TRANSLATIONS FROM VOYENNAYA MYSL NUMBER 9 - SEPTEMBER 1971

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 135
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2002
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: February 14, 1974
• Content Type: TRANS

STAT
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INFORMATION
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FOREIGN
BROADCAST
FOREIGN
STAT
RESS DIGEST
Translations From "Voyennaya Mysl"
NUMBER o - SEPTEMBER 1971
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FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
FOREIGN PRESS DIGEST NO. 0009 -- 14 February 1974
TRANSLATIONS FROM "VOYENNAYA MYSL'," NO. 9, SEPTEMBER 1971
Issue No. 9, September 1971, was signed to press on 11 August 1971.
The 24th CPSU Congress and Questions of the Scientific
Guidance of Ideological Work with the Troops (3-14)
Maj Gen S. Ill in
Leninist Ideas Concerning the Role of the Rear in Warfare (15-21)
Col Gen K. Abramov and Maj Gen M. Ivanov
16
On the Question of Foresight (22-31)
27
Col D. Samorukov
Basic Trends in the Organizational Development and
Employment of Army Aviation (32-37)
Col A. Drozhzhin
41
Development of a Theory of Troop Control (38-45) 49
Capt 2nd Rank V. Morozov
Methods of Checking the Readiness of Weapons Systems
for Combat Use (46-52)
Engr-Lt Col V. De; +i a ov
6o
Basic Theoretical Questions on Troop Cooperation 68
in Combat (53-56)
Lt Col G. Tseglin
The Military-Economic Basis of Tasks (57-60)
Capt 1st Rank Yu. Solnyshkov
74
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Personal Responsibility (61-68)
Capt 1st Rank I. Ivanov
Rear Support of the Soviet Armed Forces During the
Great Patriotic War (69-79)
Army Gen S. Maryakhin
Ideological Training of the Personnel of
Imperialist Armies for War (80-90)
Lt Gen A. Shevchenko
79
91
l06
Equipment and the Psychological Factor (91-94) 122
Lt Gen Tank Trps (Ret) I. Petrov
Meeting with Readers (95-96) 128
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THE 24th CPSU CONGRESS AND QUESTIONS OF THE SCIENTIFIC GUIDANCE OF
IDEOLOGICAL WORK WITH THE TROOPS
Mai Gen S. Il'in, Candidate of Historical Sciences
An enormous role is played by science in the diversified activities of our
party and people connected with building Communism. Creation of the
material and technological foundation for the new society, implementation
of sociopolitical tasks, and indoctrination of the new man all are directly
dependent on the development of science and the level of scientific leader-
ship.
Communist society, in contrast to exploiter socioeconomic systems, develops
not spontaneously but rather as a result of the conscious, planned activi-
ties of the masses, directed toward a common goal by the Marxist-Leninist
party. Consequently, scientific leadership and guidance is an attribute
of the new, socialist society, and the importance of this attribute is con-
tinuing to grow. Presenting the Central Committee Report to the 24th CPSU
Congress, General Secretary of the Central Committee CPSU L. I. Brezhnev
stated: "We have always and in all things been assisted by the party's
revolutionary will, scope, and ability to mobilize the efforts of the mil-
lions to perform the tasks of construction, as well as the labor enthusiasm
of the worker class, the kolkhoz peasantry and the intelligentsia. Today
as never before we must even more closely unite this great force with
systematic, painstaking organizational effort, with a consistently scientif-
ic approach to economic management, strict self-discipline and efficiency"
(my underline -- S. I.).
Viewing improvement in planning as a central element in economic management,
the congress noted that "a further rise in the scientific level of planning
is becoming a task of primary importance."
These statements apply to all areas of management and directive activity
by party agencies, our cadres, including in the ideological area.
The increased importance of scientific direction and guidance of ideolcgL al
work is dictated by a number of circumstances, which essentially define the
enhanced role of ideological effort in general.
In the first place, the scale is bra;adening and the tasks of party
theoretical activity are becoming more complex. As we advance toward Com-
munism, new and more complex problems crop up in all areas of societal
development. In order to elaborate a correct course and to avoid sub-
jectivistic errors, the party teaches us that it is necessary to comprehend
more deeply the phenomena of societal affairs, to further enrich and
develop revolutionary theory.
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In the second place, spiritual factors are becoming increasingly effective
elements accelerating the accomplishment of the practical tasks of building
Communism. For successful implementation of economic and sociopolitical
plans it is necessary to raise toiler awareness to an even ;Nigher level,
to increase toiler incentive to carry out the plan, "to convince," as Lenin
stated, "millions and tens of millions of this necessity" (Poln. Sobr.
Soch. [Complete Works], Vol. 42, page 140). This of course presupposes a
higher level of direction and guidance of ideological effort.
In the third place, the importance of scientific guidance of ideological
effort is increasing in connection with the unusual complexity of the task
of indoctrinating the new man.
Noted English bourgeois philosopher Herbert Spencer once stated: "Nc matter
what the social organism, the vicious nature of citizens will always be
revealed through malevolent acts. There is no political alchemy with the
aid of which it would be possible to transform lead instincts into golden
behavior." Our Soviet reality has refuted these and similar predictions by
bourgeois scientists and politicians. Today the task of shaping the man
of the Communist tomorrow has become a practical matter. "The great cause
of building Communism," states the Central Committee Report to the 24th
CPSU Congress, "cannot advance without the comprehensive development of
man himself." Indoctrination of the man of the Communist society is a
complex and many-faceted process which requires profound scientific sub-
stantiation and skilled direction.
Fourthly, enhancement of the role of scientific guidance is connected with
aggravation of the ideological struggle between two social systems --
socialism and capitalism. One must bear in mind thereby that in order to
achieve their ends our ideological adversaries are resorting with increas-
ing frequency to pseudoscientific devices and are stepping up the integra-
tion of propaganda, politics, and science. It is quite understandable that
a vigoruus offensive against imperialist and opportunist ideology pre-
supposes scientific substantiation and the fundamental nature of our
propaganda activity.
Enhancement of the role of the scientific approach toward direction of
ideological effort in the Armed Forces is dictated by the specific features
of the mission of the Armed Forces. The Soviet Army and Navy must be
constantly prepared to wage war, employing the most advanced weapons; this
poses the problem of the :coral factor, the morale-political and psycho-
logical training of personnel much differently than in the past.
Bearing in mind the increased demands on ideological effort, the Communist
Party and its Central Committee are taking effective steps to improve
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Communist indoctrinatior if Soviet citizens and are demanding that party
organizations constantl aep these matters in their attention focus and
raise the level of dire on and guidance of all sectors of the ideological
front.
The Laws and Patterns of Ideological Effort
Scientific direction of ideological effort, as in other areas of building
Communism, is possible only on the basis of Marxist-Leninist methodology.
Of major significance in this area are the tenets of historical materialism
on the interaction between the material and spiritual life of society, the
role and place of ideology in societal affairs.
Ideological work encompasses two interlinked aspects: ideological.-theoret-
ical activity (particularly the development of theory taking specific con-
ditions into account) and introduction of Communist ideology into the
consciousness of the masses.
Ideology as a system of ideas expressing the root interests and needs of a
given class is a derivative of social being. Arising on the basis of cur-
rent material needs of society, however, it in turn exerts great influence
on the course of societal development. We are speaking not of ideas in
general but of ideas which have captured the masses, when they cease to be
merely ideas and are transformed into a material force, are embodied in
practical deeds.
Scientific guidance of ideological work thus involves the elaboration and
enrichment of revolutionary theory as well as the transformation of ideas
into a material force.
A scientific approach to implementation of the tasks of ideological work is
possible with comprehensive cons'.deration of the material conditions and
objective processes taking plac in society. Otherwise manifestations of
subjectivism are inevitable.
The content, forms and means of ideological effort develop and improve in
conformity with continuously changing material and spiritual conditions.
That which was vital and essential yesterday may not correspond to today's
situation, and consequently may not be applicable today. Failure to take
this into account may engender conservatism and a predominance of a
formalistic approach toward carrying out the tasks of ideological work.
Scientific guidance presupposes cognition of the objective laws governing
ideological work as a unique process of sociopolitical life, as a reflec-
tion of the laws of the material and spiritual lima of our society. Know-
ledge of these laws and ability to make practical use of them enable us
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more deeply to analyze occurring processes, to see trends in their develop-
ment and to specify correct and comprehensively substantiated measures for
improving Communist indoctrination.
The question of natural laws is a key item in theory of scientific
guidance of ideological effort, as in direction of any area in the build-
ing of Communism. This question has already been dealt with to one degree
or another in the press, in particular in an article by P. Isakov and V.
Merkulov, published in Voyennaya Mysl', No 2, 1971. Nevertheless it
requires additional, more profound elaboration. Without claiming complete
treatment and coverage of this problem, we should like to present certain
views.
The la;:s and patterns of ideological work as the most persisting, repeating
essential links manifested in the process of ideological activity can in
our opinion be examined in two aspects: first of all as laws and patterns
connected with its content, and secondly, as laws and patterns defining the
development of the forms and methods of ideological work.
Just what are these fundamental laws, these most stable relations of the
most important phenomena and components of our ideological effort?
The determining law of ideological effort is its determination by Marxist-
Leninist theory and CPSU policy. This law reflects the thesis that Marx-
ism-Leninism and party policy are the foundation of all ideological ef-
fort. "Leninism, as an eternally living, developing doctrine did, does and
will continue to occupy the center of party ideological life, constituting
the foundation of all party revolutionary-transforming activity," states
the Central Committee Report to the 24th CPSU Congress. Turning to the
ideological-theoretical legacy of V. I. Lenin, the party sees as its most
important task that of finding a solution to the current problems per-
taining to building Communism, on the basis of Leninist ideas and Lenin-
ist methodology.
Stressing the determination of the content of ideological work by Marxist-
Leninist theory, Lenin and the party always focused attention on the neces-
sity of its creative development as an essential condition in order for
theory to serve as a guide to action. An enormous contribution to the
treasure house of Marxism-Leninism was made by the 24th CPSU Congress. Its
proceedings contain a profound scientific analysis of the development of
our society since the 23rd CPSU Congress, the problems of the present
international situation, new phenomena in the capitalist system, tasks of
further strengthening the positions of socialism; the prospects of our
progress along the path toward Communism and its armed defense are compre-
hensively substantiated.
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The 24th Party Congress emphasized that the party will be devoting even
greater attention to the development of theory, will be enhancing the role
of the social sciences and will be striving to place them in a close link
with practical activities and the concrete tasks of building Communism.
This point is of prime importance for the Armed Forces. Radical changes in
army and navy armament, in methods of waging warfare and in all areas of
military affairs demand thorough theoretical comprehension of new phenomena.
It is possible correctly to resolve matters of modern military organiza-
tional development only on the basis of Marxist-Leninist methodology,
creative development of theory with consideration of changing conditions,
It is essential to bear in mind that the newest and most destructive weap-
ons have not been tested directly in battle. All this enhances the role of
scientific prediction and comprehensive substantiation of problems of
troop training.
An important contribution toward solving these problems is made by the
social sciences. Our military scientists are called upon to work more
persistently and in reference to present realities on further research,
enrichment of Lenin's military theory legacy, and particularly his
doctrine on war and the army and doctrine of defense of the socialist
homeland, more deeply comprehending practical recommendations necessary for
personnel training and indoctrination under conditions of scientific and
technological advances.
The theory of Marxism-Leninism and its creative development are in an
inseparable unity with all activity connected with instilling party ideas
into the consciousness of the masses, their indoctrination in a spirit
of Communism. Since ideological work has the task of arming Soviet citi-
zens and our fighting men with the ideas of scientific Communism, it must
utilize to a maximum degree the results of the development of theory and its
achievements. Revolutionary theory helps our fighting men comprehend more
deeply the grandeur of the road trod by our people, the essence of party
policy, including its military policy, the essence of Soviet patriotism and
socialist internationalism, and also helps them accomplish their missions
in an intelligent manner. Only on the basis of Marxist-Leninist theory
is it possible to form a scientific world view in military personnel.
Marxist-Leninist theory serves as a solid foundation for a successful
struggle against a hostile ideology. Revolutionary theory enriches
people's moral upbringing.
The question of influence of policy on the process of ideological-political
indoctrination 3s ;ndisslubly linked with the determining role of theory in
ideological work. In the entire system of ideological work a leading
position is occupied by propaganda, instillment into the consciousness of
our military masses of a political ideology which expresses root class,
social interests.
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Party pclicy is determined by objective economic processes, by relations
between classes, and expresses the root needs if the toiler masses.
Elaborated on the basis of Marxist-Leninist theory, it acquires enormous
organizing and mobilizing force. It is understandable that policy largely
determines the content of ideological effort as well, particularly in the
area of comprehending the tasks of building Communism and mobilization of
men for carrying out these tasks.
CPSU policy for future years was elaborated at the 24th Congress. Bearing
in mind the enormous theoretical and political importance of the congress
documents, the Central Committee CPSU requires that they be made the basis
of all ideological activity. They today define the fundamental content of
ideological-indoctrinational effort in the Armed Forces as well.
One of the laws pertaining to ideological effort is the increasing in-
fluence on ideological effort of the content of the ideological struggle
between socialism and capitalism.
In order to understand the substance of this matter it is imporcant to
emphasize that intensification of the ideological struggle in the world
arena is not the result of some transitory circumstances. It is dictated
by the complex processes of development of society. This is one of the
manifestations of the deepening of the general crisis of capitalism and
aggravation of the class struggle between socialism and imperialism.
At one time the imperialists were counting on crushing socialism and its
bulwark -- the Soviet Union -- with military force. Today the situation
has changed. Aware of the new world balance of power, the imperialists are
to an increasing degree emphasizing the weapon of ideology in the struggle
against us, in addition to military adventures. Our class adversaries can-
not help but realize the enormous force of attraction of Marxist-Leninist
ideas. Nixon once said: "We must realize that a great battle of ideas is
taking place in today's world... We must win this battle or perish." Ibis is
how the ideologues of imperialism themselves appraise the meaning and im-
portance of the ideological struggle.
Another circumstance which has caused an increase in the influence of the
ideological struggle between the two systems on the entire process of
ideological-political indoctrination of the masses is connected with a
sharp expansion of the technical base of propaganda, particularly radio
and television. In 1940, for example, there were 1,100,000 radio receivers
in this country, while today the total is 50 million. Modern technical
means of communication make i t possible to influence people in any part
of the world, across all national boundaries.
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It is natural that the party views matters pertaining to indoctrination
of people in the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and exposure of hostile ideology
in an inseparable unity and interrelationship. As is emphasized in the
Resolution of the 24th CPSU Congress, "the most important thing in party
ideological work is propaganda of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, an.
implacable offensive campaign against bourgeois and revisionist ideology."
Consideration of this law in the content of ideological work is an essen-
tial condition of a scientific approach to direction and guidance of the
entire process of ideological-political indoctrination of the builders of
Communism and their defenders.
The content of ideological work is dependent on those economic and social
processes which take place in our country's daily activities. This law
finds scientific explanation in the major theoretical and methodological
principles of Marxism-Leninism on the determining role of social being in
respect to social consciousness, on the relationship between the objective
and subjective in the development of society.
Lenin demanded that we assimJ.late "that undisputed truth that a Marxist
must take into account the realities of life, the precise facts of actuali-
ty..." (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Vol. 31, page 134). These instructions fully
apply to direction of ideological work.
Our socialist reality proper constitutes a powerful factor in indoctrinat-
ing people in the spirit of Communism. Under its influence are formed
ideological conviction, patriotic feelings, and implacable opposition to
all manifestations of hostile ideology. At the same time it continuously
nourishes ideological effort -- theoretical activity, the process of
penetration of the masses by the ideas of the party. Ideological work,
constantly enriched by life, is eAerting an increasingly active influence
on the consciousness of the masses.
It is particularly important to take this law into consideration in direc-
tion of ideological work, especially since it demands that one hold the
entire process of ideological-political irdoctrination in an in-
separable link with life, with the practical business of building Communism.
Our army is an inseparable component of Soviet society. The ideological
life of the party and nation constitutes a life-giving source of ideolog-
ical work with personnel. The achievements of the Soviet people in creat-
ing the material and technological foundation of Communism find broad
expression in the ideological-political indoctrination of fighting men.
Comprehensively revealing the s:gnificance of the heroic labor of pLJple
and army in strengthening the nation's defense and increasing the might
of the Armed Forces, we more vigorously indoctrinate military personnel in
a spirit of Soviet patriotism and pride in their socialist homeland.
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Important conclusions both in a theoretical and ideological-indoctriia-
tional respect proceed from the necessity of developing the Armed Forces
taking into account social changes which are taking place in this country,
These problems are connected with a profound explanation of the leadership
role of the worker class and the alliance of the worker class and peasantry,
with demonstration of the great strength of the Lriendship of the peoples
of the USSR, with indoctrination of fighting men in a spirit of proletarian
internationalism, as well as with a further increase in the productive
activity of the soldier masses, while strictly following a fundamental
line -- all-out strengthening of one-man command on a party basis.
Implementing direction of ideological effort in the army and navy, it is
extremely important to take into account improvement in the cultural and
educational level of the toilers, Characteristic figures in this respect
were presented at the 24th CPSU Congress. In 1959 386 out of every thou-
sand workers possessed higher and secondary education, while now the num-
ber is more than 550. On the eve of the Great Patriotic War only 6 per-
cent of rural toilers possessed higher and secondary education, while by
the and of 1970 the number was more than half. All this has a direct
influence on the quality of new recruits entering the Armed Forces. In
1938 6 percent of inductees were illiterate or practically illiterate,
while only 5 percent possessed secondary and higher education; today the
number if inductees with secondary and higher education is .pproaching
50 per-:ent.
This objective process cannot help but reflect on the content of ideologi-
cal work and the level of its direction and guidance. This presupposes
first and foremost an improvement in the quality of ideological -indoctrina-
tional measures, constant concern by commanders, political workers and
party organizations for maximum satisfaction of the increased spiritual
aspirations of personnel.
A specific law governing ideological work in the Armed Forces is the
relationship between political and military indoctrination on the one hand
and the processes of army and navy functioning and development on the other.
Our country's Armed Forces have gone through a number of stages in their
development, each of which has had its own specific features and has gained
substantial new content.
Characteristic of the Soviet Army and Navy under present-day conditions is,
in the first place, the fact that they guard the productive labors of the
Soviet people, which is building Communism; secondly, expansion of inter-
national tasks connected with defending the conquests of socialism jointly
with the armies of the brother nations; thirdly, gigantic changes in the
development of military equipment and weapons, which have produced radical
reforms in all areas of military affairs. All this finds expression with
objective necessity in ideological work.
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All our cadres must thoroughly study and comprehend those new processes and
phenomena which are taking place in the army and navy, and they must draw
appropriate conclusions both for ideological-theoretical activities and
for political and military indoctrination of personnel.
A comprehensive study of the present stage of development of the Armed
Forces and their missions has made it possible to draw a fundamentally
important, determining conclusion on increased demands regarding personnel
morale, and consequently the increased importance of forming excellent
morale-political and fighting qualities in p,:'rsonnel. On the basis of this
analysis and scientific forecasting of the character and features of
modern warfare and the demands imposed on the Armed Forces, a big job is
being done to improve the means and methods of morale-political and
psychological training of personnel. The importance of military in-,
doctrination is being taken into consideration more fully, since greater
demands are being made on our armed defenders, while the time available to
train military personnel. has been reduced, in conformity with the new law
on universal military obligation.
Ideological work cannot help but take into consideration everything which
is characteristic of the modern concept of combat readiness, and partic-
ularly the existence of new weapons and the danger of a sneak nuclear
attack by the imperialists. Today the level of troop combat readiness
determines our nation's security and the fate of the process of building
Communism. It is precisely for this reason that the demands of the party
on the Armed Forces, reemphasized in the resolutions of the 24th CPSU
Congress, as well as orders issued by the Minister of Defense USSR are
permeated with the idea of maintaining continuous troop combat readiness.
This idea finds reflection in ideological indoctrinational effort in the
army and navy. One cannot ignore such important components of combat
readiness as level of combat and political training, mastery of combat
equipment, discipline, and state of the art of war.
In connection with an increase in demands imposed on man and his inner
strength as well as the complexity of training personnel to operate under
conditions of modern war, the role of Tilitary psychology and educational
science has become enhanced. Military psychology and military educational
science help utilize with greater effectiveness ideological means to
influence the consciousness of military personnel. Knowledge of these
sciences by military cadres is an essential condition for scientific
direction and guidance of ideological effort. This has always been true,
but it is becoming even more important at the present stage of development
of the Soviet Ax med Forces.
The laws governing ideological effort are manifested both in its content
and in the forms of implementation.
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In discussing the laws of development of the forms and means of ideological
work, we can single out two of them which are of the greatest significance:
z) the relationship between their development and qualitative change in
the human material; b) tl;- fact that they are determined by improvement in
the technological basis of mass information.
As has already been note'., every year army and navy inductees represent a
higher cultural and educational level. This naturally not only increases
demands on the content and level of ideological effort but also dictates
with objective necessity a creative and innovative approach to utilization
of the forms and means of personnel ideological-political indoctrination.
The work forma and methods employed with low-literacy and even illiterate
military personnel, as was the case in the earl; years of our army's
existence, are: far from those used today, with our highly-educated fighting
men.
In widespread use under present-day conditions are the lecture-seminar
method of holding pol.iLical classes, group discussion of various topics
pertaining to theory, politics and culture in the form of seminars, dis-
cussions, reports, debates, question and answer evenings, get-togethers
with scientists, people active in literature and the arts, veterans of the
Revolution and other wars, and reader conferences. All this (in addition
to interesting lectures, reports, discussions) arouses the interest of
personnel and increases personnel acti.-;ity.
In discussing the influence of technical devices and mass communications
media on the forms and methods of political and military indoctrination,
one should note first and foremost the rapid growth of our press, cinema,
radio, and television. ` In 1940 750 cop!.es of magazines and newspapers
were published per thousand military personnel, while in 1970 the figure
was approximately 1500. in the last 12 years alone the number of motion
picture projection facilities has almost dcabled, while the number of
television sets has increased almost 40-fold. The television set has now
solidly entered the arsenal of the diversified means of ideological effort,
along with new forms -- group viewing of TV broadcasts with subsequent
program discussion, etc. All this naturally enriches ideological-political
work with personnel.
Proceedings of the 24t1: CPSU Congress -- Basis for Ideological and
Political Indoctrination
Scientific guidance of ideological work is arranged in conformity with
objectively operating laws, taking into account their diversified mani-
festation. In daily practice these laws are expressed In y'neral princi-
ples of ideological work. They include: party-mindedness, implacable op-
position to hostile ideology, a link with life, the tasks of building Com-
munism, its armed defense, etc.
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These principles serv, as points of reference in directing all aspects of
ideological-political indoctrination and theoretical activity. In con-
foriity with these principles, securc:ment of a high ideological level in
the entire process of military personnel indoctrination is of decisive
significance, as well as the forming of Communist consciousness in per-
sonnel on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, and indoctrination in a spirit of
a class approach toward evaluating the phenomena of societal affairs and
implacable opposition to all manifestations of hostile ideology. To be
guided by Leninist principles of ideological work means to seek a continu-
ous and inseparable link between ideological effort and the practical
business of building Communism, those processes which determine the
functioning and development of the Armed Forces.
Of great theoretical and methodological importance for guidance of ideo-
logical effort are the proceedings of the 24th CPSU Congress. They serve
as the basis of ideological-political indoctrination of the people"and its
fighting men over a protracted period of time. The congress proceedings
provide substantiation for the increased importance of indoctrination of
a new man in an inseparable unity with the solving of economic and socio-
political problems.
The congress emphasized that the forming in toilers of a Marxist-Leninist
world view, excellent ideological-political qualities and standards of Com-
munist morality will remain in the future a central task of ideological
effort by party organizations.
The most important thing in party ideological work, states the Congress
Resolution, is dissemination of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and a
relentless struggle against bourgeois and revisionist ideology.
The congress specified that a most important component of ideological-
political effort is indoctrination of a Communist attitude toward labor
and public property, development of toiler creative activity and strengthen-
ing of conscious discipline and organization.
The congress proceedings constitute an inexhau3tible source of inspiration
for our toilers, our fighting men, indoctrinated by the party in a spirit
of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism.
The Congress Resolutions teach an innovative approach toward guidance of
ideological effort, implacable opposition to formalism, stereotypes, and
the ability to influence in a purposeful manner and at all times people's
minds and consciousness in a spirit of Communism.
Scientific guidance of ideological work is essential at all echelons of
the military organism. This guidance is effected by the Main Political
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Administrations of the Soviet Army and Navy, the military councils and
political administrations of the services, districts, fleets, groups of
forces, large unit and unit commanders and political workers.
An essential component of guidance is a profound scientific analysis of
the state of ideological-political eff:.:^t, Diversified means and methods
are employed for this -- direct work in the units and subunits, various
political information channels, etc. An increasingly important position
is being occupied by specific sociological investigations, which make it
possible more deeply to study various social facts, concrete manifestations
of the laws governing ideological work, and to cognize those processes
which take place under the influence of real life in people's con-
sciousness. Electronic computers are beginning to be used for these pur-
poses.
Scientific guidance includes elaboration of measures or a system of
measures to improve ideological work. On the scale of the Armed Forces
this matter is handled directly by the Main Political Administration. Such
measures find expression in orders and directives on ideological work.
The most important of these is tie annual directive on political training
of Armed Forces personnel. It is elaborated on the basis of comprehensive
study of the state of ideological effort in the troops and Communist Party
decisions, taking into consi,eration the missions performed by our Armed
Forces.
In the new 1972 training year, in full conformity with the instructions of
the Central Committee CPSU, the fundamental content of political training
and all ideological effort will be a further, deeper study of the
proceedin&s of the 24th CPSU Congress and mobilization of our fighting men
to implement the Congress Resol,itious.
In conformity with the instructions of the Central Committee CPSU and
directives issued by the Minister of Defense USSR and the Main Political
Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy (taking performance of specific
tasks into considaration), measures are being elaborated by the military
councils and political administrations of the services, districts, fleets,
groups of forces, and large unit political entities.
Scientific guidance presupposes specific work aimed at implementing
adopted directives, plans and resolutions. Principal attention thereby is
focused or. er.-..,uring a high level and effectiveness of ideological effort.
This task is accomplished in a number of areas. An important role here is
played by training of propaganda cadres. A well-balanced system of work
with staff and non-T/O propagandists had been established in the army and
navy. A component part of this system is meetings and seminars at which
lectures are delivered and current problems of political and military in-
doctrination of personnel discussed.
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An essential conr?ition for ensuring the requisite level of ideological
work is preparation of the necessary liter;:ture and manuals, their prompt
delivery to military units and' naval ships, and their intelligent utiliza-
tion in working with personnel.
Scientific guidance of ideological work is a continuous process; it cannot
be linked solely with individual measure:, evc.n the most effective. Es-
sential in this area is constant concern for theoretical synthesis of
all new developments advanced oy daily life and practical Communist in-
doctrination. Guidance can be effective if one takes into consideration
those phenomena which take place in the area of the ideological struggle in
the world arena and analyzes the state of troops, processes of qualitative
improvement of personnel and the course of accomplishment of assigned tasks.
Consistency in guidance of ideological work is also essential because we
are dealing with people's consciousness. Indoctrination is purposeful,
continuing influence on an individual's consciousness. Therefore guidance
of indoctrination cannot be effected from one measure to the next; it must
be continuous.
For implementation of guidance of ideological effort an entire system of
measures is required, measures aimed at carrying out the plans and
instructions of higher bodies. These measures are connected with assigning
tasks to executing personnel, the lending of practical assistance and the
dissemination of advanced know-how.
The holding of conferences and seminars is widely practiced for the purpose
of explaining tasks, instructions, and training on the basis of positive
experience. For example, seminars were held in connection with the 24th
CPSU Congress with various categories of party workers, with staff and
non-T/O propagandists, with journalists, and with cultural and educational
establishment staff personnel. Meetings of party activists and party
meetings were extremely beneficial in this respect.
One effective method of guidance is personal contact between commanders and
subordinate party and ideological workers. This makes it possible to gain
better knowledge of the state of affairs on the spot and to help people
more effectively to carry out assigned tasks. Scientific organization of
labor, which has the aim of increasing labor efficiency with minimum out-
lays. of manpower and resources, is being more and more vigorously adopted
in diversified ideological activities, particularly in the activities of
political entities.
.An extremely effective device ensuring execution o: stated tasks and plans
is regular, wall-organized checks and verification of execution. Verifica-
tion is effected both during inspection and periodic checks on the state
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of ideological work and in the course of routine checks. Achieved results
in combat training are also taken into account.
The purpose of verification of execution is not only to determine the true
state of affairs and to reveal shortcomings but also to offer assistance
and enrich commanders and political workers with advanced know-how in this
area, At the same time they presuppose fundamental, consistent demanding-
ness and the correction of faults on the spot. The fundamental task of
verification, stated Lenin, "is not so much to 'catch,' to 'expose'... as
to know how to correct" (Poln. Sobr- Socha, Volume 44, page 127).
A prominent place in scientif is guidance of ideological-political indoctri-
nation is occupied by wall-organized party political information. Party
political information is one of the forms of party guidance in any area
connected with building Communism, and particularly in the area of ideo-
logic,: effort. It 's a matter of direct and feedback linkage between
party entities and officials on the one hand and the masses on the other.
Political information makes it possible to take more complete"y into
account the interests and attitudes of various categories of military
personnel, more purposefully and effectively to conduct ideological and
organizational work.
Constituting a major component of scientific guidance of political and mili-
tary indoctrination of personnel, it presupposes systematic information
from above, from the center to each party and Komsomol organization, to
each subunit, with utilization of the most diversified means. At the same
time there should be a continuous flow of information from below -- on the
political-morale state of personnel, positive and negative aspects in the
activities of military collectives. An essential condition for such in-
formation is its objectivity and reliability. Otherwise it can lead to
an incorrect appraisal of the state of affairs and consequently to the
making of insufficiently- substantiated decisions.
Scientific guidance of ideological work also presupposes systematic in-
vestigation of the effectiveness of utilization of the forms, methods and
means of ideological influence on the consciousness and attitude toward
service on the part of personnel. Effectiveness of ideological work is
not a simple concept. It includes the degree of people's comprehension
of party policy and activeness in its implementation, participation in
sociopolitical affairs, and observance of Communist moral standards. For
army and navy personnel it is first and foremost a thorough understanding
of party military policy, CPSU demands on the Armed Forces and practical
implementation of these demands, a conscientious attitude toward mastery
of military affairs, and the maintenance of a high level of discipline and
organization in the troops.
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It is understandable that the scientific approach cannot achieve its ob-
jective without deep penetration into the essence of the matter, without
knowledge of the degree of effectiveness of conducted ideological
measures.
It is quite obvious that scientific guidance of ideological effort, as
2~m area of Communist organizational development, imposes great demands
on cadres as on party leaders. "We need people," stresses the Central Com-
mittee Report to the 24th CPSU Congress, "who combine a high degree of
political awareness with excellent professionr,l training, people capable of
knowledgeably solving problems of development of the economy and culture,
individuals with a mastery of modern methods of management and control."
There is a well-known thesis that to guide means to foresee. In order to
foresee it is necessary to know, to utilize objective laws, to be able
from the standpoint of Marxist-Leninist methodology to appraise any given
phenomena of societal affairs.
Ideological work in the Armed Forces is conducted not only by f.pecialists
in this area but also by all Communists, by our military cadres Con-
sequently, scientific guidance of this important sector is the affair not
only of a small group of workers of the ideological front. Of great im-
portance for all supervisor and executive cadres is implementation of a
unity of organizational and ideological activity. There is not nor can
there be any guidance of an isolated area of ideological-political in-
doctrination. This work is conducted in an inseparable link with the
entire process of training armed defenders of the homeland, improvement
in combat readiness, and strengthening of discipline in the units, on
board naval ships and in large units.
The 24th CPSU Congress has enriched the entire ideological-political life
of our party and nation, the Soviet Army and Navy. It has provided a
profound substantiation of economic and sociopolitical tasks ror the im-
mediate future. Congress resolutions reflect problems connected with
further strengthening of the Soviet Armed Forces. The congress specified
the ways and means of accomplishing these tasks. One of the main elements
upon which attention is focused in these documents is improvement of the
control system, and within it -- improvement of the scientific approach
toward leadership and guidance in all areas connected with building Com-
munism. Mastery by our cadres of the scientific principles of guiding and
directing the ideological effort is an important condition for further
improving the moral spirit of our troops and increasing the combat readi-
ness of the Soviet Army and Navy,
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LENINIST IDEAS CONCERNING THE ROLE OF THE REAR* IN WARFARE
Colonel General K. Abramov and Major General M. Ivanov
For the first time in the history of military thinking, the classic authors
of Marxism approached the problem of the nation's rear from scientific
positions. They are the ones who revealed the role of the rear in the
course of a war and the influence of the rear on its outcome. ", I. Lenin
pointed out chat the rear is of decisive importance in the achievement of
victory. "A strong, well-organized rear is essential for the propel con-
duct of a war." (Complete Collected Works, Volume 35, p 4,08). This
conclusion is based on a dialectical consideration of the multifaceted
relations between the armed forces and the national econom?u-, and is
organically linked with the content of the very concept of "rear, "l
It should be stated that the concept "rear" has existed in the military
field for a long time, but that it has been interpreted in %i narrow and
simplified manner. The entire matter was reduced to its quasi itative .
aspect: how much steel had been smelted, how much coal and all had been
extracted, the size of the population, and so forth. This point of view
was held by bourgeois military theoreticians long before the beginning of
the First World War and during subsequent years. In principle, the same
views on the rear are shared by the contemporary military theoreticians
of imperialism.
Of course, the quantitative aspect of material production is of tremendous
importance with respect to supplying the active forces with equipment, arms,
rations, and other types of supplies. V~ I. Lenin understood this better
than anyone. "Whoever has the greatest amount of equipment, organization,
discipline, and the best vehicles," he taught, "will have the upper hand."
(Complete Collected Works, Volume 36, p 116). He emphasized the role of
heavy industry as the basis of the national economy, providing the front
with everything necessary.
However, if we were to attempt to demonstrate the direct dependence of
victory in a war on the volume of production achieved, we would not be able
to properly explain many historical facts. In fact, if we were to proceed
This problem has already been discussed in 0e journal Voyennaya MCysl'
in issu. , Nos. 4 and 6 of 1370 and earlier issues.
See translator's note at the end of the article pertaining to the use of
the word "rear."
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from production volume alone, then how could we understand why the young
Soviet republic with its ruined economy was able to sustain military single
combat with internal counterrevolutionary forces and with the Entente
powers whose level of production forces exceeded that of our nation by
dozens of times?
As we know, during the years of the Great Patriotic War the USSR was also
inferior to fascist Germany in volume of production. It had at its dis-
posal not only its own production potential, but also the potential of its
allies and that of the nations which it had enslaved. This superiority
became especially important after the occupation by the Hitleritcs of vast
territories of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, however, the world became a
witness to what would appear to be completely impossible: during the
course of the war the Soviet Union greatly surpassed fascist Germany in
the output of all of the basic types of arms and military equipment and
crushed the aggressor.
Even at the present time, with a level of production development which is
inferior to that of the United States of America as a whole, the Soviet
Union has been able to successfully set up the production of modern
armament and military equipment. Although the Warsaw Pact nations have
still not caught up with the states which make up the agcressive NATO bloc
with their combined production volume, the defensive shield of the social-
ist nations, however, is reliably protecting the fraternal nations engaged
in creative labor. Bourgeois minds are not capable of dispassionately and
objectively evaluating the limitless possibilities of the socialist nations.
Otherwise, they would have to acknowledge to the whole world the great
superiority of the socialist structure. It is clear that they cannot do
this. That is why they are continuing to put the main stress on the
quantitative indices of the national economy. It is precisely from the
quantitative aspect of economics that the well-known American logistics
specialist, Rear-Admiral Eccles proceeds in all of his opinions in his
book Logistics in National Defense:
Another American expert in the area of logistics and military economics,
Professor Knorr, in his monograph The Military Potential of Nz,tions,
categorically denies the influence of the social structure on the military
and economic possibilities of a nation, He writes that "the form of
government and the social structure which supports it are far from playing
a decisive role in determining military potential."
The greatest service of Lenin consists precisely in the fact that he
approached the solution to this problem in a genuinely scientific manner,
from positions of dialectical materialism and revealed factors which many
researchers could not or did not want to see. In doing this he was going
against ingrained and incorrect views on the role of the rear and its
economic possibilities. As early as the ere of the October Revolution
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V, I. Lenin came to the conclusion that the economic organization of
society, that is, the nature of production relations, is of decisive
importance for the conduct of a war and that socialist production relations
provide tremendous advantages for a people engaged in war.
Of course, a certain level of production development, especially heavy
industry, is essential. Even now concern for its development stands at
the center of attention of the CoT=tnist Party. The Resolution of the
24th Congress of the CPSU points out that "there should continue to be
rapid rates of development in heavy industry, the basis for expanded
reproduction, for technical reequipment of the national economy, and for
the defensive might of the Soviet State." A certain level of development
of culture and science is also required. "Without science," Lenin
emphasized, "it is impossible to develop a modern aLmy." (Complete
Collected Works, Volume 40, p 183). He also saw the development of
science as dependent upon the economic organization of society,
It is important to underscore the fact that V, I. Lenin viewed economics
in both the narrow and broad sense of the word. In the narrow sense it is
the achieved level of production development expressed in quantitative
indices. In the broad sense economics is the level of production develop-
ment and the economic organization of society, takc..n as a whole.
A question naturally arises as to why V. I. Lenin assignee, decisive
significance in a war to precisely the economic organization of society
and the nature of production relations. This is explained by the fact
that it is precisely the economic structure which creates the conditions
for the rates of development of the production forces and the effectiveness
of their use, and determines the stability of the government and the via-
bility of the rear.
The economic structure and the political organization of society corres-
ponding to it -,:epresent the basis fo%: the actions of subjective factors.
That is, they define the prerequisites for the emergence and strengthening
of a corresponding moral spirit of the population and armed forces' per-
si.:nnel and for the development of science, including military science, and
determine the effectiveness of the organizational, political and educa-
tional, and other activities of political parties and government and
military agencies.
At the same time it should also be pointed out that the advantages of a
socialist economy do not simply appear by themselves, automatically. A
decisive role in their realization belcngs to the Marxist party which
oversees the entire defense of a socialist state and unites and solidifies
all of the efforts of the army and the people, "Without a party,"
V. I. Lenin pointed out, "of iron-like strength and tempered in battle,
without a party which enjoys the confidence of every honorable individual
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in a given class, without a party which is able to keep its finger on the
mood of the masses and influence it, it is impossible to conduct such a
battle successfuliy." (Complete Collected Works, Volume 41, p 27).
The immutability of Lenin's instruction has been confirmed by the entire
history of our motherland. During the years of difficult military trial
the Communist Party showed itself to be a real fighting party. During
the Civil War it represented the decisive :fo-^e in converting the nation
into a united battle camp and in mobilizing all of its forces to destroy
the enemy. The party also completely justified the trust of the masses
during the years of the Great Patriotic War. It boldly assumed responsi-
bility for the fate of the socialist homeland and led the Soviet people to
a great victory over the assault forces of world reaction, fascist Germany
and =mperialist: Japan.
Analyzing wars of the new era, V. I. Lenin noted that "the tie betwt:, a
nation's military organization and its entire economic and cultural stru-.--
ture has never b:,en as close as it is at the present time." (Complete
Collected Works, Volume 9, p 156).
History has completely confirmed this conclusion by Lenin. The direct
expenditures by both sides during the First World War exceeded by 10 times
the expenditures for all of the wars which had been conducted during the
preceding 113 years. During the Second World War military expenditures
exceeded the expenditures of the First World War by five times, and the
bulk of these went for equipment and arms. The "war industry" has grown
greatly, as has the role of the professional and technical qualities of
the personnel, which is inseparable from the level of culture and education
in society.
A war employing nuclear missiles will introduce a great deal which is new
into the interdependence between the front and the rear, if such a war is
unleashed by the imperialists. It will require tremendous material means
and a developed military economy. It should be taken into consideration
that the scientific and technical revolution is also having an all-round
effect on military production and is lending urgency to the problem of
competition in the sphere of science and technology. L. I. Brezhnev, in
a speech at the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties
in June of 1969, noted the successes achieved by Lhe Soviet Union and at
the same time emphasized the fact that one must not underestimate the
strength of those with whom it is necessary to compete in the scientific
and technical sphere. It will be a long and difficult struggle.
New requirements of the rear are emerging from the coalitionist nature of
war. In preparing for a world war the imperialists are combining their
forces and creating military-political blocs, national economic organiza-
tions, and so forth. Under these conditions special urgency is assumed
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by V. I. Lenin's instructions on the necessity of solidifying the anti-
imperialist forces. "Facing the tremendous front of the imperialist forces,
we strugglers against imperialism represent an alliance which requires
military solidarity and we view any attempt to violate this solidarity as
a completely unacceptable phenomenon and as treason to the interests of
the struggle against international imperialism... .We say that a unity of
military forces is essential and that a deviation from this unity is
unacceptable." (Complete Collected Works, Volume 40, pp 98, 99).
A union of ,all of the forces of the socialist nations and an all-round
s`.rengthening of their rear, which is regarded as the rear of the coalition
of socialist states, is required for purposes of ensuring the defeat of
the imperialistic aggressors.
Application of the rear's potential in modern war depend now, more than
bef re, on the nature of the social structure, the economic and political
organization of society, and the flexibility of the party, government,
and military leadership.
V. I. Lenin pointed out the necessity for unity and centralization in the
military and political leadership of the entire matter of supplying the
army and the recessi;.y for a careful accounting of the material possibili-
ties in planning operations and the war as a whole. During the years of
civil war, this principle was reflected first of all in the organization
of the highi:r links of military-governmental agencies. The Defense
Council was in charge of the armed struggle, the rear as a whole, and
supply of the army. It contained military-political workers who dealt
directly with matters of organizing the work of supplying the front.
The experience of the Civil War, which brilliantly confirmed the Leninist
principle of single military-political leadership of the entire national
defense, was embodied in the State Defense Committee during the years of
the Great Patriotic War. Representing the highest agency for supervision
of the entire national defense, it directed toward a single goal the
activities of all party, governmental, and military agencies, all branches
of the national economy, and the efforts of rear workers and front line
soldiers for purposes of transforming the entire nation into a single
military camp.
The Armed Forces' rear is the essential link, providing a link between the
front and the nation's rear. Its work, however, is not limited simply to
intermediary functions between the front and the national economy --
transportation of supplies, storage, distribution of material and technical
means, evacuation of wounded personnel and damaged equipment from the
combat zones, and so forth. Representing an integral part of the army and
navy, rear area agencies of the armed forces actively participate in the
planning and preparations for military actions on various scales.
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Proceeding from the missions assigned by command and the actual possibili-
ties for their support, the rear area agencies determine the requirements
of the forces for all types of material means and the methods and forms of
material and technical support of combat actions. In ti,is sense they
influence the planning of combat actions on the one hand, and on the other,
the organization of production, first of all by those branches which
provide for the state's military needs.
V. I. Lenin taught that the new type of army is developed on the class
principle with party leadership playing a determining role, and that Red
officers must be active disseminators of party policy and conveyors of
the ideas of socialism, and must be infinitely devoted to their motherland.
Only then will they "enjoy authority among the soldiers and be able to
strengthen socialism in our army. Such an army will be indefeatable."
(Complete Collected Works, Volume 37, p 200).
The Soviet officer must excel over an officer of the bourgeois army in
military and political training. He must possess a profound knowledge of
his specialty and a high level of general culture. In clarifying the
essence of any given requirement placed on all Soviet party and govern-
mental personnel, V. I. Lenin pointed out that it is necessary to be
competent, Lo know the equipment at its modern level, and to h.Te a certain
scientific education. (Complete Collected Works, Volume 40, p 215).
It follows from the above that officers of various branches of the Armed
Forces, arms, and service branches, including those in the rear areas,
must constantly expand their special skills and knowledge, improve the
training and education of their subordinates, and be guided by the
principles of scientific organization of military work without which
productive work by command personnel in general and those of the rear in
particular is unthinkable.
By guiding oneself according to Lenin's instructions and considering the
entire body of experience in the development of the Soviet Armed Forces,
it is possible to single out a number of specific qualities which are
inherent in the logic. ics officer.
In the first place, he is required to have a firm knowledge not only of
his own functional duties, but also of military matters related to the
duties performed by him, especially those of the branch in which he is
serving.
A logistics officer is not just an administrator, a transportation
specialist, a builder, a repairman, and so forth, but also a commander
with a mastery of military matters and able to think on operational-
tactical and strategic scales. Only under this condition can he :orrectly
comprehend his position and role, in the "general structure" and be able to
carry out successfully the daily assignments.
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In the second place, he is obligated not just to have a complete mastery
of the complex equipment of the logistical services, but also to under-
stand the principles of employment of combat arms of those troops for
which he provides logistical support.
In the third place, he cannot get by without the appropriate economic
knowledge in order to have a state approach to expenditures of material-
technical and financial means in carrying out assignments involved in
troop support, "It is necessary," V. I. Lenin pointed out, "to be an
economist, evaluating every corresponding step in the work..." (Complete
Collected Works, Volume 43, p 359).
In the fourth place, there is no such thing as a "rest break" for the
logistics officer in a combat situation -- neither short ones nor long
ones. He works straight through, which requires endurance, presence of
mind, and operational efficiency.
In the fifth place, his work is frequently carried out in isolation from
the large troop collectives, and h.'.s subordinates perform their duties in
small subunits or very small, groups. All of this makes control more
difficult and complicates the organization of combat and technical train-
ing, educational work, and so forth. This characteristic requires that
the logistics officer be competent, firm, politically mature, and morally
and psychologically stable, and that he have the ability to mobilize the
personnel and supervise them efficiently.
Success by the field forces is directly dependent upon uninterrupted
supplies for them. This is possible under the condition that the entire
system of logistical support corresponds to the organization of forces
which has developed and if logistics officers base their work on tried and
tested scientific principles and demonstrate creative initiative, an
enterprising nature, and persistence.
In emphasizing the necessity for centralized administration of the rear
and the distribution and utilization of material resources, V. I. Lenin
singled out the requirement for concentrating forces and means at the
decisive sectors of the armed battle. This requirement was successfully
fulfilled by the Red Army during the years of the Civil and Great Patriotic
wars. The forces and means were massed on truly great scales at the
battles of Moscow, Stalingrad, and Kursk, during the extensive offensive
operations of 1944, during the battle for Berlin, and others, which have
become a brilliant page in the history of Soviet military art. In massing
its forces and means, the rear successfully fulfilled its troop support
missions. It is sufficient to recall that in 1944 alone, 2.675 million
carloads of operational-supply cargo was hauled on the railroads and that
military vehicle routes extended 55,000 kilometers. The troops were
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supplied with 3.846 million tons of fuels and lubricants, which
represented around one-third of the amount used during the entire period
of the Great Patriotic Ware
V. I. Lenin directeu a great deal of attention toward implementation of
the principle of having the rear area forces and means near the troops to
be supported. He resolutely cut through red tape, bureaucracy, and foot-
dragging in supplying the army and navy with the necessary types of
allowances. For example, he telegraphed the chief of supplies for the
Southern Front in August of l9]9 that: "You were sent a considerable
quantity of equipment and footwear during July. In spite of this, among
all of the armies of the Southern Front certain units are without
clothing and footwear. Under threat of the strictest personal responsi-
ity, I propose that you take decisive measures to immediately
distribute what has been received among the: needy units."
The important principles in the work of the Armed Forces' rear logistical
support units include a high level of maneuverability (corresponding to
the maneuverability of the field forces), the integrated use of all types
of transportation (with mandatory consideration for the specific features
of each type), maximum utilization of local means and resources for the
needs of the front, and also strictest economy of all materiel used by
the forces. "The defense of the Soviet republic urgently requires the
greatest economy of forces and the most productive application of national
labor." (V. I. Lenin, Complete Collected Works, Volume 37, p 367),
V. I. Lenin associated the intelligent use of resources allocated to the
army with the organization of accounting and control and with the correct
planning of the requirements of the forces and economy on the part of
everyone who had anything to do with materiel. He attached special
importance to the time factor. A decree of the Defense Council stated
that at the moment of a decisive encounter with the enemies of the Russian
Soviet Republic, all forces must be concentrated on supplying the Red Army
and that each second of the work of satisfying its needs is important,.
Vladimir Il'ich demonstrated careful concern for the establishment of
medical service at the front, In the article, "To the Aid of the Wounded
Red Army Man!" he said that "all of our difficulties and torments are
nothing comparea with that which is the lot of the wounded Red Army man
who has shed his blood in defense of worker and peasant power.... Let each
individual in the logistical service remember his duty, that of helping
the wounded Red Army man in every way he can." (Complete Collected Works,
Volume 41, p 156),
Lenin's positions on the role of logistics in a war are also valid under
modern conditions. They are part of the foundation of the activities of
the CPSU and communist and workers' parties of other socialist nations,
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and are being implemented under conditions of scientific and technical
progress and the military-technical revolution, which have posed a multi-
tude of difficult problems for the logistical support of the Soviet Armed
Forces. An intelligent solution to these problems requires a creative,
dialectical approach to analysis of the continuously developing concrete
historical situation, about which V. I. Lenin spoke more than once.
At the same time it must not be forgotten that an objective law is active
in the development cf science and practice -- general premises of a theory
retain their importance over the course of a lengthy period, even under
greatly changing conditions, such as those, for example, which the
development of modern means of warfare has entailed. Lenin's positions,
which we have reviewed, are prezisely of the most general nature and
therefore, even today form the basis for the solution of urgent theoretical
and practical problems, including those involved in logistical support of
the forces. Extremely valid are the words of V. I. Lenin that "whoever
struggles for individual matters, without first resolving general matters,
will inevitably 'come up against' these general matters at every step
without being aware of it." (Complete. Collected Works, Volume 15, p 368).
Consequently, both theoretical conclusions and practical recommendations
toward improvement and development of the armed forces' rear services
absolutely must correspond to the general positions. If they contradict
these, then it would behoove one to give some thought to their expediency
in the realization of the practical work. At the same time it would not
be correct to set out on a course of simple deduction of the concrete
from the most general positions. Proceeding in this way we would find
ourselves the prisoners of fruitless theorization.
Concrete conclusions and recommendations, new principles, as well as new
fc,cms and methods of practical operations by logistical support agencies
and establishments can be developed only on the basis of an in-depth and
comprehensive analysis and a summarizing of modern reality, with the
emphasis on the most general theoretical positions, and with mandatory
control of their practice. And such an approach to recognition of reality,
Lenin teaches, requires that an enterprising and principled nature be
demonstrated, that the collective experience be taken into consideration,
and that the totality of mutually related phenomena be thoroughly under-
stood. "The signs of our time," said Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A.
Grechko, USSR minister of defense, at the 24th Congress of the CPSU, "are
the rapid processes of development, and renewal and improvements in all
of the spheres of human activities, including military matters. This is
constantly posing new and more difficult tasks for us."
Supported by Lenin's conclusions and instructions and taking into consider-
ation the specifics of modern warfare, as well as the increased material
24
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possibilities for logistical support of the forces, the central committee
of our party has assigned new and difficult tasks to logistical. agencies
of the Armed Forces. The party and government have approved a number of
effective, scientifically substantiated measures for the creation of a
qualitatively new logistical service for our armed forces. The theoreti-
cal development of problems of logistical support has been intensified.
Troop exercises, especially the "Neman" logistical support unit exercises,
conducted in July and August of 1968, and the "D"iaa" exercises, the
largest of the postwar period, conducted in Iblarch of 1970, have been
especially important for checking out. the new theoretical conclusions and
for purposes of further development of the theory and practice. of
logistical support. The operations of rear service agencies :nd troops
during these exercises showed that the Soviet Armed Forces: logistical
support to on a level with modern requirements and is prepared to carry
owt combat missions.
At the same time experience has irrefutably demonstrated that under modern
conditions military specialists must have a thorough knowledge not just of
the aspects of military affairs, but also of the activities of the nation's
rear and its potential, and must be able to participate in the realization
of these potentials tc supply the army and navy with everything needed
under the leadership of the appropriate military-political and military
agencies.
[Translator's note. The Soviet definition for the word "tyl" [literally:
"rear" or "rear area"] as given in the Tolkovyy slovar' voye-,;nykh terminov
(Defining Dictionary of Military Terms), Moscow, 1966 is as follows:
"1. During wartime in the broad sense ?- the entire territory of the
country with its population, economy, state and political structure. The
term 'rear' (tyl) connotes the strength of th.,. economic and moral poten-
tial of a country, insuring during wartime the material needs of the front
and the replenishmr;nt of manpower reserves for the active and deployed
forces. 2. In the armed forces - the aggregate of units, subunits and
installations organized for the purpose of providing the branches of the
armed forces with everything required for their subsistence, training and
combat operations and intended for the material, technical and medical
support of the troops. The rear area of active armies in the armed forces
is divided into operational and close support [divisional and regimental].
(See 'close support rear area' (voyskovoy tyl))."
"skovoy tyl. Close support rear area - is the aggregate of rear area
[or: logistical support] units, subunits and installations with reserves
of materiel included within the complement of troop combined-units (units,
subunits) and intended for their material, technical and medical support.
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The main tasks of the close support rear area are: timely support of
subunits (units) with the necessary materiel (munitions, fuel, rations,
etc.) in all conditions of the combat situation; maintaining in proper
working order armament, combat and other equipment, and also providing
for their timely repair and evacuation; implementing measures for the
maintenance and strengthening of the health of personnel, providing
timely medical assistance to the sick and wounded and providing for their
evacuation to and treatment in medical facilities; battlefield collection
and evacuation of armament, equipment and property, both of friendly
troops and captured items."
in this translation the term "tyl" is translated as "rear" or "rear area"
or "rear services" or "rear support" or "logistics" or "logistical support"
depending on the context and based or, the above definitions.]
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ON THE QUESTION OF FORESIGHT
In recent years our press has devoted increasing attention to problems of
scientific foresight and prediction in military affairs,l and this is
quite logical.
The appearance of nuclear weapons produced a revolutionary change in the
character, forms and methods of military operations and, as a result, the
importance of foresight and prediction in troop control became immeasurably
greater. At the same time the content of prediction changed radically, and
the conditions for its implementation became extraordinarily more complex.
The following examples present convincing evidence of this. In the past
prediction of the course of operations was based chiefly on taking into
account gradual probable situation changes at a more or less specific time,
while under conditions of nuclear warfare it is necessary to take into con-
sideration the possibility of practically instantaneous situation change at
any time in relation to the beginning of military operations. The equip-
ping of armed forces with nuclear missile weapons, an increase in the fire
capability of conventional weapons, and increased troop maneuverabi'.ity
have produced a sharp increase in the scope of modern operations and depth
of attacks. As a result there has occurred a substantial broadening of
the spatial framework of prediction of the course of military operations.
The commander and his staff will now be dealing with solution to such a
totally new and primary problem as the establishment of probability and
time of employment of nuclear weapons, as well as assessment of the pos-
sible results and consequence of nuclear strikes, particularly massed
strikes.
The complexity in predicting development of military operations under
present-day conditions is also dictated by the fact that it is necessary
on a time-limitation basis to analyze a large number of matters and to
obtain conclusions posses!;ing a sufficiently high degree of reliability.
Today prediction should be based on a rigorous consideration of the
results of mathematical simulation and on the utilization of operational
calculations performed with the aid of electronic computers.
All these elements require further, more thorough elaboration of this
problem and a search for ways to solve it.
In light of the above we should like in this article to share with the
readers some ideas on such questions as the possible and advisable degree
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of detail in prediction,2 objectivity of data utilized in prediction, and
the relationship between prediction and decision.
Possible and advisable degree of detail in prediction. In predicting com-
bat operations the commander naturally wishes to picture the entire future
process as fully as possible. This enables him to penetrate deeper into
the essence of the contradictions and conflicts within such a complex
phenomenon as the engagement and operation.
But penetration to the depth of a given process and its cognition is
infinite. In addition, no matter how carefully a prediction is made and
a plan of action elaborated, in practice there may be a need to refine
certain elements, and sometimes very substantial elements. The probability
of this will be in direct relation to the distance in time to the predicted
events. A question quite naturally arises: what is the possible and
advisable degree of detail in prediction? Should an effort be made to
predict the entire process down to the finest details and in a specific
sequence? Would it not be better to limit oneself to such a detailed
prediction only in respect to the initial stage of the process and to
endeavor to picture the general, overall result of actions?
In our opinion the following should constitute the guiding element in
approaching the solution to these problems. A deep, detailed prediction
is certainly desirable even if the plan of action elaborated in the light
of the detailed prediction must later be subjected to substantial modifica-
tion. In any case a comprehensive, prior analysis of probable situations
enables the commander more quickly to gain his bearings with regard to
changes taking place and to find the optimal way out of complex situations.
At the same time, in predicting combat operations it is important not to
drown in an abundance of facts (sometimes quite conflictive), and for this
it is necessary skillfully to specify the range of matters to be studied,
to isolate the main elements, watch is of decisive significance in the
given situation, that is, as Lenin stated, "to find at each specific
moment that specific link in the chain which one must grasp with all one's
might," and boldly to discard everything insignificant. Without this the
commander may prove incapable of clearly and positively formulating his
decision by the required deadline.
One must also be aware of the fact that decision-making under present-day
conditions will be most frequently effected in an extremely limited time,
and consequently a detailed analysis of the forthcoming process will many
times be impossible.
Thus it is very difficult and sometimes impossible mentally to conduct an
engagement model with identical completeness and depth of substantiation of
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all processes which may take place in carrying out the mission. Therefore
the commander, predicting combat operations and making a decision, will
evidently be compelled initially to examine key elements determining the
given process, within the bounds of the essential to present the basic
plan of action and to perform preliminary calculations for utilization of
men and equipment. After this (if time allows) he can continue refining
his prediction and decision.
In such cases the commander's conclusion may naturally prove to be in-
sufficiently reliable: dertain presumable conclusion allowances are not
eliminated in prediction. But they are inevitable when it is necessary
mentally to picture an entire operation as a whole. It is important not
to lose sight of details which determine employment of decisive weapons,
particularly nuclear weapons.
Objectivity of data used in prediction. It is common knowledge that one
and the same facts (circumstances) cin.n be presented in different ways,
for the most varied and primarily subjective reasons. Such diversity
naturally has a greater range when facts pertain to military operations.
This is due both to the complexity o.` interpretation of the combat process
and to inadequacy of data on the enemy, difficulties in obtaining data,
continuous mortal danger, etc. In addition prediction is connected with
analysis of a bilaterally planned engagement, when the plans and actions
of one of the parties are opposed by the intention and actions of the
other, and each undertakes everything possible to deceive the adversary.
Under these conditions, for a correct prediction, it is particularly im-
portant for the commander to obtain the requisite data before the data
assumes a specific emotional coloring from the individuals transmitting the
information, and before all kinds of additions, frequently subjective,
distort the essence of the matter. In the aim of greater conviction as to
information reliability it is also important to gain a picture of the
situation in which informacion was obtained and the persons transmitting
this data. One of the fundamental means of increasing information reliabil-
ity is strict distribution of responsibility for its acquisition and
presentation.
Also of particular importance for objectivity of prediction is the most
careful fulfillment of such a well-known demand as thoroughness of
analysis of phenomena and total elimination of elements of underrating or
overrating of the capabilities of the belligerent forces. A prediction
of ensuing actions should be undertaken only when there is definiteness
regarding the outcome of preceding actions. "In order to foresee the
course of development of sequential breakdowns of operations," wrote
M. N. Tukhachevskiy, "it is necessary first of all to know the outcome of
the first, most difficult act..."3
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It is no less important for prediction not to be based on some precon-
ceived idea which predetermines the course of all succeeding arguments.
This situation inevitably leads to a nonobjective assessment of facts:
failure to accept or denial of those which contradict the given notion,
and emphasis of what are perhaps secondary facts but which to some degree
corroborate the advanced thesis. In this connection one recalls a state-
ment by M. V. Frunze: "...Each and every Red commander must thoroughly
realize that the most dangerous thing for us is routinism, being carried
away with some specific pattern and some specific method.i4
Nor should one forget in predicting that in practical activities it is
difficult to achieve absolute perfection, and particularly in combat
operations. Therefore our prediction will always differ substantially
from the actual development of events. That which we wish to accomplish --
a specific march, maneuver, concentration of forces, thi taking of a posi-
tion or an attack on the enemy -- constitutes, as Clausewitz noted, a kind
of i eal in relation to that which we can actually achieve.
A thorough understanding of these points forewarns a commander against
extremely dangerous attempts to fit (adapt) the actual development of
events to that model of combat operations which he has mentally created and
which is desirable to him. This is particularly important when actions
are being predicted which involve the employment of nuclear weapons,
characteristic of which are rapid and abrupt situation changes, extra-
ordinary flexibility in operations, and negation of many established
points elaborated prior to the nuclear attack. Such a shortcoming can be
manifested particularly in young commanders, to whom. It frequently seems
initially that they are capable of immediately seeing the general direction
of the development of events, the core, so to say.
"A Red commander," stated Frunze, "should learn full mastery of that method
of thinking and that art of phenomenon analysis provided by Marxist
doctrine."5 A l sketchiness in thinking and blind adherence to prior-
established views on various processes of probable combat operations should
by their very nature be alien to prediction based on a knowledge of
objective laws and dialectical-materialist analysis. Maximum flexibility
of thinking, corresponding to the changing situation, is an essential con-
dition for correct prediction.
Thorough knowledge of the adversary's basic operations techniques and
(which is equally important) their possible changes, since known opar.a-
tions methods, particularly in a nuclear war, will apparently most
frequently not be repeated, is essential for the acquisition of objective
data and at the same time well-founded prediction. Actib will not be
repeated not only because the adversary will avoid repetition but also in
view of the unique nature of the conditions of combat operations. Each
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engagement (operation) always takes place under specific conditions
characteristic of it alone. One does not encounter two identical situa-
tions on the battle front.
Consequently a correct prediction of combat operations is possible only on
the basis of a thorough understanding of the essence of the principles
by which the adversary is guided and an understanding of why he acts in
one way and not another. Without knowledge of the causes (roots, sources)
of a plan, without a clear picture of the sociopolitical, moral and
psychological countenance of the adversary, it is difficult to discover
the direction of subsequent actions by the enemy, particularly in cases of
abrupt change of initial plans.
Variants on the nature of possible enemy actions, which at first glance
may seem unsubstantiated, should also be taken into account in prediction,
taking guidance in the point that initially new knowledge constitutes con-
jecture. it appears prior to the time that its authenticity can be proven.
An additional verification and comparison of facts are essential in such
cases.
In light of the above it will be necessary to reverify some facts, to
ignore others, and to accept still others as completely reliable. if it is
impossible to verify questionable data, it is better not to utilize this
data, filling the resulting gap in the prediction with extensive utiliza-
tion of prior-accumulated information on the enemy.
The relationship between prediction and decision. Examination of this
question, which is generally speaking not a new item, and perhaps the
repetition of several well-known truths are dictated by practical necessity.
The fact is that major studies conducted in recent years in the area of
social forecasting have naturally been reflected in military affairs. As
a particular example, the conclusion that prediction precedes decision
could be perceived as a general conclusion and applied to commander work
methods. We have a definite basis for affirming this thesis. As was
correctly noted in the article by generals G. Semenov and V. Prokhorov,
"the following work sequence has long since been established in practical
training in commander decision-making: before making a decision (our under-
line -- D. S.) the commander should thoroughly understand the assigned
mission, should assess the situation and predict possible situation
changes. "6
Although we have no intention of questioning the thesis that prediction
precedes decision if it pertains, for example, to weapons and combat
equipment development prospects and other such matters, we at the same time
cannot agree with this thesis when it pertains to specific combat opera-
tions. Practical combat training, and particularly tie wealth of
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experience gained in the last war, persuasively demonstrate that prediction
of a specific engagement or operation cannot provide the desired result
if it is viewed solely as a precursor of decisions.
Prediction of a specific engagement and decision-making on its conduct
constitute a unified commander mental process. Prediction consists in the
final analysis in comparing the decisions of opposing sides, embodied by
our imagination in specific actions, Each of the sides, bearing in mind
the natural reaction which can be produced by its actions, at the same time
seeks to ensure that the adversary's response actions fit within a desir-
able framework. The main thing in prediction is not only to establish the
direction in which events will develop and the possible results, but also
to determine under what conditions this development can and should proceed
in the proper direction, what should be done to achieve this, what forces
and means should be employed and in what sequence, whence, when and how
they should be taken, etc.
We should be interested in the overall results of the engagement, battle,
and operation, losses in men and equipment, as well as their distribution
in place, time and affiliation. The commander will be capable of planning
further troop operations only when he possesses an idea on who may be
where, when and in what position during the course of an engagement (opera-
tion) .
An answer to all these questions can be obtained if prediction of forth-
coming actions and decision-making are effected simultaneously. In addi-
tion, prediction of combat operations does not terminate with an operation
decision. It should and in practice does take place continuously during
the course of the entire given engagement or operation. Prediction
comprises the basis of particular decisions and the foundation of troop
control in the engagement and operation.
Separation of prediction from accomplishment of a specific mission is also
inconceivable because the mission (objective) itself constitutes the an-
ticipated result of actions.
Finally, vhen it is clear what questions must be resolved and in what form
answers to them must be obtained, as well as what initial data is available
for this purpose, it is not difficult to select specific work methods,
Clarity of the goal of forthcoming actions and concreteness of missions
make the creative efforts of the commander in predicting a forthcoming
engagement substantially more purposeful, organized and discipline his
thinking. Maximum focusing of the commander's entire moral and physical
resources, his will, knowledge, ability, that is,everything which con-
stitutes an essential condition, for successful activity, is manifested in
such a case with maximum completeness and force. The more focused a
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thought process, the more efficient and productive it is, Any wandering
of prediction of the development of specific military operations within a
framework abstracted from the decision, outside the specific goals pursued
by the given actions, inevitably leads to extremely amorphous, multivariant
conclusions, which are very difficult to utilize in decision-making. Under
complex conditions they are capable only of confusing the commander.
Abstractness of prediction of combat operations from the specific task and
decision constitutes a fruitless undertaking. Lenin considered concrete-
ness to be one of the conditions of scientific prediction. "It is irspos-
sible to comprehend anything in our struggle," he wrote, "if one does not
study the specific circumstances of each battle" (Poln. Sobr. Soch.,
Volume 8, page 400).
As regards the sequence of predicting forthcoming operations, we are con-
vinced that it has been rather precisely defined by many years of
practical activity and has been specified in appropriate field manuals and
service regulations as the general operational procedure taken by a com-
mander in decision-making, in which everything which the prediction should
encompass is expressed in concentrated form. Obviously it is essential
not to forget this point, to understand it thoroughly and to utilize it
intelligently.
We shall recall, at least in general form, some theses connected with this.
First of all we shall note that prediction of forthcoming actions, just
as decision-making, from which it is inseparable, begins with a briefing
on the mission until it is fully comprehended. Clarifying what is to be
done where, when and for what purpose, the commander at the very outset
endeavors to see beyond these questions the specific executors and objects
of actions, the conditions under which they will take place, as well as
their possible character and results.
Carefully analyzing missions from beginning to end, the commander en-
deavors to examine the entire chain of future events and to gain a general
picture of the operations. Of course this picture is still far from
completion. Only initial sketches have been made on how key moments in
development of the process may look.
Concretization of prediction continues in the following stage of the
commander's work procedure -- in estimating the situation, when each in-
dividual element is analyzed in detail. Without examining the nature of
the analysis proper, we shall merely emphasize the following major point.
The most reliable prediction is possible only when each situation element
is analyzed in juxtaposition with others, sequentially in time and space,
tied into the solution of particular problems.
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Prediction of the forthcoming engagement (operation) is formally completed
when the commander announces his decision and assigns missions to his
troops. Subsequent refinement is effected chiefly on the basis of those
situation charges which will take place during the course of the engagement
(operation) o:7 in the interim between the time the decision is announced
and the battle begins. It is particularly important to bear this in mind
during situation prediction and decision-making to employ such a powerful
weapon as a nuclear device.
It is assumed that probable events will be analyzed in a definite sequence,
on a time and spatial development axis. Usually combat operations are
predicted on the basis of the missions which will be carried out during the
cour;,e of the engagement (operation). These missions can be viewed as
steps in the prediction. The latter are determined in relation to the
scale of combat operations and content of intermediate tasks. On the basis
of the experience of the past war, for example, while commanders at the
tactical echelon required a prediction for the taking of literally ever'i
trench in an operation to penetrate the enemy's defense, it was sometimes
sufficient for the operational echelon to possess a picture of combat
developments for positions as a whole or even for defense zones.
In other words, the size of the prediction step increases with the scope
of intermediate missions and the relative level of the command echelon
effecting the prediction, and vice versa,
Failure to observe this correspondence may lead to excessive complication
of prediction or its lessened reliability. Unjustifiably short prediction
steps lead to loss of perspective in the development of events, while
excessively large steps may cause the commander to lose sight of elements
which are of great importance for achieving the specified objective.
In the war prediction of the possible course of combat operations was
usually effected sequentially on the basis of intermediate missions, on the
basis of the accomplishment of which it was possible clearly to see the
development of events in subordinate units no less than two echelons of
command down. For example, in ground troops the division commander would
construct his prediction in order clearly to see the actions of at least
each battalion, while the regimental commander would go to the company
level,
Tasks viewed as steps in prediction should also satisfy such a demand as
securement of the requisite succession in transition from an analysis of
actions in the performance of one to analysis of actions in the per-
formance of another. This means that in eac:: such problem there should be
clearly visible the prospects of subsequent actions. Prediction of any
particular mission will be close to the truth only if it is effected taking
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into account accomplishment of the subsequent mission and is not locked
within the framework of directly analyzed actions.
Therefore the commander endeavors to see troop operations at each stage in
the light of favorable development of succeeding events and achievement of
the objective of the operation (engagement). He proceeds from the posi-
tion that it may prove not to be very difficult to find an optimal solution
to each problem individually. But the obtained answer will hardly be
acceptable. What is required is not a detached solution but one which is
fully coordinated with the solution to other problems (tasks) of the opera-
tion. Precisely such coordination makes the prediction more reliable and
the solution optimal. The commander takes all necessary steps in order
clearly to picture not only that which must be done after accomplishing
the given mission but also the manpower and equipment requisite to accom-
plish the task, the possibility of promptly forming new forces out~of.'themj
and methods of operation in accomplishing the succeeding mission. In
advancing any partial objective, the strategist should bear in mind all
the consequences of achieving that objective and the linking effect it will
exert on the subsequent course of events, wrote Professor A. A. Svechin in
his book Strategiya (Strategy). Everything is aimed in the final analysis
at finding optimal methods of accomplishing the task on the way to
achieving the objective of the engagement (operation).
Also of considerable importance in determining the prediction step is con-
sideration of the following point: the probability of the nature of
forthcoming actions increases with a reduction in the period of their
implementation, since time restriction reduces the volume of potential
situation changes,
An extremely important role is played by simplicity and clarity of
predicted tasks as well as the commander's conviction that his subordi-
nates will understand and be able to carry out the maneuver he proposes.
"It is necessary to conceive and organize an operation in such a manner,"
stated Mar M. N. Tukhacheuskiy, "that each particular mission on the
main axis will be simple and not difficult .,,7 As if clarifying this point,
Svechin writes that "any superfluous maneuver, any engagement which is not
essential to achieve the objective of the operation carries within itself
the greatest danger -- that of diverting us away from the goal onto a
false path... There should be nothing superfluous in the operation; it
should serve as an embodiment of purposefulness. i8
Such an approach to prediction of combat operations can evidently be
essentially retained in the future, but the fundamental stipulation that
intermediate missions under conditions where nuclear weapons will con-
stitute the principal means of destroying the enemy will not necessarily
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involve the advance of troops and the capture of specific lines (areas),
as was the case in the past.
For a correct understanding of the character and sequence of the com-
mander's work process in predicting combat operations it is also advisable,
in our opinidn, to realize that the adoption of a decision on the engage-
ment (operation) cannot be viewed chiefly as its selection from numerous
decisions fully determined in the course of mission briefing and situation
estimate. If such a situation is not eliminated, it is sooner a result of
the fact that not all elements were sufficiently thoroughly and com-
prehensively examined in the course of situation analysis, and the com-
mander was unable right up to the last moment in the decision-making
process to reach those well-founded intermediate conclusions which should
form the basis of the decision and determine its content, Otherwise the
decision is formed through selection of its component elements as they
are sequentially studied, In principle, in completing his briefing on the
mission and situation estimate, the commander should have a single decision
variant. This is objectively dictated and essential from a practical
standpoint.
Speaking of the objective conditionality of this thesis, we proceed from
the position that the decision is essentially a reflection of objective
reality; it is dictated by the situation proper, And since the situation
is quite specific and unequivgcal in each instance, with the same
criteria of the optimal, a decision cannot and should not be multivariant.
There will always be one best or optimal decision on the basis of each of
the specified criteria as well as on the basis of all criteria together.
If the criteria of the optimal differ, we are in practice dealing with non-
identical conditions of problem-solving, or to put it more specifically,
we are dealing essentially with different problems. Different problems
of course require different solutions, But these are no longer variants
of a single action but rather independent solutions,
Is it possible, for example, to view as variants of a single solution those
wh^reby the first is based on maximum economy of means at the expense of
time of conduct of the operation, while the second is based on achievement
of the goal of the operation as quickly as possible, which of course will
require a greater expenditure of men and materiel?
It is our conviction that these are not at all two variant solutions to
a single problem, for a choice cannot be made between them, since we are
dealing with totally different intentions which could not be given
simultaneously in the problem, as excluding one another. But since ore
of these demands is put forward in advance, there is no need to seek a solu-
tion which satisfies the second demand,
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Thus the idea of the multivariant nature of solutions apparently is caused
by the fact that solutions to problems which are essentially different but
which on the surface appear as one are taken as variants of solution to a
single problem.
Consequently the appearance of multivariant solutionoto one and the same
problem at the final stage of decision-making can be eliminated with a
deeper penetration into the essence of the problem being examined and its
comprehensive analysis.
Reference to the fact that multivariant decision most frequently does not
depend on the commander but is rather the consequence of the adversary
diverging in his plans and actions from the optimum can hardly be accepted
as fundamental. Clausewitz stated that he who takes the enemy by surprise
with an unsuccessful unexpected action, in place of success risks deserved
defeat. Therefore if the adversary has for any reason adopted a variant
of action which is less favorable to himself, in such a case there is no
need to reexamine an optimal decision which has already been reached. It
essentially ensures the requisite direction of combat operations. The
decision is refined while retaining the same perspective.
If in the final analysis the elaborated decision does not satisfy the
commander, the question posed is not that of replacing it with another
ready solution (such a situation is possible only as a consequence of the
commander's total failure to comprehend the assigned mission or ignorance
of the situation) i,ut rather refinement of the selection of its component
elements.
The presence of precisely one decision variant _s also of great practical
significance. It convinces subordinates of its correctness,, instills
confidence as to the expediency of the actions being undertaken, and gives
actions more comprehension and initiative. Firmness and decisiveness of
actions are possible only when they are definite. This is what is
primarily necessary for victory, and particularly in a nuclear war.
In conclusion we should like to note the following.
In predicting combat operations it is essential to keep constantly in mind
that a unity of military theory ?nd practice is reached on the battle-
field, in combat operations. Here not only well-known theoretical points
are applied, but new methods and forms of conducting combat operations are
elaborated and their developme:Lt trends revealed. Therefore the degree of
reliability of prediction will depend in large measure on the extent to
which the commander succeeds in taking into account the above-specified
trends, in determining the depth and time of possible changes in the forms
and methods of combat operations. And this is possible only under the
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condition of adequate commander theoretical training, his knowledge of the
history of the art of warfare, and his ability thoroughly to analyze
amassed combat experience,
The results of prediction will depend to a decisive extent on a commander's
ability to organize the prediction efforts of his immediate assistants.
It is important in the final analysis to ensure that the commander has at
his disposal at all times everything that is necessary for independent
prediction of forthcoming actions and for reaching an optimal decision,
Without extreme necessity it is not advisable to involve subordinates in
his personal work of constructing a model of the future actions with all
its contradic,ions and doubtso One should not transform prediction efforts
into a debate society and hope that a decision will be reached in the
course of receiving information from subordinates, When consulting with
subordinates the commander must have his own point of view on the matter in
question, In spite of the increased role of effort by entire teams (primar-
ily staffs under army conditions) in scientific prediction, the final
engagement (operati.on) decision is made by the commander alone.
In constructing a model of a forthcoming engagement it is necessary most
painstakingly to analyze the situation which may develop as the opposing
sides engage additional men and weapons, Particularly meriting attention
is an estimate of changes in the correlation of forces as a most im-
portant factor determining the development of combat operations, Here it
is important not to permit a mechanical approach to problem-solving, not
to reduce the problem to a ccmparison of the capabilities of the newly-
committed forces, since the overall capabilities of the two sides are not
directly dependent on the quantity and quality of the committed forces.
This relationship iF, more complex in character.9
Acquisition of a cotraei. prediction in such cases demands that in estimat-
ing the correlation of capabilities of the two sides with the engagement
of reserves, one takes Into account all the manpower and weapons of the
two sides as an aggregate, that is, the capabilities of those forces already
in action aitd the newly-committed forces should be viewed as a whole,
so that the increase in force capabilities is estimated as an incremented
result of their employment. Failure to take this into consideration in-
evitably leads to a situation whereby the overall picture of situation
changes takes on a distorted form.
It is also necessary carefully to consider the following point. In com-
paring the capabilities of the two sides when predicting combat operations,
as a ryle one assesses friendly troops fairly completely, while hostile
troops are frequently estimated on the basis of incomplete data. As a
result there develops a certain disparity in approach to a comparison of
the sides. Obviously in order to prevent this disparity from becoming
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excessive and leading to erroneous conclusions, making the overall
prediction meaningless, it is necessary to introduce into the computation
of correlation of forces an appropriate correction factor. Its magnitude
can be determined on the basis ui experience, taking into account realistic
intelligence capability and the adversary's ability to conceal his true
position and intentions.
In order for prediction of the course of combat operations to be sufficient-
ly detailed, the commander effecting the prediction requires not only well-
systematized knowledge but also practical skills in troop control. This
is achieved only as a result of regular practice solving appropriate tac-
tical and operational problems. A deficiency in such practice drills is
not compensated by an increase in knowledge on theory of military art. In
order to obtain a true picture of combat it is necessary not only to be
well prepared theoretically but also to possess considerable practical
experience, to learn a thorough feel of combat. Prediction capabilities
are developed in the course of active mastery of the art of warfare.
The ability of officers to predict the operational and tactical situation
must be constantly developed and perfected. Officers must be effectively
taught this skill, first and foremost at military training establishments.
An important role in the acquisition of requisite knowledge and skills in
prediction, in addition to direct practical experience in troop control,
is played by critiques of exercises and war games, during which trainees
become acquainted with specific prediction techniques, and the ability
to isolate the most important, substantial, repetitive and essential
relations from the great diversity of elements, and to reduce the results
of situation analysis to a simple objective of interrelated phenomena.
Requisite assistance to officers in this effort can also be offered by
well-organized critiques of the most instructive operations of the last
war.
1. Of the published studies on this problem, we should mention the follow-
ing: M. V. Zakharov; 0 nauchnom podkhode k rukovodstvu voyskam.'. (A
Scientific Approach to Troop Control), Voyenizdat, 1967; Metodologi-
cheskiye pr.oblemy voyennoy teorii i praktiki (Methodological Problems of
Military Theory and Practice), Second Edition, Voyenizdat, 1969 (the
section "Methodological Problems of Troop Control," pp 382-402); L.
Kutsev: Matematika v boyu (Mathematics in Combat), Voyenizdat, 1969
(the dection "Statistics and Probability," pp 16-27). Following are
some of the most important articles on this subject: M. Shokurov and
0, Orlov: "To Contrcl Means to Predict" (Krasnaya Zvezda, 15 September
1967), as well as the following articles published in the journal
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Voyennaya Mysl': V. Trofimov and G. Kadomtsev: "Methodology of
Scientific Prediction" (No 2, 1967); V. Konoplev: "Leninist Methodology
of Scientific Prediction" (No 7, 1969); L. Yemel'yanov: "Scientific
Principles of Decision-Making" (No 10, 1969); G. Semenov and V. Prokho-
rov: "Methodology of Decision-Making" (No 9, 1970),
2. In conformity with the definitions given in the Great Soviet Encyclope-
dia, in this article we shall not make a distinction between tha terms
"prognoz" [prediction, prognosis, forecast] and "predvideniye" [fore-
sight, prediction]
3, M, N. Tukhachevskiy: Izbrannyye proizvedeni (Selected Writings),
Volume 1, Voyenizdat, 1964, page 186,
4, M, V. Frunze: Izbrannyye proizvedeniya (Selected Writings), Volume 2,
Voyenizdat, 1957, page 47.
5. Ibid.,
6, Voyennaya Mysl', No 9, 1970;. page 37,
7. Tukhachevskiy, op0cit,, Volume 1, page 186,
8, A. Svechin: Strategiya (Strategy), Izd, Voyennyy vestnik, 1926, page 312.
90 This subject is treated in greater detail in the article "Stepping Up
Effort in Operations in a Nuclear War;" Voyennaya Mysl', No 10, 1.968,
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BASIC TRENDS IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND EMPLOYMENT OF
ARMY AVIATION1
Col A. Drozhzhin, Candidate of Military Science, Docent
In the opinion of foreign military experts, fire and mobility are the
fundamental distinctive features of modern combat. But while substantial
success has been achieved in increasing firepower in the majority of the
world's arm*s,:8uoceas in increasing troop mobility has been limited indeed.
As is indicated in the press, the modern motorized infantry division of
the FRG can deliver on the enemy five times as much ammunition as its
predecessor of World War II. At the same time the mobility of such a
division has been increased by only 25 percent.
The rate of troop movement on land has approached its limit, and al-
though the capability of means of transport to surmount various obstacles
has increased, it does not yet fully meet the demands. of maneuver and
engagement. The movement of troops by air constituted an intelligent
means of increasing both rate of movement and ability to cross obstacles.
Thus the idea of airmobile troops was born.
The range of missions performed with the aid of helicopters and lighc
aircraft is steadily broadening, the number of these vehicles in the troops
is increasing, and today nobody any longer doubts the expediency of
possessing ground forces aviation. In different countries, depending on
tradition and certain differences in missions handled, aviation con-
stituting an independent arm within the framework of ground forces is
called either army [armeyskaya] (USA, Great Britain) or ground troops
[voyskovaya] (FRG).
Commanders of ground forces units and large units have become convinced of
the advantages of conducting combat operations involving rotary-wing and
fixed-wing aircraft subunits. The U.S. Army chief of staff notes that
"the most important lesson of the war in Vietnam, from the standpoint of
U.S. Armed Forces organizational development, is disccvery of the role of
the helicopter on the battlefield. Extensive employment of these aircraft
gives ground troops qualitatively new tactical mcbility.i2 Ground forces
command personnel now have the capability of utilizing aviation as the
same kind of weapon as tanks and artillery.
Quite a few nations possess large numbers of helicopters. In the United
States, for example, according to figures as of mid-1970, 34 percent
(11,276) of the 34,014 fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft possessed by
the armed forces were in the ground troops, while 25 percent were in the
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navy. The role of army aviation will unquestionably become even more
important in the future.
Many factors influence the forming of concepts of organizational develop-
ment of army aviation: tradition, technological advances, change in the
character of combat, etc.
Today, in the opinion of foreign military experts, the organizational
structure of army aviation should satisfy the following demands:
ease of control on the ground and in the air, centralized and
decentralized control and capability of rapid shift from one form to
another; high reliability of unit (subunit) control;
capability of maximum effective, fast accomplishment of missions,
in conformity with purpose and character of employment of rotary-wing and
fixed-wing aircraft and methods of combat operations;
invariability of unit (subunit) organization in peace and wartime;
easy transition from peacetime to war footing (without preliminary re-
organization);
securement of a high degree of constant readiness to undertake
surprise combat operations with the full manpower of the unit (subunit);
maximum reduction of time required to ready subunits and aircrews for
initial and subsequent flights;
flexibility and rapid adaptability to any situation (for example,
when replacing equipment), capability of assigning individual subunits to
perform other missions without disrupting integrity of the unit;
high degree of maneuverability, capability of relocation with
simultaneous performance of combat missions; sufficient survivability,
capability of extended independent combat operations (by crews of rotary-
wing and fixed-wing aircraft, control and special support entities).
Great importance is attached to efficient basing of army aviation, ensuring
favorable conditions for achieving a high degree of combat readiness,
reliability of control, convenience in conducting combat operations and
organization of coordinated efforts with ground units and subunits, as wel'-
as reduction of threat of being hit while on the ground. It should offer
the possibility of personal contact between commanders of army aviation
units and subunits and commanders of coordinating ground troops units and
subunits.
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The organizational structure of army aviation should also make it pos-
sible effectively to perform missions which vary greatly in nature, from
the transport of men and equipment or air rescue pc.rations to fire support.
One must bear in mind thereby that army aviation will be forced to carry a
substantial load in terms of rotary-wing or fixed-u{ng aircraft sorties
per day.
Of course the above-enumerated demands have been taken into account with
a varying degree of completeness in the various countries, in resolving
problems of organizational structure of army aviation. Historically army
aviation organizational development hat proceeded in two stages. At the
first stage separate small subunits (sections, detachments, squadrons)
would be attached to ground troops units and subunits and would later be
made organic. At the second stage the number of ground troops rotary-wing
and fixed-wing aircraft would be increased, with a broadening of the range
of missions handled by them, and army aviation would be specified as a
separate ground forces arm; there would develop the vital necessity of
organizing larger army aviation units, as well as the necessity of central-
ized control of those units.
The organic incorporation of helicopter subunits in battalions, brigades
and even divisions made their massed employment more difficult. Therefore
helicopters and light aircraft began to be consolidated into regiments and
brigades operating in the interests of army corps and field armies. Ir
many of the world's armies and the American army in particular, army
aviation almost totally adopts ground forces organization: platoons (6-8
helicopters each), companies (up to 30 helicopters), battalions (150-180
helicopters), groups (600-700 helicopters), and brigade (up to 1200-1400
helicopters).
Tendencies toward enlargement of army aviation units are also noted in the
armies of Great Britain and the FRG. In the former it is planned to main-
tain in each division an army aviation regiment consisting of brigade
squadrons (formerly regiments contained small helicopter detachments),
while in the latter it is planned to place in each army corps two army
aviation regiments: a regiment of light (40 UH-lD) and a regiment of heavy
(32 CH-53) transport helicopters.
Army aviation directorates are being organized within the framework of
ground forces headquarters in connection with thc, establishment of army
aviation as -an independent arm. These directorates are assigned the tasks
of aviation organizational development, unit organization, and personnel
cotibat training. Also under their supervision are training centers and
schools at which army aviation cadres are trained. The United States,
Great Britain and the FRG have organized in the ground forces army aviation
directorates, training centers and schools.
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Thus the main trend in organizational development of army aviation is its
establishment as an independent ground forces arm and- removal of heli-
copter subunits from an organic status in ground forces units, with sub-
sequent centralized subordination to higher command echelons. It is
believed that this will ensure better control and flexibility in its com-
bat utilization, will increase combat readiness and facilitate mainte-
nance,
Aside from the need to increase ground troops mobility, the growth and
consolidation of army aviation are dictated by other factors as well.
It is a well-known fact that air forces are capable of offering efficient
close supps t to ground troops under the condition of a certain freedom of
action, that iswhen control of the air has been secured. It is precisely
for this reason that at the initiation of combat operations air forces are
assigned the mission of gaining control of the air either with all or the
bulk of their capability; they will be able to offer close support of
ground troops only with the smaller part of their capabil:+ty.
Therefore the endeavor on the part of the ground forces command to plan
for themselves, independent of"the air forces, a certain minimum of forces
for close air support, that is,to assign this mission to army aviation,
becomes understandable.
The endeavor to accomplish these two missions sequentially or simultaneous-
ly also finds expression in the organizational structure of the armed fimces
of a number of countries. For example, the air force of the FRG contains
special aviation units designated primarily for close air support -- so-
called light combat aviation squadrons, employing type G91 aircraft. The
arrangement. is the same in the British air force, where this mission will
be accomplished by the now-operational Harrier light VTOL aircraft. The
air forces of a number of other countries, however, contain tactical
fighters of a single type (for example, in the U.S. and French air forces).
It is believed that the presence in the ground forces of a sufficiently
potent army aviation will ensure the capability of gaining the element of
surprise, will increase flexibility, particularly at the initial stage of
penetration of enemy defense, will make it possible to hit the enemy's
flanks, to shift attacks from one axis to another, and to seize important
ground.
American military leaders believe *hat ground forces divisions equipped
with helicopters and armed with lightened weapons (airmobile divisions)
are able to operate most successfully in a war with the employment of
nuclear weapons. In nonnuclear combat op'rations they are allegedly
capable of developing a successful attack and pursuing the enemy, even in
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Europe, separating and destroying withdrawing enemy units with swift,
surprise attacks. The insufficient firepower of these divisions is com-
pensated for by the employment of a battalion of fire support helicopters.
At NATO headquarters they are discussing the question of forming two air-
mobile divisions within the framework of the joint armed forces of this
aggressive military coalition, made up of British and West German ground
troops equipped with U.S. rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft. A detailed
preliminary study has been made on the capabilities of army aviation at
NATO troop and staff exercises.3
In the more distant future (15 years and more) it is planned to employ
airspace to achieve a sharp increase in the mobility of armored troops as
well. It is anticipated that technological advances by that time will make
it possible to build a unique flying tank capable of quickly changi:ig'its
speed and direction of movement, and of fighting both on the ground and in
the air. Armored troops equipped with these vehicles will be extremely
mobile and will fairly fully correspond to the conditions of nuclear war-
fare. A prerequisite for the development of such vehicles is a synthesis
of advances in tank engineering, development of all-terrain vehicles, cir-
cus h*i o n vehicles and advances in rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft
design.
One can already note an effort to equip ground troops with heavy helicopters
boasting a load capacity of up to 23-25 tons, to equip all helicopters with
IFR navigation gear, to reduce their vulnerability by armor-plating crew
spaces and critical structural elements, filling fuel tanks with inert
gases. In addition, the United States plans to build a fully-armored
reconnaissance helicopter of prismatic shape (the AARV project). The com-
bination of wing a i rf ofl and rotor is finding increasing utilization,
a combination which increases maximum; speed. In-air refueling of heli-
copters from other rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft, as well as from
naval vessels, is being successfully mastered. Tests are being conducted
on the towing of light rescue helicopters by tactical fighters. This will
ensure cover to the helicopter against hostile fighter attack during air-
crew rescue operations. Helicopter-fired air-to-air missiles are being
tested against high-speed aerial targets with the same objective in mind.
The principal demands imposed on army aviation fixed-wing aircraft include
compact size and armor protection for crew spaces and other critical points.
Combat experience in Vietnam indicates that the size of an aircraft sub-
stantially affects the probability of a hit by ground fire.
The greatest debate in the press pertaim to trends in utilization of army
aviation for the purpose of close support of ground troops and delivery of
fire on ground targets. The fact is that a substantial shortcoming of
M
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combat employment of tactical air power in close support missions is the
substantial time lag between the request from ground troops subunits and
units and the time aircraft actually take off. At best at least 50 minutes
are required between the request for tactical air support and the time the
target is attacked, in the case of F-4 aircraft based 90 km from target.
T'-.e situation does not improve even if the aircraft involved are Harrier
VTOL aircraft situated directly in the deployment position of the supported
ground troops, for time savings do not exceed 5 minutes, Consequently,
most of the time is spent on the request passing through the various
ground forces and air force channels.
Time from request to air strike diminishes substantially if available
army aviation includes helicopter gunships capable of offering close air
support which is limited in scope and depth. This corresponds to the
greatest degree to the demands of ground troops unit :commanders.
A unique imprint on elaboration of army aviation combat tactics on the
European continent is made by potential aircraft losses from massed anti-
aircraf t fire. For purposes of comparison we should note that even under
the conditions of Southeast Asia the Americans lost approximately 4100
helicopters in the air and on the ground (figures as of September 1970).
The following are considered abroad to be the basic trends in combat
employment of army aviation, taking the above into account: utilization
primarily at extremely low altitudes above both friendly and hostile
territory; employment of typically helicopter tactics in attacking ground
targets; increased centralization of planning and combat employment of
army aviation air power.
Let us examine these features in greater detail.
In the first place, when flying at low altitude over friendly territory,
aircraft will less frequently be attacked by hostile fighters, which tend
to patrol airspace over enemy territory. Helicopter routes of flight
should avoid roads, showing preference to terrain offering natural screen.
Over hostile territory helicopters will fly particularly low and in many
cases will approach the objective at a height of 3-4 meters above ground or
treetop level. When flying over terrain heavily defended by antiaircraft
weapons it is desirable to employ smoke screens, which are laid out either
by air-force aircraft or by artillery.
Secondly, in the opinion of foreign military experts itwou1d.be incorrect for
helicopter gunships to employ the fixed-wing aircraft technique of attack-
ing targets: delivering fire while flying at the target. This technique
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should be employed only in exceptional cases. Fixed-wing aircraft dur'.ng
attack close on the target, most frequently diving at it, which is
dangerous even for high-speed aircraft but fatal for helicopters. Heli-
copters combine excellent maneuverability, swiftness of reaction and good
firepower capabilities. Their tactics should be based on these advantages.
When attacking forward tank and motorized infantry units and subunits
helicopters employ hovering configuration. In addition, they can deliver
fire while moving away from the enemy. The most important and determining
element in helicopter air strikes against targets in forward defense posi-
tions is their utilization of natural cover (hills, trees, buildings). A
helicopter should not expose itself above the terrain in hovering configura-
tion for a period of more than 10 seconds -- that time required by an anti-
aircraft weapon crew to open aimed fire. If a helicopter reappears to
obtain a more precise bearing on the target or to deliver fire, it should
be from another direction, unexpected to the enemy, optimally from the
target's flank.
Taking into account the element of attack surprise as well as the effective
range of ground troops light antiaircraft weapons (1000-1500 meters), an
effort is made to arm army helicopters with long-range weapons (in excess
of 2000 meters), Close-support aircraft should always operate simultaneous-
ly with ground troops. Air strikes are closely coordinated with the ground
combat and sequence of employment of artillery, tanks, and antiaircraft
weapons.
Helicopter survivability can be improved even for operations in the
European theater, when ground troops are provided cover by fighter-inter-
ceptors, with intelligent selection of targets for air strikes, and with
precise organization of coordination with artillery (establishment of
barrage fire and smoke screens), Helicopter pilots and gunners must be
able to conduct battlefield observation, to spot and identify, estimate
and destroy targets instantly, and to shift rapidly from hovering to
horizontal flight and vice versa, For increased survivability on the
ground, helicopters should be able to move expeditiously, even on soft
ground, into sheltered positions (rotor blades folded),
In the third place, American military leaders believe that the lack of
centralized control of a large number of army aviation subunits has
constituted one of the main reasons for their inefficient utilization, Of
course the main reason for American troop losses is the excellent combat
performance, self-sacrifice and dedication to the homeland on the part of
the fighting men of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front, but army
aviation operations on the basis of small subunits, without extensive and
comprehensive support, also increased American losses,
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Any mission requiring contact with the enemy can be accomplished only after
careful preparation, taking into account the combat capabilities of artil-
lery, tanks and tactical fighters. It is believed that this is possible
only with centralized planning of combined combat operations by ground
troops and army aviation.
On the whole ground troops supported by army aviation have improved
maneuverability, greater capability to achieve surprise, can be rapidly
concentrated and dispersed, and are capable of surmounting all obstacles,
offering limited close air support and mounting airborne tactical assaults,
There is also facilitation in organizing combat operations on several axes,
conducting aerial reconnaissance, combat security, etc.
But all these advantages can be implemented only in decent flying weather,
under conditions of relatively good visibility, and over hostile territory
only when the enemy possesses a weak air defense system. Regardless of
whether or not there is organic air power available, ground troops will
continue in the future to have a substantial need ;if close fighter-?bomber
support.
Many foreign military leaders believe that army aviation will exert sub-
stantial influence on organizational development of the armies of the
future, reducing their dependence on a large array of ground transport
vehicles, grour.:*~ equipment, ready stores of weapons, rations, fuel and
other supplies, and will increase flexibility of fire and provide an
increased element of surprise in ground troops attacks.
FOOTNOTES
1, From materials in the foreign press?
2, U.S. News and World Report, 29 September 1969.
3. Voyennyy Zarubezhnik, No 11, 1970, page 18.
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Capt 2nd Rank V. Morozov, Candidate of Technical Sciences
Development of a theory of control of various systems (technical, biologi-
cal, economic, social and others) is one of the most vital problems in
science today. A large number of pamphlets and articles have been
written on troop control as a component part of this general problem. The
journal Voyennaya Mysl' also devotes much attention to problems of controll
Articles published in this journal in recent years have examined the pos-
sibilities of utilizing the latest advances in the exact sciences,
cybernetics in particular, with the aim of creating a general theory of
troop control.
Practical implementation of every new theory as a rule leads not only to
the development and adoption of technical devices but also to changes in
the character of thinking and manner of action in achieving end objectives.
This applies particularly to the extensive automation of control processes
in all areas of human activity, which is taking place under conditions of
the scientific and technological revolution. Therefore success in the
creation and practical adoption of modern methods of troop control depends
to a substantial degree on a thorough understanding by officers of those
changes which are being produced in all areas of their activities by a
cybernetic approach to examination of the processes of control of the
functioning of military collectives. For this it is important in partic-
ular to assimilate the essence of such concepts as systems analysis, con-
trolled circuit, feedback, hierarchy of controlled circuits, adaptation,
learning and teachability, control process dynamics, simulation, algo-
rithmization, goal setting in the control process, etc.
Bearing in mind the above as well as a discussion on the relationship be-
tween theory of troop control and other components of military science
initiated in an article by Maj Gen Engr-Tech Serv A. Tatarchenko,2 it
seems advisable to discuss several general problems of theory of troop
control.
Success of control is determined to a large degree by skill in selection.
As a result of this, in the initial stages of establishment of a science
of trcu p control the impression was formed that this problem can be solved
by operations research methods, It is true that one of the problems solved
by these methods is optimal decision-making. Operations research as a
scientific discipline, however, is not connected with a specific object.
It can examine quite diversified problems. The only thing which links
them is the method of approaching an examination of various problems.
Therefore when one speaks of operations research methods one has in mind
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a unified approach, not object. A once-elaborated method of problem solv-
ing, such as the problem of selecting an optimal route, makes it possible
to perform various calculations connected either with air traffic along a
route or with movement of a workpiece during machining on numerous machine
tools, or with the movement of large troop units.
Operations research offers the opportunity to elucidate the deep analogy
between many processes which would seem to be totally different. As a
result of such an approach to phenomena it has been established that all
actions performed by persons or the equipment they control, regardless of
specific content, can be represented as standard problems of selection of
optimal goals, optimization of the goal-attainment process, and optimal
distribution of available means for goal attainment, The system of these
problems has not yet been completely defined, although many of them have
already been studied and systematized. Special mathematical disciplines
have been created for solving these problems: mathematical programming,
information theory, theory of mass serviging, etc. Thus operations re-
search can be defined as an aggregate of methods for solving problems of
a certain class.
There is also a group of problems whose optimal solution must be sought in
the presence of opposing interests, These problems are dealt with by an
independent scientific discipline -- theory of games, which describes
actions which develop in conflict situations. Solution to these problems
is considerably complicated if one must operate under conditions of in-
complete information, that is when distribution of probabilities that the
adversary will Pmploy his possible strategies (countermeasures hindering
the achieveme..a: of our goals) is unknown, or under conditions of simula-
tion of the adversary's intellectual activity (a simple example is
calculation of a variant in a chess game). The latter problems are called
reflex games, the methods of solving which are still in the initial stage
of development. Extremely interesting in this respect are articles by
Col Gen V. Druzhinin and Engr-Col D. Kontorov, which examine the
methodology of solving routine problems in v.cnrepeating conflict situa-
tions.3
In general form methods of seeking optimal decisions under various condi-
tions comprise theory of decisions. The basic task of this theory is
selection of possible optimal decision alternatives. If one examines
decisions from an economic standpoint, assesses their consequences, takes
into consideration the psychological aspect not only of the decisions but
also the psychology of those who make them, then obviously theory of
decisions is considerably broader than the decision pro?er. Therefore
theory of infinite, antagonistic, differential, reflexive and other games
is merely an element of a more general theory -- theory of decisions, which
quite obviously is entitled to independence as a scientific discipline.
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It is evident from the above that both operations research and theory
of decisions are not connected with a specific object. They comprise a
set of methods for solving a specific range of problems and can in turn
be examined only as applied mathematical disciplines.
We know that cybernetics as a science studies processes of control and
links in mechanisms, organisms and society, that is) in controlled systems
which are different in substance but homogeneous in structure (a system
is an aggregate of elements united by a common goal). Many processes of
control, however, such as in a system consisting of machines and groups of
persons, do not f!.*. into this "rigid" pattern. A characteristic feature of
a system which incl.ides homogeneous elements is the presence in this sys-
tem of a substan.J.al number of isolated (separable) parts, the internal
relations (energy, information, etc) among these parts and external links
with other systems. In spite of the great functional difference among
the elements of a given system (men, tanks, missiles, communications
equipment, etc), in examining the system it is necessary to consider
first and foremost the fact that the activity of each separate part of tho
system exerts a specific influence on the functioning of all other parts.
In order to assess any decision within the framework of such an or?aniza-
tional structure i.t is necessary to determine all substantial interrela-
tions, taking into consideration the effect on them of the decision made
and the behavior of this entire organization as a unified whole. Such an
aggregate of functionally heterogeneous elements unified by a common goal
of functioning has in cybernetics been given the name "large system," and
the method of its study -- "systems approach."
The term "large system" was not introduced for the purpose of classifying
systems (into "large" and "small") but rather for isolating a special
method of examining the behavior of controlled systems, ensuring considera-
tion of the entire complexity inherant in them. A distinctive feature of
this method is study of the system taking into account close interaction
among the large number of factors determining its behavior.
Obviously military units, which comprise an aggregate of men and equipment
functioning as a unified organism for the achievement of a specific goal
in an engagement, operation and in a war as a whole, correspond to the
classification established in cybernetics for "large systems."
The general theory of "large systems" is just beginning to be developed;
its basic concepts and terminology have not yet been established. But
even if this theory were elaborated, its application to solve problems of
c_ro op control would encounter the usual difficulties. The fact is that
the "large systems" with which military science deals differ substantially
from the "large systems" examined in cybernetics,
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The army as a controlled system is established to combat an opposing
system -- the adversary's army. Their interests are opposed, Therefore
control entities, endeavoring to improve the functioning of their system,
will elaborate commands which are as "unpleasant" as possible for the
alien system, As has been stated, in cybernetics such situations are
called conflict situations,
The task of system control in a conflict situation consists primarily in
elaborating reactions to situations forming in the process of combat.
Their effectiveness depends on the availability of information on behavior
of the adversary's system, In contrast to information which is obtained
from systems and subsystems functioning in interaction with the given
system (from the men and materiel of individual subunits, such as regiment,
d_vision, etc), information on the adversary is acquired uy active effort
on the part of the system under examination, Therefore special elements
are provided in the process of tha forming of a system's structure (mili-
tary collective for achieving a specific objective in an operation); the
to:k of these elements consists in acquiring information on the behavior of
ttze adversary's system,
Consequently the existence of an "intelligent opponent" with opposite
interests substantially alters the approach to determination of the systen(s
structure, As a rule situations arise where the success of its functioning
(result of the actions of the wilitary collective) will depend on the
quality of acquired information. This leads to a situation whereby a con-
siderable portion of the system's resources is diverted for the securing
of requisite information on the opponent, that is, on the conduct of
reconnaissance. The goal of this latter is to create a sufficient density
of observation in the combat area in order to secure the requisite volume
of information in the interest of the troops throughout the entire opera-
tion, Thus methods of forming the structure of a "large system" designed
for the conduct of combat operations, as well as the elaboration of
patterns (algorithms) `or controlling the processes of its' functioning,
will substantially difier from technical, biological, economic, social
and other "large systems" which are presently examined within the bounds of
cybernetics. The development of military cybernetics permits us to assume
that the time has evidently come to designate as an independent scientific
discipline that area dealing with investigation of the conditions of
functioning of "large systems" in the interest of information acquisition
(intelligence gathering, reconnaissance),
The process of control of a "large system" also possesses appreciable
peculiarities,
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As is well known, the commander's decision presupposes a certain sequence
of goal-directed actions taken for realization and securing attainment of
the stated goal. Consequently control can be viewed as a process of
elaboration of a plan (plan of operation) and measures securing its
implementation.
An article by Lt Gen G. Semenov and Maj Gen V. Prokhorov presents in
detail the methodology of the commander's decision-making in planning an
operation. They note that "it would be absurd to claim that the commander
in his decision can foresee all details of combat operations. In the
process of conducting combat operations it will without question be
necessary to perfect and refine the elaborated operation plan, to bring it
into conformity with the actual situation as it takes form, and to assign
new or supplementary missions to the troops.i4 Analyzing the features of
the commander's mental activity, Col V. Ofitserov laconically described
them as "resolution of tasks of varying scale under conditions of a shortage
of information and time."5
Let us examine in greater detail how these features affect the cc,--.tent of
the troop control process in the course of combat operations.
The commander's decision is followed by concrete actions which have
specific consequences, which in turn produce changes in the conditions of
task execution. Thus there appears the characteristic effect of feedback,
expressed in the form of a flow of information on the controlled object,
the environment and the control system proper. As it is collected, the
aggregate of incoming data (status information) is transformed into an
aggregate of orders and commands (control information). Consequently
control is based on a process of conversion of condition information into
control information.
In practice the flow of condition information is discrete in nature, that
is, information arrives with certain, unequal, in the general case, time
intervals. The conditions of problem solution can be considered fixed
for any given moment in time. This makes it possible to adopt a so-called
static solution and to initiate its implementation prior to arrival of
the next batch of status information, The aggregate of static decisions
with reaction in time can be called dyn&uic decision. Dynamic decision
comprises the basis of control.
We shall note that if at the initiation of decision implementation feed-
back is disrupted, that is? status information is not coming in or is not
processed, the dynamic decision becomes static: the adopted plan of action
for the operation will be carried out without reaction in time. In short,
as soon as the process of status information input is disrupted, the con-
trol entity will be deprived of the capability of making a correct
decision.
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As status information comes in it is processed with the aim of either
leaving unchanged a decision made at the preceding stage (to continue to
carry out a specified aggregate of actions) or to introduce corrections
into the decision (that is, in the adopted sequence of actions to alter
their sequence or to replace one or several actions with others) or,
finally, to adopt a new decision (to elaborate a new set of actions).
The process of decision-making with reaction in time, that is, the process
of control of a dynamic system (military unit), possesses significant
features. First of all continuous acquisition of status information is
essential for providing control. Second, quantitative substantiation of
the operation concept (plan), taking incoming information into account,
can be effected most fully only under conditions of the functioning of an
automated control system based on computers, We shall discuss the latter
feature in somewhat greater detail,
In the absence of automated control systems, the conduct of an operation
is normally preceded by an intensive staff effort which can involve hours,
days or even months. This depends on the scale of the forthcoming opera-
tion and is due to the necessity of examining all areas and directions of
operation development, of estimating quantitatively possible decision
variants and making the most expedient decision, that is, the one which
leads to the final objective with the least expenditure of effort. After
the operation has been initiated, the first information to come in may be
such that it will be necessary substantially to revise the entire opera-
tion plan or at least to estimate what will occur if it is carried out on
the basis of the earlier elaborated plan. How is this done on a real-time
scale?
In order to reach a new decision (or to refine a previous decision) it is
necessary to repeat on full scale (in some cases even more) the staff
effort which was carried out at the operation planning stage. In order
to carry out all calculations, as much time is required as was spent in
preparing for the operation. The commander does not have this capability
during the process of the operation. As a result he will be compelled to
make a decision without preliminary staff effort, guided by that which
M. V. Frunze called "special, specific qualities, The most important of
these is so-called intuition, the ability quickly to grasp situation
phenomena in their entire complexity, to focus on the most important
element and, taking this fundamental element into consideration, to outline
a specific combat and work plan.i6 It is a good thing if the commander
possesses such intuition and it assists him in arriving at the correct
decision. But this may also not be the case,
Considerable assistance here should be offered by modern mathematical
methods and means of automating troop control. Their task is to provide
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prompt quantitative reinforcement of commander intuition, that is, to back
up the commander's intellect, theoretically substantiating his decision.
And all this must be done on a real-time scale. In other words, the
modern troop control system must enable the commander to reach a decision
practically under all conditions, with fulfillment of the demand that his
staff has done everything in its power, that is, in each specific instance
has prepared, in conformity with the commander's instructions, several
quantitatively substantiated operation variants, from which the commander
will select and confirm one as hio decision. Lt Gen G. Semenov and
Maj Gen V. Prokhorov propose to call this decision a particular commander
decision,7 in contrast to the comprehensive decis1 r to organize combat
operations (operation plan).
Complex theoretical and technical difficulties arise in turn in the
development of an automated control system. Therefore at the first stage
one can refrain from the endeavor to create an ideal system which is
capable in all situations of "instantaneously" seeking and implementing
strictly optimal control. In actuality it is sufficient if the system
ensures not optimal control but control which is at least no worse than
control effected solely by human operators.
A distinctive feature of the present stage of automation of troop control
is the necessity of formalizing the commander's actions in the process of
decision-making in order to secure a maximum capability of computer
analysis of different action variants, with the aim of selecting an
optimal solution. This means fundamentally new tasks for strategy, opera-
tional art and tactics: to state the "secrets" of the art of warfare in
a language which permits a detailed computer study of the laws on which
they are based.
Also complex is the problem of selecting criteria for evaluating the
effectiveness of various subsystems (subunits) of the "large system"
(for example, regiment, division, etc), formed for the attainment of a
specific objective, One can reach the latter by different paths. Each
of them comprises, as has been noted above, a certain sequence of actions
and enables one to solve the stated problem with varying effectiveness:
one will result in savings in means at the expense of time; another leads
to the goal in the shortest period of time but requires considerable
manpower and materiel; a third involves risk; a fourth involves non-
recoverable losses, etc. The optimal solution is that one which under
given conditions (with certain constraints) ensures attaining the stated
objective with minimum expenditure of resources.
Various quantitative measures, called effectiveness indices, are utilized
to compare different problem solution variants. Specific quantitative
indices correspond to each problem solution variant. Selection of an
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optimal variant is effected with the aid of a problem solution criterion
(a criterion is an aggregate of measures and conditions for selection of
an optimal alternative). For example, the result of a reconnaissance
effort can be estimated on the basis of quantity of information acquired.
Different variants of utilization of intelligence-gathering and reconnais-
sance capability secure the acquisition of differing quantities of informa-
tion, which also constitute their effectiveness indices. The problem
solution criterion is the quantity of specific information, that is that
quantity of information acquired by one intelligence or reconnaissance
unit. The optimal will be that variant for which this quantity is maximum.
There can be many effectiveness indices, just as problem solution criteria.
in some problems the correct criterion is obvious, while in others its
selection requires special investigation. We shall examine two examples.
Let us assume that for development of an attack it is necessary immediately
to put fresh subunits across a river onto a captured bridgehead. The
success of the operation depends primarily on organization of movement of
the troops. This task can be accomplished by various means. The optimal
will be that solution which ensures attainment of the objective at the
earliest possible time. In this instance the criterion is obvious --
minimal time to move across the river..
Here is another example. It is essential to establish alternate and
dummy artillery positions in order to ensure maximum concealment of the
system of position siting in case of a hostile reconnaissance effort. It
is considerably more difficult to find a criterion ensuring optimal solu-
tion to this problem than in the first example. In addition to the
primary objective (to ensure maximum position concealment and minimum posi-
tion vulnerability), additional tasks may be assigned (introduction of
constraints), such as completion of construction within a specified time.
In this case the optimal plan for siting alternate and dummy artillery
potions may be implemented with nonoptimal expenses. If expenses are
restricted, it is impossible to produce an optimal siting plan. In this
case one can speak only of an expedient (optimal under the specified
conditions) construction plan.
In general form criterion can be formulated as the degree of correspondence
between the behavior of the system and the intention of control. Con-
sequently control is inseparable from tasks of determining the objective of
control, while to determine the objective it is essential to foresee
situation development, that is to effect prediction.
Thus there arise the problems of goal specification (quantitative formula-
tion of the operation objective) and construction of models which make it
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possible to predict potential situations and actions. Solution of these
problems, just as construction of a general theory of "large systems,"
is in the development stage.
Thus from the standpoint of cybernetics the subject of investigation by
general theory of troop control is a suitably organized aggregate of men
and equipment with the goal of ensuring successful accomplishment of the
combat mission during the course of an engagement (operation). The study
of operations, theory of decisions, theory of "large systems," theory of
mass servicing and other applied mathematical disciplines serve as a basis
for elaborating the methods of general theory of troop control. Concrete
mathematical methods in combination with the dialectical method of Marxist-
Leninis: theory of knowledge constitute an instrument of the practical and
theoretical activities of off1'.cers of all echelons and ranks, with the aid
of which the most sophisticated theory of troop control will. be formed.
At the present time creation of a science of troop control depends on the
solving of a number of complex problems. Here are a few. First of all
it is necessary to define troop control as a field of knowledge. This
definition should orient theory toward solving the practical problems mili-
tary commanders encounter. Secondly, it is necessary to establish the
boundaries of this field in order not to examine within the framework of
control theory all aspects connected with the functioning of the team or
collective. Thirdly, it is necessary to formalize the basic principles of
the art of warfare, including tactics, operational art and strategy,
in order to utilize computers more extensively for the substantiation and
selection of optimal solutions. Finally, it is necessary to solve the
problem of symbiosis of the capabilities of commander and machine in order
to secure normal functioning of an automated troop control system with the
direct: participation of a human collective. It is also important to
refine the terminology, in order to improve mutual comprehension on the
part of military commanders of all echelons and to eliminate errors caused
by differing and inaccurate interpretation of basic concepts and terms.
In conclusion we shall briefly discuss several practical matters affecting
the success of creation and adoption of modern troop control methods.
First of all we shall note that complexes of technical devices for automat-
ing control of "Large systems" can as a rule be utilized for various
objects. But the algorithms employed in simulating the processes of
control of each individual object require unique elaboration. Experience
shows that in order to automate control of complex objects it is necessary
to have several thousand meaningful algorithms. It takes a team of from
three to five persons 18 to 24 months to elaborate each such algorithm.
In addition, military problems do not lend themselves easily to algorithmi-
zation, and therefore what is required is the a:,ility to formalize
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individual problems of military art. These problems can be solved most
successfully by specialists who have experience in commanding troops and
possess appropriate mathematical training.
Success in the development And adoption of automation of troop control
depends on capability to effect within a specified time the requisite
scope of algorithmization of basic staff operation processes, Therefore
it is high time for dissertations, senior and course projects of military
personnel to produce when possible meaningful standard algorithms worthy of
inclusion in corresponding algorithm and program files.
Also of great importance is the ability of staff officers at all echelons
quantitatively to formulate the objectives of combat missions (to effect
goal determination), In the simplest case this means that if it is neces-
sary to destroy a target, the degree of target destruction should be
expressed quantitatively. Solution to the problem of goal determination
can initially be promoted by mastery on the part of officer-operators of
modern methods of quantitative solution substantiation, as presented in an
article by Maj Gen Engr-Tech Serv A. Moskvin.8
In the interests of mastery of control theory it is essential to devote
adequate attention in the curricula of service schools and academies to
the cybernetic approach to troop control, as well as to publish larger
quantities of appropriate literature, It is desirable for the principal
military theory publications to contain a section on theory of troop
control.
Solution of the above-enumerated problems is a task not of the remote
future but of the next few years. It demands of officei personnel an in-
tensive effort, and considerable supplementary, primarily independent work.
There is no doubt that military theorists and practical experts will con-
struct and master the most sophisticated modern "weapon" -- automated
troop control.
1. Voyennaya Mysl', No 10, 1965; No 2, 4, 6, 12, 1966; No 2, 8, 1967;
No 5, 8, 9, 1968; No 10, 12, 1969; No 2, 6, 8, 9, 12, 1970; No 1, 2, 4,
6, 1971.
2. Voyennaya Mjsl',, No 6, 1970.
3. Voyennaya Mysl', No 8, 1970; No 1, 1971.
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4. Voyennaya Mysl', No 9, 1970, page 36.
5. Voyennaya Mysl', No 3, 1970, page 68.
6. M. V. Frunze: Izbrannyye proizvedeniya (Selected Writings), Voyenizdat,
1965, page 281.
7. Voyennaya Mysl', No 9, 1970, page 37.
8. Voyennaya Mysl', No 8, 1969.
59
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METHODS OF (13ECKING THE READINESS OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS FOR COMBAT USE
Engr-Lt Col V. Demidov, Candidate of Technical Sciences
The increasing complexity of weapons s'rstems, the demand that they be con-
tinuously ready for combat utilization and the increasing adoption of com-
puter processing of data on the state of friendly forces and military hard-
ware are posing a number of new questions pertaining to methods of verifica-
tion and criteria for evaluating weapons readiness. The necessity of a
high degree of reliability of verification requires that we seek new solu-
tions in this area, based on the latest scientific and technological
advances.
A fundamental task of verification of readiness of weapons systems for
combat use, periodically organized and conducted by higher commanders and
corresponding staffs, is determination of the state of weapons and the
adoption of requisite measures aimed at ensuring a high degree of weapon
combat readiness. Successful resolution of this task is promoted by effi-
cient conduct of verification inspections and an objective evaluation of
the state of weapons according to data obtained, Observance of these
two conditions depends to a substantial degree on quality of planning,
organization of the conduct of an. inspection, and adopted verification
methods and evaluation criteria.
Until recently the weapons system readiness check boiled down essentially
to measurement of so-called check parameters, the obtained values of which
served as a basis for determining the state of a weapon.1 In some systems,
partic'::Larly those with extensive utilization of automated devices and
electronic gear, the number of such parameters runs into the tens and
hundreds. Therefore with manual measurement the check process takes up
considerable time and in case of errors results in incorrect decisions per-
taining to the state of the system being checked. A large parc of the
inspection is performed with complex methods, requiring a considerable
number of test instruments and the participation of highly-qualified
specialists. All this limits the routine availability of verification
performance.
In the past an equipment state a.s,essmant criterion has been the so-called
narameter correspondence criterion (the pass criterion), according to
which a system is considered to be operationally ready if the measured
values of all check parameters are within specified limits. If even one
such parameter falls outside allowable limits, this is sufficient reason to
determine that the system is not operationally ready.
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When this criterion: is employed, it is very important correctly to select
the requisite check parameters and to elaborate on a rigorously scientific
basis a method cf checking system readiness for combat use. Inadequate
attention to this matter and superficial knowledge of the equipment (partic-
ularly at the beginning of utilization) lead to a situation whereby secon-
dary parameters are designated as check parameters and the most important
parameters are ignored. In some cases one and the same system characteris-
tic is checked by verifying two and more parameters possessing a rigid
functional relationship which, in addition to wasting time, overburdens
the check process and introduces superfluous data.
In -hecking a large number of parameters, for the purpose of achieving
savings in time and test equipment, the measurement of each parameter is
performed one or two times; therefore the obtained value is a random quanti-
ty and depends tc a substantial degree on the skill of the operator,
method of measurement and quality of the measuring instrument. If one
takes into ccnsideration that parameter measurement errors (root-mean-
square) are commensurate with the value of allowances, it will be obvious
how great is the probability of obtaining an incorrect parameter value and
in the final analysis arriving at an incorrect decl-4on on system readiness.
In addition, methcds used to check some systems have. provided for them to
be removed frcm a state of readiness during the check. The time of
transition between check state aid combat use readiness state was comparative-
ly great and went beyond the limits specified by concrete situations.
Also , .mportarir. is, the fact that verification of '.individual technical
parameters fails to give a complete picture of the capabilities of the
equipment as a whole and does not make it possible to establish the sound-
ness of functional links between system elements and to evaluate the
quality of system operation. Technical parameters per se characterize
a device or its element from the standpoint of their sound working order
and functioning., but they do not reflect tactical properties and therefore
fail to give a picture of the state of the equipment. On the basis of
check results cne can only with a certain amount of assurance specify
soundness (readiness) or unsoundness (nonoperational state) of the system,
which excludes a differentiated approach and reduces the objectivity of the
check.
Due to the ab. vt:-rcr.ed circumstance, a natural criterion with such a check
method ~aa.s the ::.r;ter.ion of parameters correspondence, the essence of
which has been srtori above, We shall discuss the characteristic and
evaluation of chi- t.ri.terion from the standpoint of its acceptability for
the stated objecci~'~:s. We shall define readiness of a system for combat
use as a state of the syst'