not itself
proof of Soviet noninvolvement in these incidents. The
Soviets certainly bear some responsibility for anti-US
terrorism in general. The USSR supports governments
(including those of Libya, Cuba, South Yemen, and
some East European states) and entities (such as the
PFLP) which, in turn, support or conduct terrorism.
The Soviets' support for training (particularly in the
Middle East) which benefits some terrorists, their
provision of weapons to patrons of terrorism, their
anti-American propaganda campaigns, and their ef-
forts to foster cooperation between groups which
undertake terrorist acts all provide a backdrop that in
some cases favors anti-American terrorism.'
Libya
'l. The most serious near-term terrorist threat to the
United States is that posed by Libyan leader Muam.-
mar Qadhafi. On 13 August 1981, after allegations in
the US press of a CIA plot to assassinate him, a group
of Libyan military officers close to Qadhafi publicly
declared:
25X1
25X1
25X1
... we shall hit at US interests anywhere and
undertake the physical liquidation of anyone who
permits himself merely to think of harming the
life of the leader of the Great 1 September
Revolution, beginning with Ronald Reagan.
8. Information strongly 25X1
indicates that Libya planned a terrorist campaign
designed to assassinate senior US officials. There is a
4
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85T00176R001500040007-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85TO01 76RO01 500040007-0
possibility that the attempted assassination of the US
Charge d'Affaires and the assassination of the US
Assistant Military Attach
supported by the Libyan
11. Qadhafi has also threatened to attack US nu-
clear depots in the Mediterranean area and cause "an
international catastrophe" if America again "attacks"
the Gulf of Sidra. Libya may have the resources to
make such an attempt either by means of a terrorist
Inaddition, US
diplomatic facilities in the Middle East, Western
Europe, Africa, and possibly Latin America have been
targeted as part of Libyan-backed operations against
US interests.
9. Most important, Qadhafi apparently set in train
plans to assassinate President Reagan and/or other
high government officials in the United States.3 The
Libyan leader, however, was apparently greatly dis-
turbed by the worldwide publicity which his assassina-
tion plots have received, by the precautions taken
against them, and by the prospect of strong US actions
against Tripoli. In fact, Qadhafi sent a message to the
US Government that he had abandoned all Libyan
terrorist activities.
10. Although the initial Libyan threat to assassinate
President Reagan and other high US officials may
have abated, the threat of their assassination by Lib-
yan or Libyan-inspired agents (US or foreign) must still
be regarded as serious. In addition, the Libyan or
Libyan-inspired threat to US officials outside the
United States remains very serious as well and may
have increased in recent weeks. Qadhafi's assurances
cannot be accepted fully at face value. Moreover, he
could revive these or similar plans, most particularly if
he judges that the risk of their being traced to him is
minimized, or that US willingness to take strong steps
against Libya is reduced; and, most important, if he
continues to believe-as he has for some time-that
the United States is trying to oust or kill him.4
attack or the use of aircraft or missiles.
suggests that his threat to attack US nuclear depots is
only propaganda but that Qadhafi is planning to
attack a US ship in the Mediterranean. We have
12. These threats are consistent with Libya's estab-
lished pattern of supporting and conducting terrorist
activities. Qadhafi has targeted world leaders
assassination in the past; he considers assassination a
justifiable foreign policy weapon and has the resources
to carry out such an act. While Qadhafi has not
13. Over the years Qadhafi has supported such
diverse terrorist groups and liberation movements as
the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the Japanese
Red Army, and the radical Palestinians; he identifies
himself with forces striking out against "Zionism" and
the "imperialist oppression of the West." Recently, he
has focused increasingly on the United States as a
' Over the years, there have been several internally inspired coup
and assassination plots against Qadhafi which he has often attributed
to the United States.
Qadhafi's public threats against US military installa-
tions. The incident in the Gulf of Sidra, the with-
drawal of US personnel from Libya, and the US
decision not to buy Libyan oil have contributed to
Qadhafi's aggressive, confrontational stance vis-a-vis
the United States. The very act, of standing up to the
United States is interpreted by Qadhafi as an act of
5
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1'
LJ/0
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85TO01 76RO01 500040007-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85T00176R001500040007-0
revolutionary courage, and will in all likelihood
prompt him to seek further opportunities for
confrontation.
16. Qadhafi has also dispatched assassination squads
to Western Europe and the United States as a part of a
campaign to silence critics of his regime. Exiles who do
not return to Libya voluntaril are either to be
kidnaped or murdered.
Because of
15. Despite shifting moods in Libyan foreign policy,
Qadhafi continues to be driven by three causes:
championing his version of an Islamic revolution,
assisting people fighting wars of "national liberation,"
and eliminating the state of Israel. In promoting these
causes Qadhafi has supported groups whose connec-
tion to Islam, national liberation, or Pan-Arabism were
highly tenuous. Libyan support for terrorist groups
seems to reflect the following priorities:
- Palestinians, particularly extremist groups like
the PFLP, the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine/General Command (PFLP/GC), the
Popular Struggle Front (PSF), and the Front for
the Liberation of Palestine (FLP)-and possibly
the Black June Organization (BJO), which Qa-
dhafi hopes to use in assassinating Palestinian
"moderates."
- Muslim groups, such as the Moro National Liber-
ation Front in the Philippines and the Pattani
United Liberation Movement in Thailand, which
are minorities in states ruled by non-Muslims
and, perhaps, Muslim extremists in countries like
Bangladesh and Indonesia. Qadhafi has also as-
sisted the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Oman/Bahrain (PFLO/B) and the Polisario
forces fighting Morocco.
- Antigovernment groups in southern Africa, Latin
America, and, to a diminished extent, Western
Europe. Libya has in the past trained members of
the Italian Red Brigades and the West German
RAF. Currently, Libya also trains Salvadoran ter-
rorists and possibly additional Latin American
terrorists as well.
the negative publicity his campaign has generated,
Qadhafi may have become more discriminating in the
Libyan dissidents he will target.
17.
Qadhafi's terrorist plans may include the use of proxy
terrorists (for example, radical Palestinians or Ameri-
cans) in operations against officials in the United States
or against US personnel and facilities abroad. Such use
of proxies would reduce the risk of tracing such
operations directly to Qadhafi. We cannot count on
timely warning of some future Libyan terrorist oper-
1.8. There are growing indications that the United
States may be confronted with increased terrorism on
the part of radical Palestinians or dissident members
of Fatah. Although incidents of Palestinian terrorism
in Western Europe (such as the attack on a synagogue
in Vienna, and bombings in Rome, Istanbul, and
Athens) have been directed against Israeli and Jewish
interests, Palestinian-sponsored
evert e ess, a number of reports suggest the possi -
ity of Palestinian terrorism against US interests. The
most important of these are:
6
SECRET
25X1
L~~I
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85T00176R001500040007-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85T00176R001500040007-0
- Increasing pressure has been placed by radical
Palestinian groups, by Fatah militants and pro-
Communists, and by Libya and Syria on PLO
leader Arafat, particularly in the past year, to
approve the resumption of international terror-
ism and the targeting of US interests.
- Radical Palestinians, supported by Syria and
Libya, are seeking to embarrass Arafat by
launching or planning to launch terrorist attacks
in Western Europe against US and Israeli targets
and to sabotage growing PLO-European ties. The
attack on the Vienna synagogue is an example of
this effort to embarrass Arafat.
19. The US extradition to Israel on 13 December
1981 of accused Palestinian terrorist Ziyad Abu Eain
has further intensified anti-US sentiment in the
Middle East and the threat to the well-being of
Americans there and elsewhere. US embassies in the
region have been warned during the past two years
that US interests would be attacked if Abu Eain were
extradited. His extradition, moreover, comes at a time
of increased tensions in the Middle East due to Israel's
formal annexation of the Golan Heights, the stale-
mated Palestinian autonomy talks, and the reinforce-
ment of military positions along the Israeli-Lebanese
frontier. The US veto of the UN resolution condemn-
ing Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights and the
arrival of the US peacekeeping force in the Sinai may
also provide excuses for anti-US terrorism by
Palestinians. A much more serious terrorist threat to
the United States, particularly in the Middle East,
would arise in the event of an Israeli invasion of
southern Lebanon.
20. The ties of Palestinian terrorists with terrorists
elsewhere, the implacable hostility of some radical
Palestinians to the United States, and the fragmenta-
tion of the Palestinian movement contribute to the
threat which they pose to US interests. The major
Palestinian organizations have not attacked Americans
since the early 1970s. Nevertheless, attacks have oc-
curred on US personnel and facilities in the Middle
East since that time which may have been the work of
Palestinian splinter groups and radical elements. For
its part, the PLO has called for "decisive reprisals"
against the United States for deporting Abu Eain.
Even if the first wave of anti-American feeling sub-
sides without terrorist attacks, passions will again rise
when the Israelis try Abu Eain. A conviction and long
sentence may well spark reprisals against US interests.
The Israelis have not yet announced a trial date.
21. It appears that the recent increase in tension in
the Middle East has intensified the struggle for control
of the PLO. On one side is Fatah leader Arafat, who is
still striving to achieve a diplomatic solution to the
Palestinian problem. He is seeking support from con-
servative Arab regimes, including Saudi Arabia, and is
trying to improve his image in Western Europe and
the United States. On the other side are a number of
small but radical Palestinian splinter groups which
oppose Arafat's leadership of the PLO, militantly seek
to undermine the Camp David accords, wish to see a
broad revolution throughout the Middle East, and are
prepared to serve the aims of radical patron states like
Syria, Libya, and Iraq. In addition, there are radicals
within Fatah who oppose Arafat and what they per-
ceive as his less militant approach to the Palestinian
problem.
22. Some of the most radical Palestinian splinter
groups are offshoots of the PFLP, which was for a
number of years the most active Palestinian group in
international terrorism. That group's terrorist activities
began to decline in 1978, and the group was relatively
inactive by 1980. However, there are reports of train-
ing of West European terrorists, including members of
the West German Red Army Faction. at PFLP-run
training camps in South Yemen
7
SECRET
25X,
25X1 =1
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85T00176R001500040007-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85TO01 76RO01 500040007-0
23. The Arafat camp has not been inactive. There
have been reports of the training of Turks, Irishmen,
German rightists, and Armenians at Fatah camps in
also requested that Arafat offer Cuba cooperation with
Latin American revolutionary movements, and he
apparently agreed to this request.
The Red Army Faction
24. The anti-American terrorism in West Germany
is the work of the Red Army Faction and its sympa-
thizers. The RAF has claimed responsibility for the
attack on Ramstein AFB, and we have had indications
for some time that the group was indeed planning a
return to international terrorist violence and that some
group. However, the attack on Ramstein and the
attempted assassination of General Kroesen indicate
that the group is increasingly focusing on US targets.
25. The recent round of RAF violence appears to be
aimed at transforming that isolated group into the
vanguard of the West German extraparliamentary
left, which has been demonstrating against theater
nuclear force modernization and enhanced radiation
warhead production. In the early 1970s, the RAF
gained supporters and recruits by attacking US targets
during a period of widespread protests against US
involvement in the Vietnam conflict. The RAF prob-
ably hopes to capitalize on current leftist sentiment
against US foreign and defense policies in order to
renew its support among extreme West German left-
ists. At Ramstein, the United States may have been the
immediate target, but the West German left was
almost certainly meant to take notice. The left is not
likely to rally to the RAF, however, because continued
anti-US terrorism in West Germany is likely to reduce
popular support for the West German "peace
movement. "
1'.6. The resurgence in RAF terrorism follows a
period of reduced activity after the Mogadishu hijack-
ing of October 1977. This reduction was the result of
arrests, deaths, and "retirements" of key RAF person-
nel. Consequently, the RAF shifted its tactics from
demands for money or the release of jailed terrorists to
those of low risk aimed at "punishing the establish-
ment," in order to provoke a "Fascist state" and
popular revolt. The reduced level of RAF terrorism
convinced security authorities that the terrorists were
rebuilding their organization outside West Germany.
On 25 June 1979, Gen. Alexander Haig, then
SACEUR, was nonetheless the target of what was
probably an RAF assassination attempt in Belgium.
27. The resurgence of RAF terrorism in 1981 re-
flects a reanimation of the group despite the disrup-
tions caused by police efforts during the middle and
late 1970s.
Lthe RAF was trying to recruit personnel from the
ran s of the "anti-Fascist" groups ("Antifa") in West
Germany as well as from its "legal" supporters, and
wished to use its "legals" to create public disturbances
connected with causes like antinuclear protests and
squatters' rights in order to broaden its base of support.
29. Despite ups and downs, the RAF has continued.
to maintain links to other terrorists. For example, in
the raid-to-late 1970s individual members of the RAF'
participated in PFLP operations, and the PFLP at that
time engaged in terrorist operations to force the
release of RAF prisoners. The involvement of West
German terrorists with the PFLP offered them logistic
support. It enabled such terrorists, through flight to
several Middle Eastern countries, to avoid criminal
prosecution. The training of such terrorists in Palestin-
ian camps expanded their knowledge of the use of
weapons and ability to practice sabotage. The RAF'
was identified in the mid-1970s as a conduit of
weapons and forged documents for the Japanese Red[
8
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
2~DA-i
25X1
25X1
0
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85TO01 76RO01 500040007-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85TO01 76RO01 500040007-0
Army. Additionally, the RAF has had intermittent
contacts with radicals and terrorists throughout West-
ern Europe-the Dutch Red Resistance Front, Swiss
anarchists, the Provisional Irish Republican Army
(PIRA), and Italy's Red Brigades.
The Italian Red Brigades
30. The kidnaping of General Dozier on 17 Decem-
ber 1981 marked a new stage in Red Brigade strategy:
this was the first time the Brigades had targeted an
American. Previously, they had sought to undermine
domestic institutions by conducting a prolonged ter-
rorist campaign against Italian targets designed to
provoke repressive government reactions that would in
turn prompt armed popular responses. And the stated
goals of the Red Brigades, though not their violent
tactics, have enjoyed noteworthy support among Ital-
ians, especially the youth, who are disenchanted with
their government's unfulfilled promises. The Brigades'
most visible action had been the kidnaping and
murder of Aldo Moro, but the Dozier kidnaping
brought them comparable publicity. What is signifi-
cant about the Dozier kidnaping is that it indicates
that the Red Brigades, like the RAF, are trying to
broaden their support beyond traditional backers by
attempting to tap antinuclear, antimilitary, and anti-
American sentiment that they perceive is behind
popular support for the "peace movement" in Italy.
31. The Dozier kidnaping was undertaken by the
Red Brigades alone. Various "strategic directives"
published by the Brigades over the past three years
have indicated an increasing tendency on the part of
some factions to internationalize their struggle. How-
ever, some Red Brigade members do not believe that
attacks against non-Italian targets are a high priority.
The latter believe that the Brigades should continue to
target industries (including multinational firms), Ital-
ian journalists and industrialists, members of the judi-
ciary, prison officials, and the police; and to involve
themselves in the labor and prison issues.
32. The Dozier operation was carried out primarily
by the Veneto Column, which has been the leading
advocate of internationalizing terrorist operations.
33. Lack of public pronouncement of support from
these groups and others undoubtedly is disappointing
to those Brigade theoreticians who believed the Dozier
kidnaping would be the catalyst for a united European
"war on NATO."
34. Despite public pronouncements by some Italian
politicians
the Italian Govern-
ment has as yet developed no information on foreign
involvement in the Dozier case
According to
unconfirmed press reporting, Italian police allege that
one of General Dozier's kidnapers may have spent
four months in Libya under unexplained circum-
stances in 1981, prior to the Red Brigade kidnaping
operation.
t e ess, the Brigades pride t em se ves on their in e-
pendence, althoug they re-
ceived some weapons from Palestinians.
9
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
20AIN
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85TO01 76RO01 500040007-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85TO01 76RO01 500040007-0
35. The kidnaping of General Dozier initially
achieved a number of Red Brigade objectives. It
embarrassed the Italian Government, sowed discon-
tent among Italian political factions, enhanced the
Brigades' image as a group capable of striking any-
where, and achieved enormous publicity for the
group. The kidnaping, however, ended as a disaster for
the Red Brigades and has boosted the morale of the
Italian Government in its fight against terrorism.
Several Brigade columns have been seriously
damaged. Nevertheless, the Brigades-especially the
Naples Column-are still capable of carrying out
additional attacks against US interests.
The Paris Attacks and the Heightened Threat in
Western Europe
36. As of the time this paper is issued, it remains
uncertain who was responsible for the attempted
assassination of US Charge d'Affaires Christian Chap-
man on 12 November 1981 and the murder of Lt. Col.
Charles Ray in Paris on 18 January 1982. We have
unconfirmed reports that the attack on the US Charge
was the work of Libyan terrorists, and the circum-
stances of that attack and the assassination of Colonel
Ray are similar.F_
38, The attacks on US officials in Paris may augur a
major increase in anti-US terrorism in Western Europe
in the near future. We do not yet know, however,
whether these attacks are unilateral events or the
beginning of a sustained terrorist campaign by Libyans
acid/or radical Palestinians against US persons in
Europe.
39. General Dozier's release may affect terrorist
tactics, deterring kidnaping attempts, but does not
lessen the threat either in Italy or elsewhere in West-
ern Europe. The Red Brigades' first communique
called for a coordinated or cooperative effort between
the Brigades and other West European terrorist
groups, specifically the RAF, the PIRA, and ETA
Basques in Spain. But they received no response from
these groups. We believe, however, that RAF opera-
tives on their own have already begun target selection
and surveillance, and preparations for additional oper-
ations against US targets in West Germany.
40. The PIRA and ETA Basques are less likely to
target Americans at this time. The PIRA values the aid
it receives from segments of American society and
would risk categorical condemnation in the United
States if it were to attack US targets. If the ETA
Basques were to attack US targets, they would shift
attention away from their traditional ethnic cause.
Latin America
41. The potential for anti-US terrorism in Latin
America has recently increased. Reported threats by
Salvadoran leftist guerrillas against US targets give
10
SECRET
25X1
25X11
25X1
L~~I
25X1
2bAl
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85TO01 76RO01 500040007-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85TO01 76RO01 500040007-0
grounds for special concern, because of the guerrillas'
ability to strike outside as well as inside El Salvador,
and of the possibility that these anti-US threats are
partly Cuban inspired. Despite intense security meas-
sures, attempts to assassinate or kidnap US officials
(including military advisers) are likely and are clearly
within the capabilities of the Salvadoran guerrillas.
The insurgents probably believe that such terrorist
acts-even at significant cost to the guerrillas-serve
to bolster insurgent morale, attract media attention,
and perhaps erode US support for involvement in El
Salvador.
42. Another significant threat to US interests may
be posed by the M-19 terrorist group in Colombia,
whose members claim responsibility for two recent
attempts to penetrate US Embassy buildings in Bogota.
Other threats to Americans have recently been report-
ed in Guatemala, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Peru, Chile,
and the Dominican Republic.
43. For some time Cuba has been supporting var-
ious terrorist groups in Latin America which have
attacked US interests. It is possible that Castro may
encourage these groups to heighten such attacks in a
variety of locations, but in any event he is unlikely to
let Cuba's hand be shown.
Other Threats
44. In addition to Libya, Palestinian groups, the
RAF, the Red Brigades, and Latin American revolu-
tionaries, a number of other regimes and entities
currently harbor grievances against the United States
and have the capability to conduct terrorist attacks on
US targets. The foremost among these are:
- Iranians who see an American hand behind all of
Iran's woes.
- The Syrian regime, which perceives the United
States to be in collusion with Israel and Syria's
conservative foes in the Arab world.
- Radical Armenian terrorists who have expressed
support for radical Palestinians, are anti-Ameri-
can and anti-Israeli, and resent Armenian emi-
gration from the USSR to the United States.
- Turkish leftists who have mounted a number of
attacks against US personnel and installations in
Turkey.
- Croatian extremists who are aggrieved at US
prosecution of their compatriots and US extradi-
tion of accused Croatian terrorists to Sweden.
- Puerto Rican separatists who have attacked US
military interests since December 1979 and have
declared themselves to be "at war with the US
military."
The United States: Principal Target of
International Terrorism?
45. US interests have been and remain the principal
target of international terrorists of both left and right.
This will certainly continue to be the case for the
Terrorist Threats and Incidents Against Americans, 1968-81
Year
Total Threats
and Incidents
US
Deaths
Anti-US Threats
and Incidents
Next Leading
Target
1968
142
5
65 (46%)
Israel
(13%)
1969
214
1
113 (53%)
Israel
(14.5%)
1970
391
11
247 (63%)
Israel
(4.4%)
1971
324
5
231 (71%)
Israel
(3.1%)
1972
648
25
217 (33%)
Israel
(38%)
1973
563
24
203(36%)
UK
(19.2%)
1974
528
45
180 (34%)
UK
(11.8%)
1975
474
11
156(33%)
UK
(5.2%)
1976
599
11
194 (32%)
Israel,
Ireland,
Argentina
(4.0%)
1977
562
8
172 (31%)
UK
(6.4%)
1978
850
12
352 (41%)
UK
(5.2%)
1979
658
13
228 (35%)
France
(6.0%)
1980
763
10
254 (33%)
USSR
(5.4%)
1981
709
7
258 (36%)
UK
(6.6%)
11
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85TO01 76RO01 500040007-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85TO01 76RO01 500040007-0
foreseeable future, even though only seven Americans
were actually killed in terrorist attacks in 1981-fewer
than in most previous years-and all of these were in
Latin America. The percentage of terrorist incidents
directed against Americans has remained roughly con-
stant since 1972. The table shows how consistently
Americans have been the principal targets of interna-
tional terrorism since 1968.
46. Terrorism against US targets is likely to be
intensified because of the large-scale publicity which
the Libyan assassination plot and the kidnaping of
General Dozier have received. There will almost
certainly be terrorist attacks against US military per-
sonnel and facilities in Western Europe, and against
diplomatic /corporate interests there as well as in Latin
America and the Middle East. Terrorist groups, which
may have nothing in common other than visceral anti-
Americanism, are prone to emulate one another as
each event receives publicity. Finally, individual
fanatics, with no connection to any terrorist group,
may be incited by the publicity which terrorist accts
have received to attack US officials or interests abroad
or in the United States. We believe, therefore, that
international terrorism is likely to increase in the next
year, particularly against the United States.
Prospects for Terrorism Within the United States
47. We believe that the potential for incidents of
terrorism against high-ranking US officials in the
United States remains serious, particularly from Lib-
yan and Libyan-sponsored groups. Historically, terror-
ism in the United States has included acts by Ameri-
cans (particularly Puerto Rican nationalists) against
Americans or by foreigners against other foreigners.
The future, however, may witness foreign-inspired
attacks by foreign terrorists or American proxies di-
rected against senior US officials or other interests.
12
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85TO01 76RO01 500040007-0
 Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85TO01 76RO01 500040007-0
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85TO01 76RO01 500040007-0