THE SOUTH ASIAN MILITARY HANDBOOK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 89
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 18, 1999
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 1, 1973
• Content Type: CH

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No Foreign Dissem
The South Asian Military Handbook
WOUN UL
August 1973
COPY N2 250
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No Dissent Abroad/Background Use Only
Controlled Dissem
This publication was prepared jointly by the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research of the Department of State.
It is anticipated that the Handbook will be updated, when
necessary, by issuing only relevant sections rather than re-issuing the
entire publicFtion. For this reason, the Handbook has been punched
for insertion in a three-ring binder.
25X1A9a Comments or queries regarding the contents of this publication
are welcome. They may be directed to r, Chief/South Asia
Branch, OCI/CIA, Code 143, Extension 6062.
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SOUTH ASIAN MILITARY HANDBOOK
August 1973
No. 2294/73
1. BACKGROUND
A. India vs. Pakistan: An Historical Summary . . . . . . . . 1
B. South Asia imd the Great Powers . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
II. RELATIVE MILITARY CAPABILITIES
A. India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
B. Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
C. Bangladesh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Tables: 1. Selected Armaments and Forces . . . . . . . 13
2. Forces on Indo-Pakistani Border . . . . . . . 17
3. India-Pakistan War Losses, 1971 . . . . . . . 18
4. Military Advisers in Foreign Countries . . . . 19
Maps: 1. India - Internal Administration
2. India - Army Order of Battle
3. India - Fighter/Bomber Order of Battle
4. India - Naval Order of Battle
5. Ground Forces on Indo-Pakistani Border
6. Jammu/Kashmir Area
7. Pakistan - Internal Administration
8. Pakistan - Army Order of Battle
9. Pakistan - Fighter/Bomber Order of Battle
10. Pakistan - Naval Order of Battle
11. Bangladesh - Internal Administration
12. Bangladesh - Order of Battle
III. MILITARY EXPENDITURES
A. India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Bangladesh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tables: 1. India: Net Defense Expenditures . .
2. India: Gross Defense Expenditures . . . . . .
3. India: Distribution of Defense Expenditures
4. India: Estimated Defense Foreign
Exchange Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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5. India: Military Expenditures and
Total Central Government Budget . . . . . 8
6. India: Military Foreign Exchange
Outlays and Export Earnings . . . . . . . . 9
7. Pakistan: Net Defense Expenditures . . . . . 10
8. Pakistani Military Expenditures and
Total Central Government Budget . . . . . 11
9. Pakistani Military Foreign Exchange
Outlays and Export Earnings . . . . . . . . 12
IV. DOMESTIC MILITARY PRODUCTION
A. India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
B. Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
C. Bangladesh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Tables: 1. India: Defense Production . . . . . . . . . 8
2. India: Aircraft Production . . . . . . . . . 9
V. FOREIGN SOURCES OF SUPPLY
A. India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
B. Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Bangladesh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Tables: 1. India: Foreign Military Imports . . . . . . . 10
2. Soviet Military Supply Agreements with India . 11
3. Pakistan: Foreign Military Imports . . . . . . 12
4. Chinese Military Supply
Agreements with Pakistan . . . . . . . . . 13
5. French Military Supply
Agreements with Pakistan . . . . . . . . . 14
ANNEXES
A. South Asian Nuclear Weapons Capability . . . . . . . . A-1
B. Biographic Sketches of Military Leaders . . . . . . . . . B-1
C. Chronology of Major Events in South Asia 1947-1973 . . . C-1
GLOSSARY
Performance Characteristics of Selected South Asian
Military Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-1
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1. BACKGROUND 1947-1973
A. India vs. Pakistan: An Historical Summary
Partition and Kashmir
In August 1947, following years of agitation by the predominantly
Hindu Congress Party, Great Britain gave up its Indian Empire. At the same
time, as a result of Muslim agitation, Britain partitioned India, creating
Pakistan from the two largest predominantly Muslim areas.
The two wings of Pakistan had little in common other than religion and
were separated by 1,000 miles of Indian territory. Even before partition
became official, millions of Hindus had moved from Pakistan to India and
millions of Muslims had migrated in the opposite direction. Violence on both
sides encouraged the exodus. Nevertheless, some 10 percent of India's
population remained Muslim, and several million Hindus stayed in Pakistan-
almost all in East Pakistan.
Large parts of the British Indian Empire had been ruled by theoretically
sovereign native princes. The British left to them the decision as to whether
their states would join Pakistan or India, or remain independent. In instances
where the religion of the prince and his subjects was the same, accession did
not become a problem in Indo-Pakistani relations. A few Muslim princes
ruled predominantly Hindu populations in states not contiguous to Pakistan.
Although several of these princes either acceded to Pakistan or decided to
remain independent, all of their states were eventually incorporated into
India.
In Jammu and Kashmir, a Hindu Maharajah ruled a population that was
mostly Muslim. When he delayed making a decision, some of his Muslim
subjects rebelled, receiving assistance from some Pakistani tribesmen. At this
point-on 27 October-the Maharajah opted for India in return for Indian
military assistance. Indian troops arrived in the state the same day. The
Indians and the Pakistanis fought in Kashmir for over a year, and in the end
India held most of the state, including the strategically important Vale.
Pakistan annexed part of northern Kashmir and gained control of a
small part of western Kashmir, the theoretically independent state of Azad
Kashmir. The UN Security Council called for a plebiscite to determine the
future status of Kashmir, but the plebiscite was never held. A cease-fire 'ine
was delineated in the summer of 1949, under UN auspices, and served as the
de facto boundary until 1971.
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For over 15 years, despite continuing hostility, open fighting between
India and Pakistan was limited to border incidents. In the spring of 1965,
however, serious clashes broke out in a desolate area along the shore of the
Arabian Sea known as the Rann of Kutch, where India and Pakistan had
conflicting claims. Both sides eventually agreed to arbitration, and in 1968 a
decision was announced that was generally regarded as favorable to Pakistan.
In August 1965, Pakistan began sending "freedom fighters" into Indian-
held Kashmir. India moved quickly to seal off the access routes, making
incursions into Azad Kashmir in the process. In any case, no enthusiasm for
rebellion developed among the Kashmiris. On 1 September, Pakistan
launched an attack against extreme southern Kashmir in hopes of cutting
India's communications with its forces farther north in the state. Five days
later, India began a full-scale attack in the Lahore area of West Pakistan. The
Pakistanis held the Indians outside of Lahore, and with little or no resistance
captured extensive desert area in Rajasthan, but were unable to advance
farther into Kashmir. By mutual agreement the-e was virtually no fighting
along the border between India and East Pakistan. After three weeks of
fighting in the West, both sides agreed to a UN-sponsored cease-fire. The
Pakistanis were running critically short of military supplies, while the Indians
believed that their gains would not be worth the considerable cost of
protracting the war. Under Soviet sponsorship, the two countries reached an
agreement in January 1966 at Tashkent that restored the border to that
existing before the war.
Bangladesh and Kashmir
In Pakistan's general elections in December 1970, the Awami League,
which advocated provincial autonomy, won enough seats in East Pakistan to
ensure an absolute majority in the projected Pakistan National Assembly.
The assembly was to write a new constitution, and the leaders of the league
refused to compromise on principles many West Pakistanis felt would even-
tually dissolve the union. In early March 1971, the Awami League in effect
took over the administration of the province, and on 25 March, the army
moved to restore central authority. The Bengalees then proclaimed their
independence.
The Indian Government felt threatened by events in East Pakistan.
About 10 million Bengalees eventually fled to India, creating major eco-
nomic problems and potentially serious political and social ones.
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Inside East Pakistan, extreme leftists became stronger, although they
never became more than a long-term potential threat to the moderates in the
freedom movement.
India supported the Bengali guerrillas, hoping to force Islamabad to
grant the Bengalees' political demands. By fall, the Indians were clearly
willing to risk war, and by late November regular Indian forces, in brigade
strength, were conducting raids into East Pakistan.
On 3 December, Pakistan launched air strikes at air bases in western
India, and full-scale war on two fronts began. In the East, on 4 December,
India invaded East Pakistan. Pakistani forces surrendered after two weeks of
fighting, and Bangladesh became independent. In the West, the main Pakis-
tani attack into Kashmir stalled, but both sides seized some territory along
the cease-fire line. In the strategic Lahore sector, there was relatively little
fighting, but in the Sind, the Indians seized over 5,000 square miles of
territory. The Indians proclaimed a unilateral cease-fire along the western
border effective as of 17 December, and the Pakistanis concurred.
In July 1972, at Simla, the two sides agreed to withdraw their troops
from occupied territory, except in Kashmir, where a new "line of control"
was established. The agreeme.,t was implemented in December.
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B. South Asia and the Great Powers
Relations between the Great Powers have important repercussions in
South Asia. In the 1950s US-Soviet tensions played an important part in
determining not only the relations of South Asian nations with the Great
Powers, but relations among the South Asian nations themselves. The emer-
gence of China in the 1960s and the detente in Sino-US and US-Soviet
relations in the 1970s have also had a significant impact.
The 1950s
Washington's policy of containment during the 1950s put the US at
odds with India and led to a military alliance with Pakistan:
-India's policies, such as its ambiguous stand during the Korean
conflict and its abstention on the UN vote to condemn the
Soviet intervention in Hungary, led to serious strains between
Washington and New Delhi;
-US efforts to contain the USSR resulted in the inclusion of
Pakistan in SEATO and CENTO, and in bilateral defense agree-
ments with the US in 1954 and 1959.
Moscow, after Stalin's death in 1953, placed a high priority on develop-
ing close relations with India as a large new nation advocating socialism.
In South Asia, while India bought arms from Western Europe, princi-
pally Britain, a major US military supply program, including grant aid,
enabled Pakistan to challenge Indian dominance. Nehru claimed the military
assistance agreement prevented further progress on resolving the Kashmir
dispute.
China, not yet a Great Power, chose the Third World as its forum for
international expression and also developed close ties with India. At the
same time, India emphasized its own non-alignment and acted asa leader of
the Third World.
The 1960s
Beginning in the late 1950s, the growing power of China began to
change relationships in the sub-continent:
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r
-China and India began to see each other as rivals for Ieadershil- in
Asia and in the Third World;
-Sino-Soviet rivalry encouraged close Indo-Soviet relations;
-Pakistan began to see China as a potential ally against India and,
as early as 1961, entered into negotiations with Peking for a
border agreement, which was finally signed in 1963;
-The US, desiring both to offset growing Soviet influence in New
Delhi and to contain China, took some tentative steps toward
improving relations with New Delhi.
The war in the Himalayas in late 1962 brought most of these trends to
a head. The US and UK rushed arms .to India to demonstrate their support
for New Delhi. Pakistani faith in the US as a protector against India was
badly shaken by these actions. The war also pointed up the mutual hostility
of Pakistan and China toward India. The USSR, forced to choose between a
Communist and a non-Communist country, opted for India. Soviet arms
shipments began arriving the following year.
The US continued to be the major arms supplier to Pakistan, but, when
the US imposed an embargo during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, it was
replaced by China.
Decreasing strains in US-Soviet relations during the 1960s were both
reflected and encouraged by the parallel policies of the two countries in
South Asia:
-Both sought to contain China;
-Both worked for stability in the sub-continent;
-In late 1965, US efforts with India and Pakistan undoubtedly
contributed to the receptivity of each country to the eventual
Soviet mediation at Tashkent;
-Both sought to increase their influence in India and Pakistan.
Following the 1965 war, the USSR improved its relations with
Pakistan slightly, at minor cost to its relations with India.
In the early 1 970s, there has been some swing back toward the relations
existing in the 1950s. The Sino-US detente obviated Washington's interest in
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India as a vehicle for containing China. The detente also eliminated a major
complication in Pakistan's foreign policy, allowing Islamabad to maintain
relations with one of its Great-Power allies without offending the other. US
and Chinese policy toward the sub-continent began to coincide. For exam-
ple, the policies of the two countries during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war
were roughly parallel. Finally, the detente and the continuing Sino-Soviet
rivalry, together with Indo-Pakistani hostility, resulted in closer relations
between New Delhi and Moscow-symbolized by the 1971 Indo-Soviet
Friendship Treaty.
The independence of Bangladesh injecte'i a new factor into the South
Asian equation. Dacca's relations with the Great Powers tended to parallel
India's. Bangladesh, however, stood in much greater need of economic aid
from the US. Its relations with the U SR were limited to some extent by
Soviet reluctance to undercut New Drahi's influerce in Dacca. China-with
an eye toward Islamabad-refused to have any d.-slings with the new nation.
The Future
The beginnings of further shifts in the Great Power - South Asian
relationship are already visible. China and India appear to be moving toward
rapprochement, while Indo-US relations, badly hurt during the Bangladesh
crisis in 1971, appear to be improving. The USSR is once again seeking
better relations with Pakistan, and Pakistan for its part, now seems to want a
more amicable relationship with Moscow.
Regional Relations
Relations between India and Pakistan have influenced and been in-
fluenced by the policies of the smaller nations of the area.
Iran has consistently supported Pakistan, providing limited quantities of
military supplies and sanctuary for Pakistani civil aircraft during Pakistan's
wars with India and using its diplomatic influence on Islamabad's behalf. The
Iranian interest is in maintaining a stable and independent nation on its
eastern border and in limiting Soviet, Chinese, and Indian influence both in
South Asia and farther west. Iran has never, however, pressed its support of
Pakistan to the point of actual involvemer,, 'n combat operations.
Afghanistan has long-standing differences with Pakistan over the status
of the two Pakistani frontier provinces-Baluchistan and the Northwest
Frontier. India's cordial relations with Afghanistan are partly a function of
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their respective problems with Pakistan. Afghanistan', military and economic
vulnerability, a latent fear of Indian encroachment, and sympathy for fellow
Muslims have all tended to limit Afghan-Indian cooperation.
Sri Lanka and Nepal have pursued a policy of preserving their independ-
ence and freedom of action by playing not only India against Pakistan, but
the Great Powers against each other. India seeks, at a minimum, to have no
other power dominant in these two countries, and-especially in Nepal-has
made special efforts to increase Indian influence.
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II. RELATIVE MILITARY CAPABILITIES
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The 1971 war with Pakistan demonstrated India's pre-eminence as a
military power in South Asia. Although Pakistan's military capability re-
mained largely intact following the conflict, the country's leaders recognize
that their armed forces are no match for India's. There is little difference
between the two forces in terms of leadership, morale and logistic capability,
but the Indian armed forces are much larger and better equipped, and would
ultimately overwhelm their foe. India's military strength has, in fact, evolved
to the point where it could probably defend itself successfully against a
conventional attack by China or a combined Chinese-Pakistani attack.
The key to India's strong position is the massive military expansion
program, including the development of a domestic armaments industry,
begun after the 1962 hostilities with China. India is continuing to purchase
sophisticated military equipment from the Soviet Union as well as Eastern
European and Free World countries, and is arranging for production of such
items whenever feasible. Pakistan has increased its efforts to acquire weap-
onry, primarily from France and the Peoples Republic of China, but has
been unable to match India's military buildup. It is doubtful that military
parity will ever be restored.
The Bangladesh armed forces, in their present embryonic stage, have no
offensive, and only a limited defensive, capability.
A. India
Ground: The Indian Army is capable of successful offensive and defensive
operations within South Asia. It could also constitute an effective expedi-
tionary force within the region, using its own resources, or elsewhere in
combination with a major power. The Indian Army, in conjunction with the
paramilitary forces, is capable of maintaining internal security and of meet-
ing any civil emergency. The army has a personnel strength of about
1,092,000. There is no compulsory service. Enlistment is permitted between
the ages of 17 and 24 for 10, 12, or 15 years of active service. Based on the
availability of organized reserves, arms and equipment, training facilities and
cadres, administrative machinery, and economic considerations, but without
additional logistic support, maximum mobilization could be reached on
M-plus-90 with 1,175,000 troops. The manpower would come from the
Reserve Force (a pool of men who have completed active duty service), from
the Territorial Army, and from the National Cadet Corps. Among the
principal weaknesses of the army are logistics problems stemming from a
diversity of equipment and a shortage of platoon and company officers.
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Combat and support units are divided into five geographic (territorial)
commands, with the majority of troops concentrated either on the western
border with Pakistan or in northeastern India. Major tactical units include:
7 Corps Headquarters
15 Infantry Divisions
10 Mountain Divisions
1 Armored Division
8 (Independent) Infantry Brigades
2 (Independent) Parachute Brigades
7 (Independent) Artillery Brigades
7 Corps Artillery Brigades
5 (Independent) Armored Brigades
7 (Independent) Air Defense Brigades
Twelve infantry divisions and several independent brigades are deployed
against Pakistan, while six mountain divisions (in northeastern India) and
one infantry division (in Ladakh) are stationed across the border from
Chinese forces in Tibet and Sinkiang.*
Arms and equipment are a mixture of imported and indigenously
produced or assembled equipment. The USSR supplanted the UK and the
US as the principal provider of military equipment after 1965. Foreign
technical assistance is minimal; the quality of maintenance is good. A small
number of personnel is sent abroad for staff or advanced technical training,
but the Indian Army itself conducts a program covering all requirements
from basic individual through advanced unit and high-level command and
staff training. Many of the Indian Army schools accept students from
less-developed countries.** On occasion, Indian training missions are sent
out of the country.
The Indian Army logistic system, despite problems stemming from a
diversity of equipment, is capable of maintaining the forces. Vulnerable lines
of communication, however, could jeopardize Indian forces in Kashmir and
*Chinese forces along the borders with India include three infantry divisions, one
independent- infantry regiment, one independent artillery regiment and seven border
defense regiments. No combat aircraft are permanently stationed at airfields in Tibet.
**Bangladesh, Bhutan, Ghana, Kenya, Iraq, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and Zambia sen,'
students.
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northeastern India. The Banihal Road is the only major land communica-
tions link in Kashmir, and its severance would seriously hamper any opera-
tions in the area. An alternate, but less satisfactory, route is available. The
reliance on one single-track railroad from West Bengal to Arunchal Pradesh
opposite China has also been a significant logistic weakness, but this problem
has recently been alleviated by the emergence of a friendly Bangladesh that
would probably give transit rights to Indian forces. An extensive system of
depots is maintained throughout India; stocks of ammunition, POL, and
other stores are considered sufficient to support a maximum combat effort
of at least 45 days.
Air: The Indian Air Force is capable of providing air defense and engaging in
strategic and tactical operations within South Asia, as well as assisting in civil
emergencies. Its main strengths are:
? the availability of ample manpower;
? the high morale and individual capabilities of personnel;
? and the ongoing program to acquire modern aircraft from outside
sources, while at the same time developing a local manufacture/assembly
capability.
The principal weakness is the diversity of aircraft (over 35 types). With such
variety, there is considerable difficulty in resupply, in procurement of spare
parts, and in training qualified pilots and maintenance personnel. Other
weaknesses are lack of an effective strategic strike force, poor communica-
tions in the air defense system, and the lack of an all-weather air-to-air
missile.
There are 104,000 men in the air force, of whom 2,300 are pilots. The
aircraft inventory totals 1,415, including 354 supersonic and 261 subsonic
fighters, 39 light bombers, 240 transports, 8 reconnaissance aircraft, 211
helicopters, and 302 other aircraft. The air force is organized into 95 units: 8
day fighter, 9 fighter/interceptor, 15 fighter-bomber, 3 light bomber, 1
strategic reconnaissance, 1 maritime reconnaissance, 13 transport, 14 heli-
copter, 1 VIP, and 30 miscellaneous training and utility. Most of the major
combat units are strategically located along the border areas. More than half
of the flying units are based in the western portion of the country. Prior to
any hostilities, a wide dispersal of forces and aircraft to numerous forward
locations could be expected.
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The air defense system has a good capability against a conventional
medium-to-high altitude attack by either China or Pakistan. MIG-21
FL/Fishbeds are used in the interceptor or ground-support role, depending
on priority. Effectiveness of the early warning/ground-controlled intercep-
tion system is limited by the number of available radars and by the masking
effect of the Himalayas. Siting is largely orieiited toward the north and
northwest. Contiguous coverage is provided along the northern border and
along the western border south to the Bombay area. Coverage does not exist
along the eastern border, except for the Madras and Calcutta areas. The SA-2
SAM system, used in defense of significant military/industrial targets, in-
cludes five main complexes consisting of 19 active sites (squadrons). The Fan
Song F radar has been identified with the system, enhancing its electronic
counter-countermeasure and low-altitude capability. Indian Army AAA
weapons proved to be the most effective defense against low-level ground
attacks and strikes on airfields during the 1971 war. The air force has a
minor strategic bombing capability that would permit it to strike all targets
in Pakistan. Fifteen fighter-bomber squadrons (SU-7/Fitter, HF-24 Marut,
and F-56 Hawker Hunter day fighters) are available for tactical operations.
Transport capability is built around 13 squadrons of medium and light
transports, including aging C-47 and C-1 19G Packets, DHC-4 Caribous,
AN-12 Cubs, and MI-4 Hound and MI-8 Hip helicopters. It is estimated that
the air force is capable of transporting one of the army's parachute brigades
on a single lift under optimum conditions. Inadequate logistic support would
preclude sustained operations on this scale. Pilots are well-trained and
effective in aerial resupply under visual conditions.
The air force sends students to the USSR for training on the various
pieces of Soviet-provided equipment, and Soviet technical specialists in India
provide guidance in specialized fields. Students also attend staff colleges in
the UK and Australia, on an exchange basis, while Egypt and France have
conducted training programs for air and ground crews. The air force also
trains a few students from underdeveloped countries.
Air force logistics are hampered by the multiplicity of aircraft types.
Maintenance is further complicated by lack of trained personnel, shortages
of test equipment, insufficient spare parts, and lengthy lead-times in the
procurement of spare parts for foreign aircraft. The air force normally has an
operationally ready rate of 70 percent. During the December 1971 war, this
rate dropped to 60 percent. The air force usually keeps a 30-45 day POL
supply at principal operatir~; bases.
Navy: The. Indian Navy, with 33,000 men (including air arm) and the
largest, most potent fleet in South Asia, is capable of successful offensive or
defensive operations in the region.
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The navy has 1 antisubmarine warfare support aircraft carrier, 2 light
cruisers, 4 submarines (Foxtrot-class), 2 destroyers, 16 destroyer escorts
(including 8 Petya-class and 1 indigenously produced Leander-class), 26
coastal patrol ships/craft (including 8 Osa-class large guided-missile boats), 8
mine warfare ships, 3 amphibious ships, and 19 auxiliaries. The Styx missile-
equipped Osa boats are unmatched in the area and were a decisive factor in
the naval engagements of the 1971 conflict.
While the antisubmarine warfare capability of the Indian Navy is
effective within confined areas, the small number of antisubmarine warfare
ships and aircraft precludes simultaneous patrol of all coastal waters. An-
other serious shortcoming is the paucity of minesweepers.
The main operating bases and the principal activities of the Indian Navy
are in the ports of Bombay on the west coast, Cochin in the south, and
Vishakhapatnam on the east coast. About two thirds of the total ships and
craft are based at Bombay, with approximately one third at Vishakhapatnam
and a few at Cochin. The Western Fleet operating out of Bombay consists of
the aircraft carrier, the light cruisers, 1 destroyer, 11 destroyer escorts
(including 3 Petyas), 17 coastal patrol ships/craft (including the 8 Osas), all 8
of the minesweepers, and the majority of the auxiliaries. The Eastern Fleet,
working out at Vishakhapatnam, consists of 1 destroyer, 5 destroyer escorts
(Petyas), all 4 Foxtrot-class submarines, 6 coastal patrol ships, 3 amphibious
ships, and 5 auxiliaries. In addition to operating along the east coast, some of
these ships are temporarily based at Port Blair in the Andaman Islands. Ships
and craft based in southern India report to the Southern Naval Command at
Cochin. These include 3 coastal patrol ships and 1 auxiliary. The Indian
Navy sends a small number of personnel to the UK, US, and USSR for
training, while at the same time training naval personnel from several
Mid-East, African, and Asian-Pacific nations.
The logistic system of the Indian Navy is beset by two major problems.
First, the navy must depend upon outside sources for most of its ships and
craft, supplies, and modern equipment. Second, Bombay is the only base
capable of undertaking major repair and resupply of the forces afloat. In
spite of these difficulties, ship production capabilities are increasing.
Modest facilities at Cochin and the east coast ports of Calcutta and
Vishakhapatnam are being expanded in an effort to decrease reliance upon
outside sources for logistic needs. The Mazagon Docks at Bombay has
successfully undertaken the Leander project, and the Garden Reach
Workshops at Calcutta is building a number of small naval ships. Stocks of
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Table 1 (continued)
India
Pakistan
Bangladesh
NAVY
Personnel
33,000
9,900
400J
Ships
Carriers
1
0
0
Cruisers
2 J
1 1
0
Destroyers
2
4
0
Destroyer Escorts
16 J
2
0
Submarines
4
3J
0
Missile Patrol
8
0
0
Other Coastal Patrol
18
13
5 J
Aircraft
90
0
0
AIR DEFENSE
Personnel
Unknown
Unknown
0
Missiles
Surface-to-Air SA-2
est. 480
0
0
No. Launchers SA-2
est. 126
0
0
No. Sites SA-2
est. 19
0
0
AIR FORCE
Personnel
104,000
17,100
750-1,000
Aircraft
Jet Bombers (light)
Canberra B (I) 58 (UK,
New Zealand) 39
0
0
Canberra B-57B (UK) 0
13
0
IL-28/Beagle (P RC) 0
4
0
TOTAL 39
17
0
JJEstimated force of 2,000-2,500 planned.
JBoth over 30 years old; one used as training ship.
111944 vintage.
4/Includes the Leander-class DEH and 8 Petyas.
JNot included are 6 SXs.
.At least two more are under construction. In addition, Bangladesh may have captured
or salvaged sonic former Pakistan Navy boats.
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Table 1 (continued)
India
Pakistan
Bangladesh
Jet Fighters
Supersonic
SU-7/Fitter (USSR)
88
0
0
MIG-21/Fishbed (USSR)
201*
0
10
H F-24 Marut (Indigenous)
65
0
0
F-104 A and B (US)
0
5**
0
MIG-19/Farmer D (PRC)
0
123-145
0
Mirage III-E (France)
0
21
0
Mirage 5 (France)
0
21
0
Subtotal
354
170-192
10
Subsonic
Gnat I (UK, Indigenous)
176
0
0
Hawker Hunter F-56 (UK)
65
0
0
Vampire FB-52 (UK)
20
0
0
F-86F Sabre (US)
0
51
8 (Pak)
Sabre MK-6 (F-86) (West
0
83
0
Germany)
Subtotal
261
134
8
*/ucludes both MIG-21M (Fishbed J) and MIG-21 FL aircraft.
**In storage.
Reconnaissance
Canberra PR-57 (UK)
8
0
0
Mirage III-R (France)
0
3
0
RT-33A (US)
0
2
0
Transports
Medium
TU-124/Cookpot (USSR)
3
0
0
C-1 19G Packet (US)
54
0
0
AN-12/Cub (USSR)
38
0
0
L 1049 Super Constellation
8
(US)
C-130B Hercules (US, Iran)
0
8*
0
Subtotal
103
8
0
*Two additional C-130s reportedly are on short-term loan from Saudi Arabia.
pproved For Release 110991,Q91 5
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Table 1 (continued)
Light
HS (Avro) 748 (UK,
Indigenous)
C-47A Skytrain (US, UK)
DHC-4 Caribou (Canada)
I L-14/Crate (USSR)
F-27 (Netherlands)
AN-24/Coke (USSR)
AN?26/Curl (USSR)
Hel icopters-Transport
MI-4/Hound (USSR)
Sikorsky S-62B (US)
MI-8/Hip (USSR)
HH-43B Huskie (US)
Helicopters-Utility
Alouette I I I
Alouette I I (France)
OH-13H (US)
OH-13S (US)
Sikorsky S-55 (US)
UH-19D (US)
Westland Wessex (UK)
Trainers
Utility
India
Pakistan
Bangladesh
80
0
0
14
0
0
18
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
82
0
0
1
0
0
33
9
4
0
6
0
80 (France) 10 (France, 1
Saudi Arabia)
2 0
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Table 2
FORCES ON INDO-PAKISTANI BORDER (estimated)
India Pakistan
Current
M+15 days
Current
Combat effective personnel
Army
302,000
452,000+
224,000
Paramilitary
Border Security Force
34,000
34,000
Central Reserve Force
3,000
8,000
Civilian Armed Forces
0,000
TOTAL
339,000
494,000
232,000
Units
Army
Corps Hqs.
4
5
5
Divisions
Infantry
12
14+
11
Mountain
0
2
0
Armored
0
1
2
Independent Brigades
Armored
5
5
1*
Artillery
6
12
5
Infantry
5
8
3
Sp Svc Gp (Bde) (Abn)
0
0
1
Parachute
0
1
0
Air Defense
2
6
2
Paramilitary (Bns)
Border Security Force
36
36
--
Central Reserve Police
4
10
--
Civilian Armed Forces
--
--
10
M+15 days
253,000
20,000
273,000
5
13
0
2
--
--
25
Current deployment of aircraft in both India and Pakistan (see OB map)
precludes the necessity to transfer combat units to the border areas.
*In addition, each army corps headquarters has one armored reconnaissance regiment (bat-
talion equivalent) assigned to it.
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100030003-0
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Table 3
INDIA-PAKISTAN WAR LOSSES, 1971
India
Pakistan
Personnel:
KIA
3,691
5,000 (est.)
WIA
8,650)
11,000 (est.)
MIA
275
1,000 (est.)
TOTAL
12,616
17,000
Equipment:
Tanks
125
187
Naval Ships
1
6
Aircraft)
71
43
Canberra B(1)58
10
SU-7/Fitter
20
Hawker Hunter F-56
20
MIG-21/Fishbed
5
Gnat I
5
Mystere I V A
5
HF-24 Marut
5
Breguet 1050 Alize
1
71
F-86F
20
Sabre Mk-6 (F-86)
4
Canberra B-57B
4
F-104A
3
MIG-19/Farmer D
7
T-33A
2
UH-19D
2
Beech Queen (U8F)
1
TOTALS
43
)Approximately 1,100 personnel f,:ccived disabling wounds.
)Some tanks listed as "losses" were subsequently returned to service after repair
at depots.
)Air-to-air combat operations were relatively few during the 1971 conflict and
most aircraft losses on both sides resulted from ground fire.
./Includes an estimated eight F-86F and one T-33 captured and now in the
Bangladesh Air Force.
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Ta
Country A
Pakistanis in:
Abu Dhabi
Oman
Kuwait
Saudi Arabia
Iraq
Jordan
Syria
Libya
Maldives
Nigeria
Iran
Qata
*Does not include sevemi thousand personnel with the Border Roads
Organization.
**Approximateiy 40Ind'an military personnel serve as advisers in Bangladesh;
breakdown by service is unavailable.
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India
South Asian Military Handbook
2294/73
1. August 1973
Jammu and
Kashmir
Himachal
Pradesh
Chandigarh.
},
Punjab ~`(???
Haryana
.Delhi
Uttar
Pradesh )
( 1 5
V~ ~~ ~t?^-~'.rt`. Bihar.
4.. Madhya \ r.; west
Gujarat Pradesh 1. Bengal
Orissa
Dnmin Maharashtra
Dadra arid r ~`?~ ~~
Nay,ir Hm'h
Pondlchcny\, .
7 '!`'~'Y qtr
Gaa
Karnataka4,?
Locrndlve. Minicoy and
Amindivi Islands
(Lokshadwcep)
Nadu
( f'ondlcherry
, gofdVed Po' ?Retease 11-99/09125`'
Arunachal
Pradesh
la
?
ya c /?' Man Igo
7ripurn
~Mimrnrn
Andaman and
Nicobar Islands
R001100030,003-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100030003-0
516213 9.77 CIA
Map 2
i.Ahmadabad
Laccadive Sea
I
'Secunderabad
South Asian Military Handbook
2294/73
1 August 1973
INDIA
Army Order of Battle
1 AUGUST 1973
Armored division
Infantry division
Mountain division
Bay of
Bengal
NAMES ANO ROUNOARV REPRESENTATION
ARE NOT : IECESSAIIILY AUTHORITATIVE
Dinja
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J*Baramula -Leh
Rajaori
Jammu
.Pathankot
Amritsar
Pakistan )'Jullundur
ff A?Ferozepore DehraY
1~Dun T
I.Batinda i'Kausali
Jodhpur'T
Arabian
Sea
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100030003-0
r ? Z
Jamnagar
tab HF-24
1Poona
111B(1)58
11 MIG-21
515214 0.73 CIA
Map 3
South Asian Military Handbook
2294/73
1 August 1973
INDIA
Fighter/Bomber Order of Battle
1 AUGUST 1973
0 too 200 300 MJos
0 100 200 300 M.-tors
Bay of
Bengal
NAMES ANO VOUNOARV nErRr.SCNTATION
ARC NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
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Se
116 GNAT .
culdam__npli~ rl~ 112 Hunter
-
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1 August 1973
- --- S. R.
Arabian
Sea
Amindivi Islands'
Laccadivu
1.Aircrafl Carrier
2 Light Cruisers
13 Dostroycr/Destroyer Escorts
'3 Patrol Escorts
8 Large Guided Missile Boats
6 Coastal Patrol Boats
?~8 Minesweepers
y Bombay
2 Patrol Escorts Cochin
1 Small Submarine Chaser
510215 9.73 CIA
Map 4
Maldives
6 Destroyer/ Destroyer Escorts
4S u bmarines
2 Small Submarine Chasers
3 Coastal Patrol Boats-?-Vlshakhapatnam
Bay of
Bengal
Andaman i-
Islands
1 SmcIl Submurlne ChaseryPort Blair
Sri Laka
(Ceylon
NAMES AND ROUNOARY REPRESENTATION
ARE NOT NECESSARILY AUTMORITATIVC
Nico'oar
Islands
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INDIA
Naval Order of Battle
1 AUGUST 1973
0 100 200 300 Mlles
0 100 700 300 Kdomelers
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1 August 1973
Afghanistan
516716 8.77 CIA
Map 5
Ground Forces on Indo-Pakistani Border
1 AUGUST 1973
Indian infantry division
Pakistani armored division
Pakistani infantry division
BmuIa.' I(ASHMIR '
Murrou~
ISLAMABAD
Rawalpindi' ?Rajaori
Jholum? ~~
Kharian? iI ? Jammu
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KdSHM)(7,
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1 August 1973
1972) under theSimla Agreement
Road
Track or trail
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Boundary of former state
of Jammu and Kashmir
International boundary
-X- International boundary. indefinite
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Pakistan
South Asian Military Handbook
2294/73
1 August 1973
/.Gllgit 1 1
L-1 Agency ` Boltistan
North-
west
Frontier
Azad
-~? - Kashmir
I51: MABAD 1\Sfalc
610710 013
Map 7
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Map 8
2294/73
1 August 1973
KASHMIR---_
Murree, ')
Rawalpincli'
Jhelum. \~r
Kharlan?
SIAM* -N
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1 August 1973
r
PAKISTAN
Fighter/Bomber Order of Battle
1 AUGUST 1973
0 100 200 MIles
. .
D 100 200 Kilometers
NEW DELHI?
61.6220 8.73 GA
Map 9
Arabian Sea
SECRET
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PAKISTAN
Naval Order of Battle
1 AUGUST 1973
0 100 200 Miles
0 100 200 Kilometer,
Arabian Sea
515771 8.79 CIA
Map 10
South Asian Military Handbook
2294/73
1 August 1973
JAMMU
AND /
KASHMIR`0ISLAMlZ6AD
"1
NEW DELHI OW
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South Asian Military Handbook
2294/73
1 August 1973
610222 6 73
Map 11
Noakhall
} Barisal ; J
~~ t
~.1
i rr
1 Chittagong
t.l
Chittagong'
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Dlnajpur r
1, Rangpur
Bogra Mymensingh
Raishahl >1
Tangall\..,n.
I ~?' f
Pabna
Kushtla Uacca
Comilla
Jessore Faridpur
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South Asian Military Handbook
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1 August 1973
BANGLADESH
Order of Battle
1 AUGUST 1973
T Arigadeeeedquarters
Fighter-Order. of Battle
Rangpur?'
_ DACCA I r
Comilla
r'
Bay of Bengal
Map 12
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Military expenditures in India and Pakistan have grown substantially
since 1960 and are absorbing a larger share of domestic economic resources.
The outflow of foreign exchange for military purposes has increased and
constitutes a significant portion of export earnings; military aid has deferred
or eliminated only a portion of foreign exchange payments for imports.
In both countries, higher military spending reflects increased personnel
strength, qualitative upgrading of weapons systems, increases in equipment
inventories and maintenance requirements, expansion of domestic military
production, and rising costs for military items at home and abroad. The
expenditures are given in "current" prices and cannot be adjusted satisfac-
torily to reflect the impact of inflation. The available price information
indicates, however, that most of the increase in military spending in South
Asia since 1960 reflects a real growth in military strength.
Indian defense expenditures rose sharply following the Chinese border
incursions in 1962, increased more slowly through FY 1970,* then rose
abruptly in 1971. This second heavy buildup followed the outbreak of civil
war in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in March 1971, and continued
through the December war with Pakistan. Defense spending for FY 1971 was
more than $2.1 billion,** exceeding the previous year's spending by 25
percent, and the original budget by 22 percent. Procurement expenditures
alone increased by more than 40 percent, reflecting accelerated deliveries of
foreign military equipment. Army procurement increased by 64 percent,
primarily as a result of large receipts of major combat equipment from the
USSR and Eastern Europe. By contrast, pay and allowances-the largest
component of the Indian military budget-increased by only 4 percent. The
impact of these changes on the distribution of expenditures is shown in
Tables 2 and 3.
India's revised defense budget for FY 1972 and the budget estimate for
FY 1973 are about 10 percent higher than actual expenditures incurred in
*Fiscal year beginning 1 April of stated year.
**This and other dollar values are computed at the exchange rate of 7.5 rupeesll US$.
Data are gross expenditures unless otherwise stated.
III-1
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1971 civil war in its former East Wing and the December war with India,
actual defense spending increased 16 percent over the previous year in terms
of rupees. Much of this rise represented construction of defenses, repairs to
war-damaged defense property, increased salaries and other personnel ex-
penditures, and increased demands on the civilior sector to supply items
such as fuels and transportation. Imports were limited by foreign arms
embargoes, the ;.hort Indian blockade of Karachi harbor, and the inability of
foreign suppliers to complete deliveries of new orders by 30 June 1972.
Actual foreign exchange outlays probably were between $115 and $145
million.
Pakistan's defense spending in FY 1973 was 19 percent higher in terms
of rupees than the previous year. This reflected little change in real terms
because most of the increase was used to cover the higher cost of military
i;sports following the rupee devaluation in May 1972, and increased local
costs resulting from domestic inflation. Pakistan's population was reduced
by more than half when it lost the East Wing, so this is a considerable
financial burden-roughly 8 percent of gross national product. There are no
indications that Pakistan intends to reduce its arme forces or its military
spending abroad soon.
Scheduled equipment deliveries from foreign arms suppliers probably
boosted foreign exchange defense outlays beyond the planned figure of $115
million for FY 1973. Military aid down payments and repayments to France
alone were scheduled to increase, as were cash payments to several Western
arms suppliers, including the US. Pakistan evidently has experienced diffi-
culties in financing some of its arms procurement. It deferred taking delivery
on French Mirage aircraft for about six months, and reportedly delayed its
scheduled payments to France. The burden of Pakistan's foreign defense
procurement can be seen in the ratio of foreign-exchange outlays to export
earnings-about 17 percent through FY 1971, and more than 20 percent in
FY 1972. This ratio may have declined to 15 percent in FY 1973 as a result
of greatly increased export performance. Pakistan may have received some
financial assistance for arms purchases from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and
Libya, but the amounts are not known; $18 million was transferred to
Pakistan from Abu Dhabi in late June 1972.
C. Bangladesh
Bangladesh's military expenditures from 16 December 1971 to 30 June
1972 were announced by the government as $18 million, with an additional
$53 million budgeted for 1972/73. These expenditures are classified as
recurring expenses, which suggests that they are primarily for salaries and
other personnel expenses.
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South Asian Military Handbook
2294/73
1 August 1973
INDIA: Net Defense Expenditures*
(Fiscal Year begins 1 April of stated year)
BILLION RUPEES
(Current Prices)
25 1
PERCENT OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
(In Current Prices)
516224 8.73 CIA SECRET
NO FORE?N C1SSE.M
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
(Revised (Budget)
Estimate)
'After deducting the value of receipts and recoveries of the Ministry of Defense
from gross expenditures.
'D 'ST $?7,5Fk407?4 00030003-0
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South Asian Military Handbook
2294/73
1 August 1973
INDIA: Gross Defense Expenditures
(Fiscal Year begins 1 April of stated year)
MILLION US $
App,roved.For, Release 1999/0.9/25 :
l
1972 1973
(Revised Estimate) (Budget)
ARMY
(Weapons and
Other Stores)
MANUFACTURING
AND RESEARCH
TRANSPORTATION
WORKS
PAY AND
ALLOWANCES
NON-PROCUREMENT
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
P$5T0:O,8.,75;ROO:1:1,0OO3,0003-0
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1 August 1973
INDIA: Distribution of Defense Expenditures
(In Percent)
> NON-PROCUREMENT
MANUFACTURING
AND RESEARCH
ESTABLISHMENTS PROCUREMENT
1.8' I NAVY
1972 1973
(Revised Estimate (Budget)
PAY AND
ALLOWANCES
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1 August 1973
Figure 4
INDIA: Estimated Defense Foreign Exchange Costs*
1973
(Budget)
1969
1970
1971
1,172
1973
294
324
432
515
526
TOTAL IMPORTS
-90
-92
-191
-130
N.A.
FINANCED BY MILITARY AID
100
113
120
150
N.A.
MILITARY DEBT REPAYMENTS
304
345
361
535
N.A.
TOTAL ESTIMATED FOREIGN
EXCHANGE OUTFLOW"
begins 1 April of stated year)
1972
(Revised
Whale)
FINANCING MILITARY IMPORTS
'Computed at the exchange rate of 7.5 rupeesll US$.
"Indian exports from defense industries, which totaled about $13 million
in FY 1972, are not taken into account.
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1 August 1973
INDIA: Military Expenditures
and Total Central Government Budget
(Fiscal Year begins 1 April of stated year)
70.5
50.7
50.2
55.8
57.3
21%
22%
21%
23%
23%
22%
22%
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717 7
TOTAL CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
EXPENDITURES
MILITARY EXPENDITURES AS
PERCENT OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
EXPENDITURES
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INDIA: Military Foreign Exchange Outlays
and Export Earnings
(Fiscal Year begins 1 April of stated year)
BILLION US $ 2.4
MILITARY
FOREIGN EXCHANGE OUTLAYS
AS PERCENT OF EXPORT EARNINGS
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PAKISTAN: Net Defense Expenditures*
(Fiscal Year ends 30 June of stated year)
BILLION RUPEES
(Current Prices)
PERCENT OF
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
(In Current Prices)
1912 1973 1974
(Revised (Budget)
Estimate)
pp -oved ForR le :e 9994 / 51: IA }01100 30,003-0
'After deducting the value of revenue of the Ministry of Defense
from gross expenditures.
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PAKISTAN: Military Expenditures
and Total Central Government Budget
Fiscal Year ends 30 June of stated year)
BILLION RUPEES 12.1
9.7 F
28%
:61
23%.
1 28%
32%
E
1973
(Revised
Estimate)
1914
(Budget)
TOTAL CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
EXPENDITURES
MILITARY EXPENDITURES
AS PERCENT OF CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES
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Figure 9
PAKISTAN: Military Foreign Exchange Outlays
and Export Earnings
(Fiscal Year ends 30 June of stated year)
MILITARY FOREIGN EXCHANGE
OUTLAYS AS PERCENT OF
EXPORT EARNINGS
20-
25%
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
'Excludes former eastern wing. (Estimate)
111- 12
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IV. DOMESTIC MILITARY PRODUCTION
For more than a decade, New Delhi has tried to develop an arms
industry that would enable it to be less dependent on foreign suppliers and
thereby save foreign exchange. The industry's output already includes a wide
range of defense equipment: small arms, artillery, tanks, several types of
aircraft, frigates, and small tactical missiles. Although considerable progress
has been made, particularly in small arms production, India still relies heavily
on imports of raw materials, components, and technology for the manu-
facture of more sophisticated weapons systems, such as aircraft and naval
ships. Domestic military procurement now constitutes about 70 percent of
total military purchases. Public and private enterprises in the civilian sector
furnish about 60 percent of military supplies obtained in India, including
petroleum products and foodstuffs. Ordnance factories and enterprises under
the Ministry of Defense Production provide the balance, including most
military hardware.
Management and Scope: India's defense industries are managed primarily by
the Department of Defense Production, which owns and operates 28 ord-
nance factories, a tank factory, and a freeze-dried meat factory. The Govern-
ment of India also has either majority or total ownership of eight public
enterprises, which are controlled by the Department of Defense Production.
Production in these industries increased at an average annual rate of 12
percent from April 1964 to March 1971. Concomitant with India's military
build-up beginning in spring 1971, defense production was accelerated and
output increased by 29 percent during FY 1971 * (see Table 1). Production is
estimated to have increased an additional 10 percent to almost $520 million
in FY 1972. Approximately 80 percent of defense production was for the
Indian military, with the balance for the civilian market and exports.
Defense plants provide transport aircraft for India's civil airlines, small
commercial ships, trucks, tractors, railroad coaches, and communications
equipment. Exports of products and services-about $13 million in FY
1972-include goods for both military and civilian end-use and repairs to
foreign ships and aircraft.
Ground Armaments: India is self-sufficient in small arms, light artillery and
antiaircraft weapons, and related ammunition. Weapons production includes
rifles, sub-machine guns, light machine guns, 3.5-inch rocket launchers,
*Fiscal year beginning 1 April of the stated year.
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57-mm. and 106-mm. recoilless rifles, 2-inch, 81-mm., and 120-mm. mortars,
40-mm. antiaircraft guns, and 75-rrim, pack howitzers. A prototype 105-mm.
'Field gun has been developed, is scheduled to enter lim;'^d production by
1974, and to reach full production by 1976. An agre:ment for licensed
production of the Soviet 130-mm. field gun was reached early in 1972, but
production is not likely to begin soon.
India already has produced about 400 "Vijayanta" (Vickers) medium
tanks with a 105-mm. gun under British license at the Avadi heavy-vehicle
factory. Almost 70 percent of the components currently are produced in
India, but some major parts still must be imported. The factory also is
producing armored recovery vehicles. The Ministry of Defense Production is
developing an armored personnel carrier-a modified version of the Czech
OT-62-as well as 105-mm. and 130-mm. self-propelled guns. Trucks and
jeeps for the military are built under West German and Japanese licenses.
Naval Construction: India produces Leander-class frigates equipped with
antiaircraft missiles under British license at the Mazagon Docks in Bombay.
These are the first large modern combatants constructed in the country, and
the project is several years behind schedule. Of the six frigates currently
under order, one has been commissioned, and two are fitting out. The locally
produced content of the first unit is only about 50 percent, but is expected
to increase to almost 80 percent by the end of the program. India also has
constructed inshore minesweepers, patrol boats, landing craft, and dredgers;
it eventually plans to expand production to include submarines and missile-
equipped frigates.
Aircraft Construction: Despite the fact that India has been engaged in
military aircraft production for over a decade, the industry still relies
extensively on imported raw materials and components, and on the use of
foreign production licenses. To utilize domestic sources to the fullest, the
Indians are attempting to substitute components manufactured indigenously
for foreign-built ones.
The difficulties in such a substitution of components and raw materials
include the lack of suitable raw materials-steel alloys-and the stringent
manufacturing specifications of most aircraft components. In addition, the
unit cost of producing many aircraft parts domestically would be high
because of the limited quantities required. Some items involving essentially
unsophisticated technology-such as tires, hydraulic seals, filters, electrical
components, electrical cable, and batteries-have been successfully developed
by the Indians for their aircraft industry. The Indians also have been able to
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produce some aluminum alloy sheets. These efforts have increased the
domestic content, by value, of the various aircraft under production. They
have not, however, created a great degree of Indian self-sufficiency.
A plant for the manufacture of accessories for the Indian aircraft
industry is under construction at Lucknow, and New Delhi hopes that it will
result in a significant reduction of foreign contributions to the manufacture
of some aircraft. The plant is scheduled to produce items such as wheels and
brake systems, undercarriages, powered flying controls, fuel, hydraulic and
instrument systems, and aircraft ejection seats-all under license from several
British firms and the Soviet Union. Initially, all components will have to be
imported, but the Indians plan eventually to substitute locally manufactured
components.
Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., which is responsible for virtually all air-
craft manufacture in India, produces six types of military aircraft with major
assistance from various countries. The Soviet MIG-21, the British Gnat, the
British HS-748 light transport, and the French Alouette III light helicopter
are produced under license. The domestically designed HF-24 jet fighter and
IAJT-16 jet trainer also are in production.
Production of the Soviet MIG-21 jet fighter is likely to continue
through much of the 1970s, as Moscow has agreed to license follow-on
production of the improved MIG-21M to replace the MIG-21 FL. The
scheduled production of 196 MIG-21 FLs should be completed in 1974, and
the improved version should then be in full production. The first MIG-21M
assembled in India was completed in early 1973, and less than 100 re-
portedly will be produced. Final assembly and production of air frames for
the MIG-21 take place at Nasik, engines are produced at Koraput, and
avionics at Hvderabad.
The Bangalore Division of Hindustan Aeronautics originally scheduled
the production of 215 subsonic Gnat jet fighters. More than 200 already
have been built. The program, employing an improved version, is likely to be
extended as a result of the fighter's excellent performance in the 1971
conflict with Pakistan. India also is considering the manufacture of Gnat
fighters for export.
The HF-24 jet fighter program, intended tz) provide India with an
indigenous Mach 2 interceptor, has not been very successful. The key
problem has been matching the aircraft to a suitable engine. The current
Mach 1 version, with a British engine, had some success in the ground-attack
prgve
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role, and an improved version and a trainer model are under development.
Production is likely to continue well into the 1970s, and more than 150
Mach 1 aircraft may be built.
India plans to produce a new generation supersonic fighter aircraft in
the next decade as a follow-on to the HF-24 program. The shortcomings of
the HF-24, however, suggest that the pro,,.;rn is likely to encounter diffi-
culties, particularly in engine development. India will require considerable
foreign assistance to ensure the success of the project.
Production of the HS-748 medium transport for the military is also
likely to continue into the late 1970s. Some 45 have been ordered by the air
force, and freighter/airdrop and maritime reconnaissance versions are under
development. The HJT-16 jet trainer is likely to continue in production at
least until 1975. More than 65 of the aircraft have been ordered.
The Alouette III helicopter production program was to end by late
1974 after some 145 aircraft had been built. India recently was seeking to
extend the Alouette III licensing agreement with France to 1977. Agreement
has been reached with the French for production of the SA-315 for use as an
observation helicopter and the first prototype has been assembled. At least
140 are scheduled to be built. The Indians hope to develop their own
helicopter by the end of the decade.
Missile Production: In July 1971, Bharat Dynamics Ltd. began production,
under license, of the French SS-11 anti-tank missile. India has secured
options to produce other types of French missiles. Hindustan Aeronautics
Ltd. manufactures the Soviet K-13 Atoll air-to-air missile for the MIG-21
aircraft. A project was begun in 1972 to produce surface-to-air missiles based
on the Soviet SA-2 design. Production is probably years away because the
Indians are attempting to manufacture most of the components themselves.
Development work also is under way on a launch vehicle for the country's
space program, but the project is not likely to have any military applications
until at least the 1980s.
Assessment: India has developed a significant industrial base for military
production and except for Israel, which it rivals, has the largest defense
output ..f any developing country in the non-communist world. But it has
not yet achieved over-all self-sufficiency, nor has it reduced annual foreign-
exchange outlays for military imports. Its requirements for substantial
quantities of sophisticated weaponry and support equipment necessitate
large-scale procurement from abroad of finished defense stores. During the
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South Asian Nuclear Weapons Capabilities
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India has the skills and material to set off a nuclear explosion, probably
of low yield. Its civil nuclear program is broadly based and is aimed
principally toward the production of electrical power. The total nuclear
program, including power applications, has been large; the Department of
Atomic Energy has spent about $1 billion since the program began in 1954.
It employs several thousand scientists who have studied in the US and
Europe. Other technologies-electronics, metallurgy, computer capabilities,
and high explosives-are more than adequate to support an effort to set off a
nuclear explosion.
India is capable of detonating a nuclear device within a few days to a
year should it make a decision to do so. Actual time required would depend
on how far preliminary work had gone.
The nuclear device would have plutonium as its fissionable material.
The Indians probably now have enough weapons-grade plutonium to make
10-12 weapons (15-20 kilotons each) and could add about two more each
year from new production. 1-he plutonium is being produced and separated
at the Bhaba Atomic Research Center near Bombay. The only safeguard on
the reactor is a written Indian promise to the Canadians, who designed and
helped build the facility, that the reactor and its products will be used only
for peaceful purposes. India has not accepted the Canadian and US interpre-
tation that any nuclear explosion is tantamount to a weapons test, regardless
of the declared purpose of the test. India has ratified the Limited Test Ban
Treaty, and the selection and preparation of a suitable underground site for a
nuclear test would involve considerable time and expense.
Current Indian delivery capabilities, like the prospective weapons them-
selves, are modest. A fleet of about 40 Canberra light bombers, with a radius
of about 1,000 nautical miles and a payload of 5,000 pounds, could reach
India's closer neighbors, including much of western and southwestern China,
but not the heavily populated areas farther east. India has no 'long-range
bombers, but could conceivably, with extensive modifications, use some of
its civil fleet of Boeing 707s and 747s to carry weapons several thousand
miles. All these aircraft would be vulnerable to Chinese air defenses.
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For at least five years, India will .e unable to enhance its extremely
limited nuclear weapons capability without violating safeguards. A large
Indian-built nuclear power plant without international safeguards is sched-
uled to be in operation sometime after 1977. The plant, at Kalpakkam in
south India, will have two natural uranium-fueled reactors. With current and
planned separation facilities, the plant eventually could produce enough
unsafeguarded plutonium to make 50-70 low-yield bombs a year in the
1980s. A prototype for a new generation of fast-breeder reactors producing
U-233 from India's huge supplies of thorium may be ready in the 1980s.
India's planned and slowly expanding capabilities in the nuclear and
space-related fields will eventually remove many of the obstacles to a
large-scale nuclear weapons program. In the late 1980s, there will be enough
plutonium and U-233 to make a number of intermediate-yield weapons. The
Indian space program, which is still in its early stages, probably will have
borne fruit by then. To date, only sounding rockets have been tested. A
small test satellite was scheduled for launch in 1974, but the Indians have
been unable to develop a suitable launch vehicle. As a result, the Soviets have
agreed to orbit a satellite constructed in India. An Indian satellite launch is
still at least five years away, however, and it would then require quite a few
additional years and considerable cost to develop an operational missile
system.
Pakistan is unlikely to have any effective nuclear capability within the
current decade. It has only one nuclear power reactor, a heavy-water model
built with Canadian assistance and under safeguards. Negotiations reportedly
are under way with the French for a chemical separation plant to extract
plutonium from the spent fuel elements of the power reactor and for a fuel
fabrication facility. Even if this plant is built,, the plutonium will remain
safeguarded. Moreover, Pakistan has no large domestic sources of exploitable
uranium.
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Chronology of Major Events in South Asia, 1947-1973
1940
23 March
All India Muslim League, meeting in Lahore, calls
for separation of predominantly Muslim areas from
India
1942
8 August All India Congress Committee calls on British to
"quit India"
1947
14 August Pakistani independence
15 August Indian independence
27 October Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir accedes to India;
Indian troops enter Kashmir to fight Pakistani-
backed tribal invaders
1948
30 January Mahatma Gandhi assassinated
11 September Mohammed All 'innah dies
1949
1 January Kashmir cease-fire becomes effective
26 July Agreement reached on cease-fire line in Kashmir
1954
17 May US and Pakistan sign Mutual Defense Assistance
Agreement
7 September Pakistan signs SEATO Treaty
1955
1 July Pakistan joins Baghdad Pact (later "' NTO)
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1958
7 October President Iskandar Mirza imposes martial law in
Pakistan
27 October Field Marshal Mohammed Ayub Khan seizes power
1959
5 March Pakistan signs bilateral defense agreement with US
1961
18-20
December Indi~jn conquest of Goa
1962
20 October
After months of border clashes, heavy fighting
breaks out between India and China
28 October Chinese halt their successful offensive
1962
14 November
21 November
1 December
20 December
1963
January
2 March
1964
27 May
2 June
1965
April
US agrees to emergency arms aid for India
Unilateral Chinese cease-fire goes into effect
Chinese begin unilateral withdrawal
US and U K agree to continue arms aid to India
Soviets begin shipments of MIG-21s to India
Pakistan signs border agreement with China
Lal Bahadur Shastri chosen prime minister of India
Fighting breaks out in the Rann of Kutch
30 June Formal cease-fire signed more than a month after
fighting ends in the Rann
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Early August Pakistan begins infiltrating "freedom fighters" into
Kashmir
1 September Pakistani troops launch major attack into Kashmir
6 September Indians launch full-scale attack on West Pakistan
8 September US embargoes all arms to India and Pakistan
22 September Cease-fire goes into effect
1966
10 January At Tashkent, India and Pakistan agree essentially to
return to the status quo ante bellum
11 January Prime Minister Shastri dies
19 January Indira Gandhi becomes Prime Minister
1967
February Congress Party reduced to slim majority in parlia-
ment in Indian general elections
April US modifies arms policy to permit sale of some
spares to India and Pakistan
1968
7 November Student riot in Rawalpindi; disorders spread to all
of Pakistan
1969
25 March Ayub resigns and is replaced by General A. M.
Yahya Khan
1970
28 March President Yahya, in Legal Framework Order, out-
lines process for establishing a civilian government
October US announces one-time exception in sale of military
equipment to Pakistan
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7 December Z. A. Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party sweeps Na-
tional Assembly elections in West Pakistan; Mujibur
Rahman's Awami League in East Pakistan. Provin-
cial Assembly elections on 17 December follow
same pattern
1971
30 January Two Kashmiri "freedom fighters" hijack an Indian
plane to Lahore
2 February India bans Pakistani overflights
1 March East Pakistan Awami League calls for a general
strike to protest Yahya's postpoiement of the con-
vening of the National Assembly
March Prime Minister Gandhi's Congress Party wins sub-
stantial majority in lower house of parliament
15 March Mujib announces he is taking over administration of
East Pakistan; Yahya begins talks with Mujib
25-26 March Talks break down; Pakistan Army moves to restore
central authority in East Pakistan; Mujib arrested;
independence of Bangladesh proclaimed
17 April Bangladesh Republic (in exile) officially established
2 July US imposes total embargo on arms to Pakistan
9 August Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty signed
3 December After gradually increasing Indian involvement in
civil war in East Pakistan and military build-up by
'-ioth sides in the west, the Pakistan Air Force at-
tacks Indian air bases in the west; full-scale war
breaks out on both fronts
,i 16 December Pakistani for-^s in East Pakistan surrender
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17 December Cease-fire goes into effect in the west
20 December Yahya resigns, and Z. A. Bhutto becomes president
1972
7 January Mujibur Rahman, released from Pakistani custody,
arrives in Dacca on 10 January and becomes Prime
Minister
3 July Mrs. Gandhi and Bhutto reach agreement at Simla
29 August
7 December
Indian and Pakistani negotiators, in New Delhi,
reach accord clarifying Simla Agreement
Delineation of new "line of control" in Kashmir
completed
20 December Mutual troop withdrawals completed
1973
14 March US announces resumption of limited arms supply to
Pakistan and India
17 April India and Bangladesh propose a package deal under
which prisoners of war (except those to be tried for
war crimes), bengalees in Pakistan, and Biharis in
Bangladesh would be repatriated
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The South Asian
Military Handbook
GLOSSARY
Performance Characteristics of Selected
South Asian Military Equipment
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