INSPECTOR GENERAL'S REPORT ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
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CIA-RDP85G00105R000100130030-7
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T
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7
Document Creation Date:
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 30, 1998
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TS No. 196650
MEMOPJ NDUM FOR : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT . Inspector General's Report on Foreign
Intelligence Collection Rc(i- ir(,rr)cnts
REFERENCE DDCI Memorandum, above Subject.,
dated 18 January 1967
1. In response to your request the subject report has
been reviewed in detail by me and by all offices of this Directorate.
The following comments respond to those conclusions and recom-
mendations pertaining to the scientific and technological areas of
interest.
2. This Directorate fully appreciates the depth of the
problem involved and the need for a concerted effort toward solu-
tion. In part, our views coincide with those in the report. In
certain areas, however, this Directorate feels that the corrective
procedures recommended will not result in the practical achieve-
ment desired. We trust that our suggested modifications in the
recommendations will prove to be constructive and complement
the spirit of the report.
Chapter 2 - The Problem of Priorities
Recommendation #1
Concur.
Recommendation #2
Concur.
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TS No. 196650
Chapter 3 - Rccuiremerts for Collection b Human Sources
Recommendation 1113
While we agree with the need to revamp the CPC process,
We arc, nevcrtnelcss, concerned with the tone of rccon 111cndatlOn
3c. This reads, in part, as 'follows: "... all other normal oper-
ations of the Clandestine Services' requirements system, except
the development of requirements tailored to known reporting
sources, until this is accomplished. " We believe that the type
of review suggested here would be time-consuming, and we are
herefore concerned about any approach which keeps an already
bad situation static. It would seem that to accept a situation,
even for a brief period, wherein requirements are tailored to
known reporting sources is a step backward. We believe that
improvement of the Clandestine Services collection effort requires
concentration on requirements not being covered by existing
reporting sources. Further, we feel that such a shift of emphasis
is of immediate concern.
With regard to manpower requirements for the IPC
Secretariat, we believe that a careful examination of the appli-
cation of automatic data processing to this problem area should
be included with the study of such manpower needs.
Recommendation #4
Concur.
Recommendation ~r`5
While agreeing fully with the necessity for controlling
requirements levied on any collection resource, it appears that
this recommendation tends to treat the Clandestine Services too
reverently. We believe the basic language of DCID 5/5 can be
challenged. Why should the Plans Directorate collect certain
information only when no other collection method could be used?
I,'lith the tremendous cost and the processing problems associated
with photographic collection and other technical means it appears
that there are times when clandestine collection should be tried
simply because it is easier, cheaper, and possibly quicker and
more accurate.
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TS No. 196650
In short, we would oppose a scheme which gives any
collector the right to reject unilaterally requirements on his
collection system.
Recommendation 76
Concur. DD/S&T would be happy to participate in a
review of Form 986.
Our concern about this recommendation is similar to that
expressed with reference to recommendation '-5, above. The
thrust, here seems to put emphasis again on collecting that which
we already know how to collect rather than collecting what we
really need.
The practice of having analysts make queries prior to
placement of a requirement is basically a good idea; however,
it has been the experience of DD/S&T analysts that the Clandestine
Services' policies and practices tend to deny dissemination of
_ eaningful information concerning their current assets or col-
lection capability. This is not an attempt to debate the need for
sight security and need-to-know. . Nevertheless, we doubt t he
practicality of this recommendation unless there is a significant
change in the amount of information the collectors are willing to
provide.
Again, we express the concern that this concept would
result in the further entrenchment of existing programs and a
general lessening of attention to the establishment of new efforts
to meet critical needs.
Chanter 4 - Collection Guidance
Recommendation ?r8
Non-concur. This Directorate cannot support imple-
mentation of this recommendation, and we find little in the
substance of the report that truly supports the need for any
change in the existing relationship with CGS. Although we do
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TS No, 196650
Gt under Stand how CGS exercises "S pervasion"over collection
uida::CC W: thy.. the Intelligence Directorate, we arc not anxious
iJ
tG have a stall' element of another Directorate exert sun')ervision
over DD S :; l areas of interest and responsibility. ills recom-
acnd .t1J:. ap,)cars to be inconsistent With the impie nc 1. n Gi
--- ter rccomll"eneations strengthening command t'C'S17C)i1 il)ii7tj at
all revels in the requirements process, and tends to substitute
stall supervision for command responsibility.
We Continue to feel that there is a need for even closer
contact between analysts and collectors, and are concerned over
any co..ce~t that gives a staff element authority to broker require-
me nts between thcn"i.
Reccenrnend.ation 1#9
No comment.
Recommendation ##10, "11, #12
It is difficult for this Directorate to understand the ration-
ale of ti:e iG Report with regard to GIRL. Whereas the report
identifies GIRL as "the most useful single method of collection
guidance produced in the community" it would appear to be, on
t,e contrary, one of the principal contributing factors in the
"information explosion. " While GIRL might be quite useful in
the political field, we believe that it has been singularly unpro-
ductive in stimulating the collection of information in the scientific
and technological fields of interest to this Directorate.
Non-concur. Without much more careful study, we are
not anxious to support a major effort toward the preparation of
collection guidance documents. OSI has had long experience in
this area and is particularly aware of the amount of analysts'
time -required to do this job well. We believe the likely payoff
from a major effort in this area is questionable, except perhaps
in a very few carefully selected situations.
Here again a much closer coupling between the analyst
and the field collector seems to be the answer, and very often.
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. ~ t
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the d rec; involvement of the analyst in exploitation of the
source :.as 'Dec. the most productive approach.
25X1A
cac:: separate collection mechanism. Our concern, again, is
the :on-productive use of the analysts' time if we are to embark
Non-concur. it seems doubtful that this Agency can
fiord ;,e luxury of a separate collection guidance program for
on a major cilort geared specifically to the 25X1A
Recommendation 5
It would appear to be more desirable for the C ief, F.I
to make 1.1.is type of information available directly to the
offices concerned with intelligence production. We would not,
of cour:;c, object to having this information go to the CGS but
do not believe that CGS should attempt to serve as the only focal
point for interaction with the FI Staff.
Chap er 5 - Some Problems of Requirements
Recommendation ir`l6
This recommendation raises the cuestion of division of
responsibility between the CGS and the SPINT Staff. It would
appear th at one group brokering the SIGINT account should be
adecuate. This !Directorate has no strong feeling as to whether
the CGS or the SPINT Staff should be.so charged.
No comment.
Recommendation #18, #19
No comment.
i t.JD G E.ii~t L.. V
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~~cco: rnc.nciation 20
--CC t e subject of COMOR and SIG.I~T'I' Cornmitt.ce
responsii~ib.il:y is curren'.ly under review,
we recoir,iur.,ui that
action on this rccon-uncndaiion ire dclerred.
Recommendation ;r21, i;22
W0 believe that the spirit of these two recommendations
is a rcac y JCiilg complied with through regular lnlormation
exc.ranges between ELINT collectors and OS.:/r;V:SAC analysts.
~,Te have, however, no objection to this being done in a more
ormal way.
Chanter 6 - Recommendations for Overhead Imagery
Concur, and suggest that the recently constituted
DDI/DLSi T Pre-COMOR would be in an excellent position
to immme:r.ert this recommendation.
:antur o C - Res -Donsibilities of Management
Concur, except that one statement in paragraph 2a. of
the discussion causes us considerable concern. This relates
to the s ipulation that the division chief certify that the informa-
~ion needed to fill a gap in national intelligence is not already
available. " If interpreted literally, satisfaction of this require-
:nert in many instances may never be possible or may take many
ma : weeks of effort for almost any given question. In short, it
would be necessary to interpret not already available" with
considerable latitude.
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t1?
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tt'.nC.~Ill
15 d ffiCU.i; to i.nd Spcc1Lc fault with this
We would again like to note, however, that
on to the requirements -problem, must rest with the
of the Agency and not with any one stall
r- ct.ng Dc,:~utyf l it ec o
:or
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Sclonco and
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