CIA PROPOSALS FOR DCI FY 1983 PRODUCTION ENHANCEMENT INITIATIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00816R001100160002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 78
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 25, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 8, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL S"T"ELLiGENCE AGENCY
WASHI GTCN, DC. 20505
COMPT L-" ~-"
R JUL 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Intelligence Community Staff
SUBJECT CIA Proposals for DCI FY 1983 Production
Enhancement Initiatives (S)
1. We submit the attached 21 project proposals (Attachment B)
for consideration as part of the DCI Enhancement Initiatives for
for FY 1983. Although they have been placed in a priority order
.(Attachment A), each would provide a worthwhile enhancement to the
CIA Program and is worthy of consideration.
(S)
2.
I understand that the Community-wide review process will
start
the
week
of 13 J
uly, and
I have asked
--]of y 25X1
staff
to
assist
You in
that pro
cess. He may
be co
nta
cted on 25X1
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Maurice Lipton
Comptroller
Attachments:
A. Ranking Order of Enhancement Initiatives
B. 21 Project Proposal Packages
This Document may be Downgraded to
SECRET and taken out of Channels
when Enclosure is Detached.
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Distribution:
Copy 1 - Addressee
2 - ICS
3 - ICS
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5-ICS
6 - ICS
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9 - ICS
10 - ICS
11 - DDCI
12 - Executive Resist
13 - DIA
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15-NSA
16 - D/NF
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4--2O - Compt Subj. File
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(6 July 1981)
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CIA PROPOSALS FOR DCI FY 1983 PRODUCTION
ENHANCEMENT INITIATIVES
(in Rank Order)
($000)
NFAC/PMES Computer..for _Experimentation;.-with .;Large
Computation Intensive Applications
NFAC/OPA Exploiting Political and Social Data
DDS&T/ORD Large Scale Econometric Modeling System
DDS&T/OSO
NFAC/OGSR Nonfuel Mineral Supply-Demand Data
DDS&T/ORD Water/Rail Transportation,Assessment
NFAC/OS R/ Center for the Study of Soviet Naval
O SWR Tactical Warfare
DDS&T/ORD .Advanced Cartographic Support System
DDS&T/OSO
NFAC/OER Computer Technology Research
DDS&T/ORD Cost Estimation Methodology for Non-Market
Economies
DDS&T/ORD Digital Back-Issue FBIS Dailies
NFAC/OGSR Spatial Data Analysis Project
.NFAC/OER Industrial Analysis Forum
DDS&T/OSO.
.DDS&T/OSO
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($000)
?NFAC/PMES Systems Modelling.Center
DDS&T/ORD Multidisciplinary-Military"Research
:DDS&T/ORD Advanced Computer Techniques 'for the
Pro,duc,tion.,and_Interpretation of.Finished.
Intelligence Products
`DDS&T/ORD Analytical-'Skills Enhancement:Program.
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I. Project Title: Computer for Experimentation with Large
Computation Intensive Applications
Submitting Agency: CIA
II. Costs:
III. Description of Project:
A. Statement of Need:
Several NFAC offices have requirements for
experimentation with large computation intensive computer
applications. Large computer models such as OGSR's
CHALLENGE, some of OER's econometric models and some of
OSWR's and OSR's systems/models require large amounts of
mainframe computer processing time (some require
hours). Consequently, the number of computer runs is
limited to at, most a few per work day and, in some cases,
is limited to a single overnight run. Such delays reduce
the overall amount of experimentation and exploitation
that can be done with these models. They also constrain
the. ability to develop and subsequently run in a
production mode. A-solution to this problem, and for
many computation intensive applications of this type, is
a high speed digital processor with parallel processing
of heterogeneous data. Such processors have been under
development for several years and are just now beginning
to enter the commercial marketplace. They have execution
speeds of 10 to 160 million instructions per second,
which compares to about five million instructions per
second for ODP's largest IBM mainframe. Such speeds
would reduce processing time by factors of up to 30
through execution of different instructions on multiple
data streams simultaneously. This represents a
significant advance in computer architecture. (U)
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B. Who Will Accomplish?
ODP will install and operate the parallel
processor. NFAC requirements for the processor will be
coordinated through the NFAC ADP Control Officer. (U)
C. What is to be Installed?
A high speed digital processor with parallel
processing of heterogeneous data elements is to be
installed for experimentation with large computation
intensive applications. (U)
D. Payoff
The payoff of such a processor to NFAC production
offices will be substantial. For example:
The OER linked econometric model of
major western economies now requires so
much mainframe computer resources that
it currently gets only about a single
run turn-around per work day.
The OGSR CHALLENGE model is so large and
so computation intensive that it
currently gets only about a single run
(or several late night runs) turn-around
per work day.
These are but two examples of NFAC applications that
will be considered for the parallel processor. The
processor can provide for quicker and much more frequent
turn-around of applications such as these. It will
facilitate experimentation and allow for more
exploitation of data due to timing considerations.
Analysts will be able to, on one hand, be more
speculative and be able to, on the other hand, do more
fine tuning of applications when they are able to turn
jobs such as these around in minutes rather than hours.
In the case of the OER linked econometric model, the
number of scenarios that can be analyzed is limited by
the turn-around time. In the case of CHALLENGE, over 100
runs are required to fine tune a new version of the
model. One run (or several late night runs) turn-around
of the model per day is very restrictive. The more
timely the runs, the quicker the feedback, and the more
experimentation analysts can perform. (C)
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E. Time Phasing
In the first year we will bring in the basic
parallel processor system and begin experimentation with
appropriate existing applications on the system. Lease
vs. purchase considerations will be addressed as part of
the system procurement cycle. In the second year we will
expand the hardware to accommodate more experimentation
with new applications. System capacity is in many
regards modular. Additional capacity can be obtained by
adding hardware. (U)
IV. Intelligence Community Applicability
Information on our experience with such a device, from a
technical standpoint will be available to the Intelligence
Community. We will also make available software and system
information--barring proprietary limitations. Policy makers
throughout government make use of output from Agency models
such as OER's linked econometric model. In this regard the
payoff from such a device will be applicable to the
Intelligence Community. (U)
V. Intelligence Consumer Benefits
Increased experimentation with and usage of computation
intensive applications will improve and broaden the scope of
our intelligence product and consequently will benefit
consumers. (U)
VI. Probability of Success
The probability of success is high. High speed parallel
processors of the type described above should be available by
FY 1983 from industry to provide incredibly fast processing
times for many computation intensive computer applications.
Such processors will provide a practical means for
experimentation with large computation intensive
applications. (U)
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Submitting Agency: CIA
Intelligence analysis is often constrained by limitations in readily
available data. To the degree that information is difficult to identify
and manipulate, it will not be incorporated in intelligence production.
In practice, this has meant that a vast array of political and social
information--on public opinion, social trends, and domestic
confict--has remained largely untapped by NFAC analysts. When
analysts assess political and social conditions, such as the potential
for political instability, the effectiveness of foreign government
policies, or support for its foreign policy, they, therefore, often rely
on incomplete information.
This situation calls for the creation of a unique intelligence
resource: a data archive of important political and social information
and the means for analysts to easily use this information in their
To make these data readily accessible by
analysts, an extensive interactive computer software system would
need to be developed. The result would be an archive more
extensive and timely than any that currently exists in either the
public or private sector; one with sophisticated retrieval and analysis
capabilities that would significantly enhance the depth and quality of
NFAC analysis.
The Intelligence Community is embarking upon an extensive effort
to upgrade its capabilities to monitor socioeconomic trends in foreign
countries through increased use of external data bases, such as those
of the Bureau of the Census, and by more intensive analysis of these
data. This is a vital effort. Rarely, however, can one infer political
consequences from socioeconomic trends alone. To make this linkage,
we need an in-house capability to store and retrieve not only
socioeconomic information, but also information of a more political
nature as well. For example, the historical relationship between
inflation rate and a leader's popularity or the incidence of domestic
protest could be quickly measured statistically and graphically. More
complex models would lead to forecasts of stability within a country.
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OPA is collecting and computerizing political and social data that
will facilitate interpretation of economic, demographic, and electoral
trends by NFAC analysts. At present, the OPA Data Archive
The rapidly-increasing availability of information in computerized
formats, the projected,arrival of large numbers of computer terminals
in NFAC offices, the: development of analytic aids through ORD's
Intelligence Production Laboratory project, and Agency acquisition of
sophisticated computer graphics systems will soon make possible a
thorough and systematic exploitation of political and social data.
These new data and analysis tools will be of particular importance for
the new political instability and terrorism analysts in NFAC.
C. What is required:
External research funds will be used to hire outside contractors to
complete four basic tasks:
1) Development of ; a computer software system that will allow
analysts to make queries regarding the availability of data on their
country or issue and conduct simple statistical analyses. This would
involve the capability to interface with computer packages --
including graphics support -- already available on the Agency's
computer system or currently under development. The computer
software development is vital if maximum utility is to be derived from
these data. The system we envisage would permit the analyst to
specify a country, region, or issue and receive at the terminal an
inventory of available archive data by time period. The system would
then query the analyst, about his or her interests. At each point,
the analyst would make choices, receive results, process data
statistically or graphically, save files, and otherwise manipulate the
data in an interactive way. Only by making the information readily
available and easily usable will its full benefit be realized. It is
estimated that development of this software will cost Dover the 25X1
first two years.
3) Transcription of socioeconomic data and election returns from
published documents to computerized formats. We estimate 60 files
will need to be transcribed at a cost of
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4) Coding of politically relevant events, such as acts of terrorism,
insurgency- and government reprisal within countries. OPA currently
has such a file in the archive on 136 countries for the period 1948 to
1977. The contractor w Id bring the file up to date. Estimated cost
of this work is
D. Implementation and timing:
We do not anticipate that these tasks will be implemented by the
same contractor. OPA will have overall responsibility. The computer
software development will be done in consultation with ODP. It is
assumed that major portions of that work will have to be contracted
out, since the task is likely to exceed ODP's available resources.
External contractors are the most appropriate means for the massive
data collection and preparation effort because of the need to develop
an extensive set of historical files at the beginning. Once the
historical baseline has been developed, the archive will be updated
and maintained in-house, supplemented by a minor investment of
office external analysis funds when required.
If this project is funded, the OPA will conduct an ADP
requirements study during FY82 and locate, through competitive
bidding, contractors able to perform the related tasks, so that there
would be no delay in getting started in FY83.
The archive would constitute a unique resource within the
Intelligence Community that could be used by NFAC analysts via their
terminals in either VM or Batch mode, but would also support
requests for analysis from DIA and State. The computer-based
retrieval and analysis capability will be developed with such flexibility
that additional data bases could be added to the system in the future.
OER's TRADAR data base, for example, will be linked to this system.
The development of an archive of this sort responds directly to
one of the basic issues involved in improving the quality of
analysis--namely, insuring the systematic analysis of the most
comprehensive data available. Consumers would benefit by getting
products whose judgments are derived from the best available
information.
While the data archive would be a unique resource, there are no
known technical or administrative obstacles to its development. We
anticipate that a significant amount of time would be needed to
familiarize analysts with its capabilities and use.
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I. PROJECT TITLE: Large Scale Econometric Modelling System
Submitting Agency: CIA
II. COSTS:
III. DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT:
a. Statement of Need:
The volume of data and large number of variables
which must be generated and processed for analysis of
international economic situations is too great to be
handled by existing Agency software. The current
Community systems have severe limitations. For example,
the Agency system is 1960 vintage and has many design
defects which restrict the incorporation of advanced
mathematical and economic techniques. The system
architecture also seriously restricts the size of
problems which can be generated and requires the user
to resort to undesirably high levels of data aggregation.
The Agency's current system (TROLL) has the capacity to
run models with 2,000 equations and 4,000 variables.
The high priority OER requirement which this project
addresses is a system with the capacity to run models
with 10,000 equations and 15,000 variables in the same
CPU time and real elapsed time. OER's requirements can
be met by a custom-developed system. (S)
b. What will be Developed
The system will essentially consist of two parts.
One part will be designed for creating the framework of
economic types of models. Its purpose will be to take
econometric or mathematical statements, logical requests,
and other such demands, and then generate an appropriate
model. In addition, the first part of the system will
also be able to perform data management tasks. The
second part of the system will consist of a set of
algortihms which will be designed to solve large scale
econometric models on efficient computers such as array
processors. Other systems capabilities such as storing
the output from one algorithm for input in the use of
another algorithm will also be available. (S)
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system will be designed in a modular fashion so that new algorithmic
techniques can easily be incorporated and accessed (if required) to solve
a new type of problem. As new generations of simulation and optimization
software are developed, they will be implemented in the system to in-
crease the efficiency and to provide even faster turnaround times. In
conjunction with the system, the documentation will provide detailed
definitions and sample problems,-and general information about other_ap-
o_ications of the techniques. (S)
c. Who will Accomplish
This project will be a joint effort by ORD/kNIR, OER/DAC, and ODP/
Applications. This project will require extensive commitments by both
organizations. ORD will provide specialized manpower to manage the pro-
ject. OER must provide manpower to document their experience with the
current system and provide personnel to test the system as it is con-
structed. The following table represents the manpower requirements by
CRD and OER for the duration of the project:
ORD
OER
FY 1983 FY 1984 FY 1985
2 2 2
1 2 2
d. Time Phasing
This project will have a duration of three years. The direct research
cost The tasks which are required and their order of
occurrence are as follows:
o feasibility and system design study (FY 1983)
o prototype software and documentation development (FY 1983-1984)
o test, evaluation, and refinement (FY 1984-1985)
o? final system development (FY 1985)
:i 1985 costs will be borne by ORD and OER.
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IV. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY APPLICABILITY
The Agency is currently developing many econometric
models to answer the questions from the White House, NSC,
DOD, State, Treasury, and Commerce Departments. These
models have been very useful, but the Agency has reached a
level where a more sophisticated system is required to model
and solve large-scale problems. (S)
V. INTELLIGENCE CONSUMER BENEFITS
This project will provide the intelligence community
with a unique modelling system that has been designed to
meet the Agency's requirements and specifications. many of
the software systems which the Agency has acquired have
previously been developed for industry or academia. Although
most of these systems do solve the Agency's immediate software
needs, the analysts who must extensively use these systems
have no input in the design and their experience in working
on problems cannot be fully accommodated by such systems.
The development of a new system would enable the analysts to
incorporate their experience into the system design, and the
system could be constructed to meet the long range goals of
their managemet. (S)
VI. PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS
There is a high probability of success for this project.
The recent advances in software and hardware have enabled
business and researchers from academia to solve problems
that are two or three orders of magnitude larger than they
have previously solved. The technology and experience to
undertake such a project currently exists, but it would
require extensive participation on the part of the consumer,
OER, and dedicated manpower by the managing office, ORD.
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I. PROJECT TITLE: Nonf uel Mineral Supply-Demand Data Base
Submitting Agency: CIA
II. COSTS: FY83
FY84 : FY85 : FY86 :
III. DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT:
a. Statement of need:
There is a persistent and justifiable Federal policy concern
with the vulnerability of the United States and its allies to
interruptions in the imports of nonfuel minerals that are critical
to the maintenance of defense or essential civilian production or to
the general strength of the Western economies. The United States,
Western Europe, and Japan all import, more than 90 percent of their
requirements of such important minerals as manganese, cobalt,
chromium, and bauxite; interruptions would severely affect steel
production (manganese), stainless steel output (chranium), and the
manufacture., of jet engines (cobalt and chranium), among other
industries. The United States is also dependent on imports of
columbium, tantalum, and platinum, which are critical to such
industries as jet engine manufacture, metal working, electronics,
and petroleum refining..
The risks of supply disruption are magnified by the restricted
availability of these minerals: chromium comes overwhelmingly from
South Africa, platinum-group metals mainly from South Africa and the
USSR, manganese from Gabon and South Africa, cobalt from Zaire and
Zambia, and tantalum from southeast Asia. In short, these and other
critical minerals are disproportionately imported from areas that
are especially subject to instability or politically motivated
supply interruption.
In response to this problem, the Agency has intermittently
carried out ad hoc analyses of particular mineral supply or
contingency situations, and its Resource Analysis Branch (ERAD/OGSR)
has initiated a series of System Dynamics modeling efforts designed
for systematic evaluation of the many influences, including
political and commercial, that impinge or may impinge on the
international flow of important nonfuel minerals. Such efforts,
however, are hampered by the lack of comprehensive, systematically
compiled and coordinated governmental and private information
bearing on future nonfuel mineral consumption and supply. It is
believed that the proposed effort would greatly enhance the
potential for quicker, more penetrating, and more reliable
evaluative efforts. While a substantial commitment of resources
would be needed to establish the system,the maintenance cost should
be relatively modest.
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b. Who will accomplish:
The proposed data base would be maintained by Resource Analysis
(RA) Branch staff after having been established as the result of
both staff. and contract efforts. It would rely largely on already
ongoing effort, in the sense that it would combine. and coordinate
those relevant governmental and, possibly, commercial data bases
already in existence or under development. Crude data and
intelligence that is reported currently in a variety of open and
classified sources would also be assimilated and coordinated.
c. What is to be developed:
The proposed data base would consist of a variety of separate
data sets, both quantitative and narrative, on consumption,
capacity, production, inventories, prices, and recycling, as well as
on the relevant economic, political, psychological, geographic,
institutional, and other determinants of those variables.
Predictions made by other authorities would also be included-
especially predictions or contingency scenarios that relate to the
risk of future supply problems. These data sets would be maintained
on disk and magnetic tape files accessible through the CIA MM
system, which would be programmed to provide both machine readable
output and printouts suitable for distribution or for inclusion in
finished reports. Adjunctive use would also be made of the MAGAS
system to provide a variety of graphic displays and cartographic
arrays.
Under appropriate safeguards, the data sets would be made
accessible in part to other government agencies, and efforts would
be made to maximize, to. the extent practicable, the automatic
assimilation of data sets and inputs available from these other
government agencies, as well as within the CIA itself. Following
the practice of other government agencies, efforts would also be
made to make the unclassified (security or business) portion of the
data base available, through an appropriate agent (governmental or
nongovernmental), to outside researchers and the general public.
The data sets would be established and maintained for each of
the important commodity forms of those nonfuel minerals
(tentatively, some 15-20) selected for their importance in the
general economy and/or their critical defense applications.
Particular priority would be given to those minerals characterized
by the greatest apparent risk of potential supply problems. Part of
the initial project for establishing the data base would be the
review of selections and selection processes already used by other
Federal agencies. To the extent possible, advanced forms of a
particular mineral would be linked to the specific sources of
contributory inputs and cruder forms would be linked to the specific
processors which consume them.
Information on relevant determinants would be kept in separate
data sets, code-linked to the particular minerals and commodity
forms to. which they were relevant, and there would be similar,
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reverse linking of the particular mineral commodities to the
determinants. These determinants would include not only
macroeconomic, financial, and end-use consumption information, but
institutional and political factors affecting production or
consumption in particular places, including specific business
interrelationships. Care would be taken to include political and
business-relationship factors that would be likely to affect the
volume and direction of supply in a stringency or contingency
situation. -
The data sets would consist not only of crude statistical and
narrative inputs, but of such analytical summations and
manipulations of the data as were determined to be useful on a
routine basis. Reports would be examined for apparent original
source and duplicate reports eliminated (with preference being given
to the retention of the least highly classified), except as
duplication (or partial duplication) seemed to be useful for
purposes of corroboration or clarification; procedures would also
allow for the routine replacement of original reports in their
entirety, where warranted, by analytical summaries, conversions, or
abstracts.
Apparently contradictory statistical data sets would be
maintained, as seemed useful, with cross-references to explanations
of the reasons for apparent or actual discrepancies; this would be
particularly in order for statistical data sets in common use,
including preliminary versions of statistics subjected to later
adjustment. Annotations would include reasons for preferring
particular statistical sets for particular applications. Routinely
compiled composite, synthesized, or converted data sets deemed to
have useful analytical application would likewise be included. All
of the data sets used in the System Dynamics modeling would be
included, with the annotations in the computer file serving as the
necessary documentation.
Access to, and maintenance of, these files would require
additions to the present complement of computer terminals. The
corresponding offset would be a material reduction in the need for
individual file-keeping. The proposed data base would entail some
small overlap with the computerized document service of the office
of Central Reference, but would differ from the latter in its
organization and in its inclusion of processed rather than crude
intelligence; the OCR data base would be a key source for initial
file establishment. There would also be small overlaps with the
USGS Computerized Resource Information Bank (CRIB), the Bureau of
Mines Minerals Availability System (MAS), and other Bureau of Mines
computerized files (such as one on aluminum processing facilities
and a developing Automated Mineral Information System (AMIS); to the
extent feasible without sacrifice of analytical capabilities,
summary or synthesized output from these or other relevant files
would be utilized in lieu of raw records.
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Since the proposed data base consists of a number of discrete
segments and sources, it can be phased in over a period of time and
yet be useful as soon as the first segment is in place and
accessible. Nevertheless, it.is assumed that'the bulk of the work
of establishing the data base can be accomplished, under one or more
outside contracts, during the first year of the program, with
practical application and "debugging" commencing late that same
year.
Several concurrent operations would be initiated within the
first few months of the first ;year, including, tentatively: design
and award of contracts for reconnoitering, appraising, and, if
appropriate, designing procedures for the incorporation of one or
more governmental data bbases;;in-house investigation of the optimal
means for incorporating material from the OCR and other intelligence
community files; and staff exploration with the office of Data
Processing (ODP) of the optimal means for assimilating inputs into
the proposed file, maintaining. the file, providing both for
restricted and unrestricted access, and linking the file with the
System Dynamics models and other computerized operations.
The second half of the first year would see the initiation of
staff work or contract design and award for follow-up with regard to
gaps in the system or, if necessary, improvements in system
design. In particular, the initial assessment of privately
maintained data bases may reveal a void needing to be filled by
original collection and.coordination of published reports bearing,
particularly, on announced plans and projects for establishment,
expansion, or contraction of mineral extraction and processing
capacity. Work on this or. other supplementary contracts, if
required, would be carried on mostly in the first half of the
project's second year. The third year of the project would find the
data bank in full current operation, though still on.a "shakedown"
basis. The amount budgeted fori'the fourth year is the estimated
level of continuing operating expense for the mature system, subject
only to later inflationary escalation.
In the detailed scheduling, priority would be given to those
minerals and those elements of the system that were most relevant to
providing assessments of situations with apparently greatest risk
and most serious consequences of a supply contingency.
The project might pioneer some methods of data banking and access
-particularly with regard to varying degrees of. access by varying
categories of users -- but this would be only an incidental and possibly
not boo visible by-product. It may also lead to the development of new
techniques for the screening and integration of partially or wholly
inconsistent reports on the same subject. In the development of the
project, previous experience of this sort would be reviewed, to the
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extent practicable, and information on any apparently useful new
experience gained would be disseminated to the intelligence community.
V. INTELLIGENCE CONSUMER BENEFITS:
The principal benefit to intelligence consumers would be a
considerably enhanced capability both for foreseeing the emergence of
potential mineral supply problems and for evaluating the implications of
contingency, policy, and other scenarios affecting mineral supply.
These benefits would accrue both from direct evaluation of the entries
in the data base and -- especially for longer term problems -- use of
the data base in the System Dynamics models. Of a comparable order of
benefit would be the vastly increased productivity of each hour of RA
analyst time - sufficient, it is believed, to provide a substantial net
benefit over and above the costs of establishing and maintaining the
data bank. It is believed, furthermore, that as familiarity with the
data base spread to other parts of the intelligence community,
significant cost and time savings would be effected for other analysts
as well.
VI. PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS:
There has by now been a sufficiently large body of successful
experience with large data banks - both numerical and narrative and
particularly within the CIA -- that the probability of success for the
one here proposed is very high. Furthermore, the proposed data base
would be a success in terms of its productivity, quality, and cost
aspects even if particular parts of it failed to be achieved. Although
sane risk exists with regard to the costs and degree of effectiveness
with which the objectives - including both original establishment and
later upkeep -- are accomplished, it is very unlikely that the outcome
would be such as to negate in its entirety the potentially large excess
of net benefit.
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nfs..f9 C i
I. PROJECT TITLE: Water/Rail Transportation
Assessment
Submitting Agency: CIA
III. DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT:
The flow of economic goods and military supplies is
highly dependent upon a country's water and rail transpor-
tation infrastructure. For example, the main mode of east-
west transfer and support of Sino-Soviet forces is by rail.
The ability to maintain a tactical account of material flow
is frustrated by the large amount of all-source data that
must be assimilated and analyzed. Current analytical capa-
bilities are restricted by a lack of large-scale, high
speed modelling techniques and a data base management
system for network models. The current Agency modeling
systems only have the capacity to efficiently model trans-
portation systems with a few hundred lines. Models of this
size are excellent for classroom exercises, but they do
not exploit the full economic and physical integrations
which are available and necessary to understand large,
complex network systems. Recent advances in software have
provided the ability to efficiently solve network problems
that are three and four orders of magnitude larger than
those solved by classical procedures and do it in near-
realtime, (S)
b'. Who will Accomplish:
This project will be a joint undertaking between
ORD (AMR) and NFAC (OER, OSR, OGSR, and OIA). It will
*FY85 costs will be borne by ORD and customer offices.
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c. What will be Developed
A data base management system will be adopted to
collate and format the diverse sources of information
into the desired structures. A transportation model
(simulator) will be analyzed to provide an assessment
methodology for a water and rail system for a selected
region. An interactive information management system
will be employed to allow the analyst a direct interface
with the model and the data base.
d. Time Phasing:
This will be a three year program. The first year
will involve the development of a data base on Soviet
rail and water systems, movements, and port facilities
and, the procurement and adoption of a data management
system and network models. In the second year, systems
documentation will be prepared and qualified personnel
will run pilot operations. The third year will focus
on entering the analytical model to handle assessments
for other selected transportation networks. (S)
IV, INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY APPLICABILITY:
This assessment procedure will be employed not only by
NFAC but also by DOE and DIA. The Community will share a
common data base and evaluation criteria. The analysts will
be able to routinely employ imagery and automatic mapping
procedures to generate the transportation networks and
monitor key targets such as depots. Information processing
routines will automatically calculate distances, potential
flow capabilities, and duration of movement. This methodology
can provide significant data and criteria in establishing
collection requirements. (S)
V, ? INTELLIGENCE CONSUMER BETNEFITS :
The consumer of intelligence information will be assured
that the complex issues such as Soviet grain transshipment,
east-west military mobility, and economic infrastructure
limitations can be routinely examined and analyzed with a
formal methodology by the intelligence community. In addition,
the collection requirements employing expensive and high
demand collectors will be coordinated and efficiently employed. (S)
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VI. PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS:
This project, though complex in nature, is based on
proven industrial modelling techniques. The
operations research approach
multidisciplinary
will insure a highly reliable end product. Combining
both of these elements should provide confidence in successfully
meeting the project objectives. (S)
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I. PROJECT TITLE: Center for the Study of Soviet Naval
Tactical Warfare
There is currently much debate over the capability of the US
Navy to carry out its missions of sea control and projections of power
ashore. As US dependence on Mid-East oil has increased, so have the
concerns about the capability of the US to protect vital shipping
lanes and, if necessary, to transport troops and equipments to remote
regions and then provide extended logistical support. Accurate
assessments of Soviet naval capabilities and intentions are vital as
decisions about the size, capabilities, and composition of our navy
are being made. These assessments require a thorough understanding of
Soviet naval doctrine and Soviet perceptions of US naval capabilities.
Additionally it requires an understanding of Soviet weapon systems,
ships, submarines, and the means of integrating these elements into
.effective naval forces. It also requires an understanding of Soviet
naval support entities that range from satellites for targeting naval
weapons to supply ships for allowing extended naval operations.
Finally it requires a broad understanding of Soviet and US naval
programs in order to evaluate their comparative strengths and weak-
nesses.
Currently, many efforts are underway within the Intelligence
Community to evaluate technical elements of the Soviet Navy. However,
these efforts are largely fragmented with little coordination between
agencies and deal with a limited aspect of the overall naval problem.
The resultant products are not always effectively integrated into a
comprehensive perspective of Soviet naval capabilities and intentions.
The mechanism does not exist to focus the currently ongoing technical
analysis into a comprehensive Community view. The NIE process does
this type of comprehensive integration for the Community at the policy
level but obviously is not intended to provide an acceptable outlet
for appropriate consumers at the technical analysis level. The
results are that gaps in our understanding are not readily identified
and recommendations regarding data collections are often lacking. A
single center for the study of Soviet tactical weapons could comple-
ment each agency's program and integrate the analytical efforts
already underway, identify gaps in analysis and collection, initiate
studies to fill the analytical gaps, recommend changes to fill the
collection gaps, and, in general, provide a comprehensive product in
Soviet naval tactical weapons. In conjunction with the US Navy many
issues regarding future US programs could then be addressed in a more
knowledgeable manner.
CCE DCT
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B. Who Will Participate
The proposed Center would be administered by an Interagency
Control Committee consisting of a member and alternate from CIA, NSA,
NISC, DIA, and FTD. Because of CIA's centralized intelligence func-
tion, they will provide the chairmanship for the Committee. All
members and alternates shall be at a first or second tier management
level within their respective organizations. The Interagency Control
Committee will provide for interagency awareness of and informal coor-
dination of all community naval analytical efforts but will provide no
censorship or control authority over these efforts. Recommendations,
however, will be made to the sponsoring agencies as appropriate. The
Committee will also identify important issues that need to be
addressed by the Community, initiate contractor support to bridge
important gaps, and provide a mechanism for the comprehensive integra-
tion of the technical analysis output of the Community into important
studies of a broader scope. It is anticipated that a willingness will
be present on the part of each agency to direct some level of effort
toward meeting Center goals.
The Center will ultimately give a. comprehensive appraisal based
on an interdisciplinary approach, regarding the Soviet capabilities
and assets available to initiate and sustain tactical warfare and
Soviet doctrine regarding such warfare. In documenting this
appraisal, inputs related to the following more specific areas will be
sought from Community elements:
o Role of the Soviet navy as a tool to effect
political goals and project economic/military
power;
o Soviet naval tactical doctrine
o Naval command, control, and communications
structures;
o Methodology, procedures, and equipments used for
battle management and pre-battle planning;
o Soviet perception of US naval tactical warfare
capabilities, assets, doctrine, etc.;
o Capability of Soviets to acquire relevant
.intelligence;
Targeting against naval forces to include
targeting assets, accuracies, timeliness, etc.;
o Definition and evaluation of the ECM environment
and assets available;
o Naval systems capabilities, vulnerabilities,
availability, numbers, deployment, technical
parameters;
o Human factors;
o Equipment factors;
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o Factors in deciding whether to initiate nuclear
tactical warfare or conventional tactical warfare;
o Specific evaluation of important scenarios;
o Changes in US collection of intelligence.
D. Time Phasing
In the first year we will establish the Interagency Control
Committee and develop the methodology to comprehensively examine
Soviets capabilities. We will identify critical elements in our
understanding of Soviet naval capabilities and initiate analytical
efforts for those elements for which adequate analysis does not
already exist. We will attempt to integrate the massive intelligence
effort already being expended on the Soviet Navy and determine if
collection efforts can be initiated or redirected to answer questions
that have previously been unanswerable. We will review Soviet reac-
tions to current US naval programs and estimate Soviet reaction to
future US programs.
Extensive analyses of critical Soviet weapons, radars, ships,
submarines, satellites, and battle management assets will occupy the
next two years. Additionally, we will have to acquire a thorough
understanding of US naval programs and capabilities in order to view
Soviet programs and capabilities in their proper context. The final
year of the study will be spent evaluating the effectiveness of an
integrated Soviet naval force in achieving Soviet naval goals. Test
cases in evaluating the validity of our conclusion will involve
specific scenarios relating to vital US needs. For example, we will
assess the capability of the Soviet Navy to impair the US Navy's capa-
bility to protect shipping lanes from the Mid-East oilfields in the
face of determined Soviet opposition. Additionally intelligence
requirements that cannot be fulfilled with current or planned collec-
tors will be identified.
IV. Intelligence Community Applicability
The comprehensive methodology used by the Center could serve as a
model for other topical categories within the US Intelligence Commu-
nity. Additionally, the results of the analysis will affect analyt-
ical requirements and collection efforts at NSA, DIA, NISC, and CIA.
Establishment of this Center will allow us to optimize collection of
Soviet naval intelligence with current capabilities and define
specific requirements for future collection.
Intelligence Consumer Benefits
If successful, this effort should greatly aid the US Navy in
assessing the Soviet capability and assets available to conduct
tactical warfare and in planning for future resources. Additionally
it will aid a wide variety of US policy makers by better defining the
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strengths, weaknesses, and limitations of the Soviet Navy in thwarting
US global plans. This effort will also serve as a valuable input into
DoD officials and Congress in allocating future US military funds.
Probability of Success
This effort, if well managed and with selfless cooperation from
Community agencies, has a high probability of limited success and
could well prove to be very successful if cooperation exists at a high
level. ..The greatest uncertainties concern the complexities of the
problem ~ the sufficiency of the data, and the degree of interdisci-
plinary cooperation.
SFCR FT
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I. PROJECT TITLE: Advanced Cartographic Support System
Submitting Agency: CIA
II. FUNDS:
III. DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT:
a. Statement of need:
Many intelligence production activities use
geographic information as an intelligence source.
These analyses are supported in part by cartographic
data bases maintained by OGSR; however, these data
base systems are designed to store cartographic fea-
tures in point or linear form. These data struc-
tures and formats were historically designed around
the limitations of digitizing and plotting systems
and were tailored for traditional use in the prepa-
ration of maps and charts.
A number of functions of interest to analysts
are not supported. In particular, partially over-
lapping areas--e.g.,.the not structly hierarchical
lapping areas--e.g., the not strictly hierarchical
nature of neighborhood, ward, school district, SMSA,
borough, city, county, state, industrial region--
cannot be easily manipulated. A similar,. problem
arises for point targets, area targets, cultural
features like rail/water routes, growing regions,
and political boundaries. Similarly, relationships
of cultural and geographic features--e.g., feed
roads and rails, water tributaries, point targets
as part of a larger target complex--are inadequately
treated today.
The geographic information systems must be
enhanced and expanded to,support the future needs
of production analysts, imagery analysts, cartogra-
phers, geographers, and publication artists. There-
fore, several functions are needed to support and
supplement ongoing CIA programs (e.g., NFAC's Analyst
Productivity Theme, OGSR's Graphics Automation
Upgrade, NPIC's NDS).
One need is for a cartographic data base manage-
ment system. Present data bases contain point and
vector data; that is, they can support the drawing
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of outline maps with labels, cities, etc. These
data bases do not support certain basic analytical
problems requiring a computer system which contains
geographic information, e.g., "is this point in
France," "is this river a tributary of the Seine."'
The present data bases must be upgraded to include
such geographical information and research must be
done to identify what sorts of information are
needed by intelligence analysts, how such informa-
tion should be stored in a data base, and how our
existing data bases can be efficiently transformed
and enhanced.
6 ;'AY ?331
A second need is the ability to use various
analytical data bases in conjunction with the geo-
graphic data base and to be able to merge analytical
data bases from several sources. The system must be
able to maintain geographical relationships' such
that they can be accessed across a variety of appli-
cations. The system should be designed, insofar as
possible, to be compatible with the needs and products
of other systems (e.g., NPIC's NDS, CAMS).
Additional research is needed on related
themes, including:
o Communication of geographic information
among different systems and different
devices (e.g., graphics shops, televi-
sion centers).
o Specialized mapping techniques for
showing information (e.g., cartograms--.
distortions of geography to portray data,
i.e., showing the size of a country
according to its population rather than
its area.)
o Raster and vector data merger.
b. Who Will Accomplish:
The proposed work would be done by existing ORD
staff personnel with external contractor assistance.
ORD would work closely with OGSR graphic and carto-
graphic staff members. ORD would also be responsible
for coordinating with other groups in the Agency,
especially NFAC and NPIC, on applying the research
results to real-world analytical problems and
systems.
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c. What is to be developed:
We will develop the following products:
o Survey of external state-of-the-art
geographic data base systems (e.g.,
Harvard's mapping software, DMA data
bases, JPL's VICAR system) and appro-
priate graphics and cartographic tech-
nologies. (This is a relatively minor
effort since ORD and OGSR are already
monitoring these fields.)
o Set of analytical requirements for
support.
.J U JJru :93i
o Integration of appropriate external
software with existing Agency systems
(e.g., WORLD DATA BANK, CAM, MAGAS, TACK).
o Research and development efforts for those
requirements for which no existing method-
ologies are sufficient; these efforts will
build on ORD's existing research programs
in information handling, artificial intelli-
gence, computer graphics, and interactive
systems, as well as ORD's knowledge of
other research in government, industry,
and academia. Likely areas include:
o Automated digitization and map
building.
o Specialized mapping techniques.
o Query systems for analysts using
multiple-source data with geographic
data bases.
o Formatting techniques, especially
for communicating information among
different offices and different
media.
d. Time Phasing:
Because this project builds upon and supports
other on-going ORD and Agency projects, most of the
groundwork and preliminary analysis will be prepared
in FY-82. The first year of the DCI Enhancement will
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provide for system integration and the first research
projects. The second year's funding will be devoted
to research and development.
IV. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY APPLICABILITY
The project will produce an enhanced World Data Bank, which
is a major resource for the Community at large. Insofar as it
supports COMIREX and NPIC, it should enhance the Community's
capability as well. ORD and OGSR are already working together
with NSA and other parts of the Community on graphics and car-
tography and we assume that all research performed under this
effort will be shared in a like manner.
V. INTELLIGENCE CONSUMER BENEFITS:
The project will result in increased capability for analysts,
cartographers, and graphic designers. This, in turn, should
provide improved analysis and presentation of the analytical
product.
VI. PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS:
The probability is high for producing.a system which will
significantly improve geographic/cartography data handling and
analysis. It is likely that it will improve the Agency's ability
to handle more data with no increase in staffing.
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I. PROJECT TITLE: Computer Technology Research
Originator: CIA/OER/DAC
II. COSTS:
III. DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT:
a. Statement of need:
We in the Agency are now spending millions of
dollars per year on computers, partly to increase the
productivity of NFAC analysts. Our success will depend
on how we spend the money.
There is a big difference between (1) computer
systems for document storage and retrieval, and (2)
systems for analytic calculations. Project SAFE will
provide access to documents, but SAFE itself will offer
few if any computer capabilities to pull numbers from
different files, and then do calculations based on the
numbers. For that purpose, different computer software
is necessary.
Analytic computer software is very important in
NFAC, and it will continue to be even after SAFE has
grown to its full size. In particular, analytic
systems are essential for various intelligence
assessments of energy markets, arms trade, Soviet
economic prospects, and many other subjects.
Analytic computer systems differ tremendously in
one respect. Using one system, an analyst with a week
of training and an hour of effort can program certain
calculations. The same calculations, done on a
different system, may take months of effort by a
programmer with years of training. This difference
among systems is sometimes called user friendliness,
and it is a critical determinant of how productive our
machines and people are, as a team.
Determining the best analytic software takes time,
talent, and money, just as in many other fields of
research. Hundreds of new systems are put on the
market each year. To choose intelligently, we have to
take the time to find out what the new systems really
offer, how expensive they are in total, and how well
our analysts can use them.
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It is difficult to tell how well a new system will
work, without ever allowing analysts to test the
system. Therefore, it makes sense to begin and
continue a program in which. our computer specialists
seek new analytic software, and install the most
promising systems for analysts to test. OER's newest
system of information storage and retrieval--namely the
RAMIS package--is now over ten years old. Something
better has almost surely been developed in the last
decade.
b. Initial phases:
The funds requested for FY83 are to cover the
testing of successors to OER's present system of data
storage and retrieval. OER, ORD, and ODP would develop
criteria for testing the new systems. These criteria
would be applied by an external contractor to systems
suggested by the three offices, along with other
systems suggested by the contractor. At the end of
FY83, a decision would probably be made to purchase a
new package, for approximately Thereafter, 25X1
the research on new sof ware at an annual
rate of whil per year is allocated 25X11
for purchasing new systems s -on the research.
IV. CONSUMER BENEFITS:
This project would develop more sophisticated computer
software, so that analysts could create their own files of
machine-readable data, and access these files. OER would
benefit from this effort in the areas of international arms
trade, shipping, and finance, and in narrower areas of
research on specific industries and commodities.
V. COMMUNITY BENEFITS:
New systems for accessing certain databases would
naturally be available to other intelligence agencies, if
the systems are not proprietary. In particular, the
Defense Intelligence Agency has already requested a
cooperative effort on our database of international arms
sales, along with the National Security Agency.
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VI. PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS:
It is possible that we are now using the very best
computer technology for our work, and that without an
additional effort we will somehow keep pace with
developments in the field, so that additional research
would yield no payoff. On the other hand, for an amount
not to exceed 2 percent of our current annual expenditures
on computers for NFAC, a new program of software research
might easily double the productivity of our computer system
for intelligence analysis.
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I. PROJECT TITLE: Cost Estimation Methodology for Non-Market
Economies (C)
Submitting Agency: CIA
III. DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT:
a. Statement of Need:
At present, NFAC analysts have no meaningful way to
measure the value or production cost of a commodity in
a non-market economy. Prices in local currencies are
available for many items, but they are set by government
agencies and do not reflect the relative scarcity of
goods or the value of inputs to their production. (C)
Analysis of the Soviet strategic metal industries,
for example, a high priority economic intelligence target,
has been vitiated by the lack of a cost estimation metho-
dology. NFAC analysts have no reliable way to measure what
it costs the Soviet Union to produce uranium, chromium,
cobalt and other strategic metals. As a result, when a
cost estimate is needed, for example, to evaluate
uranium resources, U.S. production costs are assumed to
obtain. (Resources are defined as the amount of a
mineral that can be produced at a given price level).
But this assumption is tenuous at best and OER analysts
wish there was a valid and accurate way to estimate
Soviet strategic metals production costs. Such estimates
would not only have great value in themselves but would
enhance CIA abilities to 1) measure trends in Soviet
strategic metals production costs over time; 2) estimate
production cost differentials among various parts of
the Soviet Union; 3) predict future levels of Soviet
strategic metals production, imports, or exports, and
4) anticipate, analyze, and interpret developments in
Soviet strategic metals industries. (S)
This project will develop a quantitative indicator of
production costs for use in a non-market economy and demon-
strate its use by applying it to the strategic metals industry
in the Soviet Union. (S)
*FY85 costs will be borne by ORD.
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b. Who will Accomplish:
The cost estimation methodology should be developed by
an external contracting team composed of economists and
engineer-economists who have expertise in non-market
economies. The cost estimation methodology should be
applied to the Soviet strategic metals industry by external
contractors who are engineer-economists familiar with the
Soviet Union. The work should be carried out with
inputs from OER analysts who will be using the finished
products. (C)
c. What is to be Developed:
The project will yield three different kinds of
products:
1. A multidimensional indicator of costs for use
in studying non-market economies.
Prices in the Soviet Union are set by government
agencies, not the market, and, therefore, do not
reflect the relative demand for, scarcity, or
production costs of the commodities to which they
apply. A price expressed in roubles or dollar
equivalents tells an analyst very little about the
cost or value of an item in the USSR. The first
goal of this project will be to develop a multi-
dimensional indicator of the cost of producing
metals that takes into account such inputs as
energy, skilled and unskilled labor, raw materials,
technology, infrastructure, etc. This indicator
will enable analysts to understand production
costs within the perspective of the USSR's national
and regional economies and to understand the
implications of cost differentials over time, with
various technologies, and in various parts of the
country. (S)
2. A methodology for estimating production costs
in a strategic metal industry.
would be
used to analyze the technology employed at individual
strategic metals plants. Information about that
technology as used in the free world, modified by
knowledge of Soviet industrial practices and the
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design and operation of Soviet iron mines and
steel plants (for which there is abundant information)
would be used to generate production cost estimates
expressed in terms of the project's multidimensional
cost indicator. Additional cost and data verification
can be obtained from emigre accountants, economic
planners, economists, and engineers. The methodology
can be tested by applying it to free world countries
such as Canada or Sweden, which are geographically
or climatically similar to the USSR. (S)
3. Estimates of the cost of producing uranium,
chromium, nickel, cobalt, etc. in the Soviet
Union.
d
The costs of producing uranium shoUl be
first because of its value to
which is developing a uranium resource
estimation methodology. (S)
d. Time Phasing
During the first year the cost indicator, the
methodology for estimating production costs in a metals
industry, and an estimate of the Soviet cost of pro-
ducing uranium will be produced. Estimates of the
costs of producing other strategic metals, e.g. chromium,
nickel, cobalt, and manganese, would be generated
during the second and third years. During years two
and three the contractor will give NFAC analysts short
courses in the development and application of the
strategic metals cost estimation methodology. Tours of
metals production facilities will be included in this
training. (S)
The first year's products will be published in a
methodological report. Economic and technical analyses
of each strategic metal industry, including production
cost estimates, will appear as separate reports. (C)
IV. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY APPLICABILITY
The project's "multidimensional indicator' of cost" will
be a highly useful tool for analysts of the Soviet economy.
The strategic metals production cost methodology and the
cost estimates will be of direct benefit to intelligence
analysts following those industries and industries in which
strategic metals are used. (S)
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All the products of this project can be adapted for use
in studying other non-market economies such as those of
China, Cuba, and the Eastern European nations. The project,
too, will indirectly enhance analysis of world production
and trade in strategic metals. (S)
The products of the Soviet Strategic metals production
cost estimates methodology project will greatly enhance the
quality of intelligence available to policy makers concerned
about Soviet military and industrial strength, the Soviet
Union's role in world trade, and U.S. dependence on imported
strategic metals. (C)
VI. PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS
The probability of developing a methodology to estimate
strategic metals production costs in the USSR is fairly
high. It will, however, depend on finding a contractor
familiar with the Soviet economy and on inputs -- already
volunteered -- from OER analysts with much experience with
Soviet metals industries. (C)
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I. PROJECT TITLE: Digital Back-Issue FBIS Dailies
Submitting Agency: CIA
II. FUNDS:
III. DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT
a. Statement of need:
In automating the production of FBIS Daily Reports,
Project MIDAS will, as a by-product, be able to provide a
digital version. This is certain to appeal to customers who
wish to use new computer tools for manipulating, retrieving,
indexing and cross-referencing, and disseminating text. As
with many such services, however, the start-up could be slow:
software for use with a digital daily report will not have
been refined, analyst experience will be lacking, and more
importantly a critical mass of back issues will take time to
accrue.
This proposal recognizes the need to provide, at the
outset, a certain historical base of on-line daily reports, to
specify the formats so that software can be-designed now to
mate to that base, and to design certain of that software now.
b. Who Will Accomplish:
The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), and CIA's
Office of Research and Development (ORD)
c. What is to be developed
Within the scope of the proposed effort, two year's of
-FBIS Daily Reports will be digitized, indexed, and
cross-referenced. Distribution formats will be standardized,
and software interface specifications will be published.
Copies of the database so constructed will be made available
to Community members for test and evaluation. Experiments at
CIA will be conducted by ORD within the scope of this effort.
d. Time Phasing:
Excepting the early front-end design work, the effort is
spread equally across the two years. Its fruition should
phase nicely into FBIS Project-MIDAS plans.
IV. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY APPLICABILITY:
The Foreign Broadcast Information Service is run by CIA. as a service
of common concern for the US Government. The entire intelligence
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community represents an important sector of the subsdziber base. Many
members of this community have the processing power and the unique needs
to take advantage of such an available database.
V. INTELLIGENCE CONSUMER BENEFITS:
FBIS reports are the second largest US Government publication. All
intelligence consumers will benefit from the timeliness, personalizable
indexing and cross-referencing, and timeliness. Consumers who are their
own analysts will appreciate it all the more.
VI. PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS:
Building, as this project does, upon preliminary experiments using
back issues of the FBIS Daily Reports and commercial OCR technology, the
digitizing of the database has a high probability of success, although
the cost projections recognize that some human intervention will be
necessary to clear up certain ambiguities. As the database description
and management methodologies have matured, and as many organizations
turn their attention to large collections of textual data, the
specifications are also quite likely to be successful the first time.
No technological breakthroughs are required.
In the larger sense of being analytically useful, the effort also
has a high probability of success.
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I: PROJECT TITLE: Spatial Data Analysis Project
Submitting Agency: CIA
II: COSTS:
III: DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT:
a. Statement of need:
The quality of intelligence products depends as much on the
quality of the raw data used in analysis and the inferences that
can be derived through comprehensive modeling of that data as it
does on the expertise of the intelligence production analyst
working .the problem. In recent years the volume of data available
to analysts has increased extraordinarily; the advent of electronic
mail is an indication of the magnitude of this growth and the
concomitant need to efficiently sift through the data, organize it,
and present it in a manner most effective for meaningful
analysis. At the same time, analytical efforts are necessarily
growing in complexity with the recognition that many of the
problems being addressed are affected by a growing number of
variables that both interact with each other and have an impact on
the end result. For exceptionally ccmplex-problems, the analyst
must use sophisticated simulation models to determine likely
outcomes and alternatives. This is particularly true where large
geographic areas are a dimension of the problem, as is the case in
a variety of natural resource analysis efforts underway in CIA.
In order to address these types of problems adequately, it is
necessary to develop new and innovative ADP procedures and
techniques, new software modeling approaches, and better
interactive graphics support for the modeling efforts. Faster,
larger-capacity computational capabilities are needed. Experience
in OGSR has shown that natural-resource modeling efforts, which
typically involve solution of complex, multi-dimensional estimative
equations, tend to demand exceptional amounts of dedicated computer
memory, use excessive amounts of processing time, and require
special types of peripheral data processing equipment.
Furthermore, these types of models are most effective when the
analyst has quick and repeated access to them. The typical process
involves frequent readjustment of variables until model output
matches available data, followed by simulations of possible future
alternatives and tests of modeling assumptions. Special-purpose
data processing equipment is necessary to make this process most
cost-effective. In order to develop the requisite modeling
capability it is necessary to significantly upgrade OGSR's MAGAS
(Meteorological Agronomical Geographical Analysis System)-which
presently provides primarily interactive graphics analysis and
cannot handle large models--through procurement of appropriate
complementary processing equipment; in our experience existing OGSR
and Agency computers cannot address these types of modeling needs
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in the Ames Building location with the necessary efficiency. The
models OGSR would like to use to help its analysts work with the
large volumes of available data (many of these models have already
been acquired by CIA) will then be adapted to the processing
equipment through specialized programming assistance. This
combined hardware/software package will give OGSR analysts a
powerful new capability to conduct quick sequential runs of their
petroleum analysis models, water resources models and other large
numerical simulation models that are currently very costly in their
use of both staff and contractor resources because of the amount of
computer memory they require and slow turnaround times.
Both the equipment and programming needs can be net quite
readily. In industry, special-purpose computing systems employing
array processors tied to minicomputers (which are enormously
efficient in solving the types of "number-crunching" partial
differential equations resource models typically use) are being
developed for just such applications. The added computing
capability that will make these array processors compatible with
MAGAS and the unique graphics capabilities it provides for this
type of work is available in industry, and most of the models OGSR
is interested in using have been (or can readily be) adapted with
minimal programming. It is therefore in the interest of
significantly increasing analyst efficiency and analytical
capabilities that we propose the Spatial Data Analysis Project,
through which these OGSR needs will be defined and coordinated, a
system capable of meeting them will be developed, and the desired
models will be installed on the system.
b. The Spatial Data Analysis Project
In the first phase of the Spatial Data Analysis Project antici-
pated OGSR modeling needs during the early 1980's will be
identified and the system capabilities necessary for satisfying
them will be defined. The OGSR experience with MAGAS and current
computer modeling efforts in the agronomic, narcotics and petroleum
resources areas will be evaluated to help determine potential
modeling and system needs in such topical areas as current foreign
agriculture estimation, food and population assessment, water
resources assessment, demographic change and migration, and
transportation network assessment. Based on these needs, a unique
special-purpose minicomputer-based system that will meet the
dedicated use and special interactive graphics requirements of OGSR
will be designed. Such a system would necessarily involve a direct
supplement to the existing MAGAS system, which provides the special
graphics analysis capabilities these analytical efforts in part
require.
The second phase of the project would concentrate on systems
and software procurement/enhancement; in V1983 would be
used to acquire an array processor and a to upgrade MAGAS to
give the added computational capabilities to make it compatible
with the array processor. The third phase would involve training
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and applications development; ~in FY 84 and ~ in FY 85
would be devoted to contract programming to adapt relevant models
to the system. Approval of the Spatial Data Analysis Project would
provide for a logical enhancement and expansion of existing
analytical activities and capabilities in OGSR and would result in
a consolidation of many OGSR data processing efforts. The Project
would have a high probability of success and would involve a
relatively small investment of funds.
c. What is to be Developed:
The Project will implement new and innovative ADP hardware and
software techniques with the goal of improving the quality of
OGSR's intelligence products in its Geographic Research and
Environment and Resource Analysis Programs. Specific areas that
will be addressed in developing these capabilities include:
o Petroleum analysis software and estimative techniques
applications
o Spatial inference modeling in support of geographic, environ-
ment and resource issues
o Further improvement of graphical analysis capabilities and
procedures
o Alternative methods for processing, exploitation and presen-
tation of analytical data
d. Who Will Accomplish
The proposed OGSR Spatial Data Analysis Project would be
operated by existing OGSR staff with external hardware procurement,
contractor development and software implementation and external
consultant assistance.
IV. INrELLIGENCE COMMUNITY APPLICABILITY:
While the Project will initially concentrate on techniques of the
most utility to CGSR's intelligence production program, the resulting
research and analyses findings will be made available to the entire
Intelligence Community, and it is logical to expect that the added
modeling capability it will provide will support analytical efforts in
other sectors of the Community as well as in OGSR and CIA should the
need arise.
V. INTELLIGENCE CONSUMER BENEFITS:
The principal benefit to consumers is that policymakers will be able
to have many of their queries on natural-resource-related issues
currently handled by OGSR answered far more quickly and definitively
than is now possible. The effects of alternative policies could
be examined rapidly with a high degree of confidence because all
of the available data can be taken into account in each case. The
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dI_' I\I.1.
costs of these analytical efforts would be minimized through the
use of a dedicated modeling system of this type because
contractor/consultant efficiencies would be greatly improved by
the rapid turnaround and extended computing capacities that would
be acquired. Operational efficiency of all CIA computer-using
analytical efforts would be improved because the Project would
divert a significant number of large, time-consuming analytical
programs fran Agency mainframes to a system that both would handle
them much more rapidly and provide the unique interactive graphics
that make such large-scale programs so useful for analysis.
VI. PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS:
The probability of success for the Spatial Data Analysis Project is
high, as much of the software that OGSR is interested in' using has
been acquired or is available in industry, and mostof the rest is well
along in the development phase. The necessary ADP hardware that would
support OGSR objectives is also in existence in industry or in the final
stages of development. The chances of blending both the new hardware
and programs with the existing MAGAS system appears excellent, since
the requisite array processing technology has already been melded with
similar PDP equipment successfully. The implementation of the new
analytical procedures and techniques that would follow will greatly
enhance current analytical efforts and will break new ground in the
area of improved quality, timeliness and completeness of intelligence
research and analysis products in OGSR.
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I. PROJECT TITLE: Industrial Analysis Forum
Submitting Agency: CIA
II. COSTS:
III. DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT:
a. Statement of need:
There is a recognized need among high level
policymakers for finished intelligence integrating specific
industry knowledge, multicountry political economy, and knowledge
of the world market that provides world-wide, in-depth
perspectives on key industrial issues.
The problem facing NFAC is to insure that
industries, sectors within industries, and national industrial
policies are properly understood. NFAC has neither the time nor
resources to indigenously develop such in-depth expertise over
the wide range of topics associated with industry analysis. Our
best chance for success is to combine in-house and other
government expertise with the considerable knowledge already
available within the US business and financial community.
What will be developed:
We propose to bring together representatives from
government, industry, and academia to analyze and discuss various
industries and industrial policies. The specific topics will be
identified as NFAC analysts develop a better appreciation for the
issues. Likely topics include worldwide developments in machine
tool production capacity and technology and the international
differences in the cost and availability of investment capital.
The forum will consist of a roundtable discussion
focused on one or more scope or issue papers on the topic in
question. These papers would be contracted in advance and
reviewed by the participants prior to the actual discussion. The
papers and a record of the ensuing discussion would be published
by NFAC for government-wide distribution.
IV. COMMUNITY BENEFITS:
The papers and the ensuing discussion will benefit
working level analysts within the government organizations
following US and foreign industrial developments. They will be
used to sharpen NFAC understanding of the issues and dynamic
forces shaping industrial developments internationally. As such
they would serve as a starting point for further analysis,
including external contracts on specific research topics
identified by the forum and a tasking of the Agency's unique
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collection capabilities. The end result would be published
intelligence memoranda. Lastly, such roundtables will provide an
opportunity for intelligence collectors to quickly come up to
speed on the issues in questions and thus better fulfill their
reporting responsibilities.
V. CONSUMER BENEFITS:
This proposal will make available important,
substantial resources to the Intelligence Community, improving
our capability of providing good, timely policy support on an
important subject: the parameters and dynamics of threats to the
US and allied industrial base, and the role of foreign
governments in technological and industrial development.
VI. PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS:
Success will, to an important degree, depend on the
willingness of US Industry to participate, particularly
willingness to share proprietary data affecting international
competitiveness of specific industries. Preliminary discussions
by OER with industry leaders, however, lead us to believe that
they would view such participation as being in their own long-
term interest. We would expect that this new and more coherent
approach will turn up information not presently available to the
Intelligence Community, especially in Free World countries, and
lead to sharply defined external analysis contracts with funds
earmarked for the out-years of the program.
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Submitting Agency: CIA
A. Statement of need:
The increasing need for multi-disciplinary teams in the analysis
of complex intelligence questions poses the problem of how
different types of expertise and information can best be combined.
Existing mechanisms for combining the expertise of several
disciplines into intelligence products are deficient; genuine
synthesis rarely takes place. Clearly, alternative mechanisms need
to be developed. In this regard, formal modeling of complex
intelligence problems has distinct advantages in a multi-
disciplinary environment. Working as a team, analysts bring
together their particular contributions, but are required to come
to a common understanding of the factors that shape the situation.
Modeling allows the analysts to explore the interactions between
political, social, economic, and military factors in ways that are
simply not possible through conventional analytic approaches.
Differences in viewpoint between team members can be explored
through the. development of alternative models. The outcomes of
alternative models can then be compared and evaluated--leading
analysts to a better understanding of the impact of their differing
views. Whether or not the results of the formal model are
explicitly incorporated into the final intelligence product, the
modeling effort will provide the analysts with a better
understanding of the key assumptions of their analysis. In turn,
this understanding will enable analysts to search more efficiently
for needed information in the future.
B. Status and Requirements:
NFAC analysts are generally unaware of formal modeling
techniques of potential applicability to intelligence problems,
such as system dynamics, linear programming, difference equations,
artificial intelligence, and applications of graph theory. What is
required is the establishment of an NFAC resource unit that could
provide assistance to analysts, particularly those involved in
multi-disciplinary work. Regional units that cut across office
lines would be especially in need of assistance. External research
funds will be used to hire outside consultants and contractors to
provide the necessary expertise.
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C. Implementation and timing:
During FY82, NFAC will survey the modeling abilities of its
analysts, arrange with OTE to strengthen those abilities through
training, and evaluate the approaches identified by ORD in its
Intelligence Production Laboratory project. We anticipate that the
need for outside assistance will decline from FY83 to FY85 as in-
house capabilities are developed.
The systems modeling center will be an NFAC-wide resource whose
primary clients would be interdisciplinary teams or regional units.
It would also serve individual analysts working on complex
intelligence problems that lend themselves to a more formal
approach. As expertise grows within NFAC, greater interaction with
DOD modeling units can be anticipated--particularly when the
problems being addressed contain a large military component.
The development of modeling skills in NFAC will improve the
quality of interdisciplinary analysis and lead to more forward-
looking estimative work. By being based on models where the
assumptions are explicit, policymakers will be better able to
identify the critical factors shaping intelligence estimates.
Models also offer policymakers the opportunity to simulate the
impact of alternative policy choices.
There are no known technical or administrative obstacles to the
enhancement of formal modeling skills in NFAC. We do anticipate
some time lag before a majority of NFAC analysts will feel
comfortable with these new techniques.
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I. PROJECT TITLE: Multidisciplinary Military Research
Submitting Agency: CIA
II. COSTS:
III. DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT:
a. Statement of Need:
Existing Military Operational Research (MOR) procedures
have been developed over the years to accommodate modest
(by industrial standards) data bases. Expanding collection
technologies which are providing near'real-time data bases
have created a data base management crisis. The classical
MOR approach has failed to provide the required DATA BASE
MANAGEMENT, INFORMATION HANDLING SYSTEMS, and LARGE SCALE
MODELS to accommodate the glut of electronic data which
daily flood intelligence channels. Vast quantities of
costly data are being stored on the premise that it will
eventually be exploited. Unfortunately, much of this data's
value is lost unless there is-timely analysis. (C)
It is apparent that the 80's will 'also provide numerous
opportunities for.new data collection systems. The recent
advances in modelling technologies, hardware systems, and
data management tools will provide the analysts with tools
to handle the myriad of data, generate models, and simulate
scenarios in real-time. These new analytical methodologies
will enable the community to more accurately define collection
requirements and thus better serve the needs of the military
analysts. (S)
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b. What will be Developed
The program will consist of five research elements:
o RED Force and Special US Operations
Research Software and Firmware (RMOR)
o RED Force Data Base Management System (DBS)
o General System Emulator software and
firmware (GEMUL)
o Specialized Hardware System to support all
phases (HW)
o Operations and Logistics Emulator (BEMUL) (S)
c. Who will Accomplish:
This project will be a joint undertaking among ORD
(AMR), NFAC (OSWR, OSR, OGSR & OIA), OSO, NPIC, ODP, NSA, and
DOD The project will involve ORD's proven multidisciplinary,
inter-agency management and research approach. (C)
Indirect Agency and DOD manpower cost is 15 man-years
per year (5 Agency, 10 DOD). Personnel loading is projected
to decrease during the third year to ten man-years (three
Agency, seven DOD). (C)
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Communications among the team members will be accomplished
by the Distributed Management Approach. This project will
require an additional staff member beyond the existing ORD
manning complement. (S)
d. Time Phasing:
The program would be completed in three years with a
major operational Day-off each year. Direct research costs
are projected at FY-85 costs will be borne 25X1
directly by participating agencies.
SCHEDULE OF DELIVERABLES
FY84
FY85
RMOR
Preliminary Operational
Capability
Operational
DBS
Operational
Advanced capability
EMUL
Preliminary Operational
Capability
Operational
HW
Operational
Operational
BEMUL
Preliminary Operational
Operational (C)
IV. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY APPLICABILITY:
This program will provide the Community with a unique
set of evaluation tools which do not exist in the intelligence
Community. However, this general technology is being exploited by
industry, and this approach offers a solid foundation. (C)
V. INTELLIGENCE CONSUMER BENEFITS:
The consumer will now have the dual benefit of previewing
projected SOVIET/EAST bloc military moves and measure of
NATO force effectiveness. Additionally, national intelligence
collection systems could be programmed for optimal targeting. (S)
VI. PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS:
Though this program has a number of high risk elements, the
approach to MILITARY OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT is based on proven
industrial process model techniques. ORD's proven distributed
management approach will provide a highly reliable product. (C)
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s
T
I. PROJECT TITLE:. Advanced Computer Techniques for the
Production and Interpretation of Finished
Intelligence Products
Submitting Agency: CIA
II. FUNDS:
III. DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT:
a. Statement of need:
The final step in the intelligence cycle is the
preparation and dissemination of a finished intelli-
gence report. Today this process is aided by computer
data bases of text material, word processing equipment,
and electrical communication of data to computer-aided
printing systems. But there is a problem which arises
in the production and interpretation of finished
intelligence products: how to find information on the
subject of interest and how to identify related reports
or parts of reports.
Preparation of a report involves organizing
material into a preestablished framework. For example,
sections of previously published. reports may be used as
a starting point for a draft report. A report will
then proceed through various coordination and editorial
reviews to establish that the report is correct, inter-
nally consistent, and coordinated with other material
bearing on the same subject.
The readers of these reports want to know the
relationship of raw intelligence information to the
views expressed, the consistency and logical develop-
ment of the arguments within a report, and the relation-
ship of the expressed views with those contained within
other reports.
Both aspects of report preparation and interpreta-
tion may be seen in the preparation of National Intel-
ligence Estimates. Normal to this process is the
coordination and resolution of differing views of an
intelligence issue. There is no ready mechanism that
allows those responsible for the preparation of an NIE
to ask questions on the resulting consistency of the
NIE when a given item within the estimate is changed,
or to question estimate's inherent support of a given
perspective.
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,Increasingly, text is being stored within computer
systems as part of the report preparation process. We
propose to take advantage of this to make report
preparation and interpretation easier.
Classically material has been retrieved from
computers by three methods--a user provides title,
author, date, etc. (bibliographic retrieval); a user
prov;ides words describing areas of interest and the
computer matches them against index terms (index
retrieval) or against the text of the documents (keyword
search). While these approaches are useful, they also
have limitations. Bibliographic data may be too general
to be of use. Index retrieval and keyword search may
require the user to guess at the terms an indexer or
author used to describe the area of interest. Con-
fusion may arise in the use of terms. These retrieval
methods have led to frustration as users cannot find
material they know is present in a data base or they
find-too much material, most of which is not relevant
to their interests but does meet the requirements of
the search.
We propose a new form of storing and retrieving
finished intelligence which will augment these clas-
sical approaches. The.idea is to store intelligence
reports as collections of paragraphs or sections, each
of which is indexed, not only by its subject matter,
but also by its semantic attributes, e.g., its function
in the intelligence report or its relationship to parts
of other intelligence reports. Examples of such attri-
butes include "updated estimates," "evidence supporting
conclusion," and "more detailed description." It will
then be possible to retrieve, assemble, and contrast
text segments by these semantic attributes.
The addition of indexing by semantic attributes
allows the users of the data base of intelligence
reports to find the report parts in which they are
interested more rapidly--to check to see what was said
before, what needs updating, etc. Perhaps more im-
portantly, however, because the relationships among
parts..of reports are stored the user/analyst can
identify the related sections which may be impacted by
changes. Those working on NIE's can find supporting
material from their Agency's related publications when
coordinating and resolving conflicting views as well as,
identifying where the associated changes should be
made.
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The addition of explicitly storing semantic
attributes will result in easier preparation of sub-
sequent reports and better interpretation of report
meaning. Also the discipline of making explicit the
logical structure and relationships in reports will
result in better organized reports.
b. Who will accomplish:
The proposed work would be done by existing,ORD
staff personnel with external contract assistance.
Initial indexing will probably be performed by con-
tractors with analytical offices giving final approval
to the results. Only after the methodologies have been
tested with contractor personnel will analysts be asked
to index. However access to the system for retrieval
will be made available-to analysts at the earliest
feasible moment.
c. What is to be developed:
We will develop a testbed system which will
include the development of the following:
? Indexing schema needed to support a finished
intellignece data base.
? A set of indexed finished intelligence reports.
?' Techniques for storing indexed finished
intelligence.
? Methodology for allowing analysts to index,
with minimal effort, finished intelligence
as it is being written and coordinated.
? Methodologies for using the indices to retrieve
intelligence of interest, including mixed
retrieval strategies (i.e., using both the new
and classical retrieval methods).
? Techniques for including the new system within
the analysts normal working environment (e.g.,
word processing equipment, SAFE).
We will then evaluate the use of this way of
storing and retrieving finished intelligence over
traditional methods.
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d. Time phasing:
In the first year of the project, we will identify
the formal indexing and structuring requirements needed
to support a data base of finished intelligence.
During the second year we will build a testbed syst.em..
The third year, beyond the scope of the DCI Enhancement,
will be devoted to careful evaluation of the system for
operational use. We expect that during the third year
the testbed system will also serve as a semi-operational
resource for the subset of Agency products it contains.
The product of the first year will be a report
defining the relationships among parts of Agency
products and the indexing methodology which will make
their retrieval and use more efficient. Some analysts
may find this product useful in and of itself since it
can be used as a guideline/checkline for organizing
reports. At the end of the second year, the testbed
system will be available as a resource. The results of
the third year will be reports documenting the advan-
tages and disadvantages of the system, recommendations
for its future, and the experiences and comments of its
users.' FY85 costs will be borne by ORD.
IV. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY APPLICABILITY:
The project will produce an enhanced ability for the
CIA to coordinate reports with the rest of the Community and
to respond to requirements from the Community for special
reports. It is also likely that the CIA's experiences from
this project will be applicable to the reporting procedures
of the other agencies.
V. INTELLIGENCE CONSUMER BENEFITS:
The project will result in a system which will make it
easier for analysts to produce more timely and comprehen-
sible reports. The production of customized reports will be
.easier. In general, reporting should appear more responsive
to the consumer.
VI. PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS:
The probability is high for producing a system which
will significantly improve information retrieval including
retrieval of related reports. That this capability will
improve timeliness of report production and coordination
seems very likely. Whether or not the system will improve
report organization may depend on the individual reports--
4
SEC ET
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many are well organized now and it remains to be seen if the
system will be of great benefit in this area. It is likely
that the effort required to enter the semantic indices will
not be burdensome. But the third year evaluation is required
to establish the operational cost/benefits relationship.
Ct1 rT
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PROJECT TITLE: Analytical Skills Enhancement Program
Submitting Agency: CIA
DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT:
Statement of Need
Most projects to improve the quality of intelligence analysis thus far
have been narrow in scope. Few projects have addressed, in concert, several
generic issues such as providing a cost-effective training curriculum,
identifying analysts who could most benefit from specific types of
analytical training, or providing work environments supportive to
conducting superior analysis.
This proposal differs because it takes cognizance of the simultaneous
and interrelated impact of the bureaucratic, managerial, and analytical
components on finished intelligence production. It distinguishes
substantive knowledge from generic analytic (problem-solving) and
methodological skills; and focuses on the generic issue of how to improve
analyst problem-solving performance by identifying specific skills useful
to analysts, by designing an appropriate analyst-training curriculum, and
by developing a tightly coupled management/training system sensitive to
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promoting the cost-effective acquisition and use of generic problem-solving
skills.
Quality analysis usually incorporates the application of systematic
methods, which can result in explicit and consistent logic that can be
examined independently and conveyed clearly to consumers. But most attempts
to introduce effective methods into the analytic environment have failed to
address adequately the issue of how to to select "THE" technique most
appropriate for the problem at hand.
The literature dealing with generic problem-solving skills
distinguishes between the ability to implement a specific analytic
technique (how to manipulate data via a specified algorithm), and the
ability to pair available techniques with general classes of problem-types.
Analytical training in the Intelligence Community has, thus far, heavily
emphasized the former of these two distinct skills. Hence, the current
analyst community has had little corporate training in, and is relatively
unaware of, the conceptual aids that can be derived from the application of
systematic problem-solving strategies (as distinct from algorithmic
"tactics"). Seldom do specialists, which most analysts are, receive
training in generic problem solving-strategies or techniques beyond perhaps
the scientific method. Additionally, current managers of analytical units
(who are predominantly former analyst's) have the same lack of problem-
solving exposure and expertise.
Since methods to a large extent determine (more precisely predetermine)
the kind of conclusions that will be reached, the how and why of selecting
appropriate techniques should be understood by all analysts. There is no
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methodological panacea. Every technique has weak points. What is needed
is a training curriculum that teaches not only the fundamentals of
implementing specific techniques, but also strategies for selecting
techniques according to their logic, assumptions, and purpose(s).
Some techniques are quite formal (structured), whereas others seem so
informal as to hardly be "techniques" at all. They also can vary along
dimensions such as Veridicality (subjective versus veridical) and
Complexity (simple versus complex). Each of the dimensions has advantages
and disadvantages associated with its extremes. Table 1 gives some thoughts
on this. (The UPPERCASE factors suggest advantages, the lowercase factors,
disadvantages.)
The problem-solving skills of the analyst community can be improved by
providing awareness of and training in both the fundamentals of using
specific techniques (which we already do fairly well) and the process
through which one can better select techniques appropriate to a given
problem. To accomplish this goal, managers of analytical units must become
familiar with general problem-solving strategies in order to identify
persons requiring training in specific problem-solving skills and to
support the appropriate use of these techniques on-the-job. Currently,
there is no management system, nor any management training program,
designed to accomplish this purpose. This proposal addresses these needs.
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COMPLEXITY
Simple
FAST
EASY
CHEAP
non-enlightening
narrow focus
limited capacity
STRUCTURE
Unstructured
FLEXIBLE
potentially inconsistent
undocumented
updating sophisticated
VERIDICALITY
Subjective
Complex
slow
hard
expensive
confusing
INSIGHT HELPFUL
COMPREHENSIVE
LARGE CAPACITY
Structured
rigid
(inhibits creativity)
CONSISTENT
DOCUMENTED
EASILY UPDATED
Veridical
LOW DATA REQUIREMENTS requires hard data
soft results CORRECT RESULTS
What Will be Developed
This proposal will result in several products:
1. Key problem-solving skills judged to be useful to intelligence
analysts will be identified.
2. An initial inventory of the current level at which these skills
are present in NFAC will be generated.
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3. A management procedure for periodically assessing the problem-
solving performance and skills needs of each analyst will be
devised.
4. A supplemental management curriculum designed specifically for
first-line supervisors of analytical components will be developed.
5. An analyst-training curriculum, matched to the needs of NFAC and
coordinated with the management skills assessment system mentioned
in 3 above, will be designed and implemented in the Office of
Training and Education.
6. An evaluation program to assess the success of this project and
its impact on production quality will be designed.
The list of key problem-solving skills useful to analysts will be
developed for the kinds of problems facing the various NFAC analytical
components. The list will be based on theoretical/empirical results of
problem-solving research in fields such as systems analysis, information
science, and creative problem solving, and will provide the foundation
around which the remainder of the project will be structured. Thus, the
list must be thorough, and key players controlling later implementation
phases of this project (senior NFAC and OTE managers) must reach concensus
agreement about the list's veridicality and usefulness.
The management system devised for assessing analyst problem-solving
capabilities and needs will be based on research to identify behavioral or
performance observables that permit the extant level of problem-solving
skills to be assessed. The same research results will be used to design a
survey to poll NFAC supervisors. This survey will provide initial
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information about ;current NFAC problem-solving resources and the
distribution of these resources within NFAC, thereby facilitating the
selection of those problem-solving courses to be implemented first and the
initial class memberships. The skills assessment vehicle will provide NFAC
management with new and useful tools for assessing analytic capabilities
(both current and potential), as well as blindspots, so that the directly
related analytical training curriculum can be utilized most effectively.
The NFAC Supervisors Curriculum' will be based on the results of
research conducted or. reviewed as part of this proposal; and would include
such things as categories of problem-solving techniques and the problem-
types to which these technique classes are appropriate, how to assess
problem-solving skills, understanding differing personality types and the
typical analytical styles and preferences of each type, providing an office
environment conducive to productive analysis, cost-effective allocation of
analytic resources, minimizing bureaucratic interference(s) with effective
analysis, etc. (The curriculum will not include material that duplicates
or competes with standard management training courses.)
The analyst training curriculum will not represent an entirely new body
of instructional material. Rather, it will reorganize current course
materials into a problem-solving format and incorporate new problem-solving
material identified by this project. The curriculum will be tailored to
meet both the training needs of NFAC analysts and the resource allocation
constraints of NFAC management. Each course will have a very specific
skills objective, against which supervisors can match specific skills needs
1 The supervisors curriculum will be less extensive than the analyst
curriculum, and conceivably could consist of one course only.
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of individual analysts.
The project evaluation portion of this proposal will provide senior
management with a vehicle for assessing the value of having implemented an
initial portion of the training program. This will facilitate decision
making about subsequent resources to be devoted to analytic training of
this nature, and concurrently would provide feedback to OTE on the quality
and relevance of various training activities, methods, topics, and the
effectiveness of different instructors or courses.
Who Will Accomplish
The program relies on external research and substantive support, with
active internal collaboration and participation. It seeks the active
involvement of senior NFAC and OTE management, so that the project will
have a reasonable chance of successful implementation. A staff study that
asks senior management to implement a system to evaluate analyst problem-
solving skills or to utilize (or develop) a new training curriculum will
have little chance for success unless the responsible decision takers have
accepted the basic assumptions of the project--in this case, the list of
useful problem-solving skills--and have approved in principle the goals of
the project.
External contract work would be monitored from ORD/ACS or ORD/AMRD,
with OTE and NFAC providing technical critiques. The main players would be
the internal and external substantive "experts" needed to identify and
design the recommended curriculum content and structure, to design the
survey and analyst evaluation vehicles, and to develop the actual course
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material. Other key players, included because of their roles in
implementation, would be the D/NFAC and AD/NFAC (in
advisory capacities),
the NFAC career development officers (in active, decision making and
evaluative roles), the NFAC Senior Review Panel (to coordinate the project
evaluation effort), and senior OTE management (to coordinate curriculum
design and development).
Time Phasing
The project proposed consists of numerous distinct, but interrelated
and interdependent, activities. They are summarized into 9 general tasks in
Table 2, the time phasing for which is summarized graphically in Figure 1.
External support of these activities can be divided into several separate
contractual efforts.' This will permit multiple contractors to be used if
this approach would optimize expertise availability. The tasks are
discussed separately below.
Task A. The overall success of this project will depend heavily on the
extent to which desirable problem-solving skills can be identified
accurately and converted into a useful training curriculum. External
experts contracted to perform this task will undoubtedly be able to
complete work more quickly than in-house personnel with relevant
substantive expertise, but who would need more time than would external
2 The contractor selection process will use a decision analytic,
hierarchical utility model to evaluate the proposals. The structure of this
model will be included with the Request for Proposals to communicate as
clearly as possible to the potential contractors the factors considered to
be important.
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Description
A 18 I Determine Desirable Problem-Solving Skills and Develop
Analyst Training Courses
Determine Methods for Assessing Problem-Solving Skills
of Individuals, Survey Current NFAC Skills, and
Develop Assessment Vehicle for Management Use
C 9 I Identify Environmental Factors that Affect Problem-
Solving Effectiveness and Identify Management
Techniques to Optimize Them
D 3 Conduct and Evaluate Survey of Extant NFAC Problem-
Solving Skills
Training Program
F 6 Design and Prepare the NFAC Supervisors Curriculum
G 1 Select the Specific Courses to be Implemented First
H 8 Conduct and Evaluate the Initial Courses
I 1 Decide on Future Commitments to the Problem-Solving
Training Program
experts to become thoroughly familiar with relevant problem-solving
literature and who probably would be unable to work full-time on this task.
To minimize completion time and to maximize available expertise, it is
suggested that external resources be used to support the majority of this
task, with internal personnel interacting frequently to enhance their own
knowledge through the close association with the external substantive
experts from the private or academic sectors.
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Figure 1
TASK A
TASK B
TASK C
TASK D
TASK E
TASK F
TASK G
TASK H
TASK I
The figure summarizes the approximate time phasing estimated for the tasks
The list of good problem-solving skills must identify, define clearly,
and defend the relevance of the selected skills to problem-solving
activities as they exist in the information-incomplete and time-constrained
world of the intelligence analyst. Inherent in this task will be the
identification of generic types of intelligence analysts, (i.e., those job-
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Analyst Skills Enhancement Program.
categories requiring the application of similar problem-solving
techniques), and the specification of the degree to which each of the
skills included apply to each of these analytical job-types.
Once the set of desirable analyst problem-solving skills has. been
developed, a conceptual design for an appropriate Analyst Tr4ining
Curriculum can be undertaken. The content of the courses included, will
already have been identified fairly clearly by the skills list. Thus:;. the
design activity will be devoted primarily to deciding the most cost-
effective way to "package" the training alternatives.'
Developing the classroom materials needed to support the analyst
training curriculum is estimated to be the most time- and resource-
consuming task of the entire project. External contractors could be used
to present lectures as well as to develop material, but it is recommended
that external contributions be limited to the substantive identification
and development of specific, useful classroom material.
Several in-house experts (primarily from NFAC) should be assigned to
supplement OTE instructor personnel on a part-time (e.g., guest lecturer)
basis. This will serve the multiple purpose of involving NFAC more closely
in the curriculum development and content, of identifying (or creating)
experts in various topics among the analyst community, and increasing the
linkage (coordination and communication) between OTE and NFAC personnel
For purposes of this proposal it has been assumed that the training
curriculum will consist of a set of interrelated courses; but actual
project work will not limit results to traditional means of instruction
only.
` Work that should support curriculum development actually has been
started already, in the form a Problem-Solving Handbook (currently about
225 pages) being developed jointly by OTE and ORD (copies of the current
i it 11.381
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regarding the analyst training curriculum.'
Task B. The portion of this task devoted to identifying observables by
which an individual's extant problem-solving performance can be judged will
involve basic research conducted by external contract. From the results,
instruments can be developed both for assessing current training needs of
the analyst community and for developing evaluation devices for management.
The time-frame of the proposed project will not permit the research on this
topic to reach final, definitive conclusions; but reasonably sound results
should be achieved. These results can make a meaningful contribution to
managements's capability to accurately assess problem-solving abilities and
needs.
Designing the survey "form" will have a large degree of overlap with
designing an assessment vehicle for NFAC supervisors to use on-the-job for
periodically assessing the problem-solving skills of each employee
supervised. But, the survey form will be designed for use by supervisors
who have had no training in identifying or evaluating the use of problem-
solving skills in their employees. Also, the survey form may keep track of
results by component, but will not identify individuals. The survey form is
meant to provide preliminary, working data.
The supervisory assessment vehicle will permit this program to function
efficiently over the long term by providing a mechanism for identifying
analysts who are weak in problem-solving skills needed (or desired) for
optimum performance in their current job. Since assessing job-related
skills of individuals has potential implications for complimentary use for
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such things as in promotion considerations, the development of the
supervisory assessment vehicle must be conducted throughly. In contrast to
the survey form, this vehicle is intended to provide accurate data.
Oversight and/or participation of senior NFAC management (ideally, the
career service officers) on this project would be desirable.
Task C. This task involves external research to identify environmental
factors that can be manipulated by managers to increase analytical
performance. Part of this task will be the empirical identification of
environments that work well. A second part will be the theoretical
specification of environments that should encourage analysts to use, and
optimize their ability to use, the skills identified in Task A. The intent
is not to review or replicate the literature on group problem-solving
techniques; nor is it confined to helping groups work more effectively
together. Rather, the object is to identify working environments that help
and encourage individual analysts, as well as groups, to use appropriate
problem-solving skills.
Research to identify management techniques that can help to optimize
environmental factors for enhanced problem solving, is a direct follow-on
to the initial portion of this task. It is intended to take the "wish-
list" of desired environments and to determine a) techniques that a manager
can use to generate a desired environment, and b) factors that a manager
can use to assess the current status of the working environment being
supervised.
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Task D; This task, to be conducted entirely in-house, involves
conducting the initial survey of problem-solving skills extant in NFAC, and
analyzing the responses to the survey. The results of these activities will
facilitate the selection of courses to be offered initially and the
anticipated frequency with which each of the courses will be offered. The
survey results also will provide useful classroom material for the NFAC
supervisors curriculum.
Task E. Before the training curriculum is finalized, decisions need to
be reached, on how the impact of the program will be assessed. These
decisions probably will influence the selection of the analytical and
supervisory training alternatives to be offered first, since it may be
wiser to start with a lower-priority (in terms of the determined problem-
solving needs of analysts) course, the impact of which can be assessed
meaningfully, than with a high-priority course, the impact of which would
be difficult to assess accurately or quickly.' It is recommended that
external support be provided for developing evaluation alternatives from
which in-house management can select the most desirable.
' A potentially useful evaluation alternative is the Analyst Workshop
Project (scheduled to begin in FY82) under ORD sponsorship. It could be
used to evaluate the analytical appropriateness of the responses of trained
versus untrained groups of analysts to similar (or even identical)
intelligence problems within the context of the Workshop's laboratory-like
conditions.
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Task F. Design of the NFAC Supervisors curriculum can begin after
completion of earlier tasks about the precise observational skills/tools
that managers can use to help assess employee problem-solving skill
accurately, about the overall status of problem-solving skills extant in
NFAC, and about the things that supervisors can do to optimize the chances
that their employees will employ good problem-solving techniques. Once the
curriculum design has been accomplished, work can proceed on providing
classroom materials. Much of this will have been clearly identified and/or
provided by earlier task activities, but the most likely in-house
candidates for coordinating this task (OTE management school personnel)
probably would be able to work on developing materials on a part-time
schedule only. Therefore, external support is allocated for this task.
Task G. Based on the training needs identified by the survey data, the
results of the research to develop means of assessing the programs
effectiveness, the availability of analysts and supervisors from NFAC, and
the availability of OTE personnel, the initial training courses to be
offered will be selected and scheduled. This task is to be accomplished
entirely in-house, involving the joint participation (under OTE leadership)
of NFAC management, the OTE schools involved, and the major in-house
participants from the other related project tasks.
Task H. The survey results can be used in this task to identify NFAC
components having skills needs that match the set of courses chosen for
initial implementation. Including the supervisors of these components in
the initial supervisors course(s), and polling them to identify relevant,
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available analysts, should permit the initial class rosters to be
determined.
The time estimated to run the initial set of courses could vary
tremendously depending on such things as the number and length of courses
chosen, the availability of classrooms and instructors, and the priority
given by NFAC to implementing this program. Three months to five months are
estimated.
Evaluating the impact of the training courses offered initially can
begin as soon as the first course ends, if a short-term assessment method
is selected. But if the chosen assessment vehicle requires long-term
performance observations by supervisors, the 8 months estimated for the
entirety of Task H will be too short.
Task I. The inclusion of a task to decide on future commitments to the
problem-solving approach to analyst training is included to insure that the
program can continue beyond the initial implementation phase only on the
basis of merit. Additionally, it emphasizes the implicit intention that
this program not become static and unresponsive to changing training needs.
The decision at this point should be made by the customers of the training
program (NFAC and users of finished intelligence products) based on the
impact or expected impact that the training program is assessed to be
capable of having on the quality and usefulness of analytical products.
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INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY APPLICABILITY
Benefits accruing from the proposed project will be directly relevant
and transferable to all training facilities in the Intelligence Community.
Furthermore, the project research may identify observable characteristics
or non-substantive academic skills that are desirable to acquire in new
employees, thus aiding recruitment programs.
The establishment of a common, coordinated analyst-training curriculum
also can help to establish a common "analytical language," thereby
facilitating inter-analyst communication, and perhaps resulting in a more
consistent format, style, or "language" for communicating finished
intelligence to consumers.
The supervisors curriculum should help promote effective utilization of
analytical resources by enhancing a supervisor's ability to match an
analyst's skills to an appropriate intelligence task, or to assign joint
projects to complementary/supplementary analytical types, rather than to
antagonistic or non-synergistic ones.
INTELLIGENCE CUSTOMER BENEFITS
Customers will derive benefits primarily from the increased quality of
analysis anticipated from the use of appropriate methods to accomplish
systematic analysis. For instance, the use of systematic methods should
result in the creation of analytic audit trails that document clearly for
both analyst and consumer, the assumptions on which an analyst based
conclusions, etc. They also should help analysts a) to specify clearly the
levels of uncertainty associated with their judgments, and b) to become
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more likely to question their conclusions and to extend analyses to the
stage of addressing the "but if I'm wrong" possibilities that frequently
are absent currently from intelligence products. The supervisory curriculum
should encourage analytical managers to expect that these things be
included in the finished products they review.
The use of appropriate methods during all phases of problem-solving
activities also tends to focus analytical effort on those activities most
relevant to consumer needs (by improving problem selection and problem
definition activities). Because the problem-solving activities become more
tightly focused and better organized, communication of results and
conclusions often.becomes more concise and explicit. The tighter focus also
can produce greater analytic efficiency, thereby increasing the
productivity of individual analysts.
PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS
Several success probabilities can be assigned to this project. The one
assessed to be the most critical to successfully implementing this project
is the level of acceptance and support that NFAC will give to this effort.
This is estimated as a toss-up: 50%.
The chances of successfully developing an appropriate skills list, of
devising an appropriate OTE curriculum, and developing supporting classroom
materials are all at, or essentially at, 100%.
Assessing the probability that the program will have a meaningful
impact on analyst problem-solving behavior probably is best assessed as the
percent of students who will incorporate the training to the extent that an
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observable behavioral modification or quality of effort can be detected.
This probably will occur from 50 to 90ie of the time, with a best guess of
about 757..
If the above are treated as joint probabilities (a slightly pessimistic
approximation), their product gives the best estimate for the program as a
whole:
0.5 * 1.0 ?? 1.0 * 1.0 ?? 0.75 = 0.375 -- (about 40%)
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