TRANSLATIONS FROM VOYENNAYA MYSL NUMBER 11 - NOVEMBER 1971

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• Publication Date: January 22, 1974
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STAT
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IIIIIIIII III~~~~~IIIIIIIIIII
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BROADCAST
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L".'SS DIGES1
Translations From "Voyennaya Myrl"
NUMBER 11 - NOVEMBER 1971
STAT
A::: T
PLEF~r RcT,
AGENCY. APnc1iiVu5
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STAT
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FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
FOREIGN PRESS DIGEST NO. 0004 -- 22 January 1974
TRANSLATIONS FROM 'VOYENNAYA MYSL'," No. 11, NOVEMBER 1971
Issue No. 11, November 1971, was signed to press on 13 October 1971.
War and the Socialist Revolution (3-14)
Maj Gen A. Mil.ovidov
On the Question of Programmed Learning (15-19)
Co.]. Gen I. Shkadov
Ideological-Political Training of Young Officers
of the Czechoslovak People's Army (20-24)
Maj Gen Vaclav Mati'dka
Evolution in the Correlation of Strategy,
Operational Art and Tactics (25-33)
Lt Gen I. Zav'yalov
24
Principles of Milit-ary Art and Their Development (34-44) 42
Col V. Chervonobab
Troop Control to the Level of Current Requirements (45-52)
Lt Gen M. Ivanov
General Principles of the Approach to Appraising
the Effectiveness of Combined Arms Control Systems (53-62)
Col N. Zubkov
67
Military Cambuflage (63-68) 79
Engr-Lt Col Kh. Adam and Lt Col R. Gebel'
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The Significance of the Cheimical Situation
and Its Evaluation (69-T2)
Engr-Ma3 Kh. Gorges
(Abridged translation by Col I. Andrushkevich)
Radio Electronic Equipment in Theaters
of Military Operations (73-82)
Mai Gen Sign Trps V. Grankin and
Engr-Col V. Galinskiy
V. I. Lenin and Soviet Military Science (83-87)
Col Ye. Rybkin
Book on Troop Control (88-96)
Col I. Chetverikov
87
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WAR AND THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION
(Military Problems in Theory of Scientific Communism)
Maj Gen A. Milovidov, Dootor of Philosophical Sciences, Professor
The present era of transition from capitalism to socialism, which was
? ushered in by the Great October Socialist Revolution, has placed mankind
face to face with an abrupt break with the old principles of societal.
affairs. Under conditions of rapid development of the world revolutionary
process, when socialism has become firmly esthblished in the wo::ld and has
become a powerful international force, under conditions of growing aggres-
siveness on the part of imperialism and increased potential for utilization
of the achievements of scientific and technological progress in war, the
problem of war and the socialist revolution has become particularly acute.
The present situation is both complex and conflictive. It demands dialec-
tical flexibility in analyzing and solving specific problems; a scientific-
ally substantiated conclusion on the fact that the road to socialism
passes through revolution, however, is mandatory and indisputable for the
peoples of all the nations of the world. "...Socialism," wrote Karl Marx,
"cannot be achieved without revolutions" (K. Marks and F. Engel's: Soch.
[Works], Volume 1, page 448).
The fundamental conflict of the present era -- the antagonistic conflict
between two opposed social systems -- can be resolved only by means of a
world socialist revolution -- this is the logical path of social develop-
merit of the modern world.
The militarists grossly falsify Marxist-Leninist doctrine on the socialist
revolution and declare it to be a special expansionist program. Equating
the terms war and revolution, they cynically ascribe to the Communists
aggressiveness and an attempt to resolve social conflicts with the aid of
war, while they describe Leninism as the product of "military thinking,"
of a unique military doctrine oriented toward "baptizing its revolution in
blood,"
Marxism-Leninism has provided a precise definition of war and the socialist
revolution and has revealed the dialectical interrelationship between them.
Its doctrine on the socialist revolution, on war and peace enables re-
volutionary parties to elaborate a scientifically substantied strategy and
tactics and to wage an implacable struggle against the lie of anticommunism,
a struggle both against rightist opportunists, who fear the revolution, and
against the adventuristic course of "leftist" elements.
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War and Revolution -- Social Phenomena of a Differing Character
War and revolution possess certain common traits. They are engendered by
the conditions of an exploiter society and constitute forms of political
struggle, a continuation of the policies of specific classes, ExIloitation
of the toiler masses and predatory wars are two aspects of one and the same
bourgeois policy. At the same time war and revolution are radically
dif fe: cant as social phenomena
War and revolution possess different sources, The socialist revolution
possesses first and foremost an internal source. It matures within the
capitalist society as a result of the objective laws of its development.
All economic development of the capitalist system leads to a termination c
the dominance of capitalism. "No force would destroy capitalism," wrote
Lenin, "if it were not urda~aft-ad by history" (Poln, Sobr. Soch. [Complete
Works], Volume 32, page 99). The socialist revolution involves the effect
of the law of conformity between production relations and the character
and level of development of productive forces. Its economic basis is th;a
conflict between the new productive forces and capitalist production
relations, which have become an inhibiting factor in their development.
The conflict is expressed in a sharp aggravation of the antagonistic con-
flict between labor and capital.
The socialist revolution is the result of the development both of objective
and subjective preconditions for social revolution in a given country.
The material, sociopolitical preconditions presume the existence of a,
political army of the revolution -- class forces which are politically,
ideologically and organizationally prepared to storm the bastions of the
old society. A war engendered by the domination of capitalism and/the
policies of the bourgeoisie is not always necessarily linked with an acute
conflict between productive forces and production relations.
The founders of scientific communism came out vigorously against the
theory of export, of the urging of revolution from without, and,'particular-
ly with the aid of war. '
Marx and Engels subjected to withering criticism those Blanqui'sts and
anarchists who claimed that it was sufficient to have an orga;,iized group
of conspirators in order to produce a revolution at any giveri time, At the
time of the negotiation of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk Lenin sternly
branded the "leftist Communists" as adventurers and pseudorcivolutionaries
who were calling for the spread of socialist revolution in ;Western Europe
even at the cost of the collapse of the Soviet government.' War would con-
stitute such an urging of revolution. These views are incompatible with
the theory of Marxism, which has always denied the "pushing" of revolu-
tions. Lenin angrily branded the idea of "revolutionary;'war" for the
purpose of priming the pump of the revolutionary process;; as advanced by
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the Trotskyites, as a "mangy revolutionary phrase," and people who think
that revolution can arise in any country on order as fools or provocateurs.
Adventurist theory is oriented toward passivity of revolutionary class
forces within a given country. The danger of such an approach to the
problem under present-day conditions was emphasized by Le Duan,'First
Secretary of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers' Party. "...One
cannot conclude," he wrote, "that war is an essential source of and con-
dition for the outbreak of revolution and that therefore one can sit +.dle
and wait for war to come, only then waging revolution."1
War and revolution differ in motive forces. Wars are waged both by
reactionary and progressive classes. A revolution is waged only by progres-
sive forces.
Preparations for unjust wars are kept completely secret from peoples, are
waged under false banners specially prepared by the military organization --
the army -- and express the selfish, narrow class interests of the bour-
goisie.
Progressive social forces capable of pronouncing a judgment of history
rise up in revolution. The socialist revolution is based on the political
activeness of the broad toiler masses, particularly the worker class,
guided by Marxist-Leninist parties. The revolution is prepared not by
machinations behind the scenes but rather by means of open and frank
mobilization of the masses. Without their sympathy and active participa-
tion a victorious revolution is impossible. Of unfading significance is
the Russian experience, about which Lenin wrote. "w.e were a small party
in Russia, but we had as allies the majority of soviets of worker and
peasant deputies throughout the country... Almost one half of the army was
with us, an army which at the time tvt3led at least 1D million men" (Poln.
Sobr. 5och., Volume 44, page 26).
Bolshevism united around itself the entire revolutionary vanguard and the
great majority of toilers. Lenin's nesis is extremely pertinent today,
when the opportunity has arisen to expand the social base of the revolu-
tion, when the problem of winnip6 over the bulk of the masses, the problem
of creating a broad front of antiimperialist forces has become one of the
most important problems in the strategy and tactics of Communist and worker
parties. Their struggle for implementation of general democratic slogans
and for peace is helping to create a mass political army of socialist
revolution. The general democratic struggle does not further postpone the
socialist revolution but rather draws it closer.
Falsifying Marxism-Leninism, the Maoists place the struggle for democratic
reforms in opposition to the cause of the socialist revolution. In their
opinion, the less developed democracy in capitalist countries is, the
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greater the chances for socialist revolution. This primitive, metaphysical
appraisal is incompatible with the dialectical Leninist idea of rapproche-
ment of the struggle for democracy with the struggle for socialism,
In the period of transition from capitalism to socialism it is not essen-
tial in each and every country, at each and every stage of its development,
to proclaim the slogans of socialist revolution. Whatever stages the
revolutionary masses must pass through, whatever intermediate programs and
slogans the Communists may advance in consolidating and rallying the
masses, they always remember that there lies ahead a struggle for the over-
thr o w of capitalism and the establishment of socialism. Under present-
day conditions of the development of mankind, national; anticolonial and
liberation revolutions, independent nations constitute tributaries which
flow into the general stream of the antiimperialist and anticapitalist
world revolution.
Propaganda and agitation alone are insufficient to bring the masses to sup-
port the position of ;:he proletariat; the masses themselves must gain
political experience for this. It would be not only unintelligent but
criminal to throw the vanguard alone into decisive combat before the masses
have been drawn into the struggle. Our party led the masses in the
assault on capitalism when suitable objective and subjective conditions
had been created for this, "when the consciousness, will and passion of
tens of millions of persons had been prepared for this by the entire course
of the struggle," state the Central Committee CPSU Theses "On the Vladimir
Il'ich Lenin Birth Centennial."
The fundameni:al law of revolution thus presupposes the presence of the
vanguard of a revolutionary class, as well as political experience of the
masses.
War and the socialist revolution differ in political content, end goals
and social consequences. In contrast to wars, which can be progressive or
reactionary, revolutions pursue just goals, which prompted Karl Marx to
call them the "locomotives of history." While an imperialist war serves
the aims of plundering the peoples of other countries, the seizure of
territories, markets, spheres of influence and the aims of destroying
revolutionary forces, the socialist revolution encompasses the entire
aggregate of economic, political and spiritual transformations which lead
to the total destruction of capitalism, to the building of socialism and
consequently to elimination of the source of all wars.
War and the socialist revolution, societal phenomena which are profoundly
different in content, frequently lead to diametrically opposite socio-
economic consequences. Imperialist wars have brought mankind incalculable
loss and suffering. Productive forces are savagely crushed and millions of
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human lives destroyed. Lenin sharply censured the-,e who lescribed wars as
an accelerator of development of productive forces, The arguments of
German professor Heniger in favor of an arms race as a stimulus of economic
progress were called by Lenin the babblings of a "nasty little man
dedicated to militarism" (Leninskiy Sbornik [Lenin Collection], XXVII, page
17).
Lenin's assessment of this ideologue of militarism has a direct rel-tion-
ship to the present-day apologists of aggression, who have fabricated a
special theory of the benefits of civilian utilization of the results of
research conducted on the basis of contracts with the military, on the
beneficent influence of the development of military technology for improv-
ing the health of science.
Social revolution means a transition to new, more progressive forms of
societal affairs. The Great October Socialist Revolution is the best
evidence of this. Those 10 days in October "shook the world," while the
54 years which have passed since then have changed it, The ideas and legacy
of the October Revolution consist in the total and ultimate victory of
socialism in the USSR, in the establishment and consolidation of the world
socialist system, in the burgeoning of the present-day labor, communist and
national liberation movement, in the profound change in the spiritual life
of mankind, The triumph of the Great October Revolution signifies a new
chapter in world history -- an era of unprecedented revolutionary accom-
plishments.
The essence of the revolution consequently lies not so much in compulsion,
which is characteristic of war, as in the creative establishment of a new
society.
War and socialist revolution coo not coincide in methods and forms of
achieving political goals. In contrast to war, for which employment of
means of armed violence and mass armed struggle is a specific, determining
indicator from the standpoint of form of implementation of political. goals,
the socialist revolution presupposes, depending on specific historical
conditions of place and time, a variety of ways, methods and means of
achieving common goals. Marxists have never claimed that the conquest
of power must he achieved everywhere and in all cases with identical means.
Lenin warned against stereotype in determining the forms of transition to
socialism and criticized attempts to shift the center of gravity from the
content of the term revolution to the forms of its manifestation. Withcut
predetermining in advance the method of gaining political power, without
absolutizing any given variant of implementing the socialist revolution,
he considered it essential to master all, without the slightest exception,
forms of struggle, to be prepared for a rapid shift from one form to
another. ",.,Marxism definitely does not renounce any forms of struggle,"
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wrote Lenin (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 14, page 1). The ruling classes do
not voluntarily yield power, and therefore revolution is always social
coercion, but it does not always constitute phys'cal, armed violence.
The methods and forms of gaining political power depend on the general
conditions of the era, the specific situation in each country and its na-
tional features, the acuteness of class conflicts, the correlation of
class forces, the degree of organization and political maturity of the
worker class and its allies, skilled party guidance, as well as on the
strength or weakness of resistance by the bourgeoisie. Consequently,
selection of forms of struggle is based not on subjective desires but
rather on the objective logic of historical development. Each party
elaborates its own policy, specifies areas, forms and methods of struggle
and selects, depending on circumstances, a peaceful or nonpeaceful path
of transition to socialism.
The Chinese schismatics have placed their dogmatic and adventurist position
in opposition to the scientific conclusions of the Leninist parties, which
have been confirmed by practical experience. A Marxist-Leninist concept of
the socialist revolution is alien to the Maoists. They reduce the revolu-
tionary process to extreme forms of armed activity, justify the correctness
of Blanquist insurrections, etc. They replace the decisive role of the
class struggle with the determining significance of war, absolutize armed
violence as the highest form of class struggle, as the main front of
struggle, and have declared war to be an ideal toward which one riust
strive.
In actual fact the highest form of class struggle is the socialist revolu-
tion proper. Armed violence cannot be called the highest form of class
struggle. It is the most acute but not the highest and not an absolutely
mandatory form.
Utilizing the ultrarevolutionary phrase fcr purposes of obfuscation, the
Maoists are playing into the hands of capitalism. Denying the possibility
of employing peaceful means, they express thereby a lack of faith in the
power of the worker class and its allies, in the strength of the socialist
community. Orienting themselves totally toward the achievement of results
on the basis of war and assessing the"cultural revolution" as a great mili-
tary exercise "with the got'. of preparing to wage a popular war," the
Maoists in fact are joining the general chant of the American "superhawks"
with their militarist slogan "Victory, Not Peace," Thus by the very logic
of things leftist slogans converge with the slogans of the extreme rightist
supporters of ultramilitarism, who openly state that they are constrained
by no caution in selection of the means of struggle.
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For justification of this petit-bourgeois, anarchist element, the Peking
propagandists have replaced materialist dialectics with sophistry and
eclecticism. They translate Marxist-Leninist dialectics into the language
of demagoguery and a subjectivist fast shuffle. They seek to make capital
on the element of authenticity, absolutizing it, removing it from the
general context. It is a well-known fact that a strategy of protracted
guerrilla warfare was implemented in China when an offensive was being
mounted on the cities from the rural areas. This strategy, failing to
take the concrete situation into account and hypertrophied to a global scale,
is expressed in the absurd theory of revolutionary war of the "world
village" (the entire nonindustrial world of -Asia, Africa, and Latin
America) with the "world city" (the industrially developed regions of
Europe and North America), which includes the Soviet Union. Thus the
specific knowledge of tactics of guerrilla warfare in an. agrarian country
is sophistically universalized and transferred to the world arena.
History indeed knows of many instances of temporary coincidence of war and
revolution, revolution and civil war, but this is not a natural law.
Maoist claims are rejected by Marxist-Leninist theory of socialist revolu-
tion and by the very experience ref the world revolutionary process. A
revolutionary situation does not necessarily become transformed into a
revolution as a result of war. The experience of the 1919 Hungarian
revolution is of interest. The bourgeois dictatorship collapsed under the
pressure of a powerful worldwide wave of revolution, as it was unable to
cope with the growing revolutionary crisis in Hungary. The Hungarian Com-
munist leader Bela Kun, who enjoyed solid support by the masses, took over
as head of government. As Lenin stated, the transition to a Soviet system,
to dictatorship of she proletariat was incomparably easier and more
peaceful in Hungary (Poln. Sobr. Soch.,, Volume 38, page 260).
The young Hungarian revolution was crushed by the forces of domestic and
external counterrevolution. Soviet Russia, whose every effor.i: was committal
to the struggle against foreign intervention and domestic counterrevolution,
was unable to lend that assistance which would have been possible under
different circumstances. In the People's Damocrac.ies of Central and South-
eastern Europe the worker class, under the leadership of Marxist-Leninist
parties, ensured an essentially peaceful transition from democratic to
socialist revolution, under different historical conditions, with a more
favorable balance of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary forces in the
international arena.
It is characteristic that a revui?.icion is not always accomplished in that
country which has participated in war. The revolution is victorious
wherever a revolutionary situation has been established. Sixty-one nations
were drawn into World War II, while a socialist revolution took place in 11,
countries, where internal preconditions existed.
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Nor is civil war a mandatory form of class political struggle, Lenin
spoke of the necessity of the most acute class struggle under certain
historical conditions of civil war. One must bear in mind the fact that
"the world bourgeoisie is organizing and waging civil war against the
revolutionary proletariat..." (Poln, Sobr. Soch., Volume 39, page 187).
The Bolsheviks demonstrated an example of combination of peaceful and non-
peaceful means of struggle and flexibly utilized them, depending on the
prevailing situation.
Specific patterns and relationships are inherent both in war and socialist
revolution. The course and outcome of an armed conflict depends on the
correlation of economic, moral-political and military forces of the
belligerent states. This is the most general law of war, and war is not
at all mandatory for the transition from capitalism to socialism.
Revolution as a mandatory and inevitable condition for transition by any
capitalist country to socialism, with all the unique features and diversity
of the individual countries, develops on the basis of the same common
patterns of collapse of the exploiter edifice of state and the establish-
ment in one form or another of a dictatorship of the proletariat, which
has entered into an alliance with other toiler strata, liquidation of
exploiter classes, nationalization of the means of production and establish-
ment of socialist production and other societal relations in city and
village, and acquisition of cultural treasures by the broad toiler masses.
Although the genesis of an imperialist war is determined by laws in-
herent in imperialism, it can be prevented, since a new world balance of
forces has been created. Nothing can prevent a socialist revolution, how-
ever, since there are no other means than socialist revolution to resolve
the increasingly-acute conflict between labor and capital.
Thus war and the socialist revolution, constituting societal phenomena
engendered by the exploiter capitalist system, are not mandatorily linked
by cause and effect relations. They have fundamentally different sources
of origination, motive forces, method., and forms of implementing political
goals. The attitude of the masses toward them is fundamentally different.
The laws of war and revolution are specific.
Features of dif.ferenc,: between war and socialist revolution do not exclude
but rather presume a dialectical interrelationship, flexible, mobile,
multifaceted and profoundly contradictory interlinks between them.
Correlation Between War and Socialist Revolution
Revolutionary processes cannot be viewed in an isolated fashion, abstract-
ing from other social phenomena, including wars between nations and civil
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wars. Wars between nations have a definite effect on development of the
class struggle and maturation of the revolutionary situation; the so-
cialist revolution in turn influences the origination of a war, its course
and outcome.
Wars between nations, particularly world wars, exert a dual influence on
the socialist revolution: on the one hand they speed up the ripening of a
revolutionary situation and on the other hand inhibit and complicate
achievement of the goals of revolution.
In many cases an aggressive, unjust war functions as a catalyst of revolu-
tionary processes. It leads to an excessive strain on all socioeconomic
contradictions of capitalism and creates a dynamic situation as regards the
political interrelationships between classes. World War I generated in
Russia prof'iind revolutionary moods among the masses and placed them
before a dilemma: to perish or to overthrow the yoke of capital by
revolutionary means, to pass final judgment on social institutions which
had lost their viability.
Under certain conditions war is capable of accelerating the maturation of
objective and subjective preconditions for a socialist revolution.
In the first place, an unjust war exposes the policy of the ruling classes,
unmasks its class, antipopular character and promotes a deepening of the
"summit" crisis. The conflict between people and government is manifested
particularly acutely when a war fails to bring victory to the aggressor.
Under these conditions the government is unable to pull the nation out of
crisis, writhes in agony, going from one extremity to the other, displaying
nervousness and confusion. Political improvisations may assume the
character of governmental desperation. The "summit" loses the ability to
administer and govern.
Secondly, during the course of an aggressive war the government is more
dependent on the people than during peacetime. The masses are drawn into
the war by the millions. The times are long since past when, for example,
it sufficed Nicholas I to give the command: "Gentlemen, mount up! France
has become a republic!" t o strangle with impunity a revolutionary war by
means of intervention. Today the militarists are compelled to adapt them-
selves and adjust, but opportunities for maneuver are narrowing, During
war it is more difficult to play at democracy. Militarist propaganda
loses its force, since it contradicts the experience of the masses. In
addition, the highly-trained,, militaristic officer caste dwindles away in
numbers as casualties rise. The toiler masses, now dressed in uniforms,
possess in their hands weapons which they can turn against their oppressors.
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Thirdly, war aggravates social antagonisms, brings even greater suffering
to the toilers and deepens the discrepancy between the rising level of
greedy demands of the bourgeoisie and toiler living standards,
Today this te*~dency is -'hewing up increasingly clearly in the world's
richest capitalist natioi., which is staggering v.ider the burden of war in
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. In the United States the mad rampage of
militarization, whipped to a fever pitch by the war, is dev,'uiing the
lion's share of the gross naticaal product. The arms race and related
climb in military expenditures constitutes the main reason for a growing
burden of taxation. The monetary crisis, which is leading to inflation --
rising prices, stagnation or decline in real wages -- is becoming a real
calamity to the toilers. The monetary crisis which broke out in the United
States has led to confusion throughout the capitalist world.
Crisis phenomena, which are aggravated in the course of an unjust war, im-
part greater dynamism to the historical process. "...It is precisely the
'instability' of capitalism," wrote Lenin, "which is that enormous progres-
sive factor which is accelerating societal development, drawing the
masses to an increasing degree into the mainstream of societal life, com-
pelling them to think about its structure, compelling them to 'forge out
their own prosperity"' (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 2, page 208).
Fourthly, war exerts influence on a regrouping of class forces and promotes
changes in the sociopolitical situatic:n which cxestes an objective pos-
sibility for a decisive onslaught on capitalism. The popular masses open-
ly engage in sociopolitical affairs. Indignation breaks through to the
surface. There occur active mass demonstrations by the worker class and
progressive forces, which escalate into decisive, revolutionary actions.
Tile masses acquire their own political experience and rally around their
political vanguard, the worker class.
Symptomatic phenomena are occurring today in the United States, to a
substantial degree under the influence of the war. Animosity and hostility
toward the military-industrial complex is being aroused; there is a lack of
confidence in both the Democratic and Republican parties. Confusion and
dissatisfaction are being manifested even among those elements friendly
toward the regime; more and more social groups are escaping from the in-
fluence of the ruling class.
In the recent past the leaders of the military-industrial complex spoke
much about the stability of capitalism, counting on the political in-
difference of large segments of the population, on the "silent majority."
The process of activization of the masses in a country whose rulers are
waging bloody aggression is becoming increasingly apparent, Broad segments
of the population are being drawn into the struggle, including those which
prior to the dirty war in Vietnam maintained a state of political lethargy.
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This awakening frequently channels into various streams of a spontaneous
antimonopoly, antimilitarist, national-democ-Tatic movement. One must bear
in mind, however, that it can also be utilized by reactionary forces. It
is extremely important to bring the nor.proletarian masses into the world
revolutionary liberation movement headed by the worker class and Marxist-
Leninist parties.
Fifthly, war speeds up the process of delimitation of class elements in
the imperialist army. During World War I favorable conditions developed in
Russia for movement by soldiers and sailors to the side of the revolution,
for development of the class struggle emong the troops. The prediction of
Friedrich Engels that the day would come when soldiers under arms would
refuse to kill their brothers and fathers had come true.
Under present-day conditions increased social unreliability of military
personnel, particularly under the influence of the dirt}- and unsuccessful
war which is being waged in Indochina, is characteristiz even of the army
of the citadel of modern capitalism, the United States, It is true that
this army still constitutes a powerful war machine capable of carrying out
inhuman orders but, to quote the magazine Newsweek, the war in Vietnam has
become "poison in the veins of the American army."
We are all familiar with the fact that military personnel transferred from
Vietnam to other units, including in Western Europe, carry with them a
spirit of distrust and rebelliousness. Upon arriving home they frequently
become antiwar activists. In the spring of 1971 Washington was stunned by
a demonstration by Vietnam veterans, which took place in conjunction with
widespread strikes by American toilers, a stepped-u? movement against
racial oppression and increasing public protest against the domination of
the military-industrial complex and the bureaucrat:Lc police edifice.
In order to achieve development of the revolutionary situation it is
essential that people, accumulating political experience under the in-
fluence of Marxist-Leninist ideology, reach an awareness of their class
missions, that a substantial increase in mass political awareness and
activeness take place on the basis of increased organization, conscious
discipli"e and expansion of the influence and leadership role of the
Communist Party. International solidarity of the worker class, interna-
tional solidarity in the revolutionary struggle, and unification of
various currents of the revolutionary process into a single mainstream
capable of crushing the exploiter system, acquires particular importance.
An unjust war contains negative aspects from the standpoint of prospects
for development of the socialist revolution. Accelerating its advance
in certain cases, wars can have a negative effect:. Under conditions of a
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war situation, a reactionary government endeavors to establish a rigid
dictatorship,, strengthens the military-bureaucratic edifice, encourages
terrorist actions against the toilers and the liberation movement, and
organizes reprisals against revolutionary and democratic elements.
During the period of preparing for and in the course of waging war the
imperialists, as is the case, for example, in the United States, endeavor
to chain society with despotic military rule, All aspects of activity are
permeated with bureaucracy and militarization. Factory, office, city, and
the state as a whole are transformed into a barracks. Liberal American
journalist Fred Cook had reason to call the United States a symbolic
juggernaut - - a garrison state, a being of ruthless force demanding of its
subjects blind faith and a willingness for self-destruction.
Political repression, military despotism, lawlessness and the employment of
cruel, punitive actions complicate revolutionary activities and make the
establishment of links between the worker class and the masses more dif-
f icult.
In the course of war, under conditions of intensified political reaction,
favorable soil is created for d=formation of revolutionaries and the
burgeoning of opportunism. Great numbers of petit-bourgeois elements, in-
fected with opportunism, elements who have evaded mobilization, replace
cadre workers who have bees. cast into the field of battle. Savage acts
of repression against the most, conscious members of the worker class and
their leaders can revive conciliatory, compromise-prone parties and trade
unions, which make political deals with the bourgeoisie, making capital
on the nationalist-chauvinist attitudes of ideologically immature in-
dividuals.
There also exists a danger of another kind. An imitation of revolutionary
nature, leftist adventurism may arise in an atmosphere. of unrest, dis-
satisfaction and growing anger against militarism.
The strategy and tactics of the Communist and worker parties rigorousLy
take into account all the plus and minus points of the effect of a war in
a given specific historical situation.
Positive prospects are borne in mind under conditions of any and all
difficulties. The exploiter classes, initiating aggression, have the goal
of diverting the attention of the toiler masses from internal political
crises, of disuniting and fooling the masses, of destroying the vanguard,
of weakening the revolutionary movement of the proletariat. Their cal-
culations, however, ultimately fail. A general tendency of development of
the class-antagonistic society is specifically revealed in this area --
the law of discrepancy between the content of the objective and the
pract'.cal results of the activities of the ruling class.
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The influence of war on development of the class struggle and maturation
of the revolutionary situation is not one-sided. A process of inverse
influence is extremely important. The effect of a victorious socialist
revolution is particularly powerful. It creates a new, unprecedented op-
portunity to eliminate war from the experience of society. Only a social-
ist revolution can liquidate the exploiter classes and do away with the
conditions which produce wars. The Great October Socialist Revolution
plucked our nation from the maw of a bloody imperialist war. Popular
dcmocra-ic followed by socialist revolutions in many European and Asian
nations helped bring World War II to a speedy end. When we, wrote Lenin,
'overthrow, ultimately defeat and expropriate the bourgeoisie throughout
the world, not only in one country, wars will become impossible" (Poln.
Sobr. Soch.,.Volume 30, pp 133-134). Complete accomplishment of this task
is a thing of the future, although even now, where victorious socialist
revolutions have taken place in many countries, with the ensuing creation
of a mighty community of socialist states, which enjoy vast international
prestige and authority, a formidable obstacle has been placed in the path
of the aggressive policies of i-.nperialism. The era of imperialism has
been correctly defined as an era of wars and revolutions. It is nou pos-
sible to prevent or even exclude world wars from society even prior to the
complete victory of socialism tlroughout the world. The victory of so-
cialist revolutions in a number of countries has given particular im-
portance to external, international conditions of maturation of precondi-
tions for a socialist revolution in other countries. Socialism is receiv-
ing the opportunity to dictate to the iiorld bourgeoisie both the forms
of struggle and the battlefield as well.
The ratio between peaceful and nonpeaceful forms of socialist revolution
has changed substantially. Under conditions of total hegemony of im-
perialism the peaceful path of revolution was improbable, an extremely rare
historical possibility, although extremely desirable. Since the war a
socialist revolution without wa has become increasingly probable, a fact
which of course does not remove from the agenda or diminish the role of the
nonpeaceful course of revolution.
Economic development of socialist nations constitutes a powerful and
revolutionizing factor in the world,
Lenin appraised economic success as a force and factor of revolution. One
can hardly exaggerate the effect on the masses elsewhere in the world
produced by successful development of a new society in a number of countries
in various parts of the globe. The very fact of existence of a socialist
world constitutes enormous assistance to the toilers in the capitalist
nations in their struggle for their rights.
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The Comprehensive Program of Further Deepening and Improvement of Coopera-
tion in Development of Socialist Economic 'Lntegration of the CEMA Member
Nations, passed at the 25th Session of the Council for Economic Mutual
Assistance (1971), attests to the political solidarity of the, nations of
the socialist community, to the indisputable advantages of socialism over
capitalism and, 'i.he attractive force of the., positive example of socialism.
Under peacetime conditions one observes enormous changes,in development
of the world revolutionar=y process. Imperialism is receiving increasingly
telling blows both in the central areas of its domination and on the
flanks -- delivered by the peoples of colonial and dependent: countries.
Everywhere, in all capitalist nations, the bourgeoisie is experiencing
an intensifying onslaught by the labor movement. Militant demonstrations
by tens of r,.illions of proletarians constitute the best response to the
fabrications of the enemies of Leninism, who are spreading a lie about the
alleged loss of revolutionary spirit by the worker class,
The founders of scientific communism have emphasized time and again that,
utilizing the entire arsenal of means of revolutionary overthrow, it is
essential to seek ways toward less painful forms of revolutionary trans-
formations. Marx Marx and Engels stated that it was desirable for the prole-
tariat to take over power by peaceful means, without armed violence, with
a minimum of lives lost and detriment to productive resources, in order to
speed up the building of socialism.
Taking into account the experience of the Great October Socialist Revolu-
tion, Lenin stated that although the socialist revcli. `ion connected with
the world war led to the collapse of capitalism, "one could not conceive of
a more painful, more difficult transition, more acute deed and a more acute
crisis, undermining all productive forces" (Poln, Sobr. Soon,, Velum' 36,
page 397). Revolution breaking out during Oar "is a particularly difficult
case of birth" of a new social system. Lenin's idea was reflected in the
Manifesto of the Communist International, adopted at the First Comintern
Congress: "Never artificially inciting civil war, Communist parties en-
deavor to make it as brief as possibly when a civil war of necessity
occurs, to reduce the number: of victims and particularly to ensure the
victory of the proletariat."
In the eighties of the last century the founders of Marxism approached the
prospects of a temporary convergence of the socialist revolution with a
general European war "with redoubled caution." Under the new conditions,
Lenin emphasized, particular prudence is necessary, since war "will
result in unprecedented brutalization and backwardness of all Europe..."
(Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 36, page 397).
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A nuclear missile war would lead to even more devastating consequences than
the two world wars. Such a war could destroy a lrrge part of the world's
productive resources, is capable of inflicting ill.-afforded losses on the
worker class and retarding the movement toward communism, since it would
take a long time to rebuild. the economy, culture, and. local resources.
The end objective of the socialist revolution is not s mply the overthrow
of capitalism at any price but rather the building of communism.
The Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence is consequently not a temporary
slogan but rather a realistic, scientifically-substantiated political
course. It most fully reflects the interests of the toilers of the entire
world and the interests of development of the world revolutionary process.
The Chinese dissenters scoff :9t the Leninist idea of peaceful coexistence.
They portray Marxist-Leninist.^ in the. caricature of toothlass pacifists
who are counting on "the love of peace and humanitarian nature of the im-
perialists"; at every opportunity :hey raise a cry about an' alleged deal
between the USSR and the United States. They cynically ignore the: genuine
dialectic of Marxist-Leninist foreign policy, characteristic of which are
purposefulness, consistency, boldness and decisiveness, refusal to
compromise in the struggle against imperialist aggression, and at the same
time composure, caution, and precise calculation. The dialectics of the
Leninist foreign policy course are consequently such that "the love of
peace and willingness to offer suitable resistance to aggression are
totally merged and coalesced in our policy.i2
The 24th CPSU Congress, in its "Freedom and Peace for the Peoples of Indo-
china!" appeal and its "For a Just and Solid. Peace in the Near East"
declaration, confirmed a readiness and willingness to continue resolute
support of the just cause of the peoples of Indochina and the Near East, which
have been made the victims of imperialist aggression.
A revolutionary course without war is not reformism, it is not a negation
of the revolution, nor does it constitute social partnership between the
proletariat and the bourgeoisie; it is a savage bttle which demands of
Marxist-Leninist parties flexibility, firmness and resoluteness. It is not
demobilization but rather mobilization of the masses, isolation of both
rightist opportunists and "leftist" sectarians and schismatics.
Peaceful coexistence between nations of diff3ring social systems does not
mean absolutization of peaceful forms of socialist revolution in a given
country, nor does it exclude the employment of arned forms of revolution
in certain areas of the class struggle. "The policy of peaceful coexistence
is not in contradiction to the right of oppressed peoples to utilize in the
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struggle for their liberation that path which they consider necessary --
military or, nonmilitary...i3
The struggle between socialism and capitalism is a class struggle in all
areas of societal affairs and activities, including military. Under con-
ditions of increased aggressiveness on the part of imperialism, the
greatest vigilance is necessary. Our Communist Party is
rigidly
guided
by Lenin's instructions that "we must accompany our
by stepping up our military preparedness..." (Poln.
steps
Sobr.
toward
Soch.,
peace
Volume
40,
page 248). Minister of Defense A. A. Grechko declared at the 24th CPSU
Congress that the Soviet Union is prepared, Logether with the other so-
'ialist nations, to respond to force with superior force.
FOOTNOTES
1. Le Duan: "Under the Glorious Party Banner," Pravda, 24 March 1970.
2. L. I. Brezhnev: Speech delivered at a meeting of constituents on 12
Juae 1970.
3. Mezhdunarodnoye Soveshchaniye k.ommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partiy
(International Conference of Communist and ?-Iorker Parties), Politizdat,
1970, page 317.
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ON THE QUESTION OF PROGRAMMED LEARNING
Col Gen I. Shkadov, Chief, Main Directorate of Military Educational
Institutions of the Ministry of Defense USSR
The principal task in the area of training officer cadres consists in
implementing the resolutions of the 24th CPSU Congress on further
development of higher and secondary specialized education in conformity
with the demands of scientific and technological progress, improvement in
the quality of training and ideological-political indoctrination of future
specialists.
In accomplishing this task military educational institutions not only
equip students with the requisite volume of knowledge and practical skills,
a volume rapidly growing under present-day conditions, which constitutes
an objective pattern; they also form in sti'dents a scientific philosophical
outlook and creative thinking, indoctrinate Communist conviction, party-
mindedness, moral-psychological and professional qualities. Therefore
implementation of party emands is inconceivable without seeking new and
improving existing form:, ?f organization of the curricular process and
methods of training and inductrination.
Collective study efforts by military iducational institutions in this area
have enriched our educational science with effective methods cf working
with students, have created the opportunity to improve organization of the
curricular process and have made it possible to incorporate modern. tech-
nical devices the employment of which within the framework of tradicional
forms has promoted intensification of he learning process and improved
control.and management of this process.
An article by Lt Gen P. Vashurin entitled "More Widely Adopting Programmed
Learningi1 and responses to this article2 reflect an endeavor on the part
of military higher educational institutions faculty to achieve further
improvement of the curricular process as well as their interest in this
problem, to which more than 5000 publications have been dedicated in the
last 10 years in the Soviet Union alone.
During this same period effective studies of the problems of programmed
learning have been conducted at military educational institutions. In 1967
a special scientific theory Conference was held; on the basis of the
results in this conference clear-cut guidelines were presented for the con-
duct of scientific investigation in the area of improving the curricular
process and one of its elements, programmed learning. In conformity with
these guidelines, a comprehensive scientific research effort is being
conducted under the general supervision of the Main Directorate of Military
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 1 4
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Educational Institutions of the Ministry of Defense USSR at service
academies, schools and in other bodies. It is planned to complete this
program by the end of this year. A number of conclusions based on this
program are already being implemented in the schooling process.
We should note that matters pertaining to programmed learning which are
discussed in the journal Voyennaya Mysl' reflect the results of these
studies.
The conclusions of scientific investigations and experience in utilizing
programmed learning methods at military educational institutions and at
higher educational institutions of the Ministry of Higher and Secondary
Specialized Education USSR indicate that they produce positive results,
which are influencing the rate of learning, quality, depth and firmness of
assimilation of knowledge by students and attest to its effectiveness.
But in order to utilize this method with maximum effect for accomplishing
the overall task, it is essential clearly to see its advantages and draw-
backs and to determine the role and place of programmed learning in
instructional procedure.
In the initial period of elaboration of this problem, when there was lack-
ing a clear-cut definition of the essence of programmed learning, its con-
tent, as well as its tole and place in the instructional process, some
specialists excessively enlard the area of application of programmed
learning. The author of the article "More Widely Adoptin(r? Programmed
Learning" as well as the authors of several replies to this article also
failed to avoid this error. They continue to assign it the function of
determining demands on future specialists, determination of an optimal
volume of knowledge and skills, elaboration of scientifically-substantiated
curriculum plans and programs, organization of the instructional procedure,
lecture methods, employment of technical devices in teaching, etc. This
is evidently due to an insufficiently clear idea on the differences between
programmed learning, the programming of instruction , scientific organiza-
tion of the instruction process, curriculum and instruction programs.
As early as 1967 an editorial in the journal Sovetskaya Pedagogika (No 7,
page 41) st C(o) P
cs c S
where Ecs -- effectiveness of new control system; E(S)-- effectiveness of
old control system; p -- commensurability factor of system operational-
tactical effectivenss and cost.
If this condition is not observed, that is economic outlays for the con-
struction: or improvement of system exceed the rise in the required level
of its operational-tactical effectiveness, the control system is in-
expedient. In this case ways to reduce its cost should be sought.
Other criteria, reflecting the specific features of the functioning of
various system elements, can also be employed in appraising individual
control subsystems. For example, in an appraisal of control of radio and
radar reconnaissance these will include: anticipated number of enemy
installations reconnoitered, timetables for presentation of data on enemy
offensive %t'.clear weapons and other targets, cost of efficiently operating
reconnais,arLce means.
Criteria for appraising rear services control can include probability of
prompt support services fir troop combat operations, quantity of current
stores at supply dumps_ outlx,.: for the transport of delivered supplies
and equipment, as well as the cost of maintaining rear services records,
etc. Control subsystems of the various arias also have their own specific
effectiveness indices. General principles of approach to effectiveness
appraisal and many of the above-examined criteria; however, are applicable
for describing each subsystem.
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MILITARY CAMOUFLAGE*
Engr-Lt Col Kh. Adam; Lt Col R. Gebel', Candidate of Military Science
The experience of World W ar II and particularly of the national liberation
wars of the postwar period indicates that success in any military operation
is inconceivable without adequate concealment of both m:.litary installa-
tions and troop activities. Continuous improvement in camouflage and
concealment techniques in peacetime promotes maintenance of a high degree
of troop combat readiness.
As is well known, there exist various approaches toward studying camouflage,
its content and structure. Tn our investigations we proceed from the posi-
tion that there exists a dialectical interrelationship between camouflage
and hostile reconnaissance. The essence of this interrelationship con-
sists in the fact that reconnaissance constantly sees to detect targets
and to determine their nature., and this engende:-s in the opposing side an
objective necessity and effort to resort to various forms of camouflage
and concealment (active and passive).
Figure 1 shows the structure of military camouflage, as well. as the inter-
relationship between its nature and demands imposed, as the authors see it.
Camouflage is divided into tactical, operational, and strategic.
Tactical camouflage is effected on a tactical scale and consists: in utiliz-
ing time of day or night, geographic and weather conditions, employing
camouflage devices and materials, with the aim of concealing (camouflaging)
separate installations and small subunits, as well as for simulating
solitary installations (small subun.'.ts) and displaying feigned tactical
activity in combination with observance of camouflage discipline.
Operational camouflage is a type of operation support. It promotes the
achievement of operational surprise. It includes: keeping operation
preparations secret (radio silence, concealed control, dissemination of
false information to the enemy) ; concealment of troop regroupings, camou-
flage of assembi areas of support echelons (reserves and supply bases) ;
creation of dummy troop concentrations, command posts, defensive installa-
tions, structures, etc.
The effect of operational camouflage is achieved only with strict obser-
vance of tactical camouflage measures.
* MilitArwesen, No 9, 1970; No 3, 1971.
79
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Bo wYcR n'nCNU/)u;rn,u
TONl7.7u'/eC Unepo;n t7~J0/7If J11
NoA 4 ; cK;r~
9vda'U51- 3eY.7 ce7 Z
Cam ao-
.iccxupyenv2a
o6semo 24
r%>NmUYCL'.YaA U C/I0~7U3~+UN C,7
AO39edxO /Lw'Pua urn? 28
Figure 1. Structure of military camouflage
Key to figure: 1 -- military camouflage; 2 -- tactical; 3 -- operational;
4 -- strategic; 5 -- missions; 6 -- camouflaged object; 7 - physical
properties; 8 -- basis for meeting requirements; 9 -- aim; 10 -- demands;
11 -- aggregate of conditions; 12 -- objective conditions; 13 -- manpower,
means and purpose of camouflage; 14 -- subjective conditions; 15 -- camou-
flage properties; 16 -- theoretical knowledge; 17 -.- terrain concealment
properties; 18 -- means and methods of enemy reconnaissance; 19 -- camou-
flage effect; 20 -- revealing signs; 21 -- camouflage discipline and ob-
servance of secrecy; 22 -- weather conditions and tine of day or night;
ijOCNaA6/ dNp a 1OonNeNUN m~l?ccdoHUu
~- - - - - r
- CunSr, C 9i
a77J9ubcm I
a710Kyn 3 ____
NOCmb (/C - ? 12
CJa:x,nua? Ccr6aeN?
NS;e ycno 1'/eNSIB
reopcmu? au~ ycncalfl4 I
VGCNUe 16
- _ . 1 , a r 4cwuw -
~a c"d5 ? pvJaedvu
hfacxa a- C,;JO rromuaNU I
P Y-:,77.40- M7
d0YN0A dUC m'J
[(UnnUNO U 18
m,,1, 6 ue
;aau.+ U I
epenq
I P: rue#Ue cymcN22 ~
YOr7ONoU Pa 23
1;'JCNUp0a0 V-
'V'; /e CdQUCf-
15do
"OCNU;7O ?
50q NSW
ff-Min-NU.
/,yw ; ue
npr'7NOxw;
201
O Py.wcx' (uU
'Cl 25
PiecmNDCmu
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(Key to Figure 1 on previous page, continued) 23 -- commander decision;
24 -- properties o2 ~.nstallatic.i to be camouflaged; 25 -- terrain back-
ground; 26 -- types (forms) of camouflage; 27 -- simulation; 28 -- hostile
reconnaissance; 29 -- objective
Strategic camouflage as we define it constitutes a component of defense of
home territory and includes camouflage of important installations from the
moment of their construction. It is quite obvious that not all such
camouflage measures can and should be carried out in peacetime.
The objective of camouflage depends on the nature of the proposed actions
(o,)eration) and their scale. In general form it will reduce to preventing
the enemy from discovering our intentions, to deluding the enemy, and thus
minimizing potential losses. This is achieved by concealing troops well,
by reducing the degree of recognition and identification of targets (by
altering their external configuration, color, etc), as well as by feigned
actions (demonstration).
The following types of camouflage are differentiated on the basis of
properties of camouflaged objects: concealment against direct observation -
optical, light, sound, heat, infrared, radio and radar (antiradar), con-
cealment of operation of friendly reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering
devices.
Concealment of troops and weapons from hostile ground and air observation
is one of the principa' duties of commanders of all echelons, Concealment
can be total or partial, depending on the situation, terrain conditions,
as well as av;.:Llable time. It is possible to reduce the revealing signs of
troops and objects, if it is not possible to conceal them from hostile
observation, by altering their external appearance. For example, a large
camp or supply base can be camouflaged as a town, a tank farm can be
camoufiaged as apartment houses, While individual military installations
can be camouflaged as rubble, smoldering ruins, etc. Important elemants
of a camouflage effort are the mounting of feigned assaults and the con-
struccion of dummy defensive fortifications (control posts). Such ac-
tions can be employed not only at the tactical echelon but particularly
at the operational and strategic-
We have already noted the existence of a direct relationship between
hostile reconnaissance and camouflage (it is indicated in Table 1). The
task of camouflage is to conceal installations (targets) from hostile
ground, air and space observation both in the area of combat operations
and deep in rear areas. Any of the types of camouflage enumerated in the
table presumes the fullest utilization of terrain, weather conditions and
various means of concealing and camouflaging objects in order to reduce the
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2 1
Ln It till 411.)JP 11
X X
Y J
O r.
K G
CIIBIIIMB
X X X
Ln
UIIOgillalfauocual
x x x x X
CV
= N
YMrae
x
x n
-.-CCd OHIrud
God
y y `
?OiOJadaU xroH
-1101~1JVJ1 fHN
X
-PCHNI.Cv3tron
Hvrancvd pox]anHIF
?!dlouol YYl]rad7?
XXX :>C X X
Uod
?(le?tUUVY (JOM]
p-anudl.arloL cfc
x X
N
-
--
-
r .
n
per
I1a1IH
X
x
Y8NRI,CV3000
t~ YMrauCYdovltj)
r-(
X x x X
XOQOHOI])A mill
?N
OH CHHOW31 o1VrnO6`1
}' X
?00 ] allHa17OuV9214
CY)
4
1IVNYH]]YII
X X X x
X60
r(~ ^V
0==
C = x
YrFH a HJ.VT
X X X X X
N 11do9Hdu auM]apui
r-j
?uo v aiIHarav92H
X X X X
"ore Vl hn HHa`Kcdo
'
x x
-
094H all HarOIL
9fH
_
b
p
. . ? x
-A
o
o
U1 a'
F?
r_~ a
. -
N
x N. o
X O r
O p C 7- r
0 W-CO3
?
v aaa
'svJl
Y
d
r{
cl X
iJ G u
2 u u c O
M 0-
r:.
0
n - ''3 J O
auX ono
va
M
c
0 O 0 `) 2 v O
a 3
C a~i C, G. ri v O
Table 1. Interrelationship betareert camouflage and reconnaissance
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Key to Table 1 on previous page: 1 -- types of camouflage; 2 -- optical
camouflage; 3 -- light camouflage; 4 -- sound camouflage; 5 -- radar
camouflage; 6 -- infrared camouflage; 7 -- heat camouflage; 8 -- radio
camouflage; 9 -- camouflage of reconnaissance equipment operation; 10 --
capabilities of hostile reconnaissance; 11 -- naked-eye observation; 12 --
observation with opt.cal instruments; 13 -- observation with the aid of
infrared instruments; 14 -- active; 15 -- passive; 16 -- observation with
the aid of television; 11" p- hotoreconnaissance; 18 -- acoustic recon-
naissance; 19 -- eavesdropping; 20 -- with sound ranging equipment; 21 --
topographic reconnaissance equipment; 22 -- reconnaissance with communica-
tions devices, 23 -- intercepting telephone traffic; 24 -- radio reconnais-
sance; 25 -- heat ranging; 26 - radar reconnaissance
effectiveness of hostile reconnaissance. These objectives should also
be promoted by comprehensive utilization of various types of camouflage,
the interrelationship between which is shown in Figure 2.
We shall briefly describe the basic types of camouflage.
Optical and light camouflage is directed against hostile visual and
photographic, including aerospace reconnaissance. It consists in utilizing
the camouflaging and concealing properties of the terrain, adverse weather
conditions, hours of darkness, observance of specific illumination con-
ditions, giving objects camouflaging shapes, employment of camouflage nets
and other devices, as well as the construction of dummy installations, in-
cluding light-emitting.
Sound camouflage is directed against hostile acoustic reconnaissance and
consists in reducing the noise level of operating vehicles and machinery
(displacement of mechanized troops, the sound of submarine engines, etc)
or in simulating noise produced by dummy installations. The varying
nature of concealment properties of terrain, weather conditions and time of
day can facilitate or complicate the conduct of sound camouflage. The
sound of an operating vehicle motor, the clanking of tracks, and sounds
produced by entrenching tools carry further at night and in fog.
Heat camouflage is directed against heat ranging instruments (indicators)
and other enemy equipment capable of detecting thermal-contrast objects
aircraft in the sky, ships in the water, missiles in flight, etc. Heat
camouflage supplements optical and improves the overall concealment ef-
fect. This is achieved by employing a special heat-insulating screening
layer to conceal particularly important installations, by the extensive
utilization of heat-protective terrain propett.Les, by employing screens,
blinds, by constructing dummy installations with a heat source, as well as
by utilizing water or air-cooling systems.
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I cc/wpodYa 00dO-
E-,,7
,776/ p036edb/60 - 2
' /l npu6opod
Padua -
r7ockupoaxo 4
Tenaceos 7
MCCA'upc8X0
HHq7pcKpCCNOA
nocNupoeka
Figure 2. Interrelationship between types of camouflage
Key to figure: 1 - optical camouflage; 2 -- camouflage of operation of
reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering instruments; 3 -- light camou-
flage; 4 -- radio camouflage; 5 -- sound camouflage; 6 -- radar camou-
flage; 7 -- heat camouflage; 8 -- infrared camouflage
Infrared camouflage is directed against hostile visual reconnaissance
employing active and passive infrared observation devices, as well as
against infrared photography. This is achieved by reducing the infrared
radiation given off by objects, by setting up additional radiation sources
with the aim of altering the configuration of the camouflaged objects or
installations, and by utilizing camouflage nets, blinds, and other op-
tical camouflage devices. When employing active infrared observation
devices one should periodically change their position; at halting points
headlights should be switched off immediately, for technical reasuL.s.
The fact that visual reconnaissance comprises the basis of enemy recon-
naissance on the battlefield substantially enhances the role of infrared
camouflage and at the same time complicates it.
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Radar and radio camouflage make the active operation of hostile radar
(radio) reconnaissance difficult or impossible. It consists in establish-
ing strict operating conditions, limiting the operation of radioelectronic
equipment and eliminating revealing signs when utilizing them. Decoy radar
installations are set up, and false information is fed to the enemy. One
must bear in mind that identification of concealed or camouflaged in-
stallations by hostile radar reconnaissance means is made difficult by the
simultaneous display on enemy radar screens of a large number of reflected
signals, concealing the true position of the target being sought. When
carrying out radar camouflage it is essential to make maximum use of ter-
rain concealing and camouflaging features. carefully to construct troop
ccmbat positions, utilizing camouflage devices (camouflage nets, screens,
etc), as well as the extensive employment of simulation of targets (setting
up corner reflectors, etc). These measures can be particularly effective
against enemy ground and air radar reconnaissance.
Table 2. Possibilities of Employing Camouflaging Techniques (Methods)
with Various Types of Camouflage
g
ec
n
ques
(Methods)
opti-
light
sound
radar
heat
iinfra-
ra-
operation
cal
red
dio
of f ri-eni-
ly re
con-
nais-
sance
de-
vices
Disruptive Painting
x
x
x
Camouflage Nets
x
x
Decoys and Dummies
x
x
Decoy Devices
x
x
x
x
,.
x
Change in Telltale
Indicators
x
x
,.
x
Feigned Activity
x
x
x
Smoke
x
x
Blackouts and Dimouts
x
x
x
Utilization of Vegeta-
t i ~,a (Flooding)
X
x
x
Camoufla
e T
h
i
Types of camouflage
-
Camouflage and concealment devices include the employment of camouflage
painting, various types of camouflage nets and screens, smoke devices,
blackouts, strictly-regulated use of communications equipment and observa-
tion devices, as well as utilization of terrain background (Table 2).
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Selection and utilization of a given camouflaging or concealment device
(method) is determined primarily by objective conditions, Of great impor-
tance thereby is enemy combat activity and utilized enemy reconnaissance
means and methods. One must also bea_. in mind that one and the same method
(means) of camouflage can sometimes be used to accomplish several tasks.
For example, employment of various types of camouflage coatings (depending
on the nature of the material employed) can protect an object not only from
visual observation (photography) let also against being spotted by enemy
radar. Nor should one ignore such an effective and inexpensive device as
various types of smoke thermal generators and the employment of concealing
smokes in general.
Comprehensive utilization of the above types and aiethods of camouflage will
make it possible to achieve msx:imum effect and to compensate for the tell--
tale indications inherent in various military installations. Camouflage
should be total, continuous, active, and in keeping with the specific
situation and circumstances. This demand acquires particular significance
under conditions of enemy utilization of weapons of mass destruction.
Increasing sophistication of reconnaissance methods and techniques, in-
cluding space reconnaissance and utilization of high-accuracy intelligence-
gathering devices, demand in turn a constant improvement in concealment and
camouflage methods. Therefore modern military camouflage should be based
on the latest scientific and technological advances,
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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CHEMICAL SITUATION AND ITS EVALUATION1
Engr-Maj Kh. Gorges
(Abridged Translation. by Col I. Andrushkevich)
The American imperialists assign an important role in their aggressive
plans to the employment noc only of nuclear weapons but also of other
weapons of mass destruction as well -- chemical and biological weapons.
Chemical and biological agents have many common properties. These weapons
are capable of affecting personnel aver large areas, penetrating into
various shelters and comba_ vehicles lacking a tight seal Their range
of effect is very broad -- from moderate effects leading to temporary
loss of combat capability, to death. In the opinion of bourgeois military
theorists this property of these weapons is unique in comparison with
other weapons, particularly since materiel is not destroyed.
Chemical weapons, beginning ir. 1915, have gone through various stages of
development. Each succeeding; stage has been d.istinguisl'ed by an increase
in the degree of toxicity of chemical warfare agents as well as by the
employment of new natural poisons and various toxins,
Means of delivery have developed parallel with the development of chemical
weapor..s
Today the potential enemy possesses chemical warfare agents with a high
degree of toxicity, And he may use these agents, in spite of varir,us
existing international treaties and bans. Therefore a correct evaluation
of the chemical situation is one of the most important duties of every
combined-arms headquarters. l-ie should stress that one cannot equate the
terms "radiation situation" and "chemical situation,"
The chemical situation is a component part of the operational-tactical
situation. It. arises as a result of the enemy's employment of chemical
agents and encompasses the entire aggregate of conditions which in-
f_lue.ncc! troop combat operations. We should emphasize that the chemical
situation estimate should consist of two parts: a) theoretical assumptions
and predictions (computations.), pertaining co the possibility and probable
results of de enemy's employment of various chemical agents; b) estimate
of th-a specific tactical situations, weather conditions and nature of
terrain.
Kno~.hedge of the chemical situation makes it possible correctly to estimate
troop combat capability and to determine the possibility of their further
action, better to organize their individual and collective protection, and
prom^.rtly to conduct warning and preventive measures.
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 Determination of the specific results of the enemy's employment of
chemical agents requires a rather long period of time. Therefore a num-
ber of measures to neutralize the consequences of a hostile chemical at-
tack and for protection of friendly troops should be organized initially
on the basis of preliminary calculations, in order to refine them subse-
quently, after details have been obtained.
Ii, estimating the chemical situation it is essential: to determine the
dimensions and degree of contamination of areas of terrain, structures and
objects by chemical agents; to determine the direction of spread and
height of the base of the chemical cloud; to estimate the potential
effect and magnitude of irreplaceable losses in personnel subjected to
attack.
At the same time it is essential to determine the type of chemical agent
employed by the enemy and to determine the damage it has caused, in order
to neutralize the consequences of the chemical attack.
The content of the various chemical situation evaluation elements will
frequently depend on many factors prcceeding from the specific situation.
They include, in particular:
type, depth, place and time of the attack, degree of surprise,
chemical agent employed, met'iod of delivery, character of affected ob-
jects;
position, mission and nature of actions of fri.andly troops, degree
of protection of personnel, total time in contami',zate' areas;
weather conditions and nature of terrain: ground level wind direc-
tion and velocity, temperature and vertical stability of air mass,
season, time of day or night, terrain configuration and vegetation, in-
teraction of meteorological and topographic conditions.
Determination of type of chemical agents employed by the enemy will make
it possible correctly to estimate the results of its effects and to choose
the most effective methods of protection of personnel. Knowledge of means
of delivery of the chemical agent will make it possible more precisely to
determine the boundaries (configuration) of contaminated terrain.
Persistence of chemical agents is determined to a substantial degree by
weather conditions; this applies in particular to the rate of spread, since
the latter is determined by wind velocity and ambient air temperature.
Finally, as has been emphasized, any estimate of the chemical situation
will be meaningful only when it takes into account specific local conditions.
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Commanders and staffs of all echelons should constantly improve methods
of rapid and error-free chemical situation estimate. In the interest of
prompt and effective protection of troops against chemical warfare agents,
o%e should follow a specific sequence and establish optimal scope of
ohemical situation estimates. In any case the principal items should
be protection of troops against the effects of chemical agents, since the
protective gear at their disposal makes it possible to cope with this
problem successfully. A prerequisite for purposeful troop protection is
comprehensive evaluation of the anticipated effectiveness of an enemy
chemical attack.
In conclusion we shall emphasize that one should not underrate chemical
weapons as a variety of mass destructica weapons, which the enemy may
employ in a future war. The imperialists' intentions of using these
weapons compel us to add??ess in all seriousness problems of protection
against chemical warfare agents.
1. `1ilitarwesen, No 7, 1970.
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RADIO ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT IN THEATERS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS*
Maj Gen Sig Trps V. Grankin, Doctor of Military Science, Professor;
Engr-Col V. Galinskiy
The equipping of armed forces with modern weapons, particularly missile
weapons, jet-propelled aircraft and nuclear-powered missile-armed sub-
marines, has dictated the necessity of preparing theaters and zore~ .,f
military operations for the conduct of warfare and their equipping in ad-
vance with electronic systems and devices. The imperialist member nations
of the NATO aggressive bloc, particularly the United States, Great Britain,
ant West Germany, are applying t},e greatest efforts in this area.
In the opinion of military leaders in these countries, prior electronic
equipping of these theaters will make it possible to accomplish the fol.-
lowing strategic missions: to mount surprise attacks on major enemy cargets
with maximum involvement of all available weapons, including nuclear arms;
to conduct dynamic offensive and defensive operations on a wide front and
to great depth, employing the men and equipment of formations and large
units of all services. In addition, radio electronic systems and devices
halp secure coordination of ground troops with the other s:ivices, as well
as control of formations and large units and their effective utilization.
In peacetime they ensure the conduct of continuous intelligence gathering,
operational training of staffs and combat training of troops, constituting
at the same time an important element in maintaining a high degree of armed
forces combat readiness.
The principal radio electronic systems and devices with which theaters and
zones of military operations are equipped, depending on their intended use,
can be arbitrarily divided into the following groups: electronic intel-
ligence; control of forces and their nuclear weapons; control of antiair-
craft, ABM and space defense forces and weapons; radio navigation.
Electronic intelligence systems include radio, television; radar and infra-
red (thermal) reconnaissance. Under present-day conditions electronic in-
telligence in the armies of the imperialist states has become one of the
principal types of strategic and operational intelligence. Its conduct,
in addition to ground equipment, involves the extensive utilization of
gear carried on hoard aircraft, warships and artificial earth satellites.
Equipmer? for toe receipt and processing of intelligence data also is in-
cluded in the arsenal of radio electronic equipment of theaters :f military
operations.
Ground rac'.{o reconnaissance is conducted with the aid of radio intercept
networks (stations) and direction finder stations sited in theaters of
*From materials published in the foreign press.
90
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military operations, maintaining continuous watch to intercept propagated
signals from enemy radio electronic equipment. According to figures pub-
lished in the press, the facilities of the National Security Agency alone,
these electronic "eves" and "ears" of the United States, in a 24-hour
? period intercept and DF several million words in 60 languages in all
the ate.
-.
Deployed in every theater, electronic intercept stations make it possible
to intelligence-monitor all frequency bands, from the centimeter band to
the very low frequency band,, and at ranges up to several thousand kilo-
meters.
As a rule the intelligence effort conducted with stationary equipment is
supplemented by mobile reconnaissance subunits. According to the West
German magazine Stern, "dry-land evesdropping" has been organized .o beef
up West German electronic intelligence operations in the Western Tieater,
with the aid of motorized Bundeswehr radio and electronic reconnaissance
subunits ranging along West Germany's border with the GDR and Czecho-
slovakia.
Air, sea and space radio and electronc surveillance is conducted with
the aid of st"ategic, tactical and embarked aircraft, naval ships and
artificial earth sar.2ilites carrying special intelligence gear on board.
High-altitude reconnaissance flig:its as well as sea observation capabili-
ties make it possible substantially to increase the ra.ige of intelligence
coverage.
According to the procedure established by military leaders in the United
States and other imperialist nations, electronic reconnaissance aircraft
fly regular missions along the borders of the socialist nations and over
international waters adjoining their territory, while specially-equipped
ships ;aintain a constant intelligence watch. For example, West Germany
maintains two so- ,-.lled "research vessels" in the. Balti.,_ f or this pur-
pose, while the United States operates Liberty and Pueblo class naval
reconnaissance vessels and specially equipped submarines in the Mediter-
ranean and other seas.
Artificial earth satellites equipped with special radio electronic gear
ar employed to observe the entire depth of the theater or several
theaters simultaneously. The Americans, for example, have built and are
operating Ferret satellites, which gather intelligence on radar and radio
stations. Satellites launched under the 770 program carry electronic
gear to obtain radar maps of terrain. Midas satellites are designed to
detect the firing of ICBMs from the infrared radiation of the rocket en-
gine exhaust. It is reported that they can also detect on the basis of
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thermal radiati)n such objects as tanks and trucks. Versatile suc?.eillance
satellites carrying electronic and photoreconnaissance gea: have been
developed under Project 949.
Intercepted signals emitted by radio electronic devicp.s as well as electri-
cal signals into which photographic images are converted are recorded on
tape and are transmitted on telemetric channels to ground stations.'
Satellite communications centers and stations occupy an important place iri
?resent-day stationary equipment in theaters of military operations. The
Americans have set up such centers and stations in Northern England
(Cumberland), in Alaska (Kodiak) , in Japan, and in tie Urited States
(Hawaii, California, New Hampshire). Figure 1 contains a diagram showing
the location of radio electronic intelligence facilities in a theater of
military operations.
In the near future plans call for the use of orbital laboratories with
alternating crews for the conduct of surveillance from space. In 1973,
for example, the United States plans to launch an "orbital workshop" with
three astronaut crews on 28 and 56-day missions.
Thus theater electronic intelligence means make it possible to acquire a
large volume of information on the enemy simultan?^u61y from a large area,
adverse weather, day and night. The intelligence effort is conducted at
great depth, not only in wartim3 but in peacetime as well.
Radio electronic control systems fcr military forces and their nuclear
weapons are designed to secure troop operations and the employment. of
weapons during war. In peacetime these systems assist in the daily routine
activities of all large units and units within a given theater, particular-
ly nuc' -ar weapons , nui:'_ear weapons a 1 er t and nuclear weapons continuous
combat readiness.
A network of command posts 4 set up for control of military forces within
a t''eater; these are stationary structures sited as a rule underground and
well protected.
These stationary command posts are establi;;hed primarily for major head-
quarters. In the Central European Theater, tar example, all principal
NATO headquarters, down to army groups inclusively, have such command
posts.
An extensive stationary communications system is set up for the control of
groui.d troops in a theater, particularly in the administrative (rear) zone.
It is based on main-line and branch radi' relay and tropospheric multi-
channel links and high-capacity underground cable communications lines.
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CTaw?wn Cwcr.?vy pa0.wopeneAw~.
Tponocc epwo.? cone. 4
CTawwn Ce33. I .,)a NC3 5
Qe.'r np4'3M. wwgopwauw? 01
9 pa3aaAwsaron,woro HC3 6
0
0~
YX
CO
Y3!n goo nowrl caaja7
I....Tp oa?wcnepe.oaraS
rnavoaa crawuw++ Hong+raropwo.. .eTw
O Aapow'poY. 10
Figure 1. Diagram of location of radio
communications facilities in a theater
Craprovu, 103>(1>1. oawer 11
noel Ja:.w O+e rw~~eCw O~ 0839964.12
Nopaon. oa0.woanewTporwoa 0%3ae:ww
ww.lw Cen)w fflp 10!ewwn 13CT.1Nw
n6e7woro opyM.In 15
pa3ao.1ww 16
flonoer oaaaexww a NC3
electronic surveillance and
of military operations
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.,
 STAT
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Key to Figure 1 on preceding page: 1 -- communications satellite; 2 --
surveillance satellite; 3 -- legend; 4 -- tropospheric radio relay com-
munications system station; 5 -- satellite communications station; 6 --
reconnaissance satellite ground receiving station; 7 --- communications
center (facility); 8 -- radio intercept center; 9 -- DF network principal
station; 10 -- airfields; 11 -- missile sites; 12 -- electronic reconnais-
sance station; 13 -- electronic intelligence chip; 14 -- eleccronic sur-
veillance aircraft; 15 -- nuclear weapons control communications line;
16 --- depth of radio electronic surveillance zone; 17 -- satellite sur-
veillance cone
Radio links formed by short-wave radio sets servo as redundant means of
communu.cation in such a system. Territorial communications systems and
equipment are most effectively utilized in such a system. In addition,
civilian communica'-- ions line; in the theater are constructed with the
thought to their potential maximum utilization for military purposes. For
example, the project for laying a 640-channel submarine cable between
Italy and Spain calls for redundancy of terminal equipment including
sources of electric power, and the capability of automatic switching (in
case of necessity) to backup equipment.2
Stationary tropospheric radio facilities are extensively employed in the
theater troop control systems; these facilities provide communications with
a range of 200-400 k.m without relay. They can be used to establish high-
capacity multichannel links. The Central European Theater, for example,
contains the Ace High NATO joint forces multichannel communications system,
a complex network consisting of radio relay and tropospheric communications
stations. It begins in Norway, covers all European NATO member nations,
and terminates in Turkey. The total length of its links is 15,000 km. The
equipment of the tropospheric part of the system provides 36 telephone
channels, each of which can be utilized for several dozen telegraph (tele-
type) communications channels. Radio relay links are extensively employed
for incorporation of Ace High into the European civilian and military
systems.
Radio communications in the shortwave band and underground cable lines in
this system are backup elements. According to statements by axp`rts,
Ace High has now become the main NATO military communications system in
Europe.3
In 1966 the 486L MEDCOM tropospheric communications network was put into
operation in the European Theater, linking Spain, Italy, Greece, the island
of Crete, and Turkey. This system extends a total of 9700 km."
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The stationary theater communications system is linked with army mcbile
systems, which enables high-level command echelons when necessary to
transmit information to large units and units, bypassing intermediate
levels.
We should emphasize that major headquarters and command posts in the
theater are linked by communications channels (operating on various
? principles): underground cable, multichannel radio relay, tropospheric
links, etc. This increases the system's traffic capacity and improves
control stability against hostile fire and jamming efforts.
Mobile command posits can be employed in the theater in addition to the
system of stationary command pers. For example, the U.S. and NATO army
commands are studying the possibilities of establishing and utilizing air-
borne command posts. It is believed that military transport aircraft
(such as the C-131), specially e':sipped with communications gear, situation
display and information processing equipment, will be little vulnerable to
attack and will provide stable and reliable control of subordinate troops
and weapons under nuclear warfare conditions. The effective range of
airborne radio communications equipment is usually greater than that of
ground facilities.5
U.S. and NATO military leaders are exerting a considerable effort to
achieve further development and improvement of communications facilities.
Much has been done in recent years to establish global systems, which
will make it possible to support the operations of forces both within a
single theater of military operations and in several theaters simultaneous-
ly. The following demands are imposed on such communications systems:
a high degree of reliability and stability under nuclear warfare conditions,
high transmitting capacity, redundancy, interc:nnection of parallel ele-
ments. 6
For example, the Autodyne global automated system being developed by the
United States will link more than 2000 military facilities located on the
North American continent and elsewhere. Voice and digital infor'iation
can be transmitted on its wideband channels. It is planned to deploy 93
communications centers of this system, including 65 on U.S. territory, by
1972.7
Another system, Autovon , also consists of switching centers and multi-
channel communications links. Nineteen of 20 switching centers, including
12 outside the United States, went on line in 1968.8
Information is transmitted on A,Lodyne system channels in the form of
digital groups. In the opinion r U.S. experts, the absence of inter-
channel interference during the transmission of information, low cost,
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secrecy potential and independence of quality of transmission on length
of lines add up to making digital communications close to the ideal type.
It is also planned to use digital communications to transmit television
images of reconnaissance photographs, maps, diagrams and other documents
by narrow-band telephone channels. For this purpose the United States is
developing a special Videocoder system, which will utilize regular radio-
telephone or satellite communications links.
In the more distant future it is planned to establish a common military
automatic communications system from the Autodyne and AUtovon systems.
The employment of satellite communications systems being developed for
military use is considered particularly promising. In the opinion of ex-
perts, as more and more satellite communications systems are put into
operation, there will be less need for communications facilities sited
on foreign territory, there will be less possibility for the enemy to
establish a fix on radio transmitters and consequently to discover various
elements of control organization. A characteristic feature of such systems
is a high transmission capacity and excellent operational reliability.
One U.S. satellite military communications system calls for the launching
into orbit of 19 satellites and the deployment of 11 ground stations (in
the United States, on Guam and Okinawa, in South Vietnam, in West Germany,
etc).
The Americans are working on several projects for a similar commercial
global communications system. According to statements made by U.S. mili-
tary leaders, these systems can also be used for military purposes.9
By mid-1968 the operating U.S. commercial satellite communications system
totaled 17 satellites and 28 ground stations. The system was fully in
operation by 1969. It was planned to build 12 ground stations in NATO
countries, with stations in West Germany, Italy, Turkey and the Netherlands
to go into operation in 1970.10
Radio electronic devices, some of which comprise theater stationary radio
electronic equipment, are extensively utilized to control forces and
offensive nuclear weapons.
The theater nuclear forces control system is developed and constructed
taking into consideration the conduct of combat operations under conditions
of employment of nuclear weapons. It is therefore based on radio electron-
ic equipment which is minimally subjected to the destructive effect of
nuclear weapons. For example, the 487L control system being built by the
Americans in the continental United Statesaaad designed to provide
strategic air-force communications following an enemy nuclear attack,
employs powerful stationary low frequency and very low frequency trans-
mitters with antennas 367 meters in height.11
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Thus the L_,eater force control system is based on command posts and their
radio electronic equipment, particularly wire (cable), microwave relay and
tropospheric communications facilities. Communications systems deployed
in the Central European Theater have the capability of rapid transmission
of engagement orders and signals, including orders to employ offensive
nuclear weapons, to large uni;.t3 of the services.
Radio-electronic theater air defense control systems include a network of
detection, warning and guidance centers and sites equipped with stationary
or mobile radars, electronic computers and communications gear. Air
situation inforniation (after site processing) is transmitted to air defense
sector centers, where the decision is made to scramble fighters or fire
antiaircraft missiles. Radar sites may include equipment which automatical-
ly takes data from radarscopes, transmits information to command posts and
centers for subsequent computer proc,.;ses. Transmission of control and
target designation commands to active air defense means can also be ef-
fected automatically. A 412L automated system of this type is deployed in
the Central European Theater, It links seven air defense control centers
and command posts.12 Analogous systems a:o being built by NATO member na-
tions : n other parts of the European Theater.
In recent, years work has been under way to set up a NATO common automated
air defense system under the acronym NADGE. During the course of the
project tht. opinion was expressed that no one country is capable of
handling independently all the tasks of modern air defense. U.S. experts
explain that this is dictated by the necessity of daily performance, even
in peacetime, of an enormous volume of effort. For example, NORAD, the
North American Air Defense Command, tracks more than 600 satellites and
other artificial objects in space which daily circle the earth in various
orbits, as well as daily identifying more than 200,000 aircraft.13
The NADGE system will consist of 80 radar stations of various types,
automated data processing centers and communications lines. Some of the
radars are designed to detect targets at long range (300 km and more) .
They include two extremely high-power stations in Norway and Turkey. Ac-
cording to the designers of this system, it will take less than 1 minute
from target radar detection t o output of identifying data. The NADGE sys-
tem should be fully operational by 1971-1972. Its elements in Belgium,
the Netherlands, and West Germany were deployed in 1969.14
Devices to solve problems connected with ABM ouJ antispace weapon defense
comprise an important part of theater radio-electronic equipment to be
developed in recent years. These facilities include powerful stationary
missile and space objects detection and tracking radar stations. The
BMEWS ICBM radar early warning system has been in operation since 1964. It
consists of three groups of AN/FPS-49 and AN/FPS-50 powerful stationary
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extremely long-range detection radar stations; this system has a missile
detection range of 4500-5000 km. BMEWS sites are located in Filingdales
Moor (England), Thule (Greenland), and Clear (Alaska).
Beginning in the sixties, the United States has been working intensively
on the development of so-called below-the-horizon radar. In 1970, for
example, the AN/FPS-95 high-frequency radar with backscattering went into
operation; this radaz is designed for extremely long-range missile detec-
tion and tracking. In 1967 the U.S. put into operation a below-the-
horizon detection radar which detected targets on the basis of distortion
of a signal transmitted from one point on the earth's surface and received
at another.
As we can see, the operation of an air defense system, and particularly
the collection of data on the air and space situation, as well as direct
control of air defense active forces and weapons, is based on radio
electronic equipment. The most advanced radio electronic gear coupled
with high -speed computers is used in air defense systems.
Radio navigation systems are an important component of the radio electronic
facilities in a theater of military operations. These systems are used for
aircraft and ship navigation. The most widely-used radio navigation sys-
tems are Loran, Decca, and Tacan, which are employed in both stationary and
mobile versions. Usually several radio navigation system groups of various
types, each consisting of three to four stations, are deployed in a theater
of military operations. It is known, for example, that several groups of
Loran-C are deployed in the Central European Theater. In 1968 16 Decca
radio navigation stations went into operation in Norway; one of the
purposes of this system is to assist in low-altitude mi$ions. In 1969 con-
struction was reported on a group of three radio navigation stations in
Sweden.16 In atheater of military operations radio navigation system sta-
tions are sited in order that their effective zones of operation cover the
theater, and particularly probable areas of combat operations.
We should stress in particular that in recent years radio navigation
methods have been adopted by ground forces as well. Radio navigation sys-
tems are used to obtain position fixes for troops and weapons, particularly
missile, artillery and tank units and subunits, on terrain with few land-
marks and reference points, during hours of darkness and in adverse weather.
The Loran-A system, developed during World War II, was used only for air-
craft and surface ship navigation, and Loran-C, developed in the fifties,
was designed primarily for missile-carrying submarines, while the Loran-D
system, which was developed in the sixties, is versatile in nature and
designed for joint tactical utilization by naval forces, air and ground
forces. A Loran-D network, for example, contains three ground-base low
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frequency transmitters. This s y s. t e m has been tested and used by the
Americans in Vietnam.
The Tacan short--range radio navigation system provides navigation aids for
tactical aircraft in a theater of military operations, including departure,
en-route navigation, approach to target or reconnaissance area, return to
airfield, and landing approach. The system includes a network of ground
beacons and airborne receiving and display equipment. Aircraft interroga-
tion results in automatic determination and display of the aircraft's
bearing to or from the interrogated beacon, plus distance to station.
Tacan is extensively used in the Western Theater of Military Operations .
Approximately 170 beacons of this system have been deployed in Europe.
Figure 2 contains a diagram of the location of air defense radio electronic
systems and radio navigation facilities in the theater.
The operating zones of Loran and Decca radio navigation systems cover areas
of a theater. Preparing to conduct combat operations simultaneously in
several theaters, imperialist military leaders are endeavoring to have at
their disposal global radio navigation facilities with an effective range
of several thousand kilometers. The Omega radio navigation system, which
encompasses the entire earth, constitutes such a global system. The
Americans have been setting it up since 1957; it is designed primarily for
controlling strategic offensive weapons -??- nuclear-powered missile-carrying
submarines, carrier task forces and strategic bombers. The system operates
in the very low frequency band (10-14 kHz) and will consist of 8 powerful
transmitters, At the present time only fan' stations are in operation (Hawaiim
Islands,, Norway, Spain, New York). In 1966 the Omega system was tested on
civil airways extending 18,000 km. Future plans call for the establishment
of four more stations in Japan or the Philippines, Argentina, New Zealand
or Australia, and on Madagascar, The Omega system should be fully opera-
tional in 1972.17 Development and deployment of the Omega global radio
navigation system graphically demonstrate the aggressive nature of U.S. policy.
Theater stationary radio electronic facilities include radio electronic
communications and air navigation facilities located at airfields -- ILS,
VOR, compass locaters, etc, In the Central European Theater, for example,
aircraft navaids include omnidirectional VOR beacons, which indicate an
aircraft's bearing to or from the station, as well as DME facilities, which
measure range from station to aircraft.18
In recent years special systems for air traffic control in a theater of
military operations have been developed in connection with the increased
use of jet aircraft in highly-developed nations; these systems are de-
signed for airways surveillance and for air traffic safety in control zones
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(loci ynpaaaGMaa a oncostuC..r11
6
PHC In ?- Ilop-': A-?Aa*na")
Figure 2. Diagram of location of radio electronic air defense control and
navigation facilities in theater of military operations
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Key to Figure 2 on preceding page: 1 --- legend; 2 -- missile defense sys-
tem radar site; 3 -- air detection radar site; 4 -- Tacan beacon; 5 --
air defense warning and control center; 6 -- air defense warning and com-
mand post; 7 -- radio navigation system (11 -- Loran; p,--Decca); 8 --
Transit ground radio navigation system complex; 9 -- fighter airfields;
10 -- antiaircraft artillery and missile units; 11 -- Omega radio naviga-
tion system station; 12 ?-- radio relay link; 13 -- effective zone of Loran
radio navigation system
and terminal areas. One of the main demands made of such systems is the
capability of c-)n trolling both civilian and military traffic under heavy-
traffic conditions. One example of such a system is the Mediator system,
installed in England. It is designed for air traffic control of military
and civilian aircraft at altitudes of 1500-2100 m and above wit-'-,in
British airspace. The system consists of a network of radar stations, coin-
puter complexes and communications facilities.
Theater radio electronic equipment also includes radiogeodetic systems,
designed to determine with a high degree of accuracy the coordinates
of fixed topographic objects. For example, the American Shiran radio
geodetic system (an improved version of Shoran) can determine range to
targets up to a distance of 1500 km with an error not exceeding 3 m. The
system includes four transponder-equipped ground sites located at base
stations, plus airborne gear.
U.S. military experts place great stock in satellite: radio navigation
systems (for example, Transit), consisting of several satellites, ground
tracking stations, a data processing center, accurate time stations, as
well as on-board receiving-display equipment and specialized computers.
Thus military leaders in the imperialist nations attach great importance
to equipping theaters of military operations with radio electronic
facilities.
On the basis of fundamental development trends, following are the most
promising areas in radio electronic facilities for theaters of military
operations:
adoption of radio electronic surveillance-reconnaissance systems and
facilities with improved performance capabilities;,
expansion of the network of multichannel tropospheric and radio
relay links, as well as the establishment of satellite communications
systems;
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establishment of communications systems designed for the accomplish-
ment of special missions (support of operations by nuclear forces, tactical
air communications, air defense communications system, etc);
ground forces adoption of radio navigation systems;
improved reliability and invulnerability of radio electronic systems
and facilities.
The fact that stationary radio electronic systems and facilities supporting
armed forces combat operations in theaters and zones of military operations
are under present-day conditions a mandatory and important component of
operational facilities in a theater of military operations as a whole
faces Soviet military investigators with the task of continuously monitor-
ing the state of radio electronic facilities in theaters of military opera-
tions, taking into full account the development and capabilities of these
facilities.
FOOTNOTES
1, U.S. News and World Report, 24 September 1969, pp 32-33.
2. Engineer, No 5890, 1968, page 890.
3. NATO', Fifteen Nations, October-November, 1968, pp 58-63.
4. Signal, No 3, 1966, page 62.
5. Interavia Air Letter, 16 June 1970.
6. Armed Forces Manageme,i:, No 10, 1969.
7. Infantry, November-Le::ember 1968, page 57.
8. Product Engineering, No 5, 1967, page 43.
9. Electronics News, No 686, 1968, page 31.
10. Electronics Weekly, No 431, 1968, pp 1, 36.
11. Aviation Week, No 6, 1967, page 27.
12. Interavia Air Letter, June 1970, pp A-E.
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13. Plain Dealer, June 1969, page 42.
14. Revue Internationale de Defense, No 4, 1969.
15. Teknisk Tidskrift, No 26, 1968, page 5.
16. Svensk:s S18fartstidning, No 6, 1969, page 6.
17. Undersea Technology, No 12, 1.968, page 40.
18. Interavia, No 2, 1969, pp 196-199.
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Col Ye. Rybkin, Doctor of Philosophical. Science, Professor
Another very interesting and solid study has been added to our military
literature, a study dedicated to Lenin's military theory legacy and his
practical activities in the area of military affairs -- Lenin and Soviet
Military Science by N. N. Azovtsev.*
This study encompasses a broad range of problems of the Leninist military
heritage, from the ideological-theoretical foundations of Soviet military
science to problems of tactics and personnel indoctrination. Of consider-
able interest is a special survey section, a systematized list of primary
sources and historiography on the military activities of V. I. Lenin.
One virtue of this study is that the author innovatively utilizes the
Leninist military theory legacy to interpret and comprehend today's
problems. For example, discussing in detail Lenin's development of Marxist
doctrine on war and army and his solution of key problems of military
science, the author consistently links them with its contemporary level,
with those problems which concern us today.
Also remarkable is the fact that the author, who has thoroughly studied
Lenin's ideas, advances on the basis of these ideas new theses pertaining
to contemporary problems of military science. Although we cannot agree
with some of these theses, this fact does not minimize the importance of
his innovative approach to the subject.
Discussing the principal aim of the study, Azovtsev writes that, relying on
the works of Lenin, numerous party documents, as well as published mono-
graphs, he sets for himself the task of "showing Lenin as an eminent mili-
tary theorist and practitioner and ingenious strategist, under whose
guidance an army of a new type was established and victory won over foreign
and domestic counterrevolutionary forces" (page 10). The author endeavors
to interpret these problems in a comprehensive manner, to comprehend
Leninist ideas as an integral system of views reflecting the conditions of
the first years of genesis and development of Soviet military science, and
at the same time to show the close link between Lenin's ideas and today's
military science.
The author makes extensive use not only of Lenin's writings but also
archival materials, recollections of Lenin by his contemporaries, and a
number of historical works.
* N. N. Azovtsev: Lenin i sovetskaya voyennaya nauka, Moscow, Izd-vo Nauka,
1971, 360 pages.
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Chapter One examines the Leninist ideological-theoretical pri.ncipl's of
Soviet military science. The cuthor emphasizes that Soviet military sci-
ence arose not on empty ground but rather on soil prepared by the past
development of military affairs. But it was only thanks to Marxism that
it acquired a scientific philosophic basis.
Linked to the name of Lenin is a new stage in Marxist military-theoretical
thought -- the birth and development of Soviet military science and art of
war.
Discussing the Leninist methodological principles of Soviet military sci-
ence, the author focuses great attention on the principle of historicism
and the utilization of the lessons of history for the present day. Of
major importance in this respect is Lenin's thesis that "one cannot learn
to solve one's problems with new techniques today if yesterday's lessons
have not opened our eyes to the erroneous nature of the old techniques"
(Poln., Sobr- Soch. [Complete Works], Volume 44, page 205). At the same
time he emphasizes Lenin's statement on the inadmissibilicy of overrating
the experience of the past. This tenet is acquiring particular significance
today, when in the course of the scientific and technological revolution
there is occurring a process of profound changes in all areas of military
affairs.
The author presents Lenin's views on the specific features of war and its
peculiar features as a form of social struggle; he presents Lenin's
appraisal of the relationship ietween the development of war and politics
e!s well as the correlation of forces of the belligerents. Unfortunately
this relationship, which is a fundamental law of war, is insufficiently
revealed,
In our opinion the author intelligently systematizes Lenin's ideas on the
structure of Soviet military science and demonstrates that military science
is an integral system of knowledge, encompassing general theory of military
science (which studies the factors, laws and principles of warfare), theory
of the art of warfare, and theory of organization and training of armies.
We cannot agree, however, with the author's statement that. all military
historical science comes within the framework of military science. It, as
is well known, is a social science, a part of general history. Only such
elements as history of the art of warfare, weapons and army organizational
development constitute simultaneously to a certain degree elements of mili-
tary science.
The author has not fully examined the contrast between Soviet and bourgeois
military science. To those elements which characterize this opposition
(page 35), one should add: while Soviet science is distinguished by an
organic coalescence of scientific methodology and science, in bourgeois
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military science one notes a deep split between military science and
philosophic methodology. This is dictated by the fact that bourgeois
general methodology is in substantial conflict with the interests of the
art of war.
Lenin attached enormous importance to science as one of the factors of
victory in war. It is a well-known fact that today the role of science in
warfare has grown immeasurably in comparison with the Civil War. On this
basis we today specify scientific potential as a particular factor in war-
fare. The author examines it within the framework of economic potential.
We feel that such an interpretation of this problem fails to reflect con-
temporary views on the role of science,.
A substantial position in the study is occupied by discussion of Lenin's
ideas on morale and political factors. The author is correct in stressing
Lenin's idea about the unity and at the same time the difference of these
factors. Politics is the guiding, organizing force of war, the activities
of the governing party, the government; the morale factor is the state of
morale of the masses, their willingness or unwillingness to support the
war effort. Political leadership should in no case be equated with the
morale factor, although it does play a central role in the formation of
the latter.
Chapter Two deals with Lenin's substantiation of the principles of building
an army of the new type. The author presents the principal theoretical
tenets of Marx and Ergels on the necessity for armed defense of the con-
quests of the proletarian revolution and the nature of its military orga-
nization; he also discusses Lenin's contribution toward the subsequent
elaboration of these problems.
It is noted that the basis of military organizational development is
defined by the nature of the social system, by the character of the state.
Lenin focused particular attention on the relationship between this organi-
zational development and the processes taking place within the country as
.:?l as various aspects of societal affairs. It is precisely from this
aspect that the author examines the economic, sociopolitical, ideological-
theoretical, and scientific-technical foundations of Soviet military orga-
nizational development. The author thoroughly discusses Lenin's assess-
ments and the characteristics of these principles, and draws conclusions
for the present day.
Among economic and sociopolitical factors, the author analyzes such factors
as the socialist mode of production, the socialist societal and govern-
mental system, the alliance between the worker class and the peasantry, tr?,
morale-political unity of our society, guidance by the Communist Party,
and unity of army and people.
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Marxism-Leninism and its doctrine on war and army, communist consciousness,
party-mindedness, Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism con-
stitute the ideological-theoretical foundation of Soviet military organiza-
tional development.
Examining the r)rinciples of military organizational development, the
author presents what in our opinion is a. good classification of Lenin's
gu4.deline theses in this area: "The nature of Lenin's military activities
and his emphasis on solving specific military problems at various stages in
history make it possible in the first place to specify those principles
which directly pertain to creation of the military organization of the
proletariat and its further organizational development, in the second place,
those principles connected with armed forces combat and political training
and, in the thi:-d place, the principles pertaining to leadership and
guidance of the armed forces" (page 75).
in characterizing this part of the study, we should like to note the
extremely felicitous combination of theoretical and historical analysis,
the intelligent selection of Leninist theses from his many statements on
this matter. We feel that the author has sufficiently thoroughly discussed
Lenin's theses on the relationship between forms of organization and forms
of combat, on one-man command and centralism, on high degree of armed
forces vigilance and combat readiness, on the role of party political
effort in the army, on military specialists, etc. We should like to draw
the reader's attention in particular to Lenin's statements on the
qualities of the leader (sec pp 104-106).
Chapter Three examines problems of Leninist direction of a war in defense
of the socialist homeland. Here the author litaits himself, however, to
problems of direction of armed combat, military operations, and analysis
solely of military forms and means of combat proper. An analysis of the
economic and moral factors in war would be interesting from the standpoint
of modern military science, if only as regards their direct link with mili-
tary operations (for example, an assessment of the interrelationship
between strategy and economics, strategy and the morale-political factor) ;
Lenin offers very interesting material on this matter, But the author
discusses these questions only indirectly, in passing, in conjunction with
other problems. We cannot strongly criticize the author in this regard,
however, for statement of the problem in this context would greatly expand
the scope of the subject matter,
Selecting as a subject for investigation Lenin's activities as a strategist,
the author primarily examines those matters connected with this aspect of
our leader's activities. He devotes considerably less attention to a dis-
cussion of the particular problems with which the great revolutionary
leader dealt. The author was undoubtedly correct in this.
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In this chapter the reader's attention is drawn by an examination of
Lenin's theoretical tenets and practical activities connected with ensuring
unity of military and politir.al leadership, establishment of appropriate
government agencies, and development of the ability in military cadres to
wage war in a revolutionary nanner.
The author cites a very instructive statement by S. S. Kamenev: "I affirm
with total conviction," he wrote, "that I, as a participant in the
imperialist war, drew no conclusion on the most fundamental question of
the war. I overlooked the fact that the terms to engage in war and to
fight are not identical. It seems that one can simply engage in war in a
formalistic manner... and one can genuinely fight to win -- this is what
Vladimir Il'ich's guidance taught me" (pp 125-126).
On this chapter as well, however, we must make a few critical comments.
On page 111 the author states that "the socialist mode of production and
its socialist economy served as the economic foundation for direction of
the armed struggle..." As we know, however, the socialist mode of produc-
tion was at the time only ita an incipient stage of development. The
economy of the transition period was characterized by the coexistence of
socialist and nonsocialist sectors. This placed a profound imprint on
the military capabilities of the state, substantially diminishing them.
In Chapter Four the author examines a theoretical question -- V. I. Lenin
on the forms and means of armed struggle. Of greatest interest are those
pages on which the author discusses Lanin's views on the correlation
between offense and defense, on the connection between forms of struggle
and its spatial scope, on partisan struggle, on the forms and methods of
training and mobilizing reserves, plus many others.
Considerable attention in this chapter is devcted to Lenin's ideas of
activeness, decisiveness, boldness, organization, the element of surprise,
massing of forces and careful preparation of operations. These ideas form
the basis of the leading principles of the Soviet art of war.
Discussing Lenin's elaboration of the theory of waging partisan warfare,
the author notes that the ingenious strategists of the proletarian revolu-
tion particularly emphasized the necessity of purposeful party guidance of
the partisan struggle. Therefore during the Civil War years this form
of armed struggle, which occupied a prominent place in achieving victory
over the enemy, was incorporated in war plans, and the rules of its con-
duct were included in the Field Service Regulations, while the party
Central Committee regularly discussed problems connected with guidance and
direction of partisan activities and carried out a number of organiza-
tional measures, including the establishment of an entire partisan army.
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The forms and methods of partisan struggle elaborated at that time con-
stituted a valuable contribution to theory of Soviet art of war.
In discussing the matter of Lenin's gu.idanco of training and mobilization
of reserves, the author focuses attention on the fact that under the
extraordinarily complex and rapidly-changing conditions of the Civil War,
a decision was reached for comprehensive utilization of various forms and
methods of assembling and training troops, as well as training replacement
personnel. An object of particular concern by Lenin in this regard was
the Vsevobuch [Universal Military Training] system, which played a most
important role in coping with this task.
Chapter Five merits attention. Here the author endeavors to show the
creative development of the Leninist legacy in the area of military
science right up to the present. We must say that this is a very ambitious
task, for much has already been written on this subject.
We feel that the most interesting treatment of this subject would have
been an analysis of specific utilization of the Leninist legacy in solving
specific problems of military science following Lenin's death. It would be
important to demonstrate how Lenin's ideas live on under new conditions,
the elements of his teachings in new forms and at new stages of development
of the military organism. The author strives to accomplish this, but he is
not successful in every case. In many instances he very neatly captures
the "pulse beat" of Lenin's teachings under the new conditions, but in
some places the presentation degenerates into a simple rehash of various
stages in the development of military affairs.
The author was successful in describing Frunze's activities and the
features of development of Soviet military theory in the twenties, and in
discussing several questions pertaining to the period of the Great Patriotic
Warr and various elements of the present day. He has not done such a good
job of discussing the thirties and the initial postwar years.
The chapter ends with a general description of the state of Soviet military
science 4t the present stage. We must state that on the whole the
description is fair17 complete and convincing. There are some weak points,
however. On page 278 the author discusses the basic tasks of Soviet
military science at the present time. These tasks are correctly stated,
but the presentation is far from complete. The author discusses only cer-
tain aspects of the general theory of military affairs: determination of
the range of research in connection with the military technological revolu-
tion, explanation of manifestation of the laws of armed combat under con-
ditions of nuclear weapons employment; classification of milita-,:-37 science;
elaboration of methodological, problems; assessment of the potential enemy
and critique of his ideology; consideration of economic, moral, military
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and scientific-technological potential "in the aspects of military sci-
ence as a whole and its branches, and elaboration of recommendations for
Soviet military doctrine and doctrine on war and army." It is easy to see
that the author has failed to treat one of the fundamental elements of
military science -- elaboration of theory of art of war, strategy, opera-
tional art and tactics. He has also ignored problems of specific military
sciences.
One reads with interest those pages where the author discusses the root
military scientific theses of Leninist doctrine applicable to nuclear war:
problems of correct assessment of the correlation of friendly and hostile
forces, on the unity of military and political leadership, on creation of
preponderance of forces at the decisive moment and at the decisive point,
plus a number of others.
Extremely interesting in our opinion is Chapter Six, in which the author
comprehensively describes the sources of the Leninist military theory
legacy and presents a survey of the literature. This is not simply a
reference chapter: in it the author evaluates studies devoted to examina-
tion of the military activities and military-theoretical legacy of V. I.
Lenin, and makes an attempt to demonstrate the process of synthesis and
development: of Leninist ideas in these studies. Unfortunately the
author was not entirely succescEul in showing the initial stages in the
study of Lenin's military activities as a process of accumulation, deepen-
..ng and development of knowledge with a certain succession and interlink
among its _ttages and elements.
In appraising this study as a whole, we should state that the reader is
offered an extremely useful book which continues the efforts of many in-
vestigators working on the study, dissemination and development of the
Leninist military legacy and maker, a substantial contribution to this
honorable task.
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Under conditions of rapid scientific and technological advances, with in-
creasing aggressiveness on the part of imperialism, new and higher dem,aa:is
are imposed on armed forces control. One can no longer be satisfied with
established forms and methods, even if they have served well in the past.
This was discussed in detail in the Central Committee Report to the 24th
CPSU Congress; particular attention was directed to the fact that "problems
of control pertain not only to a narrow group of leaders and experts but to
all party, soviet and economic organizations, as well as all work forces.
This means that improvement of management is an important component of all
party activities pertaining to management of the economy."
These party demands fully apply to all aspects of Soviet Army and Navy
activity. Therefore the innovative thinking of military experts is focused
on the question of how we can more effectively develop the theory of armed
forces control under present-day conditions. This is the subject of what
we consider to be an interesting book, entitled Fundamentals of Troop
Control,' which consists of a brief introduction and 12 chapters.
The first two chapters concisely and yet with a fair amount of detail
preccn.t the development of theory and practice of troop control before and
after the scientific and technological revolution.
Subsequent cha-~Lt~-: analyze a complex of questions pertaining to troop
control. Primary attention is devoted to the most vital problems. examina-
tion of radical changes in the technical control base, caused by the
developmc;;: c.` electronic computer and information systems; discovery of
the increasing importance of a comprehensive approach to solving control
prohit.n,s; the authors discuss in detail how, under the influence of ad-
vanced echnical devices and control methods, the transition is made to
flexible and dynamic organizational structures which ensure rapid troop
response to various changes in internal and external conditions?
The authors examine this entire complex of very important and complicated
matters in the historical relationship of change trends in, troop control,
based on methodology of Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge and with
extensive utilization of the achievements of various sciences, including
mathematics, psychology, and education science.
Chapter III, "System of Troop Control," describes i-i detail the structure
of control systems and various technical devices used in control; the
authors list the requirements imposed on control entities and command
posts; the term "control system" is defined, This term is still given
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various definitions in the literature. In our opinion the authors cor-
rectly define control system as "a complex dynamic aggregate of control
entities and command posts, interrelated in a specified sequence of sub-
ordination, together with their structure and equipment, the interrela-
tions and work methods of officials involved" (page 86).
Also correct is the idea that the structure of troop control systems
directly reflects the organizational structure of the troops proper: the
higher the position of a troop control system in troop organizational
structure, the greater the number of elements it encompasses and the more
complex the relationships in that system.
The authors quite rightly assign an important position'in this book to
an examination of demands on control entitles. It is noted that their
structure should be as simple as possible and at the same time should en-
sure precise, continuous, skilled troop contrcl in all situations. The
principle of one-man command forms the basis of the organizational
structure of control entities. The commander is the basic figure in con-
trol.. This principle, established in the protracted process of develoD:r~-nr.
of control entities, acquires particularly great importance under present-
day conditions, when combat operations develop at an exceptionally rapid
pace, are distinguished by extreme intensity and abrupt situation changes.
The reader will find in Chapter III useful information on various tech-
nical control means: communications, information acquisition, processing
of acquired data and the ;plr!..,.-mance of tactical computations, the
preparation and duplication of 4ocuments -- the state and level of
development of which substantially influence the control process. It seems
to us, however, that the value of this section would be considerably
greater if in examining the solution of complex control problems the
authors more extensively demonstrated utilization of automated control
systems, electronic computers, computer input devices and information
display devices, telecode communications equipment, the application of
various cybernetic theories and mathematical methods. It is quite wrong,
for example, to devote as much space to computer description as to the
description of a dictating machine or typewriter.
Chapter IV discusses the principles of organizing the operation of control
entities. The authors Jis;:uss in detail principles of troop control and
the work style of commanders and staffs, indicating the conditions for in-
creasing organization in the operations of control entities and the pos-
sibilities of utilizing network schedules in planning combat operations.
It is noted that the work procedu,:e of commanders and control entities in
performing various functions connected with control of subordinate troops
will depend in each specific instance on the nature of the assigned combat
mission, availability of time, level of cfficer training, degree of
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technical control facilities at headquarters; and other conditions. Defini-
tions of the general principles of troop control also seem correct. The
most important are the following: party-mindedness, scientific content,
foresight and prediction, one-man command, and centralization.
The principle of party-mindedness proceeds from the class character of
warfare and the decisive importance of the morale-political state of mili-
tary personnel for successful accomplishment of combat missions. An im-
portant role in observance of this principle is played by such executive
qualities as high ideals, conviction and dedication to the Communist
cause, political maturity and sensitivity, an implacable attitude toward
shortcomings, efficiency and discipline.
The principle of scientific character of troop control. under conditions
of the s, ';,;ti.fic and technological j.,-*olution occupies a core position.
In order to ensure effective actions by large or small teams armed with
complex and diversified combat equipment, essential first and i:oremost is
a scientific approach to troop control, which in the 'broadest sense means
utilization of the objective laws of various sciences by commanders and
staffs in their practical activities. It is quite obvious that profound
and comprehensive knowledge is required of commanders for implementation
of this principle.
The principle of foresight and prediction is inseparably linked to the
principle of scientific character, supplementing and enriching it. This
principle occupies a prominent place in the theory and practice of troop
control, since it is impossible to achieve victory over the enemy without
the ability to anticipate and predict.
One-man command is a most important princi_Ae both cf armed forces orga-
nizational development and of troop control durir!.g the conduct of combat
operations. The importance of one-man command has increased considerably
under present-day conditions. It must ensure of f ictent employment of new
weapons, flexible and reliable troop control, as well as firm personnel
caiiitary discipline.
The principle of centralization of control is inseparably linked to the
principle of one-man command. They cannot be equated, however. In
practical application of the principle of centralization it is essential
to take into consideration those changes which have taken place in the
military, On the one hand participation in mndern combat of a large
number of different arms and special troops with diversified combat equip-
ment demands centralized unification of their efforts and continuous co-
ordination by the higher commander of all actions directed toward accom-
pi-shing the common combat mission. On the other hand the more highly-
maneuverable character of the modern engagement, less time available to
prepare for battle, troop operations on separate axes, increased firepower,
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greater volume of control tasks and other factors dictate the necessity of
giving subordinate commanders greater independence and the opportunity to
display initiative (but intelligent initiative!) and innovativeness in
accomplishing missions.
The reader's attention is drawn by pages devoted to scientific organization
of labor in the area of cor.t'-ol. Of practical interest are statements made
by the authors on utilization of scientific organization of labor methods
in searching for and iiading the best variant of task distribution among
control entities and officials, in seeking the most efficient form of work
organization, in determining the minimum number and optimal structure of
command posts, in selecting effective methods of executing troop control
measures under various situation conditions, etc. The authors discuss
critical-path planning methods, which have in recent years been extensively
applied to practical troop control, methods which make it possible to
analyze different decision variants much more fully and deeply in comparison
with traditional methods, to reproduce flowcharts for sequence in execution
of missions by troops, and graphically to represent the organization of
combat operations. Critical-path methods are particularly indispensable
for analyzing structure of control entities and seeking ways to increase
their efficiency.
Key problems of troop control -- the commander's combat decision-making and
planning of combat operations -- are examined in Chapters V, VI, and VII
(pp 194-280).
Chapter V, "Collection and Pr:,cessing of Situation Data in Preparing for
and During Combat Operations," in our opinion essentially correctly
reflects the significance of prompt collection and synthesis of tactical
information in the business of troop control. The authors emphasize that
only on the basis of a thorough analysis of situation data and precise
calculations is a scientific approach possible in developing the battle
plan, in correct determination of troop combat missions, in organizing
coordination and all types of support and supply, as well as in controlling
subunits during battle. Without such an approach to the problem, as is
correctly noted in the study, voluntarism in decision-making and adven-
turism in actions are inevitable.
The authors group numerous situation data needed by the commander for
reaching a well-founded and most expedient decision on the basis of the
following elements (in conformity with established traditions): the ad-
versary, friendly troops, adjacent units, raciiat!'rn, chemical, bacterio-
logical situation, terrain, weather, season, time of day or night. Quite
logical is the suggestion on the expediency of including in this list
data on the economic state of the combat area and the social-class composi-
tion of the population. In our opinion the authors draw a correct
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conclusion on the necessity of taking into consideration the interrela-
tionships and interlinks of all situation elements and at the same time
the differing degrees of influence by each on a given decision.
It would evidently be useful to end this section with the demands imposed
on situation data. Evidently the authors, having decided to discuss the
matter in greater detail, have proceeded to examine the scope and content
of data pertaining to the situation elements. As a result they have un-
necessarily repeated themselves, for in analyzing the process of situation
assessment (Chapter VII) they were compelled to return to the matters
already discussed in Chapter V.
At the same time we should like to note that a number of statements con-
tained in the first section of Chapter V require more specific comment.
For example, it is stated on page 202 that "the lack of specific situation
data does not free the commander from the necessity of prompt decision-mak-
ing," This is a well-known demand contained in field service regulations.
Obviously it would be advisable to clarify 'iow the commander proceeds in
the given instance (he evidently resorts to utilization of data on the
adversary's tactics, the demands contained in his field service regulations,
analyzes the experience of past engagements and the history of the art of
warfare, utilizes the results of his prediction of the development of
events, etc).
Further presentation of material on the problem raised in the above-men-
tioned three chapters gives rise to sc!ii::? question, since the authors have
departed from the logical sequence of the proceso of decision-making and
planning of combat operations, historically established on the basis of
considerable ccmbat experience. For some reason they initially examine
the planning of combat operations (Chapter VI) and only later study prob-
?e^s connected with the commander's combat decision-making (Chapter VII).
This sequence in presentation of the material also seems strange because
at the very beginning of the book the authors quite correctly note: ",,,The
act of decision-making is the most important and critical in the overall
control process" (page 25), and "first and foremost the commander makes a
decision on the engagement, which comprises the basis of planning of troop
combat operations" (page 24). We should add that the commander's decision
comprises not only the basis of planning combat operations but also the
basis of all troop control. It is another matter altogether that these
two processes under present-day conditions are closely interwoven and
proceed in parallel, for the limited time available for battle preparation
as well as the higher commander's endeavor not to "consume" his subordinate
commanders' time requires that they be combined.
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Thus it would obviously be more expedient to examine initially matters
connected with the commander's battle decision and subsequently combat
operations planning.
This comment pertains not so much to the content as to the architectonics
of the book. As regards content, we should like to comment on Chapter VI,
particularly the first section, "Content of the Planning Process." The
authors begin it (page 220) with the sentence: "There exists a rather
widesnread opinion that initially the commander makes his decision and then
his staff proceeds with planning, which boils down essentially to putting,
the decision into document form" (Our underline -- I. Ch,). We do not
understand at all on what is based the authors' assertion of such a
simplified comprehension of the process of planning combat operations. We
cannot agree with such an assertion.
The content of the planning process is presented i?., a fairly understandable
manner, with great enphasis placed on the preparation of various computa-
tion data essential to the commander' for his decision-making. Suffice it
to say that in the example the computation of time required for the move-
ment of subunits frrm the line of departure to the final coordination line
f ails to take into account the depth of the subunits columns, which is
impermissible for such a serious study. We also hope that the authors,
when working on subsequent editions, will more rigorously coordinate their,
recommendations with the text. For example, on page 239 they present a
variant of distribution of responsibilities among officials. It follows
from this presentation that both the commander and chief of staff compute
time required to organize combat operations. Is it necessary for
two officers to do this under limited-time conditions? Obviously for this
reason more specific recommendations are contained on page 254.
We feel that the best-done chapter is Chapter VII, "The Commander's Battle
Decision." Thy- authors examine in detail the content of the decision and
the demands imposed on it. They succeed in convincingly demonstrating that
the commander can reach a correct decision only if he thoroughly under-
stands the fundamentals of the modern engagement and if he has thoroughly
studied weapons performance and methods of combat operations of Friendly
and enemy troops.
The commander's decision-making is a complex, creative process of in-
tellectual activity. Of decisive significance here is the commander's
ability to grasp in detail the current situation, to abstract from the un-
essential, to concentrate on the essential, to find the general and
determining in the individual and isolate it. An essential condition for
a correct approach to situation assessment is the necessity of examining
each situation element dynamically, that is to assess not only the actual
state of a given element at a given moment but also to predict its
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possible changes. We feel that the authors have done a good job of reveal-
ing this aspect of the commander's activities and have convincingly
demonstrated the sequence of his efforts at each stage of situation esti-
mate and decision-making as a whole. We feel that it would be extremely
useful here to utilize examples from the experience of our commanders in
.he Great Patriotic War, in order to stress the great diversity of c_ond.i-
tions under which a decision is made and, in addition (perhaps this is
the most important), to help the reader understand control of combat and
to obtain maximum benefit from the past for the solving of present-day
problems, The three examples the authors give are fine, but they are not
enough.
The authors devote considerable attention to planning measures involving
support of combat operations (Chapter VIII). With the adoption of new
weapons (particularly nuclear weapons), the influence of these measures on
successful accomplishment of assigned missions becomes incalrt.lably
greater. It is no longer sufficient to provide for the organization only
of such traditional f:.rms of support operations as reconnaissance,
security, camouflage, etc. Other types of support are also required,
proceeding from the altered chr..:acter of modern combat: protection of
troops against weapons of mass destruction, electronic countermeasures, and
weather services support. At the same time the limited time available for
organization of thA engagement dictates the necessity of planning all these
measures simultaneously (parallel) with combat decision-making and prepara-
tion of formal operation documents.
In the modern engagement, where combat operations are conducted at a rapid
pace, under conditions of swift and abrupt situation changes, the role of
reconnaissance-intelligence becomes more important. The authors correctly
note that principal indicators of the quality of reconnaissance planning,
in addition to promptness and reliability of information on the adversary
and the terrain, include data on the radiation, chemical and bacteriologi-
cal situation. Manifested in this is the dialectical unity of such types
of combat support activities as reconnaissance and protection of troops
against weapons of mass destruc'-:ion. The latter type, as the authors state,
comprises an entire system of measures, which in turn are inseparably
linked with engineer support and camouflage.
Of definite interest in our opinion is the section entitled "Electronic
Countermeasures," written on the basis of materials published i_i the
foreign press. The authors emphasize that success in this effort depends
on prompt acquisition of detailed data on the enemy's radio and radar
n equipment. One source of such information is long-range, fast and
reliable electronic intelligence effort. Here the reader will find many
useful recommendations on protection of friendly radio electronic facili-
ties.
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The authors devote proper attention to weather service support and quite
correctly emphasize the fact that for successful troop control, in addition
to knowledge of local terrain conditions, it is necessary to possess a
clear picture of temperature and humidity', wind velocity and direction at
various a..titudes, cloud cover, precipitation, atmospheric pressure, water
conditions of rivers, reservoirs, swamps, and the condition of snow (ice)
cover. Hence the most important tasks of a headquarters staff, in the
authors" opinion, are the following: collection of data on weather condi-
tions, orgarization of weather observation, prompt warning of troops abc.ut
dangerous weather conditions, etc.
In examining the problems of rear services support, the authors note that
the basic indicator of precise operations of rear services entities is
uninterrupted supply in all categories of materiel under all situation con-
ditions. At the same time we feel that the book does not fully present
the demands imposed on rear services support in connection with the
altered --athods of conducting military operations and the potential conse-
quences of enemy nuclear strikes, as well as the procedure and sequence of
fulfilling these demands.
Chapter IX is an irportant one. It examines matters pertaining to the
commander communicating his operation decision to the executing agents, as
well as organizing and maintaining coordinated effort.
The limited time available for preparing for combat operations, frequent
and abrupt situation changes, as well as the increased volume of informa-
tion required by executing entities demand that commanders and staffs of
all echelons employ various forms and methods of communicating decisions
to subordinates.
In particular the authors discuss in detail one of the basic forms of com-
municating a decision -- the operation order. It is emphasized that
retention of a certain sequence in presentation (verbal and written) at
the various control levels is of great methodological importance. This
disciplines an officer's thinking, guarantees against possible omissions,
and saves time. In discussing methods of communicating orders and in-
structions to the executers, the authors note that each method has its
advantages and drawbacks. In most cases time is the principal criterion in
selection.
At the same time the authors state that while in the last war the method
of personal contact between the commander and his subordinates in the
issuing of an operation order was in particularly widespread use, today it
will not always be possible or expedient, particularly during combat.
Therefore the most widespread method will be the communication of orders
to subordinates by technical communications channels. It is recommended
that the most important instructions be trap switted by the method of direct
verbal contact with subordinates.
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Examining problems of troop coordination, the authors proceed from a cor-
rect ccn,?lusion that it is acquiring the force of objective necessity and
a patters: of conduct of any combined-arms engagement. But the authors
also note that this pattern. i s not manifested by itself but operates only
through the subjective activity of commanders and staffs. Consequently
their task is intelligently to utilize this pattern and to master the at
of organization and maintenance of precise and continuous troop coordina-
tion.
Based on the generally-accepted interpretation of the essence of troop
coordination, the authors arrive at two theoretical conclusions which in
our opinion are of great practical significance: first of all, organization
and maintenance of coordination cannot be separate, detached acts in com-
mander and staff activities ccna.:~,:ted with troop control but must permeate
their entire. effort; secondly, the combined-aims commander and his staff
play a guiding and decisive role it the organization and maintenance of
coordinated acti..n.
Also meriting attention is the recommended me;.hod of approaching determina-
tion of the content of coordination instructions; particularly in the
attack without halting in an attack position. At the end of this chapter
the authors examine the features of organization of troop coordinated
action in the conduct of combat operations involving only the employment
of conventional weapons.
The process of troop control in combat also encompasses such areas of com-
mander, staff and political entity activity as maintenance of high troop
morale, monitoring of troop actions, study, synthesis and practical adop-
tion of advanced combat experience and know-how. Chapters X, XI, and XII
deal with these matters.
The authors devote particular attention to the question of maintaining
high troop morale in combat (Chapter X), correctly considering this area
of commander, staff and political entity activity as one of the most im-
portant functions of control, unique in content and methods of execution,
They note that its successful accomplishment is possible only on the basis
of thorough knowledge o. Marxist-Leninist doctrine on the morale factor
and innovative practical application of the points of this doctrine.
In the first section of this chapter the authors examine the sources of
troop morale and the means used to establish morale in the armies of the
imperialist nations and in the Soviet Army. For the most part the authors
correctly handle this task. But nevertheless one should note that the
genesis of the forming of the morale of people and army under conditions of
the socialist state are presented insufficiently consistently and complete-
ly,
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For example, the political and psychological elements on the basis of
which the morale of Soviet fighting men is formed in the course of moral-
political and psychological training (p,ge 337), for some reason are
isolated from the same elements which are inherent in Soviet society as a
whole. On page 338 the authcrs state: "The term morale also includes
elements pertaining to the social strata of society, the character and
level of culture of people and army, the national features of the people,
its customs and traditions, as well as elements expressing the moral state
of the people and army..." But it is a well-known fact that the social
strata of Soviet society comprise the worker class, the kolkhoz peasantry
and the toiling intelligentsia, from which our army and navy are made up.
There are no antagonistic conflicts among these strata, aid from a socio-
political standpoint they form a unified, monolithic Soviet society. The
moral strength of this society is cimprised of the socioideological and
sociopsychological elements formed by the Communist Party in the process
of communist indoctrination of the Soviet people.2 The content of these
e:ements should have been revealed in greater detail, since they form the
basis of moral-political and psychological training of Soviet fighting men
in light of the tasks performed by the Soviet Armed Forces. The unity of
Soviet people and army, a point which is subsequently discussed in a fair
amount of detail, is also formed on the basis of these elements.
Correctly noting that psychological training of military personnel is
effected in an organic unity witn moral-political training, with the
determining influence of the latter (pp 337-338) , the authors at the same
time claim that the moral-political qualities of military personnel are
formed during the course of political training, while psychological
qualities are formed in the course of combat training, when military per-
sonnel acquire professional knowledge and skills (page 340). A question
naturally arises: how is an organic unity of these two types of training
achieved? What ways, means and methods are employed to achieve this? Un-
fortunately the authors provide no answers to these questions.
In the second part of this chapter the authors examine methods of maintain-
ing a high level of morale by troops in combat. As the authors correctly
state, the most important thing in resolving this problem is instillment
in personnel of a communist ideological outlook, a correct understanding
of the nature and features of a potential future war, as well as knowledge
of weapons, the nature of modern combat and the methods of waging warfare.
While correctly treating this problem on the whole, the authors in our
opinion have failed t-o avoid certain extremes and a few inaccuracies.
This applies primarily to the description of the nature of a nuclear war
(page 310) and the effect of radioactive contamination on troops (page 345).
These elements are presented so dramatically that in the opinion of the
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authors nuclear bursts and radiation will irrevocably produce fear and a
sense of impending doom in all personnel (our underline -- I. Ch.). It
is certainly true that radioactive contamination is one of the most
powerful effect factors of nuclear weapons. But its effect on the per-
sonnel of the arms and services is far from uniform, if only because the
combat equipment with which they are armed possesses differing but on the
whole reliable protection against radiation. Consequently the morale-
psychological state of troops operating in areas of radioactive contamina-
tion will vary, and obviously this must be considered in accomplishing the
task of maintaining a high state of morale.
The authors correctly note that an abrupt transition from peace to war, for
a number of reasons, leads to changes in the morale and psychological state
of troops. But they inaccurately illustrate this point with a historical
example. They write that at the beginning of World War II the enemy's
mass employment of tanks and aircraft, splitting attacks and encirclement
maneuver produced in troops fear and a lack of confidence in their
capabilities (page 344). What troops are they talking about? We know that
World War II began with an attack by Nazi Germany on Poland, followed by
Denmark and Norway, Belgium and France. These countries and their armies
surrendered in connection with a number of circumstances, although units
of the Polish Army and worker detachments, for example, offered the Ger-
mans stubborn resistance. As regards Soviet troops, the above assessment
of their state during the init.'.al operations of the Great Patriotic dar is
questionable.
Everyone is well aware of the courage, tenacity, heroism and unshakable
faith in victory over the enemy displayed by our troops in the frontier
battles and in the defense of the hero cities. It was only the excep-
tionally unfavorable operational-strategic situation resulting from an
enemy sneak attack and the adversary's establishment of an overwhelming
numerical superiority on the selected axes of advance which compelled
our troops to withdraw, It is true that under these conditions there did
occur instances of "tank panic" and "aircraft panic," but these were rare,
?.solated occurrences which by no means characterized the behavior of our
army and navy on the first days of the last war. Historical examples
demand absolutely accurate, precise and clear presentation,
A substantial shortcoming of this chapter as a whole in our opinion is the
fact that the authors say nothing whatsoever about ways and methods of
carrying out troop moral-political and psychological training in peacetime.
Chapter
XI,
"Verification," is quite elaborate. The authors examine in
detail
the
tasks and methods of verification, its organization and execu-
tion,
But
the material would have been much more meaningful if the
authors
had
discussed an additional, very important function accompanying
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verification -- assistance to troops. Without prompt and effective
assistance, verification as a control function is transformed into a
bureaucratic procedure. Therefore the verification plan contained on
page 359 should obviously have included an additional column: "Measures
based on verification results and time of execution."
Of considerable interest, is C.iapter XII, "Study of Combat: Experience and
Its Communication to th': Troops." We must say that this area of commander,
staff and political entity activity is frequently totally ignored or dis-
cussed very sparingly in military histories and in theoretical works on
the art of warfare. One must give credit to the authors for having the
courage to discuss the importance and content of this rather complex and
important function performed by control entites.
The authors examine the tasks and organization of control entity efforts
in studying combat experience, the learning process proper, and the com-
munication of combat experience and know-how to the troops. All these
items are discussed fairly completely and'in a comprehensible manner, with
the exception of a few elements.
For example, in discussing the area of main effort by control entities in
the study of combat experience, the authors state what primarily should
be studied in the actions of the enemy (page 366). This is correct, but
at the same time they should hav, formulated the principal areas involved
in accomplishing an analogous task in respect our own troops, so that the
process of study of combat experience does not look one-sided.
The purpose of the war diary is imprecisely stated (page 372). The
authors note that it presents the results of a study of combat experience,
and at the same time they claim that this document contains basic material
for the study and utilization of the experience of completed engagements
(our underline -- I. Ch.). The latter statement is correct. In our view
the war diary should constitute a fundamental report document, reflecting
accurately and objectively the activities of the commander, staff and
troops (units, large units) during a specified period of time (usually for
a 24-hour period). It should possess equal legal status with operations
documents (operation orders, instructions, reports).
During the Great Patriotic. War unfortunately war diaries were maintained
unsystematically and in a slipshod manner in many units and large units.
This occurred because the legal status of the document had not been defined.
It is clearly high time to settle this matter officially.
In our opinion the authors correctly pose the question of the necessity of
further development and improvement of theory of troop control as a special
area of military knowledge. Study of control theory as an independent
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discipline at military educational institutions and scientific elaboration
of its various aspects through the joint efforts of specialists in the
area of the social, applied and military sciences would greatly promote
successful solution to practical control problems.
In conclusion we can state that in spite of the noted shortcomings, on
the whole the book is both useful and needed. It will play a definite
role in the further elaboration of one of the most vital and complex
areas of theory and practice of contemporary military art -?- troop control.
The reader will find in this book well-sui,stantiated advice and recommenda-
tions on many matters pertaining to organizing the work of commanders and
staffs in securing precise, clear-cut control of subordinate subunits and
units in combat.
1 D. A. Ivanov; V. P. Savel'yev; P. V. Shenanskiy: Osnovy upravleniya
voyska.ni (Fundamentals of Troop Control), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1971,
384 pages.
2. For more detail see Voyennaya Mysl', No 9, 1969, pp 14-23.
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