TRANSLATIONS FROM VOYENNAYA MYSL NUMBER 10 - OCTOBER 1971

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010006-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 124
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 10, 2002
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: February 11, 1974
• Content Type: TRANS

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FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
IIIMHIggil
Foi
14,IGN
ESS DIG
Translations From "Voyenvaya Mysl"
NUMB?..R' 10 - OCTOBER 1971
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11 February 1974
FPD 0008/74
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1,71pr
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FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
FOREIGN PRESS DIGEST NO. 0008 11 February 1974
TRANSLATIONS FROM "VOYENNAYA MYSL'," NO. 10, OCTOBER 1971
Issue No. 10, October 1971 was signed to press on 21 September 1971.
CONWITS
The Ideological Training of Officers -- to the Level 1
of Requirements of the 24th CPS Congress (3-11)
Military Questions in the History of the CPSU (12-22) 13
Maj Gen V. Matsulenko
Strictest Observance of Socialist Law -- a Major Condition 25
for the Further Strengthening of One-Man Command and
Enhancing Military Discipline (23-31)
Lt Gen of Justice A. Polev
Correlation of Forces and Rate of Advance (32-39) 37
Col A. Gaponov
Sea and Ocean Communications and Warfare on Them (40-48) 47
Capt 1st Rank B. Balev
Employment of Helicopters in the Combat Operations 58
of Ground Forces (49-58)
Col I. Andrukhov
Questions on the Methods of Organizing Combat Operations (59-64)
Col A. Serov, Col Ye. Sokolov, Col B. Trusevich
and Col N. Kil'yachenkov
The Development of Military-Econom:(,2 Science (65-70) 78
Col M. Gladkov
70
The Distortion by Maoists of Leninist Ideas of the 87
Defense of Socialism (71-83)
Col V. Zubarev
America Under Arms (Book Review) (84-92) 104
Meeting with Readers and Authors (93-96) 116
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THE IDEOLOGICAL TRAINING OF OFFICERS --
TO THE LEVEL OF REQUIREMENTS OF THE 24TH CPSU CONGRESS
It was noted at the 24th CPSU Congress that the central task of ideologi-
cal work by party organizations consists in forming a Marxist-Leninist
world outlook and a high level cf ideological and political qualities and
norms of communist morality among the workers. Its most important aspect
is that of nurturing a communist attitude toward labor and public property,
the development of :reative activity on the part of the workers, and a
strengthening of discipline and organization based on awareness. The
congress pointed out the necessity of continuing to nurture among the
Soviet people a feeling of pride for their motherland, for their people,
and for their country's great accomplishments, and a feeling of respect
for the worthy pages of their nation's past. It was emphasized that the
development of Soviet patriotism is inseparably connected with the devel-
opment of socialist internationalism and a readiness to defend the
achievements of socialism on the part of the Soviet people.
The new image of Soviet man and his communist morality and world outlook
are being confirmed in the constant and uncompromising struggle with
relics of the past and with the harmful influence of bourgeois ideology.
The Resolution of the 24th Congress on the Accountability Report of the
CPSU Central Committeestatzs:"tke main aspect of ideological work by the
party consists in spreading the concept of Marxism-Leninism and in an
uncompromising, aggressive struggle against bourgeois and revisionist
ideology."
In defining the main directions and concrete tasks of ideological work,
the supreme forum of the CPSU resolved first of all to "direct increased
attention toward the Marxist-Leninist molding of communists and the
education of cadres on the basis of a profound mastery of Marxism-Leninism
and attitudes toward basic contemporary problems, as worked out by the
party." In developing Leninist principles of selecting, distributing, and
educating cadres, the congress emphasizes that the CPSU considers it to be
of primary importance that all sections of party, government, administra-
tive, cultural-ideological and social work be headed by politically mature
and capable organizers who have a good knowledge of. their work,
It goes without saying that this applies wholly and completely to personnel
of the armed forces. Military affairs are developing rapidly under modern
conditions. To a certain degree one finds focused in military matters
the achievements of the most advanced scientific and technical thought
and of the natural and social sciences. The new problems involved in the
administration, training, and indoctrination of personnel are being
solved, ensuring the necessary combat readiness of the troops. The
officer corps has undergone qualitative changes and the demands on its
moral-political and combat qualities have increased.
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In connection with this the matter of further improving the political
maturity, ideological strength and Marxist-Leninist training of army and
naval officers is becoming more important. Without a profound knowledge
of Marxism-Leninism and decisions of the CPSU ar officer, or any military
leader, no matter what position he occupies, inevitably loses the qualities
of a bearer of communist ideals and an educator of the military masses,
He is turned into a mere administrator or a simple technical worker, which
is a contradiction to the fundamental principles of Soviet military
organizational development. The Marxist-Leninist theory arms military
personnel with a knowledge of the objective laws of the development of
nature and society, the building of communism and its armed defense, It
makes it possible for our officers to solve problems on a scientific
basis, to foresee events, and to operate from a long-range position.
Improving the System of Marxist-Leninist Training
The ideological tempering of officers is a multifaceted process. Its
greatest significance lies in the system of Marxist-Leninist training
which has developed in the armed forces. Its basis consists of firmly
defined training plans, programs and aids and the necessary academic base;
tried and tested principles of the organization of groups and the
designation of their leaders, and of the forms and methods of conducting
classes; constant and effective leadership, supervision of and assistance
to the officers in improving their Marxist-Leninist education.
In preparing for the hundredth anniversary of the birth of V. I. Lenin and
for the 24th CPSU Congress military councils and directorates of armed
forces branches, districts, fleets and groups of forces, and commanders,
political organs and party organizations considerably intensified their
work in the area of the ideological tempering of officer personnel. In
the Central Asian Military District, for example, during the period prior
to the congress the military council specially discussed the matter of
measures for further improvement of the ideological and theoretical
indoctrination of leading personnel and the entire officer corps. This
matter was also introduced at a meeting of party activists. It was
discussed in party aktivs of combined units and in many staff party
organizations, as well as at assemblies conducted by the political
directorate for secretaries of unit party committees, secretaries of party
comn'ssions, party organizational workers of political organs, secretaries
of s-aff party organizations, as well as for propagandists of units and
combined units.
It is characteristic that the level of ideological and theoretical training
primarily of leading personnel has improved in the army and navy.
Instructive in this regard is the example of the political directorate and
the political section of the Main Staff of the Navy, which conducted a
theoretical conference on the subject, "The Guiding Role of the CPSU in
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the Development of Communism and in Strengthening the Country's Defensive
Capabilities." A report was delivered by Admiral V. M. Grishanov, member
of the Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate of the
Navy. Other speakers at the conference were Admiral G. M. Yegorov, deputy
commander-in-chief of the Navy, Engineer-Admiral P. G. Kotov, Engineer-
Vice-Admiral V. G. Novikov, Vice-Admiral S. I. Averchuk, chief of the
political section of the Main Staff of the Navy, and others. Following
the conference its participants conducted theoretical seminars and talks
on the same theme with officers in the directorates and sections.
Reports and papers are prepared by officers and generals within the system
of Marxist-Leninist training among the missile forces as well as among all
the other branches of armed forces. Supervisory personnel discussed such
urgent problems as: "V. I. Lenin on the Defense of the Socialist Homeland
and the Principles of Military Organizational Development," "V. I. Lenin
on Communist Indoctrination of the Soviet People and Servicemen in the
Army and Navy," "V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the New Type of Military
Personnel."
Marxist-Leninist training of other categories of officers is also being
improved. This has been facilitated to a great degree by the singling out
of groups of young officers which has occurred in recent years and the
organization of a system for training political workers. Mandatory checks
on groups for the Marxist-Leninist training of officers during troop
inspections are very important. As a result of these and other measures
the responsibility of officer personnel for their Marxist-Leninist
education has increased.
The very content of Marxist-Leninist training of all categories of officers
has improved. At the presenv time study plans and the long-range planning
of ideological and theoretical training of officers initiated in the
military service are making it possible for officers to study more
systematically all of the integral parts of revolutionary theory, includ-
ing its military aspects, the party activities directed toward the armed
defense of the socialist homeland, and the fundamental issues of CPSU
theory and policy under modern conditions.
The most important thing which has been achieved in the content of
ideological and political training of officers is their extensive
familiarization with the Leninist theoretical heritage, including the
military heritage. During the 1969-1971 period almost all of the officers,
generals and admirals enrolled in the system of Marxist-Leninist training
studied the fundamental works of V. I. Lenin -- Chto Delat'? (What Is to
Be Done?), Materializm i Empiriokrititsizm (Materialism and Emperio-
criticism), Imperializm, Kak Vysshaya Stadiya Kapitalizma (Imperialism as
the Highest Stage of Capitalism), Gosudarstvo i Revolyutsiya (The State
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and Revolution), Detskaya Bolezn' 'Levizny' v Kommunizme (Left-Wing
Communism, An Infantile Disease), and others.
Independent studies by military personnel of the classical works of
Marxism-Leninism and the decisions of the CPSU have noticeably improved.
There are now many combined units among tha forces in which every third
or even every second officer has the complete or three-volume collection
of works by V. I. Lenin in his personal library.
The evening universities of Marxism-Leninism are playing an ever greater
role in the ideological and theoretical training of officers. These make
it possible to fulfill one's service duties and at the same time obtain a
higher political education within the system of party studies. The number
of students at the evening universities increased by 50 percent between
the 23d and 24th party congresses. There was a 150 percent increase in
the genclral departments and a 200 percent increase in the departments of
party-political work.
At the present time the system of Marxist-Leninist training is being more
actively supplemented by other forms of ideological tempering of officer
personnel. Leninist readings have become a practice in many districts.
Lectures by officers, including lectures on military pedagogics and
psychology, are popular. Extensive use is also made of political
information for officer personnel. The network of non-organic offices
for the political self-education of officers has been expanded. All of
this is Laving a positive effect on the '.deological growth of military
personnel and on increasing their political maturity and personal
responsibility for their assigned work.
It can be seen, however, that certain aspects of the organization of
ideological and theoretical training of officer personnel require closer
attention on the part of commanders, political organs, and party
organizations. First of all, it is important to thoroughly overcome such
shortcomings as elements of formalism and an indifferent attitude on the
part of certain officers toward the improvment of their ideological level.
In some cases they violate the principle of systematic study by officers
of the integral parts of revolutionary theory, they strive for quantity
to the detriment of quality in their undertakings, and tolerate a pedantic,
dogmatic method whereby the stress is placed not so much on mastery of the
methodology of Leninism as on the simple memorization of a certain number
of facts and theoretical theses. In a number of cases the necessary
supervision over the officers' studies is lacking and inadequate assistance
is available to them for their mastery of Marxism-Leninism. One still
encounters individual officers who are showing unsatisfactory improvement
in the ideological respect and who are not able to apply the knowledge
which they have obtained in their own practical work. Party organizations
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are not always demanding enough of the communists with respect to
performance of their primary service duty.
The decisions of the 24th CPSU Congress emphasized the fact that it is
essential to further improve the political training of personnel and the
system of party education and to decisively overcome all elements of
formalism in this work. "In order to keep up with the pace of life," it
is stated in the Resolution of the 24th Party Congress on the Accountabil-
ity Report of the CPSU Central Committee, "all of our personnel must
constantly study, improve their ideological and theoretical level, and
master the achievements of science and advanced practice."
Fulfillment of these requirements is obligatory for all commanders,
political organs and party organizations of the army and navy.
In organizing this work it is important to consider more thoroughly the
modern advances in military affairs, service experience, the level of
theoretical training of officer personnel, their qualitative changes and
the tasks which they are carrying out. As tha minister of defense,
Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, pointed out in his speech at
the 24th CPSU Congress, more than 45 percent of the officers' positions
in the army and navy are currently occupied by engineers and technicians
and more than 65 percent of the officers on the regimental level are less
than 30 years old. All of this requires a differentiated approach to the
solution of problems connected with further improvement of the ideological
tempering of officer personnel.
The urgent necessity to further impre Marxist-Leninist training,
primarily of the supervisory military personnel, is dictated by life
itself. It would be expedient to consolidate and disseminate throughout
all districts, groups of forces and fleets the proven practice of creating
in the appropriate political organs special groups for the Marxist-
Leninist training of all echelons of supervisory personnel, from top to
bottom, with consideration given to the organization of commander's
training for them. The practice of organizing theoretical seminars within
the system of Marxist-Leninist training, the sessions of which are conducted
on the basis of an established curriculum with consideration given to the
sphere of work of the officers, generals and admirals, deserves to be
expanded within the central directorates, scientific research establish-
ments and military training institutions.
The political training of young officers requires a great deal of attention
in the units, on the ships, and in the combined units. It must completely
facilitate their fastest possible developmPnt and the formation in thorn of
the necessary command, moral-political and combat qualities. The necessity
is also arising for separating political workers on the company level into
individual groups for Marxist-Leninist training and for conducting classes
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for them ac-tording to a special study plan, ensuring the maximum degree
of their ideological growth.
Improvement of the system of Marxist-Leninist training of officers
presupposes more precise planning and the establishment, where possible,
of permanent days and hours for the classes in order that the officer
personnel know about them in advance. It is also required that greater
concern be demonstrated for the creation of classroomc sufficiently
equipped with visual aids. It is important to raise the level of
organization of lectures and seminars and to improve control over
attendance. It is necessary to increase the responsibility of commanders,
political organs, and the entire staff of officers in carrying out these
and other tasks.
The Most Important Thing Is to Thoroughly Study Leninism and the Documents
of the 24th CPSU Congress
A mastery of Leninism and a vod understanding of the decisions of the
CPSU and its policy with respect to all aspects of the development of a
naw society and the armed defelibe of the achievements of socialism
represent the core of a Marxist-Leninist education of military personnel.
"Leninism, an eternally vital and developing doctrine, has been, is, and
will continue to be at the center of the ideological life of the party
and the basis of its entire revolutionary-transformational work. Turning
to the ideological legacy of V. I. Lenin, the party regards its most
important task to be that of finding a solution to the urgent problems of
communist construction on the basis of Leninist thought and Leninist
methodology. "1
It follows from the decisions of the 24th Congress that officer personnel
are obligated to master Leninism as a method for analyzing the reality of
life, to study according to Lenin, to evaluate current events from class
and party positions, and to conduct a decisive battle against bourgeois
and revisionist ideology. The primary task of officer personnel consists
in their finding in Leninist methodology the key to correct understanding
of current qualitative changeL in military afrairs themselves. Only on
this basis is it possible to clarify the essence of modern military theory
and practice, to see the outlook for their further development, and to
creatively resolve concrete matters involved in the training and educating
of the troops, which is especially important under conditicns of the
military-technical revolution.
The fulfillment of this task presupposes a profound understanding of the
essence of Leninist ideas by each officer. We must everywhere ensure that
officers study Leninism as a single system of scientific knowledge, theory
and practice in the struggle for communism; we must help them to master
scientific methods of analyzing sccial phenomena and develop in them the
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ability to creatively apply theory for purposes of solving contemporary
problems connected with Soviet military organizational development and
those involved in increasing the cumbat readiness of the forces.
The ideas of V. I. Lenin have been developed in documents of the CPSU
The historical decisions of the 24th Congress represent the living
embodiment of Leninism. The Accountability Report of the Party Central
Committee, the Resolution, the Directives on the Five-Year Plan for
Development of the National Economy of the USSR for the 1971-1975 Period,
and other materials of the congress provide profound theoretical deductions
concerning contemporary problems of communist construction, the foreign
policy activities of the party, the armed defense of the achievements of
socialism, and the communist education of the Soviet people and servicemen
of the army and navy. That is ially a thorough study of the documents of
the 24th Party Congress occupies a central position in the system of
Marxist-Leninist education of party and administrative, as well as
military, personnel. It is for this very purpose that the special study
plan "Urgent Problems of Marxist-Leninist Theory and the Policy of the
CPSU in Light of Decisions of the 24th Party Congress" is being introduced.
This plan is recommended for study primarily by supervisory officer
personnel, political workers on the regimental level, and officers of
political organs. In accordance with the decisions of the 24th Congress
other study plans for Marxist-Leninist training of officer personnel have
also been refined,
In the process of studying the materials of the congress it is important
first of all to reveal more clearly the growing role of the party in
communist construction and in strengthening the military might of the
Soviet nation, the laws governing its development, and the increased
influence of the CPSU as the leading revolutionary force of modern times.
For this purpose it is useful to utilize all of the rich materials of the
24th Congress, including speeches by representatives of the fraternal
communist, workers', and leftist socialist parties, who emphasized the
fact that they view the CPSU as the vanguard in the struggle for socialism,
that one's attitude toward the CPSU is the criterion for loyalty to the
principles of proletarian internationalism, and that anti-Sovietism is a
crime against the workers of all nations.
The process of Marxist-Leninist training of officers requires a more
thorough demonstration of the essence of the economic policy of the party
as worked out by the congress and its concern for Soviet man and for
improving his standard of living and cultural level. It requires a more
substantial explanation of the fact that successful fulfillment of the new
five-year plan is helping to strengthen the defensive might of our
motherland, and requires that the magnitude of the advances made by the
Soviet people in the building of communism be revealed.
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The congress worked out a clear-cut program of social action for the CPSU.
The social policy of the party is directed toward strengthening the moral
and political unity of the Soviet people; toward bringing together all
classes and social groups of the city and village, those engaged in both
mental and physical labor. It is directed toward the development of
nations, national relations, and socialist democracy, toward strengthening
the Soviet state and law clnd order, and toward increasing the role of
public organizations and all Soviet citizens in fulfilling tasks involved
in the building of communism. All of these processes have a direct effect
on the organizational development of the Soviet Army and Navy and the
mechanism of this influence must be clear to each officer who is expected
to develop a high level of moral-political and combat qualities among the
personnel
Thebuilding of communism in our nation is being effected in a complex
international situation. The congress outlined a scientifically
substantiated foreign policy line meeting the vital interests of all of
the world's progressive forces. Considering the aggressive aspirations
of the imperialists, primarily of the United States and its accomplices,
the CPSU considers it essential to cuatinue strengthening the defensive
might of our Soviet country and its valiant armed forces. Everything
which has been created by the people must be reliably defended. This
requirement by the congress is the basis for all of the activities of
officers of the army and navy.
As borne out by the facts officer personnel as a whole are studying the
documents of the congress with great application in the districts r.ad the
fleets. The officers are actively discussing the questions posed and are
deriving practical deductions for their own work. During the course of a
check in the Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet and the Baltic Military District,
as well as in a number of other places, it was apparent that not all of
the students demonstrate a profound knowledge of the decisions of the
congress. It does happen that certain officers, concentrating their
attention on the numerical indicators of further development of the
naticnal.economy, do not penetrate properly into the essence of the
economic and social policy of the party under modern conditions. The
training classes sometimes poorly expose the concepts and propagandistic
methods of bourgeois ideologists, as well as those of right-wing and
"left-wing" opportunists. It is not always emphasized that success in
fulfilling tasks of the new five-year plan depends on each Soviet
individual and on servicemen of the army and navy,
Individual young officers do not have a sufficiently complete concept of
the special importance of instructions of the congress to the effect that
"increasing the defensive might of our motherland in every way possible
and educating the Soviet people in the spirit of a high level of vigilance
and constant readiness to defend the great achievements of socialist must
continue to be one of the most important tasks of the party and people."
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The elimination of these shortcomings is connected with a further
improvement in the ideological level of the courses conducted, with
providing high quality training of propagandists, and with involving the
best qualified supervisory personnel in the matter of explaining the
decisions of the congress. Improvement of independent work by the
officers on the classical works of Marxism-Leninism and the decisions of
the 24th CPSU Congress is of primary importance. Let us recall Lenin's
Instruction that: without a certain amount of independent wor' the truth
of a single serious issue cannot be found, And whoever is afra.- of work
deprives himself of the possibility of finc:!rtg the truth. (Complete
Collected Works, vol. 23, p 68)
The independent work requires a system, consistency, and purposefulness.
The service of officers is exceptionally intemive. The wave of daily
activities, combat training and working with the personnel frequently
"overwhelms" some of them. Naturally, a great deal of persistence and
the ability to correctly utilize his service and personal time are
required of each officer.
S. M. Kirov said: "When we touch upon matters of self-education, we most
frequently have a single argument -- we have no time, we are on the run
the whole day long, our tongues hanging out the entire day. But I advise
you to try putting the tongue back in your mouth even .for an hour and you
will see that nothing terrible will come of it. Things will be better."2
Life itself convinces one that this advice is also completely applicable
for officer personnel. Senior commanders and political workers are
obligated to help the young officers organize their independent work
aimed at improving their political education.
A profollnd study of Leninism and the decisions of the 24th CPSU Congress
is also facilitated by such forms of ideological and theoretical training
of officers as group and individual consultations, discussions and
interviews, lectures, reports and theoretical conferences. Readings and
lectures by officers on the materials of the 24th CPSU Congress are proving
worthwhile. The guarantee of further improvement in the Marxist-Leninist
education of military personnel lies in the cr,.!ative and comprehensive
application of above-mentioned forms.
Combining the School of Knowledge with the School of Life and Improving
the Efficiency of Officer Training
The goal of Marxist-Leninist training is to provide officers with a body
of knowledge in the area of revolutionary and military theory and the
decisions of the C2SU. This body of knowledge is expected to develop a
communist world outlook among military personnel, to instill a high level
of moral-political and combat qualities in them, and to assist them in
improving their military-pedagogical skills. The most important
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qualitative distincton of Soviet officers, as officers of a new type,
offsprings of the Great October, is defined by their ideological and
theoretical training. There was good reason then for the decree of the
CPSU Central Commitee "On Measures to Improve Party-Political Work in
the Soviet Army and Navy" to emphasize the necessity of directing special
attention toward improvement of the quality and'effectiveness of the
Marxist-Leninist training of officers.
The entire body of experience in Soviet military orgauizational development
convinces one that the system of Marxist-Leninist training of officers
which has been developed in the army and navy is achieving its goal. We
must, however, continue to improve the effectiveness of Marxist-Leninist
training of officer personnel. Fulfillment of this task depends first of
all on the propagandists and their theoretical and methodological
preparation ani2 on further improvement in the work of selecting, training,
and retraining of group leaders for Marxist-Leninist studies. Assemblies,
seminars and instructional-methodological classes are conducted for this
purpose.
In some places, unfortunately, all of this work is reduced to brief
instructions and individual lectures. In addition, certain group leaders
for the Marxist-Leninist training of ()facers are frequently absent from
even these limited training-methodological undertakings. Supplementary
work is not organized. As a result they attend the classes inadequately
prepared or else they completely reas3ign the lectures and seminars to
poorly-qualified individuals. Life iLself requires that these and similar
shortcomings be resolutely overcome and that the theoretical cnd
methodological training of group leaders be persistently improved.
The system of Marxist-Leninist training of officers represents a great
school of political skills. A bookish knowledge of Marxism, however,
without being tied in with life, is abstract and ineffective. 7. I. Lenin
taught that we must replace the old bourgeois studies, cramming, and
drilling with the ability to grasp the entire body of human knowledge in
such a way that communism is not something which we have learned by rote,
but rather something which we have thought through ourselves, representing
the deductions which are inevitable from the point of view of modern
education. V. I. Lenin considered that a serious ideological tempering
of Soviet cadres required not a dogmatic rote learning of certain Marxist
positions, but rather the development of sufficiently firm convictions. and
a constant readiness to successfully defend them against anyone at any
time.
This is only possible on the basis of theoretical training combined with
the practical struggle for the building of the communist society. That is
why it is necessary to constantly strive for a more profound organic link
between the school of knowledge and the school of life in order to improve
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the effectiveness of Marxist-Leninist officer training. The link between
the theoretical matters studied and the practical struggle of the party
and the entire Soviet people for the development of communism is of primary
importance. We mean by this that the ideas of the 24th CPSU Congress and
the policy worked out by the party should become, to the fullest degree,
the personal convictions of each officer and the motivation behind his
daily activities and that all officers should live by the decisions of the
congress and actively struggle for their implementation.
An important aspect of combin:mg the school of knowledge with the school
of life for officer personnel Ls the further intensification of the link
between Marxist-Leninist trairing and military practice, the tasks of the
armed forces, and the concrete problems involved in increasing the
vigilance and combat readiness of the forces. A thorough analysis of the
protlems connected with the improvement of combat equipment and arms, the
administrative system, and the training and indoctrination of personnel
during classes in the process of theoretical officer training greatly
helps attain more successful accomplishment of the practical tasks facing
the units and ships.
Improved effectiveness of ideological and theoretical officer training
presupposes a highly purposeful level for each class directed toward the
fulfillment of educational tasks. Documents of the 24th CPSU Congress
further developed Lenin's requirements for Soviet cadres, with direct
application to officer personnel as well. In light of the decisions of
the congress it is of primary importance to develop ideological conviction
on the part of the officers during the process of Marxist-Leninist training.
This is facilitated to the greatest degree by the development of an
awareness of party principles and a class a?proach to the evaluation of
events and phenomena. On the strength of this the most pressing current
problems of life's reality cannot be skirted in the training classes. A
creative discussion of these problems is the route toward recognition of
the truth and toward the development among officers of correct views on
events, phenomena, and personal behavior and actions.
Among the important qualities essential to Soviet, including military,
personnel, the 24th CPSU Congress mentioned knowledge of one's work, good
organizational capabilities, and the ability to find the most rational
solutions to problems. In the armed forces such qualities are mainly
developed during the process of combat training and during the entire
course of an officer's service. Their theoretical and scientific
foundations, however, are laid during the process of Marxist-Leninist
training. In this plan officers must master the substance of Leninist
principles on the main link and must skillfully apply those principles in
their practical work of training and indoctrinating personnel.
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The process of political training contains great possibilities for
developing among officers a feeling for the new and the ability to
foresee, and for improving administrative methods. Those group Jeaders
are doing the right thing who, during lectures and seminars, skillfully
pose questions of scientific administration, discuss methods of
scientific search, summarize the advanced experience in this field, and
make it known to all unit or combined-unit officers.
an officer is an educator of the personnel. As a one-man commander he
cannot resolve matters just on the strength of an order. He is obligated
to reinforce his orders by personal example and by organizational and
educational work with the personnel. He needs a profound knowledge of
party-political work and the fundamentals of military pedagogics and
psychology. And Marxist-Leninist training is expected to assist officers
in acquiring these skills. For this purpose the study plans provide for
special subjects. At the same time it is necessary to direct the entire
learning process more toward the development in officers of the qualities
of an educator.
The current more active involrement of officers in social work is acquiring
spacial importance. This sort of experience has been accumulated in the
districts and the fleets. Commanders, political organs, and party
organizations are expected to strive to see that this experience is
disseminated to all of the units, ships, staffs and directorates. Its
Introduction is an absolute condition for the further improvement of the
effectiveness of Marxist-Leninist training of army and naval officers.
According to the teachings of the party, everything connected with matters
of political education and the ideological tempering of personnel should be
under the direct supervision of the party organizations. The propagandists
require special attention. With the new academic year approaching we
should conso3idate and develop the level which we have achieved and
eliminate shurtcomings in the organization of Marxist-Leninist education
of the officers. improvement in its quality and effectiveness should be
subordinated to the main purpose, that of ensuring a high level of combat
readiness on the part of units, ships, and combined-units.
FOOTNOTES
1. L. I. Brezhnev: Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to
the 24th Congress of the Communist Part- of the Soviet Union, Politizdat,
1971, p 125.
2. S. M. Kirov: Selected Articles and Speeches. 1912-1934, Gospolitizdat,
1939, pp 692-693.
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MILITARY QUESTIONS IN THE HISTORY OF THE CPSU
(In Connection with Publication of Book 1, Volume V of Hietory of the CPSU)
Maj Gen V. Matsulenko, Professor, Doctor of Historical Science
Book 1, Volume 5 of History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, has
been published by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Com-
mittee CPSU.* This volume relates how the Soviet people, under the
guidance of the Communist Party, entered a new stage in the development oc
the socialist society, how it emerged victorious in a bitter cal-1kt with the
attack forces of imperialism, how it defended the socialist homeland and,
crushing the enemy, extended a fraternal hand of assistance to the peoples
of Europe and Asia, opening up for them the road to freedom and in-
dependence.
Thie vclitme contains a grcat many new documents and materials, such as more
than 130 resolutions and decrees of the Party Central Committee and its
agencies: the Politburo, Orgburo and Secretariat, as well as the State
Defense Committee. A great many new archival documents were used in
preparing this volume, documents which reveal the activities of local
party organizations.
This has enabled the authors, in contrast to previously-published work
dealing with party activities in the prewar and war years, to show more
filly and comprehensively the titanic job done by the Communist Party, its
ceni.ral and local entities and party organizations during that period.
The book is in two parts: the first is eutitled "New Stage in the Life of
the Party and Nation" and covers the period 1938-June 1941; the second
part -- "The Party -- Organizer and Inspirer of the Victory of the Soviet
People in the Great Patriotic War" -- covers the period June 1941-
September 1945.
* Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, Volume V: The Com-
munist Party on the Eve of and During the Great Patriotic War, During the
Period of Consolidation 5nd Development of the Socialist Society, 1938-
1958. Book 1 (1938-1945), Politizdat, 1970. Project Chief Editor P. N.
Pospelov. Editors for Volume V: Yu. P. Petrov, V. S. Zaytsev.
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This volume contains a thorough study of the diversified activities of the
CPSU in all areas of life in this country during tais period. In this
article we shall discuss primarily matters pertaining to CPSU military
policy and its leadership role in organizational development of the Soviet
Armed Forces and organization of the defeat of the Nazi German invaders,
* * *
Having proceeded on a course toward completion of the building of so-
cialism and guided by Lenin's statement that "the most important, root
interest of the proletariat aft:.:x it has taken over political power is an
increase in output of goods and ?in the enormous dimensions of the produc-
tive resources of society" (Poln. Sobr. Soch. [Complete Works], Volume 44,
page 345), the Communist Party focused its efforts on expanding and
perfecting the material and technological base of socialism. An enormous
role in solving this problem was played by the 18th CPSU Congress, which
was held in March 1939.
This volume contains a detailed examination of the materials of that
congress. A central place in the proceedings of the congress was occupied
by adoption of the Third rive-Year Plan. This plait consistently followed
the party line calling for a new upsurge in the nation's productive re-
sources. Special attention in the prewar five-y.s;r plan was focused on
es',:ablishment of a powerful industrial base the East, which was of
ueat importance for strengthening the defense capability of the USSR.
"The consolidation of socialism, its economio and political foundations
comprise the content of the new phase in the history of Soviet society,
which was defined by the congress as the period of completion of the
building of socialism and the gradual transition to communism" (page 6).
The congress advanced the creation of large state reserves and mobiliza-
tion stockpiles as an important task of the forthcoming five-year plan.
The importance of this task was dictated both by the target ed immense
economic growth and by the looming threat of war. In addition, the in-
creasing threat of war demanded increased budget appropriations for
defense. In 1940 they totaled 56.9 billion rubles, as compared with 17.5
billion rubles in 1937.
The work done by the party to prepare the country for defense against the
aggressive encroachment79 of imperialism is discussed on the basis of
extensive material published in this book for the first time. In the
period 1939-1941 the Central Committee Politburo passed the following
resolutions: "On Renovation of Existing and Construction of New Airframe
Plants" (September 1939); "On the Work of the People's Commissariat of the
Aircraft Industry" (January 1940); "On Production of T-34 Tanks in 1940"
(June 1940); "On the 1940 Plan for Accumulation of State Reserves and
Mobilization Stockpiles" (August 2940), and others.
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As a result of efforts by the party, by the summer of 1941 production cap-
ability of the Soviet aircraft and tank industry was almost 50 percent
greater than that of Nazi Germany. Defense industry, gross output volume
growth wa3 taking place considerably more rapidly than in industry as a
whole. In 1938, with an overall industrial output growth of 11.8 percent,
war industry growth was 36.4 percent. In 1939 industrial output rose 16
percent, while output at defense industry enterprises was up 46.5 percent.
In 1940 war industry output rose by more than one third (pp 119-120).
Mobilization stockpiles and state reserves grew substantially during
these years. During the 18 months preceding the outbreak of hostilities
the total value of state material reserves almost doubled, totaling 7.6
billion rubles (page 121).
The Communist Party devoted considerable attention to Soviet Armed Forces
organizational development. An important stage in their consolidation was
the 1939 Law on Universal MiLi.tary Obligation and the shift to a cadre
system of troop build-up.
In the fall of 1939 began the deployment of all services and arms, with an
improvement in their structure. Dozens of new ground forces and aviation
divisions, artillery and engineer units were formed. The number of rifle
divisions alone more than doubled by 1941, [pages 14-15 missing]
* * *
Within the span of several months 1.5 million railroad cars carrying
equipment, raw materials and fuel were transferred eastward, and more
than 10 million people were evacuated. During the first 6 months of the
war a total of 1523 industrial enterprises were evaNated to the east,
including 1360 large enterprises. The Volga, Urals, and Siberia became
the principal war industry base. Thanks to measures taken by the party,
by the middle of 1942 the front was receiving considerably more war
materiel than in 1941. In spite of all difficulties, the kolkhoz
peasantry was supplying the front with provisions and industry with raw
materials.
The success of this gigantic effort of rebasing industry demonstrated to
the entire world the enormous organizing force of the Communist Party, the
self-sacrifice and labor heroism of the Soviet people.
The initial period of the war, as is correctly noted in the book,
demonstrated that the German military adventure was doomed to failure.
Blinded by thqir hatred of communism, the Nazi rulers showed a total in-
comprehension of the essence and character of the Soviet political system
and its great potential. They underestimated the strength of the Soviet
economy, which was based on the most advanced socialist mode of production,
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the strength of moral-political unity of Soviet society, the indestructible
friendship of the peoples of the USSR, our nation's military organization
and its Armed Forces (page 154).
Decisive events in the summer-fall campaign of 1941 took place on the
central, Moscow axis. In the latter half of July the magnificent Battle
of Smolensk began, during the course of which the Soviet guard was born --
the cream of the army, the pride of our people. As a result of this battle
our t:oops frustrated Hitler's plan to advance to Moscow without a halt,
thus dealing a serious blow to Hitler's doctrine of "blitzkrieg" war.
The Soviet Supreme Command had gained the time needed to establish and
move to the front strategic reserves, which played an important role in
the Battle of Moscow.
Having exhausted the German hordes in the defensive Battle of Moscow, on
5-6 December Soviet troops shifted to a decisive counteroffensive and
crushed a large enemy force -- Army Group Center. This event was an im-
portant turning point in the war. The adventuristic plan of "blitzkrieg"
had suffered a total failure. The myth of the "invincibility" of the
German Army had been exposed to the world. The Germans suffered their
first defeat in World War II. The strategic initiative had passed into the
hands of the Soviet Supreme Command.
The Soviet victory at Moscow was perceived throughout the world as a genal
victory of progressive forces over fascism. It raised the morale of peace-
loving peoples, strengthened the resistance movement in the fascist-
occupied countries and played a.substantial role in strengthening the anti-
Hitler coalition.
The threat of Japanese entry into the war,against the USSR was simultaneous-
ly greatly reduced by this victory. The events at Moscow also had a sober-
ing effect on aggressive elements in Turkey (page 244).
For the peoples of the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces the defeat of the
Nazi German forces at Moscow signified the dawn of a future victory.
In the battles in the fields of Moskovskaya Oblast the Soviet Army gained
valuable experience in the conduct of large-scale offensive operations,
gained maturity and toughness. Soviet fighting men demonstrated mass
heroism and excellent morale. Forty-six units and large units, including
the 18th People's Militia Division of Moscow's Leningradskiy Rayon, were
given the guards appellation for oui;tanding success in combat at Moscow.
The lofty title Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to 110 soldiers and
partisans (page 244).
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This volume devotes considerable attention to such great landmarks on the
road to Soviet victory over the enemy as the battles of Stalingrad and
Kursk. "The turning point finally came in the battle which took place
between the Volga and Don rivers, a comporznt part of which was the Battle
o f Stalingrad," the ho'ik states, "With their stubborn defense and power-
ful counterthrusts the Soviet troops frustrated the enemy advance and
solidly pinned down in the Stalingrad area more than SO of the enemy's
finest divisions" (page 338).
The heroic defense of Stalingrad created conditions for shifting to a
counteroffensive, which resulted in the encirclement of 22 German divisions,
containing 330,000 men and large quantities of equipment. The Battle of
Stalingrad exceeded all the battles of history in scope and significance.
Savage fighting was waged for a period of 6 and a half months Dyer a vast
territory, involving the simultaneous participation of more than 2 mil-
lion men. The enemy lost approximately 1.5 million officers and men, more
than one fourth of his troops on the Eastern Front. Five of the enemy's
armies were crushed: two German, two Romanian, and one Italian (page 343).
The victory at Stalingrad ended ame a1 fur all plans for Japan to attack the
Soviet Union in the east and Turkey in the south, compelling them to main-
tain their "neutrality" toward the USSR. L: led to a new and powerful up-
surge in the popular liberation struggle against fascism.
With the victory at Stalingrad the strategic initiative shifted once and
for all into the hands of the Soviet Supreme Command. Soviet troops
shifted to a general offensive, vflich signaled the beginning of the mass
expulsion of the Nazi German invaders from Soviet territory,
In discussing the Battle o.Kursk the authors correctly note that the
Soviet military leaders accurately guessed the enemy's intentions and,
proceeding on the basis of the current situation, drafted the most ex-
pedient lilan of action for?theaummer of 1943, The Soviet Supreme Command
decided to establish a stubborn defense on the Kursk salient in order to
halt the advance of large enemy forces, to weaken his assault forces and to
create conditioas for crushing them with a subsequent counteroffimsive, In
contrast to the battles of Moscow and Stalingrad, the shift to defense at
Kursk was not a forced decision but was of a deliberate nature and did not
signify that the Soviet Army was losing the initiative it had seized during
the winter campaign. The subsequent course of events confirmed the cor-
rectness of this decision (page 350).
The German army suffered a major defeat in the Battle of Kursk. More than
70 enemy divisions took part in the battle, or approximately one third of
all enemy divisions operating on the Eastern Front; 30 of these divisions
were destroyed. In 50 days of fighting the Germans lost more than half a
million mea. The Germans were unable to replenish these immense losses;
Germany was at the brink of catastrophe.
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A direct consequence of the defeat of the Germans at Kursk was further
development of the crisis within the faseist bloc and the beginning of its
disintegration, which was expressed in the collapse of the fascist regime
in Italy.
Following the Battle of Kursk the Soviet Army conducted a number of
brilliant operations in the summer-fall campaign of 1943 and in the cam-
paigns of 1944, which led to the final liberation of Soviet territory
The Great Patriotic War was of a popular character. A vivid manifestation
of this was the partisan movement, which was extensively organized on the
party's initiative. Approximately 6200 partisan detachments and groups
(1,300,000 patriots) and 735 underground party entities were operating on
enemy-1=11*d territory. "No political party in history has managed such a
mass movement behind enemy lines. The Communist Party successful coped
with this task" (page 508). The partisan movement was an important
strategic fact in the war. The authors demonstrate on the basis of exten-
sive documentary materials how the party exercised direction of the popular
struggle behind enemy lines. This book contains the first published
systematized index of underground party entities. The struggle behind
enemy lines was truly popular, encompassing all forms of popular resistance:
combat operations by partisan units, activities of underground organiza-
tions in cities and towns, and mass sabotage against the enemy.
This book devotes considerable attention to the liberation mission of the
Soviet Armed Forces. This mission was initiated in the spring of 1944,
when our troops, pu.rsuing the enemy with the aim of annihilating him,
crossed the Soviet border into Romania. Entry by the Soviet Army into a
new phase of the war -- the phase of liberation of the peoples of Europe --
increased demands on all party political effort. Bearing this fact in mind,
the Central Committee Politburo held a conference of members of front mili-
tary councils (May 1944), at which the tasks of milltary political of-
ficers in the new phase of the war were defined (pp 588-589). The Soviet
Army received strict orders from the State refense Committee (dated 10
April and 27 October 1944) not to interfere in the internal affairs of the
liberated nations and to give their peoples the right to decide their own
destiny. These orders proceeded from the program for lending assistance to
the fascist-enslaved peoples of Europe in their just struggle for indepen-
dence and freedom. Implementing this program, the Communist Party acted in
full conformity with the ideals of proletarian internationalism, to which
it was always faithful.
The Soviet Army sacredly observed the principles of the Leninist foreign
policy of the USSR, bringing liberation to the peoples of Central and
Southeastern Europe.
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The authors discuss in detail the comprehensive assistance by the Soviet
Union to the peoples of other nations struggling against fascism, in the
establishment of national military units and the arming of these units with
the requisite weapons and combat equipment. The following were established
on Soviet territory: the Czechoslovak Corps (16,000 men), the First Polish
Army (78,000 men), two Romanian divisions, a Yugoslav infantry battalion,
tank brigade and two air regiments, and the French Normandy-Neman Fighter
Regiment. Foreign units established with the assistance of the USSR
totaled more than 550,000 men (page 573),
Thefcreign large units established on Soviet territory fought bravely side
by side with the Soviet Army against the common foe and subsequently played
an important role in the establishment and development of national armed
forces in the liberated nations,
Liberation of the peoples of Europe demanded of the Soviet Armed Forces
enormous efforts and a high cost in human lives. A total of 69,000 Soviet
fighting men were killed in Romania, 600,000 in Poland, more than 140,000
in Czechoslovakia, more than 140,000 in Hungary, 26,000 in Austria, 8006
in Yugoslavia, and more than 102,000 in Germany (pp 592-600). More than
1 million Scviet officers and men gave their lives in the European nations
liberated by the Soviet Army.
The Soviet Army also carried out its international duty in respect to the
Asian peoples enslaved by militarist Japan. The decisive defeat which
Soviet troops handed Japan's elite ground forces -- its million-man
Kwangtung Army -- constituted the most important factor in the liberation
of many Asian peoples from the yoke of the foreign invaders, particularly
the people of China, Korea, and Vietnam, as well as bringing a victorious
end to the war in the Far East (page 654).
The Soviet Union achieved equally important results in foreign policy. The
authors state that through its foreign policy the party assisted the
peoples of Europe and Asia liberated by the Red Army in reestablishing
their national statehood and sovereignty (page 656).
Soviet dfnlomacy rendered useless the schemes and intrigues of the
imperialist nations, which were attempting to isolate the Soviet Union in
the international arena. Creation of the anti-Hitler coalition and its
consolidation during the course of the war confirmed the correctness of the
Leninist course of Soviet foreign policy.
The book emphasizes that the Soviet victory over .fascism constitutes a
victory of the Soviet societal and governmental system, a victory of the
military organization of the Soviet state and socialist ideology, "The
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party was able fully to utilize the advantages of the socialist economic
system... With a smaller industrial capacity and shrunken strategic
raw materials base the Soviet Union produced more military equipment than
did Nazi Germany. Soviet industry produced during the war 137,000 air-
planes, 104,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 488,000 artillery
pieces" (page 644).
The Communist Party did enormous ideological work during the war years.
This effort was aimed at indoctrinating the armed defenders of the homeland
and all toilers, developing them into fearless, courageous, steadfast
fighters who were solidly convinced of the righteousness of their cause and
making every effort to achieve victory (page 651).
The Communist Party was the leader of the struggle of the Soviet people and
its Armed Forces, the inspirer and organizer of our victory in the Great
Patriotic War. All fundamental questions pertaining to running the
country and conduct of the war were settled by the Party Central Committee
the Politburo, Orgburo and Secretariat. More than 200 meetings of these
executive party bodies were held during the war years. Decisions
hammered out by the party Central Committee were later implemented by the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR, Sovnarkom, as well as the State
Defense Committee and the Supreme Command (page 642). A precise system of
party leadership of the armed forces took shape during the war. Strategic
plans were as a rule examined jointly by members of the Party Central Com-
mittee Politburo and the Supreme Command. Members and candidate members of
he Central Committee Politburo, sitting on the front military councils or
regularly touring the critical areas of the front, with their experience
and authority assisted In quickly and correctly settlilg on the spot com-
plex problems of warfare (page 650).
The role and influence of the military councils, which contained many
Central Comittee members and candidate members, and top officials of
republic, kray and oblast party organizations, in the army aid navy became
stronger. Acting on behalf of the party and government, the military
councils were supported by commanders and political bodies, party and
Komsomol organizations. Political workers, who included many Communists
with considerable experience in party political work, engaged in extensive
organizing and ideological activity (page 650). The party steadily grew
in numbers and strength during the war years. Between 1 July 1941 and 1
July 1945 3,788,000 fighting men became probationary members and 2,376,000
received full party membei.ship. By the spring of 1945 one out of every four
Soviet fighting men was a party member.
Communists were always at the forefront. They led the others into combat
through personal example and inspiring words. Almost three fourths of all
Heroes of the Soviet Union are Communists. Approximately 2 million Com-
munists were killed in action in the name of victory; this represents more
than one half of the party membership as of the summer of 1941.
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The victory of the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany and militarist Japan
created favorable conditions for the development and successful consumma-
tion of socialist revolutions in the nations of Europe and Asia and the
establishment of a world socialist system. This victory had a profound
influence on the struggle of peoples for peace, demccracy and socialism,
on development of the international communist and labor movement, and the
national liberation movement in colonial and dependent countries.
The authors offer a worthy response to the bourgeois falsifiers of the
history of Wor10. War II, who are endeavoring today, contrary to all truth,
through various fabrications, omissions and slander, to minimize the world
historic significance of the victory of the Soviet Union in World War II
and its decisive contribution to the collapse of fascism. Their vain
attempts boil down to portraying the defeat of Nazi Germany as a random
event, a consequence of Hitler's mistakes, the Russian winter, the
primitive soviet road system, etc. They attempt to prove that the source
of heroism displayed by Soviet citizens during the war was not socialist
patriotism but rather "the spirit of holy Russia," that they did not
fight for the socialist homeland but rather "for mother Russia."
These are brazen lies. The victory of the Soviet people and its army over
faocism was most logical and expected. Its sources were the socialist
economic system, the sociopolitical and ideological unity of society,
Soviet patriotism and friendship of the peoples of the USSR, the rallying
of the people around the Communist Party, and the unprecedented herc.sm
and bravery of Soviet fighting men. It was a victory of the socialist
ideology over the misanthropic ideology of imperialism and fascism.
References by the falsifiers to the cold, mud, and slush, which allegedly
had a negative influence on the corn at operations of the Nazi German
troops, are groundless. Warfare is a bilateral process. He who is better
trained, more skilled in combat, stronger in spirit, braver and more
courageous was able to stand the cold and overcome the mud. It was
primarily Soviet fighting men who possessed these qualities. They smashed
the Germans with equal success in blizzard and downpour, winter and summer,
day and night.
Attempts by bourgeois ideologues to belittle the role of our homeland in
the defeat of fascism do not stand up to criticism.
The Soviet people played the decisive role in defeating Nazi (3ermany.
Throughout the entire war 60 to 80 percent of all manpower and equipment at
the disposal of the German Army was on the Eastern Front. It was here that
the main forces of Germany and its satellites were destroyed -- 607 divi-
sions. The Allies on the other hand destroyed and captured 176 divisions
in North Africa and Western Europe. The Germans lost in battle against the
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Soviet troops the bulk of their artillery and tanks, three fourths of
their aircraft, while casualties comprised 10 million out of 13,600,000
total casualties sustained by the Germans in World War II (pp 568-569).
The bourgeois falsifiers of history are doing everything they can to
distort prewar Soviet foreign policy as well. The aim of their falsifica-
tion is to remove from the Western powers responsibility for urging Nazi
Germany into uar and to make it look as if the Soviet-German nonaggression
treaty was the cause of World War II.
With the lying claim of a "Soviet threat" to other nations ia 1931;-1941
they want to camouflage and justify imperialist aggression in Indochina
and the Near East and U.S. attempts to preserve its domination in NATO and
other aggressive blocs. But no matter how hard the apologists of the
bourgeoisie try, their attempts are in vain. The facts of history are
against them. The Soviet-German nonaggression pact signed on 23 August
1939, the authors state, frustrated the plans of the imperialists and
allowed the Soviet Union time to strengthen its defenses. This treaty also
struck a blow at the aggressive plans of imperialist Japan, which was
counting on a German attack on the USSR presenting the opportunity to
undertake major offensive operations against the Mongolian People's
Republic and the Soviet Far East (page 73).
The Communist Party and Soviet government did everything possible to
prevent World War II. But under those conditions this was impossible:
resolution of this problem depended not on the USSR alone. War broke out,
but not as the Western imperialists had planned it. Instead of a united
campaign by the imperialist nations against the Soviet Union, hestilities
began among the imperialist predators. The Germans directed their efforts
primarily against the :inglo-French-American bloc.
The authors convincingly demonstrate that entry by the USSR into the war,
provoked by the attack by Nazi Germany, became the decisive factor in the
transition of World War II from an unjust imperialist war to an antifascist
war of liberation, that ispit ul Lmately altered its political character
(pp 73-77).
From the very first days of the war the Soviet Union became the center of
peace-loving forces, around which all peoples oppressed by fascism united.
Subsequendy this led to the creation of an antifascist coalition, which
was an alliance not only of states but of peoples as well.
The bourgeois falsifiers claim that the Soviet troops won victories due to
a 10 to 20-fold superiority in manpower and weapons over the Nazi German
troops. This volume contains convincing facts refuting this fabrication.
For example, in the counteroffensive at Moscow the enemy enjoyed a
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superiority in numbers and equipment. As of 5 December 1941 our forces
included: 718,800 men, 5900 guns and mortars, 667 tanks, and 762 aircraft.
The Germans had 801,000 men, 10,400 guns and mortars, 1000 tanks, and 615
aircraft (page 240).
The rout of the Nazi German forces at Stalingrad took place with a slight
numerical advantage on the side of the Soviets. The Soviet forces in-
cluded 1,000,500 men, 13,541 guns and mortars, 894 tanks, and 1414 aircraft,
while the enemy totaled 1,011,500 men, 10,290 guns and mortars, 675 tanks,
and 1216 aircraft (page 342).
The authors emphasize that reactionary military historians minimize the
significance of the Battle of Stalingrad and exaggerate the influence of
combat operations fought by British and American troops in North Africa on
the course of World War II, forgetting that the enemy had 50 divisions at
Stalingrad and 12 in North A5rica. .The Nazi German Army suffered 20 times
the losses in killed and captured in the Battle of Stalingrad as in Africa
(page 344).
In the Kursk counteroffensive and in subsequent operations in 1944-1945,
Soviet troops enjoyed a slight numerical advantage over the Germans:
50 to 100 percent in men, 3 to 4-fold in clitillery and tanks, and 2 to. 3-
fold in aircraft. On main axes of advance the Soviet forces greatly out-
numbered the enemy in men and equipment, particularly in the operations of
the final phase of the war. But this superiority was achieved due to
massing of forces in areas of penetration, at the expense of weakening
secondary axes.
The outcome of the Great Patriotic War, as is correctly noted in this book,
fully demonstrated the indestructible might of socialism, the omnipotent
force of Marxist-Leninist ideas, and the Soviet people's total dedication
to the Leninist party, These results serve as a stern warning to the
imperialist aggressors, a severe and unforgettable lesson of history.
Ignoring the lessons of the last war, present-day imperialism, headed by
the United States, has stepped up its aggressive strategy, the cutting
edge of which is pointed at the socialist nations, and against the Soviet
Union in particular.
The 24th CPSU Congress stressed the necessity of keeping a vigilant eye on
the intrigues of the imperialist nations and constantly maintaining at the
center of attention matters pertaining to military organizational develop-
ment and strengthening the might and combat capability of tile. Soviet Armed
Forces. "Everything that has been created by the people," stated L. I.
Brezhnev in the Central Committee Report to the 24th CPSU Congress, "must
b e ?r el iab ly. ,d.o.f T o s t
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the Soviet state means to strengthen its Armed Forces ae well, com-
prehensively to increase the defense capability of our homeland, As long
as we live in a troubled world, this remains one of our primary tasks.
Carrying out the will of the people, the Communist Party tirelessly works
to strengthen the nation's defenses.., Soviet citizens can ba confident
that our glorious Armed Forces are prepared at all times, day and night, to
repel an enemy attack, from whatever quarter it might come."
Book 1, Volume V of History of the CPSU is a work of major significence.
It will play an important role in indoctrinating Soviet citizens in the
glorious, heroic traditio. of the Leninist party, in a spirit of dedica-
tion to the homeland and constant readiness to defend the conquests of tne
Great October Revolution.
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STRICTEST OBSERVANCE OF SOCIALIST LAW --
A MAJOR CONDITION FOR THE FURTHEa STRENGTHENINF ONE-MAN
COMMAND AND ENHANCING MILITARY DISCIPLINE
Lt Gen of Justice A. Polev
In executing control over all of the aspects of the life and the work of
the Soviet Army and Navy, the Communist Party directs a great deal of
attention to the strictest observance of socialist legality as the most
important condition for further strengthening of one-man command and
discipline.
"Respect for the law," as pointed out in the Accountability Report of the
CPSU Central Committee to the 24th Congress of the Communist Party, "must
become the personal conviccion of each individual. This especially applies
to the activities of offi'Aals. Any attempt to deviate from the Jaw or to
circumvent it, o matter what the motivation, cannot be tolerated."
One-Nan Command -- The Basic Form of Control Over the Life and Activities
of the Troops
The founders of scientific communism, Marx, Engels, and Lenin, convincingly
proved that the significance of precisely functioning production, military,
and any other activity of the people continues to increase according to
the measure of development of social production, science and technology
and the equipping of the armed forces with the latest combat weapons. In
industry, in transportation, in agriculture, in the Army or the Navy, and
throughout all of public life normal activities by the people become
impossible without subordination to a certain order and clear rules and
standards of conduct as established by appropriate laws, decrees,
regulations, and instructions. This is precisely why the role of control
of the Army and Navy is constantly growing and why the demands placed on
performance and military discipline are increasing.
The founder of our party and state, V. I. Lenin, taught that "neither the
railroads, nor the transportation system, nor the large machines and
enterprises in general can function correctly if there is not a unity of
will, joining the entire body of available workers into a single economic
organization functioning with clockwork accuracy." (Complete Collected
Works, vol. 36, p 157) This especially applies to the armed forces: the
extensive introduction of the latest arms, various radioelectronic
equipment, complex combat vehicles, aircraft, and ships requires the
perfectly functioning, precisely organized activities of each soldier and
entire collectives, and an exceptional level of discipline and irreproach-
able performance. The slightest laxity or self-willed action by individual
officials, a deviation from the established order, or an attempt at
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insubordination can cause tremendous damage to the armed forces and
Soviet society as a whole.
The Communist Party has recognized one-man command at all stages in the
organizational development of the Soviet Army and Navy as the most
effective form of leadership of the personnel, providing a constantly
high level of combat and mobilizational readiness on the part of the
subunits, units, and ships.
The essence of one-man command under modern conditions consists in
concentrating in the hands of a commander or chief all of the command,
political, technical, administrative, and logistical functions of
management and control over all of the aspects of life and activities of
the subunits, units, ships and combined units entrusted to him. This
means that the one-man commander or chief is completely respo-Asible to
the people, the Communist Party and the Sov4..et Government for combat and
political training, for troop discipline, for personal, logistical and
medical support of the troops, and for the condition of the arms and
combat equipment. Together with the party organization he actively
indoctrinates the personnel, instills communist attitudes in servicemen,
and persistently develops communist relations among them.
All of the actions of any commander or chief are executed within the
of the power given him by the law. This in no way indicates any
sort of limitation of the service rights and personal responsibility of
the commander's subordinates for their assigned work, but makes it
possible to define the sphere of their obligations and rights, within the
boundaries of which they function independently. Along with the one-man
commander or chief, resport......bility for the conditions of some specific
sector of military activities is also borne by the corresponding officials:
chiefs of staffs, services, and so forth.
Regulating the actions of commanders andchiefs within the framework of
the authority assigned to them also ensures strict observance of legality
in the interrelations of all military personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces
without exception, as well as protection of the rights and interests of
the citizens in military service.
Further comprehensive strengthening of one-man command ant military
discipline and impLovement of the political and military eaucation of
personnel in the spirit of communist ideals is unthinkable without the
most extensive application of legal standards and the laws of the Soviet
state. It is here that the will of the people and the basic directions
of party policy on matters of strengthening the defensive capabilities
and security of our nation are reflected in concentrated form.
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The Legal Bases of One-Man Command and Military Discipline
The leadership of the Communist Party in accordance with unified Soviet
legislation is the very basis for the development of our state as a whole
and military organizational development in particular. Unified legisla-
tion does not exclude the specific features of legal regulation of military
organizational development, as necessitated by the organizational specifics
and the special procedures applicable to military service. In connection
with this legislation is enacted which represents the legal basis for the
operations of the military apparatus and all service personnel and for
regulating the life and activities of the USSR Armed Forces.
The concept of Soviet military legislation encompasses the laws of the
USSR, ukases of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, decrees of the
USSR Council of Ministers, and military regulations, which contain legal
standards, reflect the policy of the CPSU aid the Soviet Government on
matters of military organizational development and the political and
military education of personnel, and in which the rights, obligations,
mutual relations and responsibilities of servicemen are defined.
The basic law of the .and, the Constitution of the USSR, defines the
sphere of authority of higher agencies of state power and state control
in the area of organization of the defense of our motherland, the
construction of the armed forces, and their leadership. In order to have
the laws correctly reflect the processes occurring in society and current
requirements, keep pace with the times, and facilitate the development of
that which is new and progressive, the USSR Supreme Soviet constantly
works toward improving Soviet, including military, legislation.' This is
one of the methods of state guidance of society and of communist develop-
ment.
The "Law on Universal Military Duty" passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet on
12 October 1967 on the basis of the Constitution established the system
for the organization and manning of the Soviet Armed Forces, t.d. procedure
for induction into military service, the basic principles of completing
active military service and reserve service, the system of registering for
the draft, and other vegulations.
Ukases have been issued by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet,
ratifying2: Internal Service Regulations (23 August 1960), the Garrison
and Guard Service Regulations (22 August 1963), and the Armed Forces
Disciplinary Regulations (23 August 1960). Thus, departmental acts (as
the regulations were considered prior to confirmation by ukases of the
Presidium of the USSR Supreme Sovic:t) acquired the force of state laws.
Ukases have also been issued by the Presidiur of the USSR Supreme Soviet
ratifying the Regulation on Material Responsibility of Servicemen for
Loss Caused to the State (23 May 3966), the Regulation on Officers'
Comrade Courts of Honor in the Armed Forces of the USSR, and others.
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Relations arising during the process of the performance of military
service are also defined to a great degree by orders of the Ministry of
Defense. Thus, citizens are drafted into the active military service,
rules of accounting for property are established, and appropriate
regulations are put into effect on the basis of decrees of the Government
of the USSR. Orders by the UcSR Minister of Defense, issued on the basis
of and supplementary to Soviet laws, represent general standards which
are binding on all service personnel.
In this manner relations developing during the process of military service
in the Soviet Army and Navy are regulated by legal standards.
The system and order of military relations, reguleted by legal standards
and consolidated in laws, make up the concept of military legal order.
Consequently, the entire procedure of military relations between servicemen
of units, subunits and military installations, regulated by military
regulations, orders of the USSR Minister of Defense, and other legal
standards, constitute the military legal order.
Personal responsibility for the strengthening of the military legal order
in the unit and subunit and on the ship is assigned to the commander.
The regulation specifies that subordinates be required to comply with
military regulations, service duties, and orders, precisely and in good
time, that they immediately eliminate any violations of service procedures
detected, strive to strengthen military discipline, prevent offenses by
subordinates, and expose and eliminate the grounds giving rise to them in
good time. The law thereby requires of the commander actions and deci-
sions directed toward all-round strengthening of the military legal order,
discipline and organization.
We know that in order to confirm the military legal order it is not enough
just to regulate legislation, rescind laws which have lost their force,
and develop and issue laws. A good law can be passed, but if it is not
observed by all servicemen and officials without exception, then such a
law will be ineffective. The vitality of a law is manifested in its
effect and execution. Undeviating and precise observance and execution
of Soviet laws and other legal acts based on them by all state organs,
public organizations, officials and citizens constitutes socialist
legality.
Legality (zakonnost') and the legal order (pravoporyadok) are interrelated,
but they are not one and the same. Legality presumes the requirement of
everyone to strictly and unfailingly observe the laws of the Soviet state.
As a result of the realization of this requirement, an order and a system
of relations develops which is generally referred to as the legal order
[or: law and order].
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"Socialist legality and the legal order are the basis for the normal life
of society and its citizens," the General Secretary of the CPSU Central
Committee L. I. Brezhnev emphasized in his speech at the meeting of
electors on 12 June 1970. Socialist legality is closely connected with
socialist democracy: democracy gives rise to and strengthens legality,
and legality, in turn, consolidates democracy.
Proceeding from the fact that "law is a political measure and a policy,"
(Complete Collected Works, vol. 30, p 99), V. I. Lenin attached exceptional
importance to revolutionary legality in the development of the new social
structure. From the very first days of the rroclamation of Soviet power
he unceasingly called upon the workers, and 401 of the toilers, to
strengthen the revolutionary order and revolutionary legality. At the
initiative of V. I. Lenin, the Sixth All-Russian Extraordinary Congress
of Soviets approved a decree "On Frecise Observance of the Laws," which
in essence meant that the declaration of legality was one of the basic
principles of Soviet power.
V. I. Lenin was resolutely opposed to contrasting legality and expediency.
What is legal is expedient, it exists within the framework of the law and
does not deviate from it. Soviet la,:c and military regulations indicate
the most expedient routes and means for achieving set goals and tasks.
Constantly pointing out the necessity for strengthening legality in the
Army, V. I. Lenin appealed to the men to "carry out the laws of the Red
Army and all orders, and to maintain discipline in it in every way
possible, not out of fear, but as a matter of conscience..." (Complete
Collected Works, vol. 39, p 152) He spoke out resolutely against
manifestati.alls of a lack of discipline: "One should avoid like fire
unsystematic work, willfulness on the part of individual detachments, and
disobedience to the central authority because it leads to ruin..." (Ibid)
Lenin's ideas on the importance of socialist legality have been developed
and strengthened in subsequent decisions of the Communist Party and the
Soviet Government.
In a decree of 19 January 1955, the CPSU Central Committee worked out
measures to further strengthen socialist legality and intensify the
procurator's supervision in the nation. In a decree of July 1966, the
CPSU Central Cr_smillittee and the USSR Council of Ministers required that
all party, soviet, and administrative organs conduct work on a broad
front and with public support directed toward the prevention of violations
of the law and toward intensification of the struggle against crime.
Everything necessary exists in the Armed Forces of the USSR for the
successful execution of tasks of the party program -- to ensure strict
observance of sociall_st legality and the elimination of all violations of
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the legal order, crime, and its causes. Commanders, political organs,
staffs and party organizations have an extremely important role in
fulfilling this task.
By orders and directives the USSR Minister of Defense and the Chief of the
Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy have demanded
undeviating observance of Soviet laws in the issuance of orders and other
legal acts by organs of the military directorate and, in reviewing letters
and complaints, absolute observance of regulation interrelations between
service personnel. Military councils of districts, fleets and groups of
forces direct constant attention to these matters.
It would be difficult to imagine one-man command which is not based on a
knowledge of and force of law.
Soviet law facilitates the strengthening of one-man command in every way
and the authority of the commander by supporting his orders and the
established order of subordination. The law on military offenses provides
for strict punishment for failure to obey the commander, for refusing to
carry out his orders, for resistance to him in fulfilling the obligations
of military service or using coercion to violate them, or for any attempt
to defame the character of the commander or thre ten his health or life.
The one-man commander is invested with a great deal of power, expressed
in the rights and obligations assigned to him. H.e has the right and is
obligated to strive firmly and unswervingly for observance of order and
discipline on the part of his subordinates and for their undeviating
observance of requirements of the laws and regulations, to prevent laxity
and lack of discipline, and to exact punishment for violations of
discipline. However, an understanding of the role of the one-man
commander just from the point of view of his right to require observance
of the laws from others is not free of one-sidedness and could lead to
errors.
In the Soviet st.ce the safeguarding of socialist legality in all
administrative agencies of the government is assigned to their leaders.
In the Army and the Navy, where the mie of the one-man commander is more
significant as a consequence of the specifics of the military organization,
the one-man commander is the organizing force behind the realization of
socialist legality.
Military regulations make it the duty of the commanders to strictly
observe the laws, thereby setting an example for their subordinates, and
to manifest concern for them and strictly observe the laws and the
privileges of military personnel and members of their families. All the
activities of a commander must be based on absolute observance of Soviet
laws, military regulations, statutes, manuals, and orders of superior
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commanders. The commander educates his subordinates in the same spirit
by the legality of his actions.
Today a commander cannot command without a detailed knowledge of the
fundamentals of modern law. In issuing an order which infringes upon one
right or another of a subordinate, a commander cannot claim ignorance of
the law. Ignorance of the law and violation of it or an attemp_ to
circumvent the law indicate that a commander is deficient in legal
knowledge. "One cannot circumvent decrees: one can be taken to court
just for proposing such a thing," V. I. Lenin wrote on the occasion of
hearing such a proposal. (Complete Collected Works, vol. 50, p 266)
A commander's exercise of his rights as an investigative agent represents
an important means for strengthening legality and military discipline.
The one-man commander in the Soviet Armed Forces is assigned one of the
responsible and specific state legal functions, that of conducting, within
his authority, investigations of viol.ations of the law committed by his
subordinates. In accordance with the law a commander is obligated to
initiate riminal proceedings whenever a crime is detected, to take
measures directed toward establishing the elements of the crime and the
individuals guilty of its commission, and toward punishment of those
individuals. Failw.e to react to violations of the law, laxity, and
failure to punish represeni: gross violations of socialist legality, which
damage the military legal order and education of servicemen.
Unit staffs and services have a great role in matters connected with the
all-round strengthening of legality. Many violations of discipline are
the direct result of the condition of troop duty, the way in which subunit
headquarters and commanders organize guard duty and internal service,
control over their performance, and elimination of conditions giving rise
to violations.
It is most important that the matter be orgarLized in such a way that all
officials of organs of the military directorate know the principles of
legislation within the limit:, of their authority, not just knowing their
rights, but also their ohligations, and strictly fulfilling them in their
work without regard for position or rank.
The Soviet officer personifies qualities of ideological conviction,
devotion, bravery, a high cultural level, competence and industry. His
actions and decisions must stand out for their great demandingness of
himself and his subordinates and they must be reasonable and just.
The commander directs his subordinates, issuing orders and instructions.
His order carries authority and it is absolutely intolerable to debate it,
no matter for what reasons. It is to be carried out absolutely and
voluntarily, but in case of unwillingness to carry it out, compulsion will
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be used. Orders and instructions of the commander must always correspond
to the requirements of regulations and laws, and be based on them,
That commander is not correct who considers it possible to hush up
violations of the law, not react to such violations in accordance with
the law, or who makes a decision which exceeds his legal authority, And
in combat, which places a special moral and psychological demand on an
individual and requires intensive efforts of him, the commander functions
on the basis of the authority and power vested in him by the law, and
subordinates the will and actions of his subordinates to his will for
purposes of achieving victory over the enemy in the interests of defending
the motherland,
A commander who exceeds the power vested in him or abuses it cannot expect
his actions to be understood by his subordinates. Wilfulness or arbitrari-
ness, no matter what the motivation, are always unlawful and amoral, They
are not fit servants of the military order. In the final analysis such
actions are detrimental, including to the prestige of one-man command,
which is executed on a party basis and on the firm foundation of legality,
Ways to Further Strengthen One-Man Command and Improve Military Discipline
In the socialist society and its armed forces the main method of influence
is that of persuasion, while compulsion is retained as a specific, but
essential, method of action. "We must first of all persuade," V. I, Lenin
taught, "and then compel. We must first do everything possible to persuade,
and later compel." (Complete Collected Works, vol. 43, p 54)
Persuasion is the aggregate of organizational, educational, incentive, and
other measures. It is manifested in various forms: talks with personnel
(including individuals) on legal subjects, individual talks with violators
of discipline, discussions of offenses at meetings, criticism of short-
comings, encouragement of outstanding personnel, and so forth. The
Program of the CPSU, however, states that so long as there are manifesta-
tions of criminality, it is essential that strict measures be taken to
punish those individuals committing crimes which are dangerous to society,
those who viclate the rules of the socialist community, and those who do
not desire to join in the life of honorable labor.
The disciplinary code, which represents the legal foundation for the
disciplinary authority of a commander, contains a statute which says that
one of the methods for achieving firm military discipline is the skillful
combination and correct application of measures of persuasion and
compulsion. Methods of persuasion and compulsion in the actions of a
commander are expressed in his disciplinary rights, as applied with
respect to his subordinates, in the right to reward and punish.
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Punishment is an expression of compulsion. And although the sphere of its
application in the Soviet Armed Forces is limited, since compulsion is
used in the case of an insignificant number of military personnel, it is
still not possible to dispense with it. The well-known Soviet teacher
A. S. Makarenko said that an intelligent system of punishment is not only
legal, but also essential. It helps to develop strong character in the
individual, nurtures a feeling of responsibility, trains the will and
promotes an appreciation for human dignity and the ability to resist and
overcome temptations. n3
The USSR Minister of Defense and the Chief of the Main Political
Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy require that a great deal of
concern be given to equipping the officers, especially young officers,
with the knowledge of the fundamentals of military psychology and pedagogics
and methods of working with people, and that they be taught to skillfully
apply measures of persuasion and compulsion in educating their subordinates
as well as the correct application of disciplinary measures.
In our pedagogical and practical educational work we have developed
standards of mutual relations between people which have become the rules
for a socialist community.
In rewarding and punishing his subordinates, a commander must be convinced
of the justness and legality of his decision, and must see to it that each
disciplinary measure is applied with a feeling of responsibility and that
it produces beneficial moral results.
It must not be considered correct when individual officers show a preference
for compulsion and set out on a course of distortion of disciplinary
practice, exceeding their authority and applying methods of influence in
which they dmonstrate their power over their subordinates in unauthorized
forms. The execution of orders strictly on the basis of compulsion, and
the observance of service regulations out of fear of punishment cannot be
an ethical matter, one which is profoundly felt and voluntarily accepted.
Life itself teaches that only the soldier with a profound political
awareness can be regarded as genuinely disciplined.
Military agencils authorized by the state to use compulsion in the Soviet
Armed Forces an. the military tribunals which are called upon to combat
infringements of the security of the USSR, the combat capability of the
Army and Navy, and of military discipline and the established order of
performance of military service.
Great educational and preventive influence on the consciousness of military
personnel is rendered by conducting military tribunal cases in the units
in the presence of unit personnel. It is important that commanders,
political workers and staffs together with workers of the military
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tribunals and military prosecutors' offices approach the matter of
improving their organizational-political and educational levels in a
thoughtful manner.
A large role in the matter of safeguarding socialist legality belongs to
the Soviet procurator's office, to which the Constitution of the USSR ..-ad
the Statute on Supervision by the Procurator's Office in the USSR
assigned the highest responsibility for control over the precise fulfill-
ment of the laws by all ministries and their subordinate establishments
as well as by individual officials and citizens.
The Statute on the Military Prosecutor's Office was ratified by a law
passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet on 19 December 1966. It executes its
functions in the Armed Forces of the USSR in close interaction with the
military command, political organs, and the army and naval communities,
and is expected throughout its work to promote the strengthening of
socialist legality and the nurturing in military personnel of a spirit of
precise and undeviating compliance with Soviet laws, the military oath,
military regulations, and the orders of commanders and chiefs.
Military prosecutors carry out their functions independent of any local or
military organs and subordinate only to the General Procurator of the
USSR. Within the limits of their authority, they see to it that orders
and other legal acts by organs of the military directorate correspond to
the laws. They see to the compliance with laws in the work of investiga-
tive agencies, the observance of legality in the detention of arrested
personnel in guardhouses, the execution of laws on procedures for reviewing
and resolving complaints and requests, and the observance of labor
legislation with respect to workers and employees of enterprises,
organizations and establishments of the USSR Ministry of Defense, and
others.
The decree on measures to improve the work of agencies of the courts and
procurators' offices, approved in 1970 by the CPSU Central Committee and
the USSR Council of Ministers, is new proof of the concern of the party
and government for strengthening of the legal order and legality in the
nation. Agencies of the courts and the procurators' offices have been
assigned .the task of increasing the protection of socialist property and
of ensuring strict punishment of malicious thieves, in accordance with the
law. Agencies of the procurators' offices are required to prove the
effectiveness of their supervision over the precise and strict observance
of the laws by all state, administrative and public organizations, and to
more actively expose and eliminate cases of mismanagement, wastefulness,
and violations of state discipline.
V. I. Lenin linked legality with the cultural level. He pointed out that
without legality "there is no point in even talking about the creation of
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a culture." (Complete Collected Works, vol. 45, p 199) These ideas were
expressed well by M. I. Kalinin who wrote that the introduction and
consolidation of legality means an improvement in the cultural level of
the masses and imprwes the culture of the population and its legal
awareness.4
The Communist Party and the Soviet Government are systematically
implementing a course directed toward ensuring precision and smoothness
of the operations of all che links of the state and administrative
apparatus, toward the strict observance of the laws and standards of the
socialist community, and toward eliminating violations of the law and
other antisocial phenomena. Discipline and organization on the part of
all of soe.ety's members assumes primary importance under these conditions.
Achievement of these goals is facilitated by improvement of the legal
standards of the population by means of strengthening the legal education
of the workers and increasing the legal awareness of citizens on this
basis.
The political education of military personnel is inseparable from their
legal education. It must be regarded as an important component part of
ideological work in the army and navy. The main point in the legal
education of soldiers is that of instilling in them a respect for the
Jaws of the Soviet state and to ensure that each serviceman has a profound
understanding of the fact that strict observance of the laws, their
implementation, and the strengthening of legal order and discipline are
necessary conditions for the successful fulfillment of the tasks facing
the armed forces.
Legal education, which includes clarification of the profound sense of
such requirements of the military oath and regulations as the necessity
to be steadfast in bearing the rigors and deprivations of military service,
to be ready to sacrifice one's life in fulfillment of military duty, and
to consciously and strictly obey commanders, should promote the improvement
of the moral and psychological training of servicemen.
A great deal of experience has been acquired in the forces with respect to
propagandizing Soviet laws. This work represents an integral part of
legal education. Forms of legal propaganda have been developed such as
lectures, reports, discussions, including with individuals, filmed
lectures, and thematic evenings. Legal lectures and schools of legal
knowledge have been organized for various categories of military personnel.
Commanders and chiefs study the fundamentals of law at meetings and
seminars. Printed visual aids are issued on legal matters.
However, the legal education of servicemen has not been set up properly
everywhere. In certain places it is conducted without a definite system,
without consideration for the specific features of the service, and out of
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touch with the actual state of legality. There is a lack of differeL.tiated
approach to various categories of soldiers.
For purposes of improving the legal education of servicemen on 17 November
1970 the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and
Navy ratified a plan of measures directed toward improving this work
It is proposed that commanders and political organs systematically discuss
the state of legal education in the political directorates, in the
political organs, at conferences of commanders and political workers, and
in party and Komsomol organizations. It is important that this work be
set up on an organized basis and that specific responsibility for it be
achieved.
Extensive legal education of all categories of military personnel is one
of the most effective means for eliminating violations of the law. It
helps to increase the personal responsibility of each serviceman for
performing military duty and the work assigned to him, accomplishing tasks
connected with combat and political training, strengthening military
discipline and legality, and increasing the combat readiness of the
forces.
FOOTNOTES
1. In recent years the Supreme Soviet has passed a number of laws
regulating important aspects of social relations and, in particular,
principles of legislation of the USSR and Union republics on public
health, labor, marriage and the family, and so forth.
2. The day, month and year of ratification of ukases by the Presidium of
the USSR Supreme Soviet are indicated in parentheses.
3. A. S. Makarenko, Works, 'iolume 5, published by the Academy of
Pedagogical Sciences, 1951, p 379.
4. M. I. Kalinin, Selected Works, Volume 1, State Political Publishing
House, 1960, p 670.
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CORRELATION OF FORCES AND RATE OF ADVANCE
Col A. Gaponov
In practical combat and operational training frequently only average day's
standard load on personnel and average rate of subunit movement on the
battlefield are considered in computing rate of advance. We feel that this
method should be improved, with the aim of determining ways to achieve
comprehensive consideration of quantitative and qualitative indices of
friendly and hostile troops.
In this article we shall endeavor to demonstrate in general form a
simplified quantitative relationship between rate of advance aid correla-
tion of forces and troop battlefield mobility, and to preoent a formula for
computing rate of advance which is convenient for staff personnel. This
article is of a tentative nature and lays no claim to an exhaustive
analysis and full solution to this problem. In ,lucidating the objective
relations which determine rate of advance we shall assume that both
belligerents operate intelligently in combat and employ optimal means of
achieving their objectives.
In the general case attacking troops accomplish the twofold mission of
destroying the defending enemy and capturing specified ground. If one
arbitrarily excludes hostile resistance, then the attacking force, proceed-
ing in combat formations, would capture hostile territory at an average
rate of Vm km per day, the maximum allowable on the basis of the nature of
the terrain and technical capabilities of tanks aad infantry. In this
case, if depth of the combat mission comprises L km, the time of mission
accomplishment in days can be conditionally presented in the form of the
following relation:
Taking into account opposition by the defending force, the actual time re-
quired to accomplish the combat mission in attack will be
tA=ty-Fttd,
where ttd -- time required to achieve total destruction of the enemy.
Designating the average rate of troop advance during the conduct of combat
operations, that is the rate of advance (km per day) with Va, we obtain the
relation
V
-
t
_A
Vm ty+ttd ?
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(1)
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? The time required to achieve total destruction of the enemy (ttd) is ob-
tained by solving simplified equations of combat dynamics for the quadratic
law (model A)1 and can be expressed in the form
4vullr;;41
t = I In
td 2167,74
W37 n2
(2)
where N1 -- number of combat units of the attacking side at the beginning
of combat operations; N2 -- number of combat units of the defending side
at the beginning of combat operations; nl and n2 -- effective rate of fire
of the combat units of the attacking and defending sides respectively,
which are equal to the product of the average rate of fire and probability
of hitting the target with one round fired. Formula (2) is meaningful when
N,
N, V ti'
The cortelation of forces of the belligeren;?s, taking into consideration
their quantitative
by quantity
(El)
and qualitative
Ar3
indices is expressed
Improvement of all qualitative indices (weapons and equipment, personnel
combat and morale-psychological training, control systems and supply:, etc),
regardless of whether or not we are able to express them with a number,
has a single end objective -- achievement of superiority over the enemy in
rate of inflicting losses with a numerical equality in forces. This
objective can be achieved only under thE condition that
lia->1.
Now, after determining the value of ttd and substituting it in formula (1),
we find the analytical relationship between rate of advance and the basic
characteristics of the combat capabilities of the two sides:
V..
ii
V,1 f4-1
"
In ?
2 W n171 I?I
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(3)
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Formula (3) is meaningful if f>1. It follows from an analysis of this
formula that rate of advance is determined by the following parameters:
correlation of forces, takinr, into account their quantitative and qualita-
tive indices ?
?
an essential condition for
success thereby is superiority in forces over the adversary (f>1); combat
effectiveness of the *weapons of both sides (47.72-); depth of echelonment of
troops and weapons of de dderrling adversary (L); battlefield mobility of
attacking troops (VM).
The rate of advance correspondingly increases or diminishes with an increase
or reduction in any of these parameters. The strongest influence on the
end result (Va) is exerted by the correlation of forces (0 and battlefield
troop mobility (Vm). It is evident from the formula that if f?.0, then
Va
V --- 4.1, that is value Va approaches value Vm.
m
Thus the conclusions obtained from an analysis of formula (3) are in con-
formity with conclusions drawn from the theory and practice of combat opera-
tions.
At this point, however, it is appropriate to note that the simplifled com7
bat dyaamics equation, the solution of which obtains formula (2), can be
applied with certain restrictions to more or less uniform engagements and
battles. These restrictions are caused by the fact that in practice combat
operations contain the element of chance, the existence of which makes it
Impossible precisely to predict the outcome of an engagement or battle.2
Therefore the question arises of how applicable formula (3) is for analysis
of combat operations of the last war and to what degree one can derive
practical benefit from this.
We shall simplify formula (3) as applied to existing data on Soviet combat
operations, first expressing the formula graphically as a function of a
vm
single variable f.
V,
Graph of relationship between quantity va and correlation of forces (f).
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It is evident from an analysis of the curve in this diagram that in
general one can replace formula (3) within a certain range, with an
approximation which is allowable for practical purposes, with the linear
equat:.on portrayed in the diagram with a dashed line.
Making this substitution, we shall have
V
Vm
whence Va=k(f-1)Vm,
where k -- proportionality factor.
If ni=n2, then
(4)
(5)
Va=k(-1-1)V . (6)
N2 M
NI
Formula (5) applies when f>l, and formula (6) -- when -->1.
N2
Assuming n1=n2 when attacking a defending force (this equality closely
approaches the conditions of a meeting engagement), we commit a certain
error.3 But this error is of a system7tic nature and therefore will be
considered in comruting quantities inTiTand k with formulas (2), (3) and
(6), employing dat.. on wartime offensive operations. If the ratio of
qualitative indices of the two sides is known
/ 1
(V :2 ), then formula (5) is employed in
computations in place of formula (6).
We shall further note that in calculations one can estimate the correlation
of forces separately for each arm, without reducing their combat capabili-
ties to a single equivalent force of one or the other side.
Lacking a better method of determining correlation of forces, we shall
assume that with massive employment of combat units of various conventional
weapons arms, the ratio of the resultant forces of the belligerents will be
close to the mean arithmetic value of the ratios for these arms.
Taking this comment into account and employing formulas (2), (3) and (6),
we have elaborated several indices o5 Soviet combat experience during the
Great Patriotic War." Thc results of this elaboration are summarized in
tables 1 and 2. The calculations made it possible to determine:
numerical value of the index of average daily combat effectivencJs
of weapons employed by the two sides -- 6=in1n2 (on the basis of formulas
(2) and (3));
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proportionality factor -- k (according to formula(6)).
?
?1 ?
Massillon'
. . ..? ?
.
Hana.assoe 3931100:03.CTIO
3 =AIX Ni rISCTILIZ,
taxa (Ar ry
3
_.,,,,- '-
r os
ma
oeopo-
NM
I Km
(L.).
.ra -
1
nP0-
.10:twa*
'WM
elocrs
npopw-
sa o6o-
poN,
xr-
skacy
=
Cpe.a-
BHA
yoin
Ha.
c"..
neHHA
txx a
g Mug j
( V )
]?..
Raccmrtanswe
mamma)
no db
T3.33s 7?0?
1
(ces.
7
DOKATIPI;
dy
8
OO Sp-
T3.4-linine-
a
."'
pea.
use?
pea-
neer
TON.
willar4 e.
il'i
k
31111 HRH 1942/43 roaa . .2
Jlenie-oceinign 1943 roaa 3
KamnaHaa 1944/45 roaa ,
2-3
3-4
5-7
2-3
3-4
3-5
3-4
5-7
7-9
2.8.
4.3
6,0
4.5
13.0
14.0
1.25
1,25
1,20
3,6
10,4
11,7
0.34
0.28
0,24
0.07
0.10
0,08
3
Table 1. Offensive engagement indices for rifle divisions in penetrating
a tactical defense zone during the Great Patriotic War
Key to table: 1 -- campaign; 2 .-- 1942-43 winter; 3 -- 1943 summer-fall;
4 -- 1944-45 campaigns; 5 -- initial superiority in forces in penetration
areas (N1/N2); 6 -- in battalions (rifle battalions, infantry battalions);
7 -- in tanks and self-propelled guns; 8 -- in artillery; 9 -- average;
10 -- defense depth in km (L); 11 -- duration of defense penetration in
days (t,c1); 12 -- average rate of advance (km-per day) (Va); 13 -- com-
puted quantities; 14 average daily value 8
Note: Ve30 km per day was employed in computing quantity k
Analysis of the obtained results confirms the possibility of extending the
relations proceeding from formulas (2-6) to combined-arms combat.
This conclusion is substantiated in the first place by the fact that the
numerical values of the index of average daily combat effectiveness of the
weapons of both sides, 8, computed with formulas (2) and (3), are in
satisfactory agreement with the actual average daily ammunition consumption
by Soviet troops in these operations: a greater or lesser value 8 cor-
responds to greater or lesser average daily ammunition consumption in the
operations. This is easily demonstrated by comparing in Table 2 the dura-
tion of each of three operations and their corresponding quantities a (as-
suming identical P-Pmunition consumption per weapon unit for all operations).
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In addition, index B in its numerical value generally correctly reflects
the actual expenditure of ammunition by combat operation stages, It is
apparent from tables 1 and 2 that penetration of the operational defense
zone requires a greater daily expenditure of ammunition than for the entire
operation as a whole (first 4-6 days of the Vistula-Oder Operation), while
the greatest expenditure occurs on the first day of the operation, that is
during penetration of the tactical defense zone, Obviously the adversary
had analogous ammunition consumption dynamics during the course of combat
operations, as is attested by the figures on distribution of average daily
casualties for the same operation stages,
Table 2, Values B and k Computed on the Basis of the Indices of Several
Soviet Army Offensive Operations
Name of Operation
Duration of Com-
bat Operations,
days (t4)
Computed Quantities
Average Dai-
ly Value
Belorussian (23 June-29 August 1944)
68
0.006
0.08
Lvov-Sandomierz (13 July-29 August
1944) ... .....
48
0.009
0,08
Vistula-Oder (12 January-7 February
1945)
for the entire operation as a whole
on main attack axes of the front:
27
0.011
0.09
First Belorussian Front
4
0.09
0.08
First Ukrainian Front
6
0.038
0.06
Note: a) in computing quantity k we assumed that throughout the depth of
the entire operation Vm=50 km per day, and on the main axes of advance of
the fronts, during penetration of operational defense, Vm=40 km per day;
b) quantities S and k were computed with the same method as in Table 1,
while the overall correlation of forces was figured on the basis of men,
tanks, artillery, and aircraft,
In the second place, insignificant deviations of particular values of the
proportionality factor computed in tables 1 and 2 on the basis of formula
(6) from average k=0.08 indicate the acceptability of formula (3) for
analyzing combat operations of a combined-arms character and the practical
validity of its replacement by linear equation (4).
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?
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Substituting in formula (6) average value k=0.1 (rounding off to the
nearest tenth), we are able to compute approximately the average anticipated
rate of advance under conditions of employment of conventional weapons:
Va=0.1(F!1-1)Vm.
(7)
Formula (7) applies when 1