NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING THURSDAY FEBRUARY 24 1983 1:00 - 2:00 P.M. IN THE SITUATION ROOM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R000300500013-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 1, 2008
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: February 22, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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I 6T
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20505
SECRET SENSITIVE
February 22, 1983
ME2?`_ORANDUM FOR MR. DONALD P. GREGG
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs
MR. L. PAUL BREMER, III
Executive Secretary
Department of State
LT. COL. W. RICHARD HIGGINS
Assistant for Interagency Matters
Office of the Secretary of Defense
NSC review completed.
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency
MS. JACKIE TILLMAN
Executive Assistant to the United States
Representative to the United Nations
Department of State
DR. ALTON KEEL
Associate Director for National Security
and International Affairs
Office of `Management and Budget
COL. GEORGE A. JOULWAN
Executive Assistant to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
E.xs'3tiVS R6gi3tiy
'.1 o'C>3
i
MR. ROGER CLEGG
Special Assistant to the Attorney General
Department of Justice
National Security Planning Group :eating,
Thursday, February 24, 1983, 1:00 - 2:00 p.m.
in the Situation Room (S)
DECL7, SSIFY ON: OADR
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Attached is the interagency paper drafted by the State Department
to be used for the discussion to be held on-Central America at the
ational Security Planning Group meeting on February 24, 1983 at
2:00 o.m. in the Situation Room. (S)
Michael 0. Wheeler
Staff Secretary
.ttach.ment: (1)
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
Political
1. The Government of El Salvador needs to take the initiative
politically -- to give the center in our Congress something to
rally around. The occasion of the Pope's visit (March 6) is
the right time to act. The Government is already considering
some useful measures but jockeying among the factions is
preventing a forceful breakthrough. The right wing (ARENA) is
the principal, but by no means only, obstacle.
Proposal: We should use all means at our disposal, to
include a special emissary, to obtain the following by March 6:
-- A call for presidential elections to be held at the
soonest practical date. (Elections are currently
scheduled for March 1984; it may be possible to have
them moved up to late 1983.)
An offer by the Government of El Salvador to
facilitate the participation of all parties --
including those affiliated with the guerrillas -- in
the elections.
Formation of a "Peace Commission" (as favored by
President Magana) or another mechanism to promote the
participation of all parties in the democratic
institutions.
Movement on Lopez Sibrian and the Hans Christ
extradition, and extension of the land reform program,
keys to obtaining Hill support for war-fighting
resources. Timing is crucial -- can't get anywhere
with security assistance until AFL/CIO is on board.
olenentation o_ a serious a~.nesty program ._`c the
rel_ase of political prisoners and incentives to
encourage defections from guerrilla _anks.
Pro: If it works, changes the question in El Salvador and
here; light even result in t :e a rg _,-Ice of unified
1eaders~,ip. Picks up Papal ort.
Con: Further manipulation by us of the government coalition
(and that is likely to be necessary) can sap its
self-respect and will to resist. Too bold an embrace
of ? NA could demoralize the rest.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
2. We need to co-opt the peace issue, before it runs away with
us in the Congress. A Latin peace initiative with a regional
focus is now emerging. We need (a) to make sure it doesn't
turn against us, and (b) try to turn it to use in the Congress.
As currently described, the Latin initiative will involve a
meeting of the five Central American countries (including
Nicaragua) in the presence of five others (Mexico, Venezuela,
Colombia, Panama and the Dominican Republic), but without the
U.S. or Cuba. The conference could be held as early as
mid-March.
There are both positive and negative sides to this develop-
ment. Its regional focus is an important step forward from
previous Latin American peace moves, notably those from
Mexico. By making clear that Costa Rica, El Salvador and
Honduras all have problems with Nicaragua, it can spotlight the
dangers of the Sandinistas' aggressive behavior for opinion-
makers in Western Europe, the Socialist International, and in
the United States.
But there are dangers. Despite assurances from Venezuelan
President Herrera and from Costa Rican, Honduran and Salvadoran
leaders that there are no anti-American implications in holding
an exclusively Latin American conference, our experience with
the lVexican Government and with Colombian President Betancur
suggests the meeting may take on an anti-gringo slant. The
non-Central Americans may try to situate themselves equidistant
from the U.S. and Cuba, trying to exact supposedly "balanced"
concessions from both. Our most vulnerable friends -- Costa
Rica, Honduras and El Salvador -- will be exposed to pressure
to make concessions. Furthermore, the non-Central American
countries are generally opposed to the "secret war" in
:7 car the .".Dta =_on to condemn it as proof of their own
"ever.-ness could prove .,v.erwhelming.
must particularly be concerned about efforts that exico
will -_ _-ke to _ .sh for po.:er-sharing i n Salvador.
he e feet o this Lati.. conference on Congress are s
larly unpredictable. Congressional opinion is restless, and
"negotiations" seen an easy ..ay out of the war. Congress might
seize on the Conference as a reason for postponing all
increased assistance pending its outcome. On the other hand,
depending on ;,ow t e conference develops, near Latin American
u:.~ni..._ty mi ht become _he ^_. ~nds for persuading the Congress
to prcvlce increased assista ce.
C ~. / ` ? S I T . : r~
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Proposal: To try to take advantage of this development
while minimizing these dangers, we propose:
-- To reassure Presidents Magana, Monge and Suazo that
the U.S. will not abandon them.
-- To caution Costa Rica, Honduras, and El Salvador on
the dangers of the process, and to insist on close
coordination with us; we will also urge them to limit
the initiative in time.
-- To respond to Venezuelan President Herrera Campins'
reque?t to you through Ambassador Kirkpatrick that we
not "torpedo" the initiative, saying that we wish him
well, and believe it essential that the same prin-
ciples of democratization, reciprocity and verifica-
tion apply to Nicaragua as well as El Salvador.
-- To try to make this into a positive development, when
it occurs, supporting it in public, and interpreting
it as demonstrating that the Central American problem
cannot really be solved until Nicaragua changes.
Military Leadership
3. The Salvadorans must overcome their garrison mentality due
mainly to the political divisions and infighting within the
r-P.1itary. They are not conducting the war aggressively.
Military cor:;manders are chosen for personal loyalties, many are
inept, some corrupt and not inclined to aggressively pursue the
war. There is widespread dissatisfaction among field comman-
ders and we may be seeing the beginning of a general "war
weariness."
p:occsal A funca"ental change in the military is ..ceded.
=ar a appears to be facing a loss of support within the
officer corps and may be on his ..ay out. We must be ready to
the m ~ 1 t a r y and
work with a potential c_r.eraL ~.Gi.al C~Z.:~g~-e in `~+ - '.
we -.ay have to help the process along (without leading it) if
Yo not have to
to sae protracted _41 nfight? ng indica =ion
frcn. us will carry ebut -ay not be enough. ;:e .. ay need
to bring about the desired results. In either case, we will
'nave to be sure that the process is orderly -- no drastic
ai ..
Chances all at once -- and that military unity is -reserved.
SECRET/SEt+SITI VE
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
And we must attempt to make more effective discipline and
avoidance of abuses by the military part of the deal.
Pro: There is really no alternative. The current leaders
are good politicians but they aren't winning the war.
If we can improve the army's leadership, the war can
be won at FY 1982 levels of military assistance ($80
million).
Con: Integrity of the military structure is critical.
Tinkering with it is dangerous and the greater our
role the more likely it is to come apart at the
seams. Keeping the process of change orderly will not
be easy.
Military Tactics
4. The military must overcome "sweep and scoot" tactics and
put into effect a real counterinsurgency plan designed to take
the war to the guerrillas and keeo the pressure on them. They
have not focussed on territorial security and bringing the
government to the people. The Guatemala experience shows what
can be done.
Proposal: Launch a full scale regionally-focussed counter-
insurgency effort, including civic action and psy-ops. Proper
organization and staffing (intelligence, logistics, command &
control, fire control) are a must. But the U.S. must also
organize and gear up for the effort. Trainers must operate at
the brigade level. Civilian ad-visors will be needed at the
Departmental level to assure an integrated political/military
approach, and to keep us informed on what is going on.. This
will require some more resources but mostly slight adustments
and changes in deployments and tactics. An effort to start
such a Drogram is now under,-.-ay .._ the e area of Usulatan/San
` i cente.
prow '- `le Government would se the initiative in the war
and put the guerrillas the defensive. Small units
would keep the pressure _n. _.. is would be a low
technology/low rosourc e :_ct_c.
Con: T?.e would have to apply so e muscle to the Salvadorans
to get them out of the c.:rr_nt f=ame of mind. As our
role increases they :dc-D` a "let the crincos do
it" mentality.
SEC: _ 'S- :_
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
US-Salvador-Military Relationships
5. We must develop the kind of relationship with the Salva-
doran military that allows us to influence the way they conduct
the war. The Salvadorans have kept us at arms length and unin-
formed on their operational plans. This close relationship
must also be used to push for more control on abuses by the
military.
Proposal: We need to augment our military group and move
it into closer contact with the high command and to augment our
defense attaches, using them more actively to travel in the
field and report on the war. (The development of these new
relationships, and the kind/quantity of resources needed to do
so are not agreed. Department of Defense has provided an
illustrative outline of steps which might be considered for
implementation; these are at Tab A. Defense has also estimated
personnel needs to carry out its proposals. These are at Tab
B.)
Pro: Would help us avoid the kind of improvisation that led
to the loss of Berlin, while promoting a shift to
small unit tactics.
Con: We risk a nationalistic reaction from the Salva-
dorans. There will be greater risks for our defense
attaches as they travel more extensively in conflicted
areas. There could also be a U.S. public reaction.
Military Resources
6. We must obtain for El Salvador $60 million in additional
military resources in the next 660 days. The $25 million pro-
vidod in CRA for FY 33 has oxen totally ex _nded . The
int ns__y of recent fighting has increased a:-m:mulit-on usage
rates. lt- present the armed forces have approximately only 90
days of small arms ammunition and 30-410 days of bo-.bs. $11_ould
e cuerri llas launch another offensive, these times will be
shortened =:e- more. T_--se amm,nition snortaces, cc pled with
the ii.^. _ tai r. I of US resolve and support, are reinforcing the
"cuartel~T-,,entality" of the armed forces. The husbanding of
resources limits offensive operations, thereby permitting the
guerrillas to maintain the initiative.
PrcDosal: Immediate provision of $60M in Section 506a
e ergency :swcc,;n, r ~i c_~ :gill _n.ciude Sgt in u:,;munition. ^
Accition i re Guest of Congress :or ".A? supple,.. supplemental of _ i G6 . i is
SFC "",SIT"`IE
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
which will permit development of long range war winning
strategy. (Details as provided Department of Defense are at
Tab B.)
Pro: Provision of 506a will redress current under-funding,
help to reverse deteriorating military trends, and
permit the armed forces to seize the initiative. The
MAP supplemental will provide resources to enable the
government to defeat the guerrillas, and restore con-
fidence of US commitment in El Salvador and throughout
region. Failure to provide funds could result in a
guerrilla victory and a setback region wide for US
policy.
.Con: 506a will probably result in a strong reaction in Con-
gress, as will MAP supplemental. Congress may attempt
to deprive the President of his 506a authority.
Congressional rejection of a MAP request could create
a crisis of confidence in El Salvador.
7. We need to maximize the effect of U.S. training in the
Salvadoran Army, using the existing ceiling more effectively,
or, possibly, exceeding it.
Proposal: We managed to average 37 U.S. personnel
in-country in 1982, although 55 is the agreed current ceiling.
We should (a) use third-country contract personnel for such
logistic tasks as helicopter maintenance, while (b) programming
every possible :ITT in-country, notably to regional head-
quarters. Once the battle for additional military resources is
over, we should consider whether the ceiling should not be
removed.
Pro: The most sensitive issue in the sl._uggle is the pre-
sence of U.S. personnel. If we remove the ceiling
aving a lot of ..m,ericans in El Salvador,
,c,,-,,, we r_sk -
ens no resources for them to work with.
Con: An additional 20-40 trainers within the ceiling ';on't
ma' e :yore than a bite ite in training i.eeds. SOUTHCOM
identifies a ra ii cement of 160 to 200 trainers over
the next several m.on`;s to address the full training
requirement.
8. Civic Action training leading to a coordinated program
could enhance the Armed Forces' image, solidify popular suo-
,.ort, and roll-back guerrilla-controlled areas.
SECPET/ S LEI: SITIVE
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Proposal: USSOUTHCOM conduct a series of small civil
action exercises within current DOD budget which will train
Salvadoran military forces in civic action-oriented activities.
Pro: Civic action is a non-hostile, necessary humanitarian
activity to successfully counter insurgency campaign.
Con: Possible adverse US domestic reaction if viewed as an
increase in US military involvement. Could be per-
ceived as military attempt to displace civilian
government elements.
10. `.:e need to find a way to ster up the pressure on the
Sandinistas this year, (a) to e""^urace nr,::ot_iat ions by
'anaC~~a, (5) to in rove ? nterdiC` Cn of i ort for the
$ai':adGrar' d (c) give 1 it fr_ rids in the area
hope.
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
Economic
11. We need special treatment on sugar for all friendly coun-
tries in Central America (including Panama) -- all of which
s?nd over 90% of their sugar exports to the U.S. -- while
cutting back on Nicaragua.
Proposal Increase their scar quotas for FY 1934 by rout
130,000Lshort tons (worth about $35 million), ,while halving
`;icaragua's quota to about 29,000 tons. If the worldwide quota
goes up sur:l C4 entlV, increase by 210,000 tons '-.worth $66
million). El Salvador, Costa Rica and _Honduras would be able
to ship at historical peak levels, with the remaining increment
dis- tributed to the others. In order to compensate
non-Central American producers, who would then be giving up
100,000 to 210,000 tons, reduce the present U.S. sugar tariff
from 2.8 per pound to 0.625 (the legal minimum). (See Tab D
for more :tails. ).
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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Pro: Would help Central American-friends, particularly the
key front-line countries, in an important sector where
they have stressed the need for,change. Vital psycho-
logically and in maintaining employment.
would minimize objections of other sugar suppliers
because of their gains from the tariff cut.
Con: We would face some legal risk domestically (possible
suit by U.S. importers or refiners) and more substan-
tial risk of international legal challenge (from other
sugar exporting countries in the GATT and the Interna-
tional Sugar Organization).
We would get strong objections from a number of impor-
tant countries that we are politicizing the sugar .
quota program and not addressing their special needs.
12. We need to get more economic resources into El Salvador, to
offset the effects of the "guerra prolongada".
Proposal: Increase non-military assistance to El Salvador
by $27.1 million, $9.1 million in PL 480 and $18 million in
development assistance. (See Tab E for more details.)
Pro: Helps meet critical needs in agricultural credits,
commodities, medicines and maintenance of public
services, most of which have resulted from guerrilla
actions.
Con: Allocating $9.1 million from the PL 480 reserve would
preclude increases in several other programs which
also have high priority and would reduce the reserve
by 25 per cent. Increasing development assistance is
likely to meet Congressional resistance which could
clay provision of the assistance and provoke con es-
sional retaliation on. _-her iportant prog;rams.
U.S. Con-,,.and and Control
13. re need to =::e sine "at G ._ c;n me ns for executing the
war are as efficient as possible; that is that they make use of
all our carabilities without confusing or overwhelming the
Salvadorans.
Prooosal: The Core Group, in consultation with the
_assador, CINCSGUTH and the relevant agencies, should produce
th n 15 days an analysis and _ _cc::nerdat~cns on appropriate
division of tasks and channels of command.
2/22/03 2 PM
,._ c
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