CASTRO'S ATTITUDE TOWARD RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE US

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100030003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2002
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 15, 1974
• Content Type: IR

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Igo. 1029/74
March 15, 1974
SUBJECT: Castro's Attitude Toward Rapprochement with
the US
This memorandum is based primarily
on a review of Fidel Castro's pub-
Zic speeches from May 19?0. Each
speech u~as examined specifically
for Castro 's s tatements concerning
the US. These statements were com-
pared for consistency and to deter-
mine the exis fence o f definitive
trends.
Summary
zn October 1962, Fidel Castro specified that
before relations could be normali2ed the US must:
lift the economic blockade, end "pirate" attacks,
cease subversive activities, stop reconnaissance
overflights, and vacate the Guantanamo naval base.
In recent years, he has referred consistently to only
two of these conditions: the blockade and Guantanamo.
At the same time he has added new stipulations, such
as his insistence that the US abandon its "gendarrne'?
role in Latin America and pay indemnification for
damages caused by the US embargo..
During the past nine years there has been a
perceptible evolution in Castro's public attitude
toward the possibility of improved relations with the
US. This change can be separated into three abserv-
25X1
able phases .
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--From early 1965 to August 1971, Castro
categorically rejected the possibility
of any deal with Washington. His
adamant stand was underscored by the
extensive use of derogatory rhetoric
denouncing the US and especially the
Nixon administration.
--In November 1971, Castro stated--for the
first time in years--that improved rela-
tions were possible, but only after the
Nixon administration was succeeded by a
"realistic government."
--Since December 1972, however, Castro has
stated that an arrangement is attainable
with the present administration, but
only if certain conditions are met.
25X1
Castro has not personally addressed this subject
since ..last May, but a formal statement .issued by the
Cuban Foreign Ministry on January 10, 1974, reiterated
his stance. Since the promulgation of the statement,
there have been signs of Cuban interest in a possible
change of US policy. Prior to the American Foreign
Ministers Meeting in Mexico, a Cuban diplomat in Mexico
City told a US Embassy official that Secretary Kissinger's
remarks at the conference would be examined carefully
by the Cuban Government. He strongly implied that Havana
would respond positively to a US initiative aimed at
easing the impasse, but repeated the standard Cuban
line that the US must take the initiative .
In addition, Cuban media have been rather restrained
in their treatment of the US in recent months. President
Nixon's State of the Union address was reported by
Havana dpmestic radio with relative moderation. Official
analysis of the President's press conference on February
25 was even milder. So far there has been no defini-
tive reaction by Havana to the Secretar 's meeting with
the Latin American Foreign Ministers,
The Cuban ambassador reportedly be-
l~eues that Secretary Kissinger achi~:ved his objectives
at the conference. The Cubans probably attribute the
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lack of any confrontation to the recent US agreements
with Panama and Peru. These agreements may have been
interpreted in Havana as signs of an increased US
willingness to accommodate the Latin Americans and may
have prompted the Cuban diplomat's questions concern-
ing a possible US policy change toward Cuba.
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May 19 70 - Augus t 19 71
Because of the failure to harvest 10 million tons
of sugar in 1970, that year was a turning point for
many of the policies of the Castro regime. Consequently,
the speech in which Castro announced that the goal
would not be met was selected as the starting point for
this review.
Castro's speech on May 19 , 1970 was ostensibly
made to denounce the kidnapping of several Cuban fish-
ermen by a Miami-based exile organization. Castro used
.the incident to incite public wrath against the US and
then announced that the harvest would not meet its goal.
He repeated his familiar litany of the many-sins per-
petrated by the "Yankee imperialists" against Cuba but
reserved his most vituperative language for President
Nixon:
'"...the fascist and treacherous mentality
of Mr. Nixon, who also brings back Mr. Adolf
Hitler....No matter how much Mr. Nixon
reminds us of Hitler...."
Castro .has compared President Nixon to Hitler on only
~ few occas-ions when he has been especially infuriated
.with the US. He is fully aware of the impact of such
language on US attitudes toward Cuba. In this speech
he did not-even raise the issue of improved ties with
the US .
After his admission of failure again on July 26,
19 70 , Castro sharply reduced the frequency of his
speeches and made no significant reference to the US
again until April 19, 1971--the tenth anniversary of
the defeat of the Bay of Pigs invasion. Befitting this
occasion, he made his adamant stand crystal clear:
"...the Yankees...h ave no right or basis
to dream about any type of normalization
of relations with Cuba and conciliation
with Cuba . "
Fidel then quoted from President Nixon's press inter-
view of April 16 regarding the requirements for a change
in U5 policy toward Cuba. After quoting the President?s
remark$ Castro gave a direct response:
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"Now they almost seem to pine for a
gesture from Cuba . But such a gesture ,
Mr. Nixon...will never be made....We can
afford to scorn relations with the imper-
ialist US government.?'
Fidel repeated his total rejection of any recon-
ciliation with the US in his annual speech on July 26
and again on August 27 when speaking to representatives
of the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the
International Union of Students:
"There is no way to explain clearly enough
that we do not want to be involved in this
reconciliation chit-chat....We have nothing
to negotiate with the imperialist govern-
ment of the US....We have no interest in
any rapprochement with the imperialist
government of the US."
In this speech, Castro added--for rhetorical
purposes at least--another dimension to his discussion
of the blockade. Instead of merely rejecting the
possibility of reimbursing US companies for property
seized during the early years of his government, he
contended that the US would have to pay Cuba for damages
caused by .the sanctions:
"We have nothing to negotiate with the
imperialist government of the US. Debts
to the imperialist government?....We will
never pay even a symbolic penny....It is
not we who owe them, it is they who owe
us--for the immense material and human
damage that they have caused us with their
blockades and economic aggressions...."
Castro's intention in raising this new twist may have
been to underline even further his adamant opposition
to a rapprochement. However, he has not alluded to
this demand again.
October 19 71 ?- October 19 72
On October 30, 1971, Premier Kosygin left Iiavana
after a brief visit to Cuba. It is not known whether
he raised the subject of US-Cuban relations with the
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Cuban leadership, but a definite change in the official
attitude became apparent less than a month later during
Castro's trip to Chile. In a news conference prior to
his departure from Chile, he discussed the subject at
length .
Reporter: "Did you not say that there is
a possibility of improving relations with
the US?"
Castro: "Yes....We said clearly that while
that country's government assumed the role
of policeman in the world and reserved the
right to intervene...in any Latin American
country, we had no interest in improving
relations with the government. I want to
clear this up. Because it is a very impor-
tant matter....We would wait until there
emerged in the U5...a realistic government
which understood that that country no longer
has the...conditions...ta continue its role
of world policeman....Then, with that gov-
ernment, we could have relations under
honorable condi tians . "
Castro, in a subsequent speech, stated that his
requirement for a "realistic government" disqualified
the Nixon administration. Nevertheless, for the first
time in years, he had stated that a rapprochement was
theoretically possible. He maintained this general
formula for several months, even in the speech on Decem-
ber 22, 1971 when he defended Cuba's seizure of two
U5-owned merchant ships that he said had been used in
"pirate raids" against Cuba.
The bomb attack on a Cuban commercial office in
Montreal brought a temporary suspension of this theme.
At the closing of the second Congress of the Young
Communists League, Castro angrily denounced the attack.
On May 1, however, prior to his departure for a
trig to Africa, Eastern Europe, and the USSR, Castro
again returned to the theme of a "realistic government."
Nevertheless, Castro became deeply embittered by
the US blockade of Haiphong and bombing of North Vietnam.
Frustrated by the subsequent inaction of the socialist
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bloc, Castro used his annual speech on July 26 to
deliver his most abusive attack upon President Nixon
to date:
'?This is why a fascist like Nixon can be
president of the US....We are sure that
some day it will become perfectly clear
how alike Nixon and Hitler are, and how
similar Nixon's crimes in Vietnam are to
the crimes committed by fascism in Europe...."
Although he did not revert to his previous stand that
rapprochement was impossible, he again rejected any
`?deal'? with the Nixon administration:
"Our position is very clearly the following:
We limit ourselves to unconditionally de-
manding that they withdraw from the Guan-
tanamo base, that the blockade end, and
that the subversive activities also end.
That is our position and it is not debat-
ab le ....Cuban and US relations cannot
improve as long as the United States as-
sumes the right to militarily intervene
in any Latin American country....US rela-
tions with Cuba will not take place when-
ever Nixon wants them....There will be no
political deals with the Cuban revolu-
tion....We simply say that Cuba's doors
have been completely closed to the poli -
ticking and trickery of Mr. Nixon.'?
.This speech contained Castro's last specific comparison
of President Nixon with Hitler. He raised the require-
ment for a "realistic" US government only once more--
in a spedch on October 13, 1972.
December 1972 - May 1973
Two months later--at a rally organized to honor
President Allende---Castro's general position again
changed. The requirement of a "realistic government"
was dropped, indicating that an improved relationship
with the Nixon administration had become possible.
Furthermore, there were significant changes in the con-
ditions-outlined by the Cuban leader. Instead of
listing several conditions to be met before relations
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could improve, he talked of a two-phased rapproche-
ment. The two stages were clearly separate and each
had specific conditions.
The first phase--the initiation of direct talks--
required a single precondition, the termination of the
economic blockade:
"On July 26, we clearly stated in the name
of our people what our opinion was and we
ratify it today..:as long as the economic
blockade of Cuba remains we will not enter
into discussian...the first thing they have
to do before speaking a single word with
us is to cancel unconditionally the eco-
nomic blockade."*
The remaining conditions were apparently subject to
negotiations .
The second phase--resumption of diplomatic ties--
presumably would be possible once the remaining issues
such as Guantanamo, overflights, exile raids, subversive
activities, and US actions in Latin America had been
resolved in the negotiations. In this speech, Castro
alluded only to US actions in Latin America as a subject
to be discussed in these negotiations. The fact that
he mentioned no other conditions generated speculation
in the US press that he had softened his position, but
he clarified his stance on May 1, 1973:
"When Comrade Allende visited us, we
explained that the Guantanamo issue was
not the main matter in our mind, but that
the common problems of Latin America were.
We said then that whenever we had to talk
with the US it would be about Cuban-Latin
American problems first of all, and that
*Castra's reference to his July 26 speech is not correct.
His conditions were far more numerous and he explicitly
rejected any arrangements with the Nixon administration.
.See the quote above from that speech.
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Cuban relations with the US could not
improve as long as the US insisted on
creating a gendarme power in Latin America
....What we wanted to say was that the
Guantanamo base was not basic. This does
not mean that we .have ceased to demand its
return.
"There cannot be an improvement in rela-
tions between Cuba and the United States
as long as the US continues to exercise
.sovereignty over Latin .America, while it
continues to police the rest of this con-
tinent. This is the main problem....We
say quite clearly that we will not discuss
anything with the US while the blockade
continues . If they want a dialog, they
must unconditionally end the blockade
first....Whenever we get down to talking
we will not be talking about the problems
of Cuba, but about the problems of Latin
America before any thing else. These are
the two positions of the Cuban revolution."
Fidel maintained this line for several months but
he has not specifically addressed the problem of US-
Cuban relations since May 1973. Nevertheless, a formal
statement issued by the Cuban Foreign Ministry on January
10, 1974 repeated his demand for termination of the
blockade before direct talks could begin:
"It is hardly necessary to repeat that
prior to the moment the US Government de-
cider to initiate some official exchange
concerning these problems, there would
have to be an unconditional lifting of the
blockade against Cuba. Cuba will not
accept discussions under any other conditions."
The statement also provided Havana's most detailed
explanation to date of the necessary steps for better
relations:
"Once the blockade is lifted, discussion
of the differences between Cuba and the
US would have to begin with the willingness
of the US representatives to admit that
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the United States does not have any righ t
to intervene directly in affairs related
to the sovereignty of Latin American nations.*
"Although the Guantanamo Naval Base lacks
strategic importance as far as Cuban na-
tional defense is concerned, the problem
of its removal would have to be the main
point of any bilateral dialog between the
twa nations.
"Cuba would not allow these discussions to
include any problem that would infringe the
right of our independent and sovereign
nation to conduct its foreign policy...in a
manner that best suits its national interest."
Three of the ora~~inal fi_vF demands--reconnaissance
overflights, exile raids, and subversive activities---are
not mentioned in the statement.. i'he fifth condition--
Guantanamo--is descried as the main issue of any dialog
but the wording suggests that an immediate return of the
base is not required.
Thus , during the past four _years , there has been a
gradual evolution toward greater. f:Lexibility in Castra's
attitude toward improving relations with the US. Never-
theless, he has given no signal that Cuba is ready to
make significant concessions, and the Cuban Government
continues to insist that the US ma7ce the first overt move
by terminating the blockade.
A combination of several factors has apparently
generated this change. Soviet pressure probably has
been the principal cause. In Moscow's eyes, a resolution
of the problem would enhance its policy of detente.
*The Cuban media have not yet reacted to Secretary
Y.issinger's statement in his press conference of
February 23 in Mexico City: "I stated in my opening
address two things that should be kept in mind. One,
the US will not interfere in the domestic affairs of
its sister republics, and secondly, what we say here
counts."
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Moreover, elimination of the blockade would probably
reduce somewhat the high cost of supporting the Cuban
economy. The Soviets evidently do not feel that a
rapprochement between Cuba and the US would reduce
Moscow's influence upon Cuban decision-making.
Castro may have been persuaded to reduce his
adamant opposition to rapprochement with the US by a
Soviet promise of full support--included in the joint
Soviet-Cuban communique issued following Brezhnev's
visi t to Cuba--for the ending of the blockade and the
removal of the Guantanamo Naval Base. In addition
Castro probably received strong assurances of contin-
ued economic and military assistance.
Although Castro has often used the blockade to
explain many of his own economic failures, he may now
believe that the benefits to be gained from its removal
outweigh the loss of a valuable propaganda issue.
For example, he could portray US termination of the
blockade as a major victory for the Cuban revolution.
It would also facilitate Havana's efforts to develop
trade ties with Western nations, particularly in Latin
America.
The Cuban leader probably is motivated also by a
need to make the- Guban position more acceptable to other
Latin American nations. By moving away from his inflexi-
ble and adamant position, Castro may hope to shift the
blame for the impasse to the US. The Havana media's
constant emphasis on Cuba's alleged role as the wronged
-party has evoked some sympathy in Latin America.
Furthermore, Castro's new line was probably influ-
enced by his growing confidence in the viability of his
government. The stability of his personal position is
demonstrated by his willingness to undertake four foreign
trips in a three-year period. There are some signs that
the Cuban economy is at last making gradual progress.
Castro is especially satisfied with Cuba's successful
expansion of ties with other countries in the hemisphere.
Seven Latin American and Caribbean nations now have
full diplomatic relations with Havana, and several
others are expanding ties on a lower level. Most of
a11, Castro takes great pleasure in pointing to the
.increasing failure of the US-supported isolation policy.
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Finally, the Cuban leader may view the recent US
agreements with Panama and Peru as indications of a
US willingness to accommodate the demands of the Latin
American nations. In his eyes, such a trend could
seriously undercut his oft-stated assertion that only
a unified Latin America--preferably led by Cuba--could
force meaningful concessions from the. US. He may feel
that he has lost the initiative at the very time that
the US has become responsive to Latin American interests.
On the other hand, Castro sees a close parallel in
the legal foundations of the Canal Zone and the Guantanamo
Naval Base and he probably is impressed with the extent
of the progress already made in the canal talks. He
is also aware that the US-Peruvian settlement on.nation-
alized properties resolved problems that are comparable
to some of those involved in the Cuban-US impasse. The
claims against Cuba for the nationalization of US proper-
ties in 1959-1960 are still outstanding. Castro therefore
may believe that now is the most opportune time for Cub a
to extract concessions from Washington.
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