SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

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Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP85-00821R000100140024-5
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
C
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 30, 2002
Sequence Number: 
24
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 10, 1978
Content Type: 
MF
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PDF icon CIA-RDP85-00821R000100140024-5.pdf376.94 KB
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3.5c21 Approved For Release 214.ffilAt00821R000100140024-5 1 0 MAR 1978 es RESISTRY MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligencrilif004 VIA: Deputy Director for Administration PROM: Robert W. Gambino Director of Security SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (U) 1. (U) Action: None; for your information. 2. (C) Background: The New York Magazine has run ? series of articles by?ffdward J7175tein entftled, "War of the Moles." The 13 March 1978 edition indicates that Epstein obtained information for his article from an SSCI source. I have also been informally advised that a document containing classified information concerning oil production has *notedly been leaked by the same Committee. This Office has taken no action with reference to these leaks but is prepared to do so should you desire that we play an active or advisory role in any investigation con- cerning these leaks. Distribution: Orig. - DCI 1 - DDCI 1 DDA 1 - ER 1 - DD/POI DD/PSI 0)- OS Registry 1 - Chrono GAMBINO:bt:rjw (9 Mar 78) Revised:Gambino:rjw (10 Mar 78) Robert W. Ganbino PAM nENTIA1 Approved For Release 2002Milf:lbatMDPkib0821R00010 or ReleaF ;092/05/1711 RDp85-0Q821R0,0010014002 -5 11A 15'0 4 t..:?,.,;;?-; 4 .4 41.; c;,,; ; ? s 41 "?ti' In the two weeks since "New rk hco pu Zhirg (iv! two-niirt War o the (by. )wa,rd Jay t::pstein, Intelligeneer has plZYS:i4r..i'.i:6/1 of new inft-A-,norion Nvhiell throws into feven sharper focus the Spirited war between the intellifiene,t.agemies the Soviet LInioa nod the United States. 0aptzre at..41pat X in.77 ,.1/1? Though it is still a closely' guarded secret in Washing- :on, the CIA is now reeling from the capture within the last few months of its most important agent in the Soviet Union. The documents passed by this "mole" to .the CIA were regarded as the most valuable intelligence on So- viet plans since the material furnished by Colonel Oleg Penkovisky before his ex- posure in 196.2. According tO a Senate source with access to intelli- gence oversight, the CIA has been hoping that the capture of this valued "mole" (re- ferred to hereafter as Agent X) would remain secret. But within the CIA. this disaster poses once more the enigma that has haunted it for twenty years: ?How has the N013 been ? able to ferret out every important ?western -mole" since 1959? To Cgch .A..1:ioie _ As a former deputy diree- :cc of? the CIA's Soviet .Rus- sia section has pointed out, "It takes a mole to catch a mole." By this he meant that the Soviets could only have caught Agent X and his pre- decessors by having their own man (or men) planted in U.S. intaigence. Is this conceivable? Many U.S. intelligence ?Gnats_ put 1 the ci,01-1 the other way 1 ii:?Otinc,I. 'T hc Soviets have 1 demansarably infiltrated ev- ery ether western intelligence Iservis-e. Their?triumphs have , irclod.xt emplacement of I s-i.1) meles as kim Philhy I in Great Britt:in. Heinz Fellie III WeSt GM113r1 counterin- tAigenee.ar 3 he Topaz ring in Frinch intelligence. To many tn2 CIA officials, it bceni6 inconceivable that the Soviets have not made every el-fort ta infiltrate li.S. spy af.:eneics, svhich th-v consider - flow did tho 1< c;.; (X,t ndoL, in Afos-rolc:r. the main ?enemy. Tin; recent. To this day, the suspicion capture of Agent X seems to in (.1-ieCiA. persists that be jtistOr1.:" Inelle link in a pensan tnr p?.n-scins) in the lung ichain of evidence that FBI's Nessr York office be- Ie Soviets have been success- toyed Popov on ? receipt of fal in such efforts. hiis 1Md rgt liaray In 1959. the CIA .?was stunned by? the capture of its only mole in the Soviet Union?Colonel hter S. Popov. .In the .postimotcm on this disaster, the CIA is nown to have focused some suspicion on the FBI's Nevv York office. One of Popov's lint mes- sages concerned the arrival by plane in Nev,- Yor'n of n Temple Soviet az_tent, Tin: CIA turned this inforniatinn over to the FBI. whose rerogo- tive of maintainimrt sceorilv bordets hal ?vavs been -iinnonsIn hV I. Edjisr I hover. But !.:cori after l'onov's new!, hlhetin routed the ? FBI, Popo,. was caught in Russia. ?'A'r.om- Fin . Into. this atmosphere of suspicion enme the crucial iigure of ,\nritoli tvt. Gn,Itisn'n (Dcaiiits of Crtis ease were ontlined hy Edward Tay Ep- stein in nn.nii 'Cork. February 2;.) In ? brief. ? this high- level from l'slos,ann ,natesi that tiler': were SOViet in place, not 011'1itthe Fill hid also in th,: CIA. Cnintsin tittded Olin the ninle within the CIA lean .eeact:':ie.I i l957 by one of the hiOntst-rankii-n; tivei,.inaW ell. nit() paid a puts,,r:i! visit to the United States using a frill,: dipl\M1:11- 'IC [or cover_ (COVt?I) KO\ 111;1\ .0 high posit-inn, it was as though fames Angie. ton had been sent on a per-. sonal visit to the Sus let Union.) Golitsin's good faith buttressed by his disclosure that the Soviets had a minor mole in the CfA, codesnomed Sasha: Sasha was subsequent- ly identified as a contract employee working out of Germany. So-ca after, he was photographed in contact with the atvicts nr.ni then rapidly retired out of the service. 81.111.1ua'sLt.t 5113plaktn3 At the same time, the FBI received iridisptitable evi- dence that it kid been pene- trated. Three sap-secret doc- uments had vanished from its 'Washing:en ofline. :lopes that they had lucre I' been mislaid were shattered when a soviet tlip!ontar, offered ZO c it heel; the-n? s.w.x Ineti!5 to a. Inniter.,1 Stases nava; attact-H: for S1a,ito0. I This cOsode cntivineed 1 iinni C.. Strtlivn.in depots, di 1 ree,or t-if the, Flit. thin Soviet moles were in place itt the 1 I ntl. For tiftec.n. ,,,:n.i7s, Siiiiivar, I, came to belie cc. the ?Soviets li had been Feresing tiiiisiof-n-,. I mation? to the Fit i c.,...', ?-,:?t: g, id Agent ''Eed 0 Si,' a porn 51 trus:ed by il?or?vcr as an assnt of extraordio-ar,?" stive. Nnt r-it-ily did Sullivan eonsicier that Fedora, -',vor-king in the Soviet I.J.N. delnizal.inn in New Yorlt., was a rlontt he also inferred th?-it 1,:ct:inro nr.ist Ty,..:. ree...iN,in.;:: 5::..,.,-,-t(i-t from awitber S.,', i,.:1: aW.1",-; aC? itnll.' C?mploy,C2A1 F-V the. I RI in New ?I'orin Stilli,,,n n'as openly reno-,.vi!?,n these. cc ,-,- elosiens to i!'),-,5-ninn't ni-t?.nen...,i Insinnic Iiis ,nin.,-,ilt in n. h,,,intIng iteeidnut iri thc: tall of . 'I-177. (At one pnint Sullivan 1-i,e, lieved hr.' h'..k .'., i&r!...:-Icii tl,e Soviet operative inside the. 1-111, but the investCon sinas int ininnted an rni.Iers front Washinin:m. 1 12 ,..1ApCriNaproved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP85-00821R000100140024-5 UDNIgURJEU Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP85-00821R000100140024-5 _ mogongtstimtiazirA xtrwriTtitpment4otriS-PgAlifXreS.l4MLIWsVi.Wt213,:garAtit,4-4.,_ Tigt, 7Alp ratt1"n In 1IK32 came another dis- aster: the capture of Colonel Oleg Penkovsky. The official account pat out by the So- viets was that Penkovsky had been dentitted .thro.;:li rou- tine surveillance. Such a ver- sion would evidently provide a protective a:TIN-it:11a for a betrayer of Penkovsky. work- ing for the Russians within the CIA (or.any other intelli- gence service). Indeed, CIA counterinielligenee still had some doubts on the case. Its reasoning displays the Byzantine workings of coonterinrellii,?ence. On his re- lease ?kurn- the Soviet Union in 1962, the British .agent Grit:stifle Wynne -reported that the KGB in the course of interrogation had quizzed him about someone named "Zen." Since ZCp was a giri in London with whom Pen- kovsky had been briefly ?in- yoked in t1ttt,.i; CIA, sur- mised that" the il.ussimis had PerikovAy under closc tar- veillitucc well before the time he had officially come under suspicion. This once again suggested the otistence of a Soviet mote somewhcre in the CIA. 'CttViar VIV:ctin tiva CIA it is hard to overestimate the fears. suspicions, and paranoia generated within the U.S. intelligence agencies -by the hunt for the Soviet moles. At the height of the debate over the credentials a Yuri Noscrtko (who defected in 19(1:1-, claiming that Oswald. had had no contacts-with the -KGB). no esr a person than the head of the Soviet, Russia Division within the CIA was? accused by ?lie of his own men of Iteing,a tioviet ati.ent. It k-es only after -a ;.til in- vestigation by the- 1.'13I that the head Iklatnai suspicion between the CIA and FBI of cath othev's rvit.,1s and stanstes hcLarne 50 intense that in 1971 Hoover broke oil re13- rions with the agency. The war within the CIA ir:;?_711 came to a iniriti with Director William Colby's summary urine, ofAnOcten and forced reste,nation of ?his- three top aides at the cnd of 1974. In the wake of the Colby massacre. the notion of a So- viet mole within the CIA was dismissed as ?sickthink.- Bat the capture of Agent -X has once again brought the issue to the fore_ Now that it is kriiwn that Nosenko, actual- ly indicted by the CIA's So- Let Russia Disision as a So- viet spy, has been reltabili- tarlal and is handling 120 ca,:cs for both the, CIA and the PnI. the 5-rnro,E? cluesrion h ;35 10 asked: Did he have any access to the Agent X 1 I:eiote the bnCt-.1- c6p- tore? Admiral l?;tirisfieid 'furrier, dit'ector of the CIA confided last rn:intli in a secret session or the Senate Ititchigenee Over7.1i,ht Committee that he consiclerut the disclosures made by Fr.i.ittl, .:;riepp,. the anchor of the CIA exposii Decent Interval, or-IL. Of the most serious problems fac- ing the agency_ Turner now might ask himself if the prosecution of Snepp for his innocuous revelations is really t:1: pressing .a problem as detection of the presumed betrayer of Agent X. Over at the FBI, its new head, kicige William WcAlster; might also inquire why the burcau, which has Ce-n1 to many years harrying pre- sumed Communist subver- tives in other organizations, has yet to ferret out the cause of so much suspicion within its own New York office. Kzor ' ? ? .144,..m.?????14.,B......510%.,011,M,...., 7?')' ''t7kA ? Aili''S.:16)"1:1 The t;,:):::.c on 69th Street: .Docs .-!ussian cf,?,ent go r/t7iough ificse tIOerS crery day to tuor,(? for the FBI? Sn-spii;io!t Hue! an FB)-cepa, working for the Soviets, may have been ILT the caP:wc 01 01,7 moic 2 KGB. 1/n- -Agent X.' case has a precedent in the .apprehen:5:-en ci Col:,;-.1 Oicg Peakov.,:ky.Tbs 0:?? el g his ar7-est indicated the .presence of a Soviet truth, within CI I. Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP85-00821R000100140024-5 1.1A51CH 13, tatarrulw y?L-iax, 13