SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF THE STAKES IN NATO'S INF DEPLOYMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00153R000100100034-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 19, 2008
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: June 10, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM Harry C. Cochran
Special Assistant for Warning
NIC #4257-83
10 June 1983
to
SUBJECT Soviet Perceptions of the Stakes in NATO's
INF Deployment
1. The Soviet leadership has deeply engaged its prestige
and credibility in the drive to block INF deployment or at least
make it politically impossible for the governments of basing
countries to deploy anything approaching the full complement of
572 Pershing II and cruise missiles. Moscow's campaign has
incurred commitments to respond with potentially risky
countermeasures whose ultimate consequences the Soviets can
neither foresee nor fully control.
2. The Soviet leaders are playing for high stakes. They
have been emboldened to invite a test of strength and political
will with the U.S. by their assessment of prevailing trends in
Western European public opinion on the wisdom of NATO's INF
decision and on relations with the two superpowers. They have
focused their political strategy on manipulating the fundamental
reality that in Western Europe the Soviet Union is now regarded
as less of a danger than the specter of nuclear war. This
reading,of sentiment in Europe has led the Soviets to gamble on
the assumption that the governments of the five basing countries,
and Bonn in particular, will either be unwilling and unable to
proceed with full deployments on schedule or will be obliged to
press the U.S. for a postponement of the schedule as long as the
Geneva talks continue.
3. Moscow's assessment of the political vulnerability of
NATO's dual-track decision underlies its judgment that the USSR
stands to gain much greater political-strategic advantages from
an impasse in the INF and START negotiations than from serious
initiatives to narrow differences and open the way for compromise
agreements. Soviet political tactics therefore have been
calculated to saddle the U.S. with responsibility for the
stalemate and to stimulate skepticism in Western Europe about
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Washington's real intentions in the talks. Thus, Andropov
declared on 21 December 1982, "It appears that Washington is out
to block an agreement and, referring to collapse of the talks, to
station its missiles on European soil in any case."
4. Soviet tactics reflect considerable confidence that INF
deployment can be defeated or at least held to a minimum without
having to make any reductions in the SS-20 force. Beyond this
short-term goal, the Soviets believe the defeat or indefinite
postponement of deployment will generate an unprecedented crisis
of confidence in the Atlantic Alliance and stimulate what Moscow
perceives as existing tendencies toward double isolationism, with
Western Europe and the U.S. both shifting to more independent and
increasingly incompatible policies. The ultimate outcome of this
process, in Moscow's scenario, will be a pervasive disenchantment
in Congress and American public opinion with the European allies
and an eventual reduction or withdrawal of U.S. forces in Western
Europe. In sum, the Soviets perceive the INF contest as
providing long-sought leverage to induce a geopolitical
realignment rooted in divergent transatlantic economic interests
that will increasingly alienate Western Europe and the U.S. from
each other and gradually draw Europe into greater political,
economic and security dependence on the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe.
Soviet Motivations
5. The offensive character of the Soviet anti-INF campaign
outlined above is balanced by four essentially defensive
motivations:
a. There is the obvious military problem
posed by the Pershing II's accuracy and short
flight-time to targets in the USSR. The Soviets
recognize these missiles will create new and
possibly unmanageable threats to the security of
their strategic strike forces and national command
and control systems, including the safety of
senior party leaders.
b. INF deployment threatens to nullify the
political-strategic advantages that derive from
the nuclear preponderance in Europe the USSR has
achieved since SS-20 deployments began in the mid-
1970's. As a result of the "Prague Spring" crisis
in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviets have
regarded an unassailable regional preponderance as
vital for maintaining their political-military
hegemony in Eastern Europe beyond challenge and
for deterring possible NATO moves to exploit
internal upheavals or vulnerabilities in Poland,
East Germany and other Warsaw Pact states. Soviet
anxieties during the Polish crisis of 1980-81
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underscored Moscow's perennial suspicion that the
U.S. and West Germany, in particular, would
attempt to capitalize on crises in Eastern Europe
to alter the post-World War II political and
territorial status quo and disrupt the USSR's
strategic glacis. The Soviets therefore attach
the greatest importance to ensuring nuclear and
conventional superiority in Europe as a guarantee
of their capability to intervene militarily in
Eastern Europe if necessary and to deny NATO the
capacity to capitalize on internal crises or deter
Soviet intervention. INF deployment, in Moscow's
view, would at least erode this vital capability
at a time when economic stagnation and public
discontent in Eastern Europe provide fertile
ground for a spread of the "Polish bacillus." The
prospect of over 100 Pershing II's in West Germany
almost certainly has deepened Soviet anxieties
about the East German regime's stability in the
face of declining living standards, a growing
peace movement, and the example of the Solidarity
era in Poland. East German party leaders regard
the peace movement as a potential political
opposition similar to Solidarity, and the Soviets
undoubtedly share East Berlin's concern that
repressive measures against peace activists and
the Lutheran clergy might trigger widespread
outbreaks of anti-regime violence that would
invite West German intervention.
c. Soviet leaders fear that INF deployment
will alter the prevailing political psychology on
defense issues in Western Europe and check trends
which they view as a potential source of a
favorable change in the global "correlation of
forces." The decisive factor shaping these
trends, in Moscow's judgment, has been growing
public perceptions of an irreversible change in
tie superpower balance of strategic power and
political will that has seriously weakened, if not
neutralized, the American nuclear guarantee of
Western Europe's security. In the Soviet
assessment, the political consequences of the
USSR's achievement of global strategic parity and
clear nuclear and conventional predominance in
Europe have been reinforced by the fallout from
the U.S. defeat in Vietnam, the U.S. failure to
respond forcefully to the OPEC cartel in 1973-74
and 1979, and the debacle in Iran. The Soviets
believe the cumulative effect of these events has
been a decline in Western Europe's confidence in
the U.S. ability and will to defend its allies and
the emergence of an accommodationist psychology
and policy drift. The fact that Moscow
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exaggerates the political-strategic significance
of what it interprets as growing nuclear pacifism
in Western Europe and a desire for a durable
accommodation with the East does not reduce the
great influence of this assessment on Soviet
calculations and intentions. In his speech to the
Central Committee plenum last November, Andropov
asserted, "Today, as never before, the peoples
come to the forefront of history. They have
gained the right to have their say and their voice
will not be muffled by anyone. They are capable
of removing, by vigorous and purposeful actions,
the threat of nuclear war, safeguarding peace and
hence life on this planet." This rhetoric
reflects policy assumptions that could induce
Soviet misjudgments about the strength of anti-INF
sentiment in Western Europe and the vulnerability
of NATO governments to Soviet threats and
inducements.
d. Finally, the Soviet leaders' conviction
that INF deployment may neutralize the advantages
secured by the USSR's regional nuclear
preponderance in dealing with both Eastern and
Western Europe also applies to their assessment of
the threat INF poses to the global political-
strategic balance and therefore to Soviet
prospects in relations with the U.S., China and
Japan. The Soviets claim that the detente of the
1970's was made possible only because of a change
in the global correlation in the USSR's favor. It
is unlikely that they would have judged it
politically possible or safe to negotiate the SALT
and other agreements with the West in the 1970's
if the achievement of rough strategic parity had
not induced the U.S. to recognize the USSR's
status as a superpower.
6. Apart from the perception of the strictly military
threat presented by the Pershing II's, the other three
motivations reflect the fact that the Soviets' resolve to block
INF deployment and thus maintain their nuclear superiority in
Europe is primarily political in nature. All Western European
targets covered by the SS-20's could be covered by the Soviet
Union's central strategic systems. From the standpoint of Soviet
high political strategy, the SS-20's serve essentially as a means
to overawe Western European publics and governments, protect the
USSR's capacity to intervene with impunity in Eastern European
crises, and maintain the Soviet.claim to full superpower
equality. If nuclear preponderance in Europe were nullified by
INF deployments, the Soviet leaders would be genuinely concerned
that this would deprive them of the capacity to enforce
unquestioned hegemony in Eastern Europe, promote the political
neutralization of Western Europe, and protect the credibility of
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their pretensions to global equality with the U.S. The gravity
of these perceived stakes in the contest over INF deployment will
oblige the Soviets to make good on their repeated warnings that,
if deployments proceed, "the Soviet Union will take timely and
effective countermeasures" to consolidate its defense capability,
including deployment of "corresponding new strategic systems" and
measures "having the territory of the United States itself in
view."
Possible Soviet Initiatives to Forestall INF Deployment
7. As the period of final decisions approaches for NATO
basing countries next fall, the pace and intensity of Soviet
threats and inducements will accelerate. The principal targets
will be Bonn and Washington. In Moscow's view, the Kohl
government's attitude will be decisive because if Bonn yields to
domestic and Soviet pressures, for example, by urging
postponement of the deployment schedule, the other four basing
countries would find it virtually impossible to proceed with
their deployments. The U.S. will be the main target of new
Soviet proposals and ostensible concessions which will be cast in-
terms known to be unacceptable to the Administration. The Soviet
aim will be to elicit repeated American rebuffs which can be used
to demonstrate that Washington is intent on deployment at any
cost and that the U.S., in Brezhnev's words, is an "absolutely
unreliable partner" in negotiations. Andropov declared last
February, "It is precisely this unrealistic position of the U.S.
that has blocked...progress at the talks in Geneva...The U.S.
does not want to look for a mutually acceptable accord with the
Soviet Union and thereby deliberately dooms the Geneva talks to
failure."
S E C R E T
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Soviet Reactions to Initial INF Deployments
11. If Moscow's campaign of inducements and threats fails to
forestall initial deployments, the Soviets would move promptly to
implement the three countermeasures specified in the 28 May
government statement. The initial objective would be to energize
strong public reactions in Western Europe and to capitalize on
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expected massive demonstrations at basing sites in the hope of
compelling target governments to halt deployments and pressure
the U.S. to make concessions in the Geneva talks. The Soviets
would calculate that the U.S. will be unwilling to make
significant changes in its position and that this would trigger a
major public backlash in Europe. The Soviets might then declare
that INF deployments had created a "qualitatively new situation"
and hint that they were considering early withdrawal from both
INF and START negotiations. Gromyko declared in February that
NATO governments "cannot but know that by deploying its new
missiles the American side would actually undercut the nuclear
arms talks."
12. Specific Soviet actions beyond the three countermeasures
would depend on Moscow's assessment of the strength of negative
reactions to INF deployments in Western Europe and the Third
World and on its reading of Washington's intentions and capacity
to respond effectively to Soviet initiatives. If Bonn and other
basing governments were perceived to be backing down on further
deployments, and if this wavering produced recriminations between
Western European capitals and Washington, the Soviets would be
tempted to seize the opportunity to launch a wide-ranging
political offensive to capitalize on the West's disarray. The
Soviets, for example, might take some of the following actions:
-- After demonstrating their resolve and
ability to neutralize the political-strategic
effects of INF deployments on the East-West
balance, the Soviets might move to accelerate the
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process of "normalization" of relations with China
by making limited concessions and providing more
vocal support for China's positions on issues in
dispute with the U.S.;
-- INF deployments would remove previous
inhibitions on more assertive Soviet actions in
the Middle East and the Third World. This could
mean a willingness to take higher risks in
supporting Syria, the PLO, and Muslim leftists in
Lebanon. Depending on trends in the Central
American power struggle and on Moscow's reading of
U.S. intentions, the Soviets might adopt a much
higher profile in extending greater political and
military assistance to the Sandinistas, backed by
propaganda pressure and diplomatic initiatives
aimed at placing the U.S. and Honduras on the
defensive. If the Sandinistas appeared to be
losing ground against the insurgents, the Soviets
might be prepared to defy Washington by
authorizing the Cubans to transfer MIG fighters
and other offensive weapons to Nicaragua. In
addition, Moscow could encourage Castro to deploy
Cuban combat units to defend the Sandinista regime
and support its cross-border operations against
Honduras.
-- The Soviets might attempt to exploit South
African and UNITA offensives in Angola to force a
showdown by sharply expanding military assistance
to Angolan and Cuban forces, perhaps by mounting a
dramatic airlift, and by providing Soviet officers
to command a counteroffensive against the South
Africans.
Conclusions
13. The Soviets have developed comprehensive and detailed
plans for a strenuous response to INF deployment. They
apparently briefed their allies on these plans at a mid.-March
meeting of ten senior party secretaries from the Warsaw Pact
states and Cuba, Vietnam, Laos and Mongolia. Marshal Kulikov,
commander-in-chief of Pact forces, declared on 6 April that Pact
leaders had "taken decisions to further strengthen the defense
capability of all member countries" at the meeting of the
Political Consultative Committee in Prague last January.
14. In view of the Soviet leaders' conviction that very high
political and strategic stakes are involved in NATO's INF plans
and that the outcome of this contest will have a profound.
influence on the global balance in the indefinite future, initial
INF deployments almost certainly will trigger Andropov's
"inevitable chain reaction." Provocative Soviet and Bloc
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"countermeasures" may set in motion a sharp escalatory cycle of
actions and reactions that could precipitate a debilitating
polarization of political forces in West Germany, outbreaks of
public disorder in East Germany and Poland, and abrupt shifts in
the 1NF positions of Bonn and other basing countries. These
events could hardly fail to generate serious strains and
divergences in transatlantic relations, and both superpowers
could well find themselves confronted by powerful centrifugal
forces that would be difficult to manage.
Harry C. Cochran
S E C R E T
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NIC #4257-83
10 June 1983
SUBJECT: Soviet Perceptions of the Stakes in NATO's
INF Deployment
Distribution:
Orig -
DCI
1 -
DDCI
1 -
Executive
Director
1 -
SA/IS/DCI
1 -
Executive
Registry
1 -
C/NIC
1 -
VC/NIC (Mr. Meyer)
1 -
VC/NIC (Mr. Waterman)
1 -
NIO/W
1 -
A/NI0/W
1 -
SA/W
1 -
NWS
1 - NIO/W Subject File
1 - NIO/W Chron
1 - DDI Registry
S E C R E T
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