ZHAO ZIYANG'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON: HIS NEEDS AND EXPECTATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R001201890001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 24, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 29, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
29 December 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central
Intelligence
FROM . National Intelligence Officer
for East Asia
SUBJECT : Attached
If you approve, I would like to send this
paper to the addressees via the Friday morning
PDB briefer.
Casey has an earlier draft with him in
Florida -- at his request -- and is aware of
the plan to offer the paper to the Cabinet officers
who will be dealing with Zhao. However, I don't
know whether Casey approves of the paper, since
I haven't heard from him. My guess is that he
would not object to our sending it out before
he returns.
David D. Gries
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National Intelligence Council
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
THROUGH : The Acting Director of Central Intelligence
David D. Gries
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
SUBJECT : Zhao Ziyang's Visit to Washington: His Needs and
Expectations
The Foreign Policy Setting
Premier Zhao Ziyang's visit to Washington comes at a time when the
Chinese leadership is trying to consolidate its current improved relations
with the United States in accordance with decisions taken early in 1983 --
probably following Secretary Shultz's visit to Beijing -- and reconfirmed at
the Party's Second Plenum held just after Secretary Weinberger's visit.
-- The decision to consolidate relations appears to reflect recognition
that the deterioration in US-Chinese ties -- which lasted from 1980
through the signing of the Taiwan Arms Sales Communique in 1982 --
weakened rather than strengthened China's ability to manage relations
with the two superpowers. In this sense, the decision was defensive;
it was designed to prevent a downward drift.
-- The decision also reflects Chinese recognition that it might be
dealing with the Reagan administration through 1988. In this
situation, the Chinese probably believe their best course is to
consolidate the relationship at its current improved level, since
they probably do not expect much further deepening of political or
strategic ties over the next few years. Economic and commercial
relations are a different matter: the Chinese look forward to steady
improvements.
The pace and scope of the improved relationship is attested to by the
number of visitors that flowed between Beijing and Washington in 1983 --
Secretaries Shultz, Baldridge and Weinberger to Beijing and Ministers Wu,
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Wang, Gao, He and Qian to Washington. These high level visits were buttressed
by concrete accomplishments -- a textile agreement, Chinese engagement of
legal counsel in the Huguang bond case, progress on technology transfer and
exploration of military sales and exchanges.
Impact of Taiwan
Although Taiwan is not an immediate territorial issue in Beijing --
Chinese expectations of achieving reunification with Taiwan any time soon are
nil -- Deng Xiaoping and his circle have long held that the road to Taipei
runs through Washington. Only Washington, they claim, can persuade Taipei to
display flexibility on reunification arrangements. Having given up the notion
of solving the territorial issue in his lifetime, Deng probably believes that
discussions with Taipei about reunification -- even though they may last for
years or even decades -- are an acceptable, face-saving substitute. The
Chinese expect Washington to help.
-- But Zhao will not ask for direct US help in starting discussions with
Taipei. Beijing believes, however, that large US arms sales to
Taiwan and continuing high level contacts impede reunification, and
Zhao will probably urge that both be cut back.
Beijing's leaders also recognize that as the China-born generation
currently in control on Taiwan makes way for Taiwan-born successors,
reunification arrangements will become more difficult to negotiate. Beijing's
current handling of negotiations with London over Hong Kong's future suggests
that Chinese leaders do not understand what makes capitalist economies like
Hong Kong or Taiwan tick. Moreover, the accelerating divergence between the
economies and social systems of Taiwan and China will in time make all but
token reunification more and more unlikely, though even token reunification
would in itself be significant.
For Beijing, starting discussions with Taipei, even if they are
inconclusive, is a way out.
Zhao will drive this point home in Washington, and, in an effort to
underscore Chinese seriousness, may repeat the comment Deng made to
Secretary Weinberger about the possibility of blockading Taiwan if
peaceful reunification measures fail. Zhao believes this threat will
induce Washington to foster discussions.
Impact of Chinese-Soviet Relations
Less than two months after Zhao returns to Beijing from Washington, the
Chinese and the Soviets will sit down in March for their fourth round of
talks. A meeting between Chinese and Soviet foreign ministers, the first time
this has happened since 1969, could come even sooner. Zhao knows that the
Chinese hand is strengthened in these talks by Soviet perceptions of stable
US-Chinese relations. He also knows that a perception of progress in
Chinese-Soviet talks heightens anxieties in Washington, thus explaining why
the Chinese bracket high-level contact between Chinese and US leaders with
imnortant events in the evolving Sino-Soviet dialogue.
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that the visit will facilitate improvement of China's position in the
"triangular relationship".
-- Beijing also believes it can remain in the catbird's seat in the
Washington-Beijing-Moscow relationship so long as Washington's
relations with Moscow are severely strained.
-- And Beijing sees important advantages in remaining there: the
two-front threat to China of the 1960s, replaced by the two-front
threat to Moscow of the 1970s, has given way in the 1980s to a
reduced threat to China on both the US and Soviet fronts (or so
Beijing claims).
Nonetheless, given fundamental obstacles to major improvements in
Chinese-Soviet relations, China has no alternative to maintaining reasonably
cordial relations with the US. Thus, periodic Chinese threats to downgrade
relations with Washington and improve those with Moscow should be regarded
mainly as negotiating ploys. Beijing still clearly views the Soviet Union as
the principal threat to China,
as "an expansionist, aggressive power.
-- Zhao can be expected to reflect these sometimes conflicting
viewpoints in discussions about the Soviet Union in Washington.
-- Meanwhile, the Chinese are reassured by evidence of a buildup of US
forces worldwide and in the Pacific. Negotiating with Moscow is less
risky for them in such circumstances.
Domestic Political Factors in China
Zhao's visit also comes at a time of heightened Chinese sensitivity
towards foreign policy issues that involve sovereignty questions, such as
China's inability to make discernible progress towards reunification with
Taiwan. Such sensitivities are a response to tensions in Chinese domestic
politics that resurfaced during 1983, when the modernizers around Deng came
under pressure from opposition elements who object to portions of Deng's
program. Fearing an opposition attack on his policy of an opening to the
West, which opposition elements have used to attack him in the past, Deng
coopted their issue and launched his own campaign against "corrupting Western
influences", esn,-riallv American influences. that tarnish China's youth and
cultural life, that promote
"the interests of bourgeois liberalism. Repeated public references in the
campaign to American support for the anti-Communist Sino-American Cooperative
Organization (SACO), a joint US-KMT intelligence activity that operated during
World War II, underscores the anti-American theme and may be intended to imply
that continuing US-KMT cooperation is blocking reunification of Taiwan.
Deng, Zhao and Party Chairman Hu Yaobang have recently used more
nationalistic rhetoric when discussing domestic and foreign policy issues.
They have not, however, abandoned anything important either on their
modernizing agenda or on the Chinese agenda for US-Chinese relations. Their
nationalistic rhetoric is meant to mollif those o osed to Den 's policy of
an open door to the West;
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Zhao is well aware of these opposition currents -- to a limited extent,
Hu may be a target of the anti-Western campaign, bringing it painfully close
to Zhao. As a consequence, Zhao in conversations here is likely to use
nationalistic rhetoric regarding Taiwan and two-China issues, while pursuing
the broader goal of promoting stability in US-Chinese relations.
-- These same currents also increase the pressure on Zhao to succeed in
Washington: failure would raise questions not only about Zhao's
ability to perform well in the West, but also about Deng's major
foreign policy accomplishment of the last four years -- the
relationship with Washington. IHu
spoke without authorization in Japan in November when he questioned
whether Zhao should visit Washington, thus raising doubts about Hu's
ability to perform well abroad.
-- Nonetheless, such nationalistic objectives as reunification with
Taiwan and settlement of border problems with Moscow, both of which
affect the US, are long-range, long-term Chinese policies that have a
life of their own. Tensions in Chinese domestic politics affect the
rhetoric with which these objectives are restated, but have less
effect on the substance.
Zhao's Personal Political Objectives
Zhao also comes to Washington with political resources and his prestige
dependent on a favorable outcome. Just as China is consolidating its US
policy, so Zhao must also consolidate his political position as premier. Less
successful than Hu in surrounding himself in Beijing with committed
supporters, he is aware of the fragile nature of the succession architecture
drafted by Deng; he knows it depends on managing relations between himself and
Hu, perhaps in a kind of analogue to the relationship that once existed
between Brezhnev and Kosygin.
Hu's stock is falling, thus presenting opportunities ano
risks for Zhao. A successful visit will strengthen his position in part by
demonstrating that he can handle foreigners skillfully, long recognized as an
attribute of leadership. In this context, it is not surprising that Zhao's
advance party pushed hard for extensive TV and print media coverage. They
hope it will play well in Beijing, though it is worth nothing that the viewing
audience that counts there is the Central Committee, not the public as the
Chinese sometimes claim.. Zhao probably also. intends to use such coverage to
explain Beijing's position on the Taiwan issue directly to Americans.
In addition, Zhao has gradually become identified with China's US
relationship, as Deng moves into the background and designates Zhao -- not Hu
-- as the successor picked to deal directly with Americans. Against the
backdrop of Deng's successful visit to the US in February 1979, Zhao must also
succeed in Washington, though not on the same scale. Moreover, Zhao's visit
comes only two months after Hu's visit to Japan. Where Hu came across to some
Japanese as occasionally ill-mannered and uninformed, Zhao undoubtedly hopes
to etch a more polished image. In doing so, he must show his Central
Committee constituency that he can consolidate current improved relations with
the US, while at the same time using nationalistic rhetoric at appropriate
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moments. It is a difficult assignment and puts Zhao under considerable
pressure.
When Secretary Shultz visited Beijing in January and discussed a possible--
Zhao visit to the US, the Chinese evidenced concern about whether Zhao could
accomplish something substantial in Washington. Nonetheless, the symbolic
aspect of a leadership visit to Washington cannot be overestimated. Forced to
conduct its foreign policy from a position of weakness, among the poorest of
the developing countries, China's leaders continue to seek acceptance and
legitimacy in the world community. Visits of foreign leaders to Beijing and
of Chinese leaders to foreign capitals confer a kind of legitimacy, and among
these none is more important than a visit to Washington. Thus Zhao's visit
itself conveys a symbolic message that the Chinese media will define as
evidence of superpower courtship: China is treated as a global, not regional
power; her friendship is sought; Zhao is an accepted world leader. As a
consistently substantiated source explained it in December, Beijing believes
its influence in the international arena will increase as a result of the
visit.
Zhao's Checklist for Washington Discussions
Zhao's checklist undoubtedly contains positive and negative points, and
the Chinese must choose between making them publicly or privately.
-- They can make their points publicly in scheduled interviews with the
three TV networks; in discussions with Washington Post, Newsweek, or
New York Times editorial boards; or in the toast that Zhao will give
during the state dinner at the White House.
-- They can make their points privately directly with the President or
the Vice President, or alternatively, with one of the Cabinet
secretaries whom Zhao will meet.
Positive points on the checklist probably include signing an extension of
the US-Chinese scientific and technical agreement, completing a protocol on
industrial cooperation, announcing a nuclear cooperation agreement and
discussing Chinese proposals previously raised by Deng regarding confederal
arrangements on the Korean Peninsula. On a less concrete level, promotion of
the transfer of high technology and an increase in American trade and
investment probably top Zhao's agenda. He is expected to stress these themes
with business groups in New York and San Francisco and with Secretaries
Weinberger, Regan, and Baldridge. Zhao will also claim (falsely) that China
never equates US behavior with Soviet behavior around the world, and can also
be expected to sound Third World themes in public statements.
Among negative points, Zhao will forcefully criticize US performance on
the Taiwan issue.
He will allege publicly and privately that the US is not only
disregarding commitments made in the Taiwan Arms Sales Communique,
but is also challenging the Shanghai and Normalization Communiques by
occasionally implying the existence of something, more than unofficial
ties with Taiwan. Zhao told an American governors delegation in
Beijing in December that he hoped in the US "to improve the American
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people's understanding with regard to the Chinese position on
Taiwan", thus suggesting an intent to go over the heads of American
leaders.
Zhao may also complain about the Pell Resolution and language on
Taiwan in IMF legislation and other Congressional actions. He will
maintain that the Executive Branch is responsible, even though the
Chinese know better.
Although pleased with new US positions on technology transfer and arms
sales, Zhao is likely to complain about slow implementation of both -- he has
told recent visitors that the new US position is helpful, but controls should
be reduced further.
Implications for the US
As Zhao works through his checklist, US responses can contribute to
educating the Chinese on areas of convergence -- bright trade prospects,
common goals in IndoChina, Afghanistan, and to some extent in Korea -- and on
areas of divergence -- Taiwan; labelling the US as a hegemonist; criticizing
US policy in Third World areas.
-- Zhao and his Central Committee constituency have demonstrated a lack
of understanding of US Taiwan policy that encompasses unofficial
relations with the people and authorities on Taiwan and support for
the principle of one China, but that within this framework, also
encompasses friendly, durable relations between Washington and
Taipei, including arms sales. Zhao should recognize that the Chinese
agreed to all this in the Normalization and Taiwan Arms Sales
Communiques.
-- Nor does Zhao understand why the US believes that it is incompatible
with friendly relations when Chinese public criticism of the US has
the effect of supporting Soviet goals, as in Syria, Nicaragua, and
INF deployments in Western Europe. Zhao does not understand how
negatively the US reacts to such criticism.
-- Zhao probably does not realize that US officials noted the September
visit of Peng Zhen, chairman of the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress, to the captured US intelligence ship
"Pueblo" and his dockside statement that China and North Korea must
fight against imperialism and hegemonism.
-- Most important of all, Zhao will be impressed with authoritative
explanations of how US officials react to continued Chinese public
statements linking US and Soviet international behavior. When Zhao
denies in private that the Chinese make such linkage, he can be
reminded that the linkage was restated by Foreign Minister Wu as
recently as September before the U.N. ("the hegemonists' (the US and
USSR) aggression against ...Third World countries have given rise to
frequent wars and emergencies..."), and again by Hu in Tokyo in
November ("As long as...China and Japan...are united, it is possible
to prevent the hegemonists (the US and USSR) from throwing their
weight around...).
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On the other hand, the Chinese undoubtedly hope for an unstated US
recognition that domestic political factors in Beijing sometimes sharpen
nationalistic rhetoric in Chinese foreign policy. Since the substance of
Chinese policy has remained generally unaffected in recent months at least and
the US ability to influence outcomes in Beijing is low in any case, such
recognition is mainly useful as a way of improving the atmosphere for
discussions.
Zhao probably expects American officials to reiterate their interest in a
strategic relationship with China directed against the Soviet Union. The
Chinese have avoided discussions of a strategic relationship for several
years. Striving for the balancing catbird seat in the Washington-Beijing-
Moscow relationship, uninterested at this juncture in strengthened strategic
ties, they probably do not want to discuss a strategic relationship now.
In any case, the Chinese do not believe that shared hostility towards the
Soviet Union is the only cement binding Washington and Beijing together.
the contrary, they expect economic, commercial, educational, scientific and
technological and perhaps military ties to cement future relations, and will
respond accordingly to American efforts to develop them. Zhao and other
senior leaders have repeatedly stressed the potential of these kinds of ties
in meetings with influential Americans.
1-a~ od-~-
David D. Gries
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