GRENADA: THE CUBAN FACTOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R001502590008-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 11, 2008
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: October 26, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

The Director of Central Intelligence
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INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
26 October 1983
GRENADA: THE CUBAN FACTOR
Prior to yesterday's invasion, the Cuban contingent in Grenada was
believed to comprise at least 400 personnel consisting of the following
elements:
a construction brigade housed at the Point Salines Airfield
(350 personnel)
-- a military advisory mission headquartered about a mile north of Point
Salines (10 to 12 advisors)
-- the Cuban Embassy staff and guard force located in southeastern
St. Georges (at least 15)
civilian technicians and advisors (including 25 medical personnel and
15 technicians at Radio Free Grenada)
This does not include any forces that may have been aboard a Cuban Naval
at Port St. been Gused to eorges transport
Academy trainan{rooship, carrier Vietnam
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til a u an workers at
the airfield were safe and in their barracks. These men include many military
reservist - come of whom may have had combat experience in Angola or
Ethiopia. indicated they were armed
and may have been formed into squaas or . Cuban Colonel Pedro
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s Interagency Intelligence Assessment was requested by the National
Security Council Staff. It was prepared under the of ee
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National Intelligence Officer for Latin America by
Office of African and Latin American Analysis, CIA. The Assessment
was coordinated at the working level with the Central Intelligence
the National Security Agency,
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The Cuban military advisory contingent is evidently larger 11
nrevinusly estimated and could number as many as 100. Reporting
fighting at the Point alines Airfield, firing on US helicopters with small
arms and a machine-gun, and making a stand against a ground assault near.the
fuel tanks north of the airfield. The Cubans who reportedly were encountered
at Pearls Airfield and at the Radio Free Grenada site nor t. Georges may
have included advisors from the military mission as well.
The Cubans could have landed some additional forces from the Vietnam
Heroico without our knowledge but we know that it loaded sugar, 500 tons of
cement and other cargo in Mariel harbor before departing Cuba for Grenada on
1 October. There are accommodations on the ship for 240 personnel when
carrying cargo. The cargo manifest and destination were declared on 29 August
and it took one month to complete the loading. We believe that the cargo was
delivered, suggesting that no more than 240 additional Cuban personnel could
have been transferred to Grenada. bThe efore itheacoup.
e
We ha two reports of landings, but none have been
confirmed,
On the other hand, a US field commander es ma e
Grena a were facing the equivalent of two well-armed and well-trained Cuban
dditional forces
light infantry battalions, which could indicate that some a
were inserted. A report yesterday that tanks and armo carriers
were located near Pearls Airfield was-not corroborated
and CINCLANT Intelligence has disavowed the rupor
The stiffness of the resistance thus far can be attributed to the
following factors:
Colonel Tortola's effective command of Cuban personnel on the island.
-- The Cubans had warning of the likelihood of landings and had time to
andaction. the advantage probably of had
caseoofdefensive
arm andforsdeployment themselves
a plan
knowing the terrain.
Heavy, accurate anti-aircraft fire from known Grenadian Army
positions downed or disabled the majority of the Black Hawk transport
helicopters early in the action, severely reducing the mobility of US
forces in the St. Georges-Point Salines area.
The only road leading from the airfield north toward St. Georges goes
right past both the Cuban workers housing area and their military
mission headquarters, where 300-400 armed Cubans were concentrated.
indicated the Army had brougnt inforcements to this general
area by truck.
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The strongest units of the Grenadiah Army -- at Fort Frederick and in,
the Frequente-Grand Anse area north of the airfield -- have probably
been stiffened by Cuban advisors.
We believe that the arrival-last night of additional helicopters and
troops of the 82nd Airborne at Point Salines, the reported Marine armored
force landing north of St. Georges, and continued heavy supression of anti-
aircraft and artillery positions in the Fort Frederick area will lead to a
collapse of organized resistance today.
POSSIBLE CUBAN DIVERSIONS
As President Fidel Castro has publicly admitted, the Cubans are incapable
of reinforcing their forces in Grenada. Nor are they likely to risk a direct
attack on US Naval forces off Grenada. Cuba's two FOXTROT submarines were
observed in port on Monday. Castro, however, may be angry enough to order
sabotage against US forces, bases, or embassies elsewhere in the Caribbean
Basin or in the continental United States, using surrogate forces or Cuban
operatives employed in such a manner to provide plausible denial. While some
e do not believe Havana can create
isolated Cuban retaliatory acts may occur, w
d
a.
any diversion sufficient to alter the outcome in Grena
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ANNEX
PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (PRA)
Commander: General Hudson Austin
Size Equipment Comment
1,000 - 1,200 AK-47s, RPGs,
heavy machine guns,
mortars, recoilless
rifles, BTR-60 and
BRDM armored personnel
carriers, ZU-23,
ZPU 4 AA batteries,
and field artillery.
Headquarters at Ft. Rupert
with camps near St. Georges and at
Calivigny. Groups of junior
officers NCOs trained in Cuba.
Some Cuban advisors on island
provide basic training. Officer
Corps probably loyal to Austin.
People's Revolutionary Militia (PRM)
Commander: Winston Bullen (deceased)
2,000-4,000 AK-47s, small arms,
possible heavy machine
guns and light
artillery
Created by Bishop as his personal
security force. Several hundred
members reportedly trained in
Cuba. The Militia reportedly was
disarmed last week by PRA with
Bullen subsequently executed.
Loyalties unknown.
Grenada Police Service (GPS)
Commander: Major Ian St. Bernard
300-500 Small arms. Consists of Prison Service,
Coast Guard Immigration Service, and.
has four small Coast Guard. Some police
British patrol boats received training, including
provided by Libya. political indoctrination, in
Cuba.
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INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STATEMENT
26 October 1983
ATTACHMENT TO GRENADA: THE CUBAN FACTOR
At approximately 0130 hours on 26 October, Cuban President Castro made a
public statement and answered questions from the press in Havana. When asked
how many Cubans are in Grenada, Castro responded that there were more than
700, including s mtruction wnrkprc- At 0945 an 26 October- we
rprpivpfl 7
7 stating that the Cuban Foreign Ministry was i n f o r m i n g its
Missio ns overseare areapproximately 1 000 Cubans in Grenada. The
credible range.
Previous reporting has indicated a basic complement of 350 to 400
construction workers, although approximately 200 additional workers were
introduced late last year -- presumably to replace construction workers
already there -- but we were never able to confirm their return to Cuba. If
they did not return to Cuba, this would account for much of the discrepancy
with our previous estimate of 350 construction workers. Vietnam Heroico could
have brought in - 300 more personnel, accounting for the remainder of
the discrepancy.
In view of the conflicting reports and the lack of good independent
information, we estimate that as many as 1,000 Cuban personnel could be in
Grenada, although an estimate of 400 to 700 still appears to be a more
CC I% D C
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