MODIFICATIONS IN U.S. NATIONAL STRATEGY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060035-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2008
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: January 15, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

1~ FAC ~ ?~.8~.~
!residential Directiye~PD/NSC-C2
The Vice President
The Secretary of State ~~
The Secretary of The Treasury -r''~"
The Secretary of Defense ~i~~
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Energy
The Director, Office of Management & Budget
The Chairman, Joint Clfs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence .
SUBJECT: Modifications in U.S. National Strategy (U)
I set forth U.S. National Strategy in 1977 in Presidential Directive/
NSC-18. It remains our strategy, but in light of increased projection
of Soviet power which threatens U.S. vital interests in the Persian
Gulf region, it has become necessary through a series of individual
directives to modify emphasis and priority in the strategy. This
Directive will elaborate and codify our progress in building a security
framework-for the Persian Gulf. (S)
Greater Readiness Required
Given the increased risk of major local or regional conflict involy-
ing key U.S. interests in the 1980s we must increase the priority given
to readiness in defense resource allocations. (C)
Shifts in Priority for General Pur ose Forces
Presidential Directive/NSC-18 put the focus for our general purpose
forces on Europe but also called for capabilities for contingencies
in Korea and the Persian Gulf region. Soviet actions in the Horn of
Africa and Afghanistan have, in the interim, increased substantially
the threat to our vital interests in the Persian Gulf region. More-
over, the chaotic situation following the Iranian revolution, the Iraq-
Iran war and the intensifying intro-Arab and Israeli-Arab tensions have
increased the instability in the region. This has also increased the
risk to U.S. and Allied interests, both directly and by giving the
Soviets added opportunities for interference. At the same time, our
success in normalizing relations with the People's Republic of China
has improved our strategic position in East Asia. Given the danger
that Soviet success in asserting influence over the oil producing status
of the Persian Gulf region could undermine the viability of NATO and
Japan, cause enormous economic disruptions in Europe, Japan, and the
SECRET
Review
on January 14,
2001
Reason
for Extension:
NSC
1.13(e)
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United States, higher priority must be given to developing adequate
strategic lift, general purpose forces and facilities access for
Persian Gulf contingencies. (S)
~~thile NATO will retain first call on force deployments in peacetime
for wartime operations, the Persian Gulf shall have highest priority
for improvement of strategic lift and general purpose forces in the
Five Year Defense Program. This priority calls for continued improve-
ment of relations with the People's Republic of China, accelerated
growth of Japan's defense capabilities as a contribution to U.S.-
Japanese security ties, improved relations with the-ASEAN states, and
greater progress in getting our NATO Allies to bear a larger share of
the burden of defense in Europe. (S)
Soviet projection of power in the Caribbean region with Cuba's assis~ .
tance over the past two-years has created another area of increased
security concern. In support of the objectives of Presidential Direc--
tive/NSC-52, it is necessary to achieve quietly a stranger military
presence in the region by gradual shifts in our military exercise
activities and basing of U.S. forces in the Southeastern part of the
United States and its territories in the region which will be perceived
by Cuba and the Soviet Union as evidence of our determination to Limit
Soviet and Cuban regional influence. (S)
Sharing the Security Burden with Our Allies
Q s ~j~,,,`1~--
Because the Soviet military buildup~~ e projection of Soviet mili-
tart' power have increased our s tegic requirements, we must make more
effor~t~and devise better ways o share the economic and military burden
with~m?_ "~. ~~e must insist that our Euro~rean Allies undertake the
programs and make available the resources needed to make up for the
reduction in U.S. force commitments caused by our effort oriented toward
the Persian Gulf. At the same-time, certain of our Allies, particularly
the British, French, and Australians, should contribute forces to the
security framework for the Persian Gulf. (S)
Germany, other members of NATO, ANZUS, and Japan should contribute
non-military resources such as economic assistance to the security
framework. Two countries which flank Southwest Asia and would be most
important recipients of this economic aid -- as well as of military aid
from selected donors -- would be Turkey and Pakistan. (S)
Our European and regional Allies should provide overflight, transit and
staging for U.S. forces moving to Southwest Asia. Procedures should be
....established to facilitate overflight and refueling clearances. (S)
Arms Control
Arms control negotiations which promise to constrain Soviet forces --
strategic and general purpose -- and particularly to limit resources
that both sides must commit to the strategic competition will be our-
sued vigorously. This latter element of our strategy must be exploited
SECRET
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i
i
~i' SECRET
to the extent possible for alleviating both the economic burdens of
defense and for reducing the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons.
(S)
Persian Gulf S~ecuri~ty Framework
Presidential Directive/NSC-63 elaborates U.S. strategy for the Persian
Gulf and Southwest Asia region, (C) -~.
Zbigniew Brzezinski
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