REVIEW OF U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060016-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 8, 2009
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: March 10, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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Executive Secretary
NSC review
completed.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Please note that this document
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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Executive Secretary
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NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL
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THE WHITE HOUSE 90133
WASHINGTON
SECRET WITH
TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT
March 10, 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.
The Secretary of State
THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
The Secretary of Defense
THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY
The Director of Central Intelligence
GENERAL DAVID C. JONES
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
SUBJECT: Review of U.S. National Security Strategy.
The President has reviewed Parts I-II (National Objectives and
the International Environment) of the NSSD 1-82 study and has
authorized its release for use as the starting point for the
national strategy reviews now underway. The NSC will consider
Parts I-II for final approval in mid-April.
William P. Clark
Attachment
Parts I-II, NSSD 1-82 study
SECRET WITH
TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT
Review March 9, 1988
.coPI- or
CI-: TS820200/1
Copy
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Draft of NSSD 1-82, PartsI and II
U.S. National Security Strategy
Part I
National Objectives and the International Environment
Broad Purposes of U.S. National Security Policy
The.national security policy of the United States shall serve the
following broad purposes:
-- To preserve the political identity, framework and
institutions of the United States as embodied in
the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. (U)
-- To protect the United States -- its national territory,
citizenry, military forces, and assets abroad -- from
military, paramilitary, or terrorist attack. (U)
-- To foster the economic well-being of the United States,
in particular, by maintaining and strengthening the
nation's industrial, agricultural and technological base
and by ensuring access to foreign markets and resources..(U)
-- To foster an international order supportive of the vital
interests of the United States by maintaining and
strengthening constructive, cooperative relationships and
alliances, and by encouraging and reinforcing wherever
possible and practicable, freedom, rule of law, economic
development and national independence throughout the
world. (U)
The International Environment
United States national security policy will be guided by the
following assessment of the current international situation and
of trends and prospective developments affecting the pursuit of
our broad objectives. (U)
The Soviet Union is and will remain for the foreseeable future
the most formidable threat to the United States and to American
interests globally. The growth of Soviet military power over the
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Review March 9, 2002
Classified & Extended by William P. Clark
Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(e)
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last decade has called into question the ability of the United
States and its allies to deter attack by the Soviet Union and its
allies across the spectrum of conflict. At the same time, the
Soviet policy of unparallelled global expansionism challenges the
strategic interests and position of the United States around the
world. (S)
The loss of U.S. nuclear superiority means that the U.S. cannot
depend on nuclear forces to offset its general purpose force
deficiencies. Rough strategic parity, and expanded Soviet
conventional capabilities including a growing capability to
project Soviet military power, have increased the relative -
importance of U.S. and allied conventional capabilities. The
increased likelihood that a U.S.-Soviet conflict could be both
global and protracted, heightens the need for a substantial U.S.
industrial base for mobilization.
Building on their strengthened military position, the Soviets
have developed a comprehensive and sophisticated political/
military/economic strategy combining selective use of their own
and proxy military and security forces, arms sales and grants,
economic incentives and disincentives, manipulation of terrorist.
and subversive organizations, diplomatic and arms control initiatives,'
and propaganda and disinformation activities. The near-term
objectives of their strategy are to extend Soviet influence globally
and to weaken the United States, first by blocking access to strategic
resources and land and sea routes; second,. by isolating the U.S. by
fomenting disharmony with allies, friends, and neutrals, and third, -
by undermining political will in the west. (S)
At the same time, the. Soviets will continue to have important
vulnerabilities. The economies and the social systems of the
Soviet Union and of most Soviet allies continue to exhibit
serious structural weaknesses. The appeal of Communist ideologies
appears to be decreasing throughout much of the world, including
the Soviet bloc itself. The Soviet involvement in Afghanistan has
revealed some of the limitations on-the effectiveness of Soviet
power projection capabilities. Non-Russian nationalities are
growing relative to the dominant Russian population. Events in
Poland have underlined, and could contribute further to, the
internal weakness of most Warsaw Pact countries. (S)
The passing of the Brezhnev era and, the likelihood of an ensuing
succession struggle will make Soviet policy less predictable.
Political and economic vulnerabilities at home could induce new
leaders to seek reduced tensions abroad. However, greater military
strength and possibly a greater sense of international self-confidence
among the younger generation of leaders could make them more willing
to risk confrontation with the West. (S)
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In the Near East and Southwest Asia, the chronic instability of
the region both within and among states, including the Arab-Israel
conflict, the rise of militant nationalist and religious movements,
together with an expanded Soviet presence, poses a critical threat
to Western political, economic and security interests. (S)
A critical stake in this region is the-oil in the Persian Gulf.
The western economic system needs ready access to it while control
of this energy source by the Soviet Union would give it a strangle
hold over. the West and enormously ease the Soviet economic.
difficulties. Herein lies an issue of potential superpower
confrontation. (S)
The People's Republic of China remains hostile to the Soviet
Union and its Vietnamese client, and appears to have begun an
ideological evolution away from Soviet-style Communism. As such,
China plays an important role in United State's global policy toward
the Soviet Union. At the same time, the uncertainties of China's
future internal evolution and the possibility of a closer relation-
ship with the USSR pose a latent long-term threat to U.S. and
allied interests. (TS)
Unstable governments, weak political institutions, inefficient
unproductive economies, rising expectations, rapid social change,
the persistence of traditional conflicts and the prevalence bf
violence, create opportunities for Soviet expansion in many countries
of the Developing World.(S)
Acceleration of efforts by several nations to acquire nuclear
weapons threatens the viability of the international non-
proliferation regime, with potentially serious consequences for
regional stability as well as for the security of the United
States. (S)
The unwillingness of our major allies to expand their military
programs significantly and to rethink political and military
strategies in the light of the increasing Soviet threat are driven
by economic requirements, domestic political conditions and
differing views of the nature and objectives of the adversary.
However, the economic strength and shared interests and values of
the nations within the Western alliance are assets of great
importance if effectively mobilized. (S)
For all of these reasons, the decade of the eighties will pose
the greatest challenge to the survival and well-being of the U.S.
since World War II. Our response to this challenge could well lay
the groundwork for a fundamentally altered East-West relationship. (S)
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Objectives of U.S. National Security Policy
The national security policy of the United States will be guided.
by the following global objectives:
To deter military attack by the USSR and its allies
against the U.S., its allies, and other important
countries across the spectrum of conflict, to defeat
such attack should deterrence fail, and to prevent or.
neutralize Soviet efforts to intimidate or coerce the
U.S. or others through its military power. (S)
-- To strengthen the influence of the U.S. throughout the
world by strengthening existing alliances, by improving
relations with other nations that have potential strategic
importance for us, by.forming and supporting coalitions of
estates friendly to U.S. interests, by selective diplomatic
and economic initiatives, by economic policies that enhance
our influence, by helping to resolve regional conflicts
that threaten U.S. interests, and by expanded political
action and information efforts. (S)
To contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet control
and military presence throughout the world, and to.
increase the costs of Soviet support and use of proxy,
terrorist, and subversive forces. (S)
To neutralize the efforts of the USSR to increase its
influence through their use of diplomacy, arms transfers,
economic pressure, political action, propaganda, and dis-
information. (S).
To foster, if possible in concert with our allies,
restraint in Soviet military spending, discourage
Soviet adventurism, and weaken the Soviet alliance system
by forcing the USSR to bear the brunt of its economic
shortcomings, and to encourage long-term liberalizing
and nationalist-tendencies-within the Soviet Union. and
.allied countries. (TS)
To limit the growth of, and where possible, to reduce
Soviet military capabilities by demonstrating the sustained
commitment of the U.S. to increase its military strength,
to redress any significant imbalance favoring the Soviet
Union, pursuing equitable and verifiable arms control
agreements that limit Soviet power, and preventing the
flow of militarily significant technologies and resources
to the Soviet Union. (TS)
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To ensure the U.S. access to foreign markets, and to
ensure the U.S. and its allies and friends access to
foreign energy and mineral resources. (U)
To ensure U.S..access to space and the oceans.(U)
To discourage further proliferation of nuclear. weapons. (U)
To encourage and strongly support aid, trade, and investment
programs that promote economic. development and the growth
of humane social and political orders in the Third World. (U)
To ensure a well-functioning international economic system
with minimal distortions to trade and investment and. broadly
agreed and.respected rules for managing and resolving
differences.
In addition to the foregoing, U.S. national security policy will
be guided by the following operational objectives in specific
regions:
In Europe, to preserve the NATO alliance, while
strengthening NATO capabilities and, if necessary
adjusting NATO strategy to-deter and defeat the threat
posed by dramatically improved Soviet and Warsaw Pact
forces; to counter West European political trends that
inhibit effective U.S. and allied action in this
direction; to encourage the European allies to provide
support for our objectives in other regions, particularly
Southwest Asia; to work with the Europeans. in their efforts
to overcome the serious economic problems that have
limited the freedom of action of certain Western
governments; to increase, the costs of, Soviet repression
of popular movements and institutions in Poland and other
East European countries; and to maximize prospects for
their independent evolution. (TS)
In the Western Ee*^.isphere,?to blunt and contain the
projection-of Soviet and Cuban military power and
influence in the Caribbean Basin and South America; to
reduce and if possible eliminate Soviet influence in Cuba;
to discourage the USSR from using Cuba as a base for
mounting a strategic threat to the security of the
hemisphere; to strengthen U.S. political and military
relationships with key countries; to promote sustained
economic progress in the Caribbean Basin area, and to
assist friendly governments-in combatting Marxist-
Leninist insurgencies. (TS)
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In Africa, to defeat aggression, subversive and terrorist
activities sponsored by Libya or other forces hostile to.
U.S. interests; to secure the withdrawal of Soviet and-
Soviet proxy forces on the continent; to ensure U.S. and
allied access to strategically important mineral resources,
while promoting improvement in regional racial policies;
and to establish a U.S. presence on the continent and
adjacent areas. (TS)
-- In Asia, to preserve our existing alliances; to recognize
our relationship with Japan as the cornerstone of U.S.
policy in East Asia; to encourage Japan to increase its
military capabilities to be able to participate meaningfully
with the U.S. in a-rational division of labor in the
Asia-Pacific area by attaining the self-defense power
necessary to provide for regional security in the.
Northwest Pacific in this decade; to deter aggression
by North. Korea and Vietnam, and to secure the withdrawal
or increase the costs of the Vietnamese presence in Laos
and Kampuchea; while maintaining our unofficial relationship
and fulfilling our obligations to Taiwan, preserve a broad,
effective working relationship with the PRC, and to encourage
its interest in friendship with the U.S. and to strengthen
its ability to resist Soviet invasion and intimidation, so
that the PRC remains a strategic counter against the Soviet
Union without posing a threat to U.S. and allied interests
over the long term; to encourage the economic and political
development of the ASEAN states as a source of stability
within Southeast Asia; to strengthen the U.S. strategic
relationship with Australia and New Zealand within the
ANZUS framework. (TS)
In the Near East, Southwest and South Asia, to ensure
Western access to Persian Gulf oil; to gain and maintain
sufficient influence and presence to support U.S. interests
in the region;.to preserve the independence of Israel and
other key states in the region and to strengthen their' abilit.
to resist aggression or subversion by a regional or extra-
regional power or movement;. to gain the. cooperation of
countries outside the region in accomplishing our various
objectives in the region; to enhance the possibility of
resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict-in a manner that
respects the security interests of all parties; to secure
the withdrawal or increase the costs of the Soviet presence
in Afghanistan; to deter or frustrate further military
intervention or subversion by the Soviet Union, Soviet
proxies, or regional states or movements hostile to Western
interests; to ensure a network of military facilities in
the region for the rapid introduction of sizeable U.S.
forces; to.encourage India to seek greater independence
from the Soviet Union, and to establish stable relations
with other states in the region; and to support the
further development of a secure and independent Pakistan. (TS
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Implementing Strategies
The overall national objectives of the -United States are. to be
implemented through an interlocking set of strategies that.
principally include the following:
-- diplomatic;
information;
economic;
military.
The full articulation of U.S. National Strategy requires the
development and integration of each set of strategies into a
comprehensive whole. The various instruments of U.S. national
power and the strategies for their use do not stand alone;.
rather, they are inextricably linked and, to be effective, must
be mutually supportive. Part I of this study provides the
common starting point towards this end.
The overall study process will build upon this common starting
point'-by means of individual study segments. Part III of this
study will consider the military component only. The other
components of U.S. national strategy as outlined above will be
the subject of companion studies to be undertaken on an
expeditious basis in the near future. Additional studies will
also be undertaken concerning the role of?intelligence, covert
operations, and arms control in supporting the implementing
strategies. (C).
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