REPORT ON A STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE JUDGMENTS PRECEDING SIGNIFICANT HISTORICAL FAILURES: THE HAZARDS OF SINGLE-OUTCOME FORECASTING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R001602930007-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 1, 2008
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: December 19, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2008/08/01: CIA-RDP85M00364R001602930007-7
ERR. 83-6093
19 December 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Senior Review Panel Members
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Report on a Study of Intelligence Judgments
Preceding Significant Historical Failures:
The Hazards -of Single-Outcome Forecasting
1. I compliment you on Ur Itthinkfthatethe9broadJperspectipeeyouing
significant historical failures. provided. in your identification of single-outcome forecasting as the root
the nose.
o
n
of the problem is right
ood job and developed so much
h a
g
e done suc
..2. However, you hav background that I am asking you to go a little further by focusing in on
specific turning points within some of the episodes nwithanhicherouiddealtld
broadly and determine whether we saw what was happening
whether we raised the speculation might have beenulahe~hor therenwasvany
and what that st.."idence indicating the actual eventuality, where we missed it, what we
;;;:ould have looked for. For example, you provided an assessment of overall
Ecoblems on Vietnam. What I would like to ss ee aadd ddedvtoethatais aa nfocusson
the specific judgments made at turning poins,
pa1,)vided at a critical point in time or on a specific development which
ac`ually occurred--could it have been foreseen--what evidence was there,
what should have been looked for, which speculations in retrospect were
reasonable and were they put forward?
3. For example, when North Vietnam launched tell offensive ithn
did we think they were going to Saigon or did we
limited objectives? In the latter point was the speculation ever raised?
When did the evidence of the ultimate objective accumulate?
4. Similarly, did we speculate theSowhat viets were going t
Afghanistan, that the Shah was finished and
Fright be, what the alternatives to Somoza might be? Menges did a study
on Cuba and Nicaragua which addressed some-of these questions.
5. To see whether you can do what I am now asking, I suggest
rpSaigondecheioecision
concentrating on the decision inNortstnam aodgo for
of the Soviets to take control of 9hani
the North to intervene in South Vietnam. We'11 wait on Cuba and Nicaragua
until we see how much help is available from the Menges exercise.
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 Approved For Release 2008/08/01: CIA-RDP85M00364R001602930007-7
7. On page 4 of Tab B on the likelihood of all-out Soviet support of
Hanoi, I present these-questions relevant to the further analysis for which
I am now asking:
-- Was there 'not a significant-escalation of Soviet. support
subsequent to 1965? . .
-- When did USSR become the primary supplier?
-- What were we. saying about them from 1965 to 1975?
.William J. Casey
Approved For Release 2008/08/01: CIA-RDP85M00364R001602930007-7